



Cornell University  
ILR School

**ILRReview**

---

Volume 60 | Number 1

Article 6

---

10-1-2006

# Real Wage Cyclicity of Job Stayers, within-Company Job Movers, and Between-Company Job Movers

Paul J. Devereux  
*UCD Dublin*

Robert A. Hart  
*University of Stirling*

Follow this and additional works at: <http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview>

---

---

# Real Wage Cyclicity of Job Stayers, within-Company Job Movers, and Between-Company Job Movers

## **Abstract**

Using the British New Earnings Survey Panel Data for 1975–2001, the authors estimate the wage cyclicity (the degree to which wage levels rise and fall with economic upturns and downturns) of three groups: job stayers, within-company job movers, and between-company job movers. Wages of internal movers, they find, were slightly more procyclical, and wages of external movers considerably more procyclical, than those of stayers. The greater cyclicity of movers' wages is particularly apparent for private sector workers and persons not covered by collective agreements. Nevertheless, because job stayers comprised about 90% of all observations in this large sample of British workers, the procyclicity of their wages was the predominant determinant of the overall procyclical pattern found across all groups. Thus, the analysis does not support the implication of some rigid wage models that employers use job title changes to adjust wages to the business cycle.

## **Keywords**

Real Wage Cyclicity, Job Stayers, within-Company Job Movers, Between-Company Job Movers

# REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF JOB STAYERS, WITHIN-COMPANY JOB MOVERS, AND BETWEEN-COMPANY JOB MOVERS

PAUL J. DEVEREUX and ROBERT A. HART\*

---

Using the British New Earnings Survey Panel Data for 1975–2001, the authors estimate the wage cyclicality (the degree to which wage levels rise and fall with economic upturns and downturns) of three groups: job stayers, within-company job movers, and between-company job movers. Wages of internal movers, they find, were slightly more procyclical, and wages of external movers considerably more procyclical, than those of stayers. The greater cyclicality of movers' wages is particularly apparent for private sector workers and persons not covered by collective agreements. Nevertheless, because job stayers comprised about 90% of all observations in this large sample of British workers, the procyclicality of their wages was the predominant determinant of the overall procyclical pattern found across all groups. Thus, the analysis does not support the implication of some rigid wage models that employers use job title changes to adjust wages to the business cycle.

---

**I**ncreased flexibility is a prime objective of government labor market policy in many economies. Against a recent background of relatively sluggish economic performance, it has been especially emphasized by policy-makers of member countries within the European Union. Central to the goal of flexibility has been the attainment of overall wage cyclicality, since the closeness of the tie between wages and market conditions determines the extent to which adverse shocks eventuate in wage adjustments rather than job losses. Total wage adjustment derives from three primary sources: the wage changes of workers (a) within single jobs,

(b) moving between jobs within the same company, and (c) moving between different companies.

Evidence from panel microdata shows that real wage changes of between-company movers are more procyclical than wages of within-company stayers (Bils 1985; Shin 1994). Also, real wages of all job movers—that is, within- and between-company job movers combined—have been found to be more procyclical than wages of job stayers (Hart 2006). However, these studies fall short of providing detailed evidence concerning the process of internal real wage cyclicality. Is within-company wage cyclicality mainly the result of internal promotions and demotions, with wage stickiness prevailing within

---

\*Paul Devereux is a Professor in the School of Economics at University College Dublin and at the Geary Institute, and Robert Hart is Professor of Economics at the University of Stirling. Both authors are also IZA Research Fellows.

The authors acknowledge the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for granting access to the NESPD

---

and thank Elizabeth Roberts for excellent research assistance. Part of the estimation of this project was funded under ESRC Grant RES-000-22-0860.

Subject to the agreement of ONS, the authors are happy to make their data available. Contact the first author at r.a.hart@stir.ac.uk.

individual jobs? Or does product and labor market competition require that within-job wages also respond to prevailing market conditions?

We investigate the relative importance of wage adjustments of job stayers, internal movers, and external movers within the British economy. Britain is generally regarded as enjoying the most flexible labor market among the main European economies. We make use of a rich panel data set, the New Earnings Survey Panel Data (NESPD). It contains a random 1% sample of British workers in employment. The data provide highly accurate individual wage and hours statistics taken from employers' company payroll records. Our period of analysis is 1975 to 2001.

This paper adds to the wage cyclicality literature in several ways. First, the previous literature that distinguishes between internal and external moves is largely based on case studies, and the generalizability of their results is in some doubt. By using a nationally representative sample of workers, we get results that apply to more than just individual companies. Second, our use of modern data from Britain complements a predominantly U.S.-based literature. Third, because we observe employer changers in addition to job changers, we can decompose overall levels of wage cyclicality into within-job, within-employer across-job, and across-employer components, something that previous studies have not done.

### Wage Cyclicality of Stayers and Movers

There is little previous literature on wage cyclicality that distinguishes between internal and external mobility. Using data from the Ford and Byers companies from the 1920s and 1930s, Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997) found that the bulk of wage cyclicality in these two companies was a result of workers changing job titles rather than changing wages within a job title. In contrast, Wilson (1997), using recent data from two U.S. companies, found no evidence that the wages of position changers were more cyclical than the wages of position stayers. She found mixed evidence for the hypothesis that the rate of position

changing is procyclical.<sup>1</sup> As pointed out by Solon et al., the within-job/between-job dichotomy within companies is a potentially important dimension for research into wage cyclicality and one that would benefit from more up-to-date and comprehensive data.

Why might wage cyclicality differ between job stayers, job movers, and employer movers? In a competitive spot market for labor in which human capital is general and wages of all workers are fully flexible and adjust in line with marginal revenue product, there are no clear reasons to expect differences in the wage cyclicality of these groups.

However, wages may be governed by implicit contracts rather than a spot market. Malcomson (1999) summarized this literature and described how both risk-sharing and human capital investment motives may lead to wages being less flexible than a spot market. In risk-sharing models, risk-averse workers may be insured by employers against fluctuations in their wage income.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, implicit contracts may be used to reduce transaction costs or avoid holdup problems when specific or general human

<sup>1</sup>Devereux (2000) carried out an exercise similar to Wilson's using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This exercise was limited by a short sample period (1981–92) and the noisiness of information on internal job mobility in the PSID.

<sup>2</sup>Malcomson discussed three types of insurance contract, all of which serve to a greater or lesser extent to constrain wage responsiveness to current market conditions. The parties to a fully binding contract agree that, over the contractual spell of employment, the real wage will be set to reflect the market conditions that prevailed when the contract was initially drawn up. Alternatively, if the contract is non-binding on the worker, the real wage remains constant unless the firm believes that prevailing market conditions may induce a job quit. If the contract is non-binding on the company, the real wage will remain constant unless the firm believes that market conditions are such that it will be cost-effective to lay off the worker. Empirical work in North America has found that contracts that are non-binding on the worker have especially strong influence on wage behavior (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991; McDonald and Worswick 1999; Grant 2003). Recent empirical work on the importance of implicit contracts in Britain (Devereux and Hart 2005) has shown that the spot market plays the dominant role in real wage determination but also finds evidence consistent with wage contracts that are non-binding on the worker.

capital acquisition is important (Malcomson 1999; Hashimoto 1979; Aoki 1984). Since implicit contracts imply some detachment of the wages of job stayers from current labor market conditions, the wages of company changers may be more procyclical than those of company stayers.

Less attention has been paid to why the wages of job stayers might be less procyclical than the wages of job movers *who remain in the same company*.<sup>3</sup> If human capital is job-specific, then rent sharing, and its associated effect of blunting wage responsiveness to market conditions (Hashimoto 1979), may also be primarily job-specific. Within-company job moves would then involve losses of specific capital, and wage changes associated with internal job changes might more directly reflect marginal revenue product and, hence, current business cycle conditions. This would predict more procyclical wages for job changers (even within companies) than for job stayers.<sup>4</sup>

An alternative model developed by Reynolds (1951), Reder (1955), and Hall (1974) assumes that wage levels within job titles are unresponsive to the demand conditions faced by firms. Therefore, employers respond to the business cycle by transferring workers between job titles so as to adjust labor costs appropriately. For example, in expansions firms lower promotion and hiring standards and hence lower the average quality of workers in each job title. Consequently, real wages per quality unit of labor rise even if real wages within job titles are rigid. Similarly, in a recession, firms increase promotion and hiring standards and thus reduce the

wage per unit quality. The model predicts that a substantial proportion of overall wage cyclical results from workers changing job titles rather than from wage changes within job titles. This arises either because the rate of job title changing is procyclical or because the wage changes of internal movers are more procyclical than the wage changes of job stayers.

### Data

The New Earnings Survey Panel Data set (NESPD) is comprised of a random sample of all individuals whose National Insurance numbers end in a given pair of digits. Each year a questionnaire is directed to employers, who complete it on the basis of payroll records for relevant employees. The questions relate to a specific week in April. Since the same individuals are in the sample each year, the NESPD is a panel data set that runs from 1975 to the present. Because National Insurance numbers are issued to all individuals who reach the minimum school leaving age, the sampling frame of the survey is a random sample of the population. Employers are legally required to complete the survey questionnaire, so the response rate is very high. Also, individuals can be tracked from region to region and employer to employer through time using their National Insurance numbers.

The questions in the NESPD refer primarily to earnings and hours of work. Since the data are taken directly from the employer's payroll records, the earnings and hours information is considered very accurate. The wage measure we use is "gross weekly earnings excluding overtime divided by normal basic hours for employees whose pay for the survey period was not affected by absence."<sup>5</sup> We deflate wages using the British Retail Price Index, as it is the United Kingdom's most widely used price index and is similar to the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). The NESPD also includes information on age, sex, occupation, industry,

<sup>3</sup>In a life cycle context, we know from the work of McCue (1996) that position moves within companies are potentially important; they are estimated to account for 15% of male wage growth in the United States.

<sup>4</sup>A similar argument suggests that internal movers will have less cyclical wages than external movers. Rents associated with specific human capital may derive from both job- and company-level knowledge acquisition. As emphasized by Aoki (1984), collective, or company-specific, skills may lead to organizational rents that are shared between workers and entrepreneurs. In this event, moving between jobs within the company would lead to a partial loss of specific capital, while changing companies would lead to total loss.

<sup>5</sup>We also estimated wage specifications in which hourly earnings (including overtime) replaced hourly standard rates. These produced no substantive changes, and so we confine our attention to standard rates throughout the paper.

and geographic location of individuals (but not education or race). We confine attention to full-time workers holding single jobs. Our samples cover 177,000 men and 112,000 women. We cannot calculate experience for each individual and so we use age as a regressor in its place.

One concern is that employers may report hours worked inaccurately, biasing our estimates of wage cyclicality. In particular, if employers report contract hours rather than actual hours worked, reported hours will remain constant from year to year, resulting in a countercyclical bias for hours and a procyclical bias for hourly wages. While there is no way to validate the reporting of hours in the NESPD, we have examined the stickiness and the cyclicity of reported hours. We find that, on average, 80% of stayers had the same reported weekly hours in two adjacent periods, with the proportion ranging from 61% (in 1981/82) to 89% (in 1978/79). Thus, there seems to have been appreciable variation in reported hours from year to year, especially given that true hours are likely to remain constant for most stayers. Furthermore, reported hours were significantly procyclical ( $p < 0.01$ ) for both men and women over our sample period, once again suggesting that any biases from misreporting of hours may not be very large. Overall, we believe our hours data are at least as good as the self-reported data from individual surveys,<sup>6</sup> but a thorough examination of this issue will require a new system for collecting hours information.

<sup>6</sup>In order to compare individual self-reporting with our company payroll data, we examined the cyclicity of basic hours (excluding overtime) in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and in the NESPD for the years 1993–2003 (BHPS) and 1991–2001 (NESPD). We regressed the change in log hours (basic and total) on a constant, a time trend, and the change in the unemployment rate. Both types of hours were found to be significantly procyclical ( $p < 0.01$ ) for men and women in the NESPD. Virtually identical results were obtained for male basic hours using BHPS. Male total hours in the BHPS were found to be more strongly procyclical than their NESPD equivalents, while female basic and total hours in the BHPS were acyclical. These regressions were also undertaken using our full NESPD sample for the period 1975–2001. Again, all specifications displayed statistically significant hours procyclicity.

Our business cycle proxy is the national claimant count unemployment rate produced by the British Office for National Statistics.<sup>7</sup> Wage agreements in Britain typically cover a 12-month period, and so the wage measures in the NESPD generally refer to wage settlements negotiated between April, when the samples are taken, and May of the previous year. Accordingly, we use as our unemployment rate measure the average of the 12 monthly unemployment rates between May of the previous year and the survey month of April.

Between one April census and the next, the NESPD provides a very clear distinction between job stayers and job movers. A question in the Survey records whether an employee has remained in a given single job within the company for more than 12 months or less than 12 months. This information allows us accurately to identify job movers, defined as individuals who have *either* changed jobs within the same company *or* changed companies.<sup>8</sup> For two consecutive years of NESPD data we have complete information that allows us to definitively separate internal and external movers. Before we describe our method of determining this mover dichotomy for the remaining years, it is useful to report key information for these two years.

For 1996 and 1997, we know precisely whether each job move took place within companies or between companies. We consider the sample of individuals who were employed

<sup>7</sup>Our main reason for choosing claimant count data is that they allow us to obtain consistent monthly data back to 1975.

<sup>8</sup>The questions used to determine this variable are as follows [bold type as used in questionnaire]:

- (a) What, if any, is the employee's full job title **and** rank or grade? [box to fill in]
- (b) Give a short description of the work this employee does. For engineers and accountants state professional qualifications, if any. [bigger box to fill in]
- (c) Has the employee worked in this **same job in your organisation** for one year or more?

(If the employee has changed to a different job or been promoted within the last 12 months then 'Under one year' is appropriate.) Circle 1 or 2.

One year or more    1  
Under one year    2



at the survey date in both periods (the unemployment rate was about 8% in both years). Between the two years, 92% of male workers and 91% of female workers remained in the same job. Of the movers, 50% of men and 55% of women changed jobs within the same company. Thus, internal mobility is quantitatively as important a phenomenon as the much more heavily studied external mobility. Let us define “no wage change” in real basic hourly wage rates between the two years as a wage in 1997 that remained within the bounds of the 1996 wage by  $\pm 1\%$ . Then, for both genders, the modal groups of job stayers experienced a wage increase—51% of men and 53% of women. But wage reductions also occurred for large numbers of stayers—29% of men and 27% of women. In the case of between-company job movers, wage reductions affected 34% of men and 22% of women.<sup>9</sup>

Apart from 1996 and 1997, a direct breakdown of individuals into within- and between-company job moves is not possible. We need, therefore, to identify such moves indirectly. Let  $M_t$  denote a binary variable indicating that a job move took place at time  $t$ . We can obtain  $M_t$  from the NESPD. Let  $M_t = M_{Wt} + M_{Bt}$ , where  $M_{Wt}$  denotes a within-company job move and  $M_{Bt}$  denotes a between-company job move. In order to identify  $M_{Wt}$  and  $M_{Bt}$ , we adopted the following decision rules:

- (1)  $M_{Wt} = 1$  if  $M_t$  does not intersect with  $M_{Bt}$   
 $= 0$  otherwise.
- (2)  $M_{Bt} = 1$  if  $M_t$  involves a change in geographical area, industry, or sector (or a combination thereof)  
 $= 0$  otherwise.

We chose three sets of combinations of area, industry, and sector to identify  $M_{Bt}$  in (2):

- (A) 10 standard British regions, 1-digit industries, and public/private sector;
- (B) 97 geographical areas, 1-digit industries, and public/private sector;
- (C) 97 geographical areas, 3-digit industries, and public/private sectors.

Table 1 shows actual and estimated job moves and real wage changes for the years 1996 and 1997 using (A), (B), and (C). All three correctly identify about 75% of all moves. The public/private sector split is common to all choices.<sup>10</sup> By moving from (A) to (C), one classifies more of the moves as being external and fewer as being internal. Choice (A) correctly picks out over 80% of within-company movers but incorrectly classifies 35–40% of external moves as internal. Disaggregating regions into 97 sub-areas and industries to a three-digit breakdown—that is, choice (C)—reverses the relative predictive balance in favor of between-company movers. Choice (B), consisting of 97 areas combined with 1-digit industries, produces a reasonably even balance and correctly classifies about 75% of moves. These findings are very similar for men and women.<sup>11</sup>

In the lower part of Table 1 we compare actual and estimated real basic hourly wage changes (that is, excluding overtime) between 1996 and 1997. Real wages rose by an average of 6.5% for male stayers. Of course, actual and estimated real wage changes coincide in the case of stayers. Mean real wage changes among both types of movers are over twice as large, albeit accompanied by considerably larger standard deviations. Both first and second moments are well estimated by each of our three mover identifiers, although choice (A) appears to provide marginally the best estimates of the actual means.

Table 2 presents summary statistics, based on our complete data set, for the key variables underlying the subsequent analysis. Note

<sup>10</sup>The public sector covers workers in central government, local government, and public corporations.

<sup>11</sup>Consider classification scheme (B) for men. Here, 447 internal movers are wrongly classified as external movers. 50% of these moved between regions, 38% moved between industries, 2% changed sector, 9% changed region and industry, 0.2% changed region and sector, and 1% changed industry and sector.

<sup>9</sup>The prevalence of downward adjustments to wages in Britain is well known. For example, Nickell and Quintini (2003) found that significantly larger proportions of British workers than of similar U.S. workers experience nominal wage cuts or unchanged nominal wages.

Table 1. Job Moves and Real Wage Changes between 1996 and 1997.

<b>Actual and Estimated Within- and Between-Company Job Moves</b>					
<i>Mover Identifiers</i>	<i>Estimated Job Movers</i>				
	<i>Correctly Estimated Internal Movers/ Total Actual Internal Movers (Percent Correct)</i>		<i>Correctly Estimated External Movers/ Total Actual External Movers (Percent Correct)</i>		
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	
(A) 10 Regions, 1-Digit Industries, Public/Private Sector	1592/1924 (82.7)	1152/1366 (84.3)	1272/1979 (64.3)	714/1151 (62.0)	
(B) 97 Areas, 1-Digit Industries, Public/Private Sector	1477/1924 (76.8)	1070/1366 (78.3)	1457/1979 (73.6)	812/1151 (70.5)	
(C) 97 Areas, 3-Digit Industries, Public/Private Sector	1215/1924 (63.1)	843/1366 (61.7)	1723/1979 (87.1)	980/1151 (85.1)	

<b>Actual and Estimated Values of Percentage Real Wage Changes (Standard Deviations)</b>						
	<i>Stayers</i>		<i>Internal Movers</i>		<i>External Movers</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Actual	6.5 (24.8)	6.1 (19.4)	14.6 (33.6)	16.5 (31.1)	12.6 (43.2)	15.5 (47.8)
Using (A)	6.5 (24.8)	6.1 (19.4)	14.1 (38.8)	16.2 (35.3)	13.0 (38.8)	15.8 (46.0)
Using (B)	6.5 (24.8)	6.1 (19.4)	13.9 (39.7)	15.5 (31.1)	13.3 (37.9)	16.8 (48.3)
Using (C)	6.5 (24.8)	6.1 (19.4)	14.7 (41.5)	16.4 (25.8)	12.9 (37.0)	15.8 (46.7)

that 90% of men and 88% of women were job stayers. Thus women were slightly more likely than men to undertake internal and external job moves. This may reflect less contractual security in female than male jobs.<sup>12</sup>

The table also shows how the proportions of movers and stayers vary depending on

whether (A), (B), or (C) is used. In line with the reported findings in Table 1, Table 2 also shows that the mean real wage changes (expressed in logarithms to conform with our estimating equations) are greater for both types of movers compared to stayers.

### Estimation

#### Decomposition of Overall Wage Cyclicity

Here, we extend the analysis of Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997) to the case where

<sup>12</sup>The similarity between men and women in rates of external mobility is consistent with prior literature. For the United Kingdom, on the basis of the work-history data from the British Household Panel, Booth et al. (1999) investigated job tenure and job mobility of men and women from 1915 to 1990. They found that men were more likely than women to leave a job involuntarily and were likely to display a higher propensity to quit their jobs in order to take up alternative employment. Women showed higher propensities to leave their jobs for other reasons. In general, Booth et al. found that job insecurity was greater for men than women. However, and most relevant to the data period of the present study, these differences narrowed appreciably in the later cohorts of these data. For the United States,

Viscusi (1980) found in the 1976 PSID that women had higher quit rates than men but that this can be fully explained by differing job characteristics and the fact that women were less likely to have at least one year of firm tenure. Also, Blau and Kahn (1981) found in the National Longitudinal Surveys of young men and women that men and women displayed similar tendencies to quit their jobs.



Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, 1975–2001.

Mover Identifiers	(A)	Men (B) Total	(C)	(A)	Women (B) Total	(C)
Number of Individuals (Number of Observations)		177,498 (1,346,612)			112,502 (644,608)	
Job Stayers as Proportion of Total Observations		0.896			0.879	
Internal Movers as Proportion of Total Observations	0.068	0.059	0.050	0.083	0.072	0.06
External Movers as Proportion of Total Observations	0.042	0.051	0.067	0.046	0.056	0.076
Mean Age (Median Age)		40 (40)			37 (35)	
Mean $\Delta \ln w_S$ (Standard Deviation)		0.021 (0.171)			0.030 (0.144)	
Mean $\Delta \ln w_W$ (Standard Deviation)	0.059 (0.231)	0.057 (0.224)	0.056 (0.213)	0.077 (0.196)	0.075 (0.192)	0.076 (0.182)
Mean $\Delta \ln w_B$ (Standard Deviation)	0.061 (0.324)	0.062 (0.316)	0.062 (0.303)	0.081 (0.283)	0.082 (0.272)	0.080 (0.260)
Private Sector as Proportion of Total Observations		0.697			0.586	
Public Sector as Proportion of Total Observations		0.304			0.414	
Bargaining Coverage as Proportion of Total Observations		0.578			0.582	

Note: The three separate estimates for movers are based on the identifiers: (A) 10 regions, 1-digit industries, public/private sector; (B) 97 areas, 1-digit industries, public/private sector; (C) 97 areas, 3-digit industries, public/private sector.

there is information on across-company mobility in addition to within-company mobility. Let  $P_W$  and  $P_B$  denote the proportion of workers changing jobs within and between firms, respectively. Let  $E(\Delta \ln W_S)$ ,  $E(\Delta \ln W_W)$ , and  $E(\Delta \ln W_B)$  be the expected wage growth of job stayers, within-company movers, and between-company movers, respectively. Overall expected wage growth is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 (3) \quad E(\Delta \ln W) &= (1 - P_W - P_B)E(\Delta \ln W_S) \\
 &\quad + P_W E(\Delta \ln W_W) + P_B E(\Delta \ln W_B) \\
 &= E(\Delta \ln W_S) + P_W E(\Delta \ln W_W \\
 &\quad - \Delta \ln W_S) + P_B E(\Delta \ln W_B \\
 &\quad - \Delta \ln W_S).
 \end{aligned}$$

Differentiating (3) with respect to the change in the unemployment rate,  $\Delta U$ , provides a decomposition of total wage cyclicality, that is,

$$(4) \quad \partial E(\Delta \ln W) / \partial (\Delta U) = \partial E(\Delta \ln W_S) / \partial (\Delta U)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &+ P_W [\partial E(\Delta \ln W_W - \Delta \ln W_S) / \partial (\Delta U)] \\
 &+ P_B [\partial E(\Delta \ln W_B - \Delta \ln W_S) / \partial (\Delta U)] \\
 &+ [E(\Delta \ln W_W - \Delta \ln W_S)] \partial P_W / \partial (\Delta U) \\
 &+ [E(\Delta \ln W_B - \Delta \ln W_S)] \partial P_B / \partial (\Delta U).
 \end{aligned}$$

The first term is the wage response of job stayers (individuals who remained in the same job in the same company). The second term defines the incremental effect on wage cyclicality of internal movers relative to job stayers. Similarly, term three defines the incremental wage cyclicality of external movers relative to job stayers. The last two terms represent, respectively, the cyclicality of internal and external job changes. Thus, three terms comprise wage responses and two denote job move probabilities.<sup>13</sup> We deal with wage and job effects in turn.

<sup>13</sup>Each worker is given equal weight in equation (3). This is conceptually different from an economy-wide

### Estimating Wage Cyclicity

The empirical work constitutes a simple extension of the approach of Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997). It incorporates the two-step estimation procedure of Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) (see also Devereux 2001) designed to get around the problem of using individual wage and other characteristics alongside a national-level cyclical indicator (Moulton 1986); the associated year-specific error is likely to result in OLS overestimating the precision of the unemployment rate coefficient.

In step 1, we estimate the wage change equation for an individual  $i$  at time  $t$ . This is given by

$$(5) \quad \Delta \ln w_{it} = \alpha A_{it} + \sum_{t=1}^T \phi_{0t} D_t + \sum_{t=1}^T \phi_{1t} M_{Wit} D_t + \sum_{t=1}^T \phi_{2t} M_{Bit} D_t + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where  $w_{it}$  is the real standard hourly wage rate,  $A_{it}$  is a cubic in age,  $D_t$  denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is from year  $t$ , and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is a random error term. The  $M_{Wt}D$  and  $M_{Bt}D$  terms represent interactions between the time dummies and the mover dummies shown in (1) and (2).

In step 2, the three sets of dummy variable estimates  $\hat{\phi}_{jt}$  ( $j = 0, 1, 2$ ) are regressed on the change in the unemployment rate and a linear time trend (from 1 to 26), or

$$(6) \quad \hat{\phi}_{jt} = \delta_{j0} + \delta_{j1} \Delta U_t + \delta_{j2} \text{Year}_t + \nu_{jt} \quad (j = 0, 1, 2)$$

Estimation of (5) is undertaken using OLS, and the second-step regression, equation (6), is estimated by weighted least squares (WLS), with the weight being the number of individuals observed in a given year.<sup>14</sup> In

measure that would weight each individual by hours worked. However, we have verified that, in practice, the terms in (3) are very similar to those that are weighted by hours worked.

<sup>14</sup>Instead of WLS, we could do Generalized Least Squares (GLS) in the second stage using the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the year dummies in the first stage. We have verified that this approach yields coefficient estimates and standard errors that are virtually identical to WLS, so we use the simpler approach.

all regressions, the change in the log wage is multiplied by 100. The estimated coefficient on the change in the unemployment rate then approximates the percentage change in the wage for a one-point increase in the unemployment rate.

We can link (6) directly to the decomposition of wage cyclicity in (4). When we use  $\hat{\phi}_{0t}$  in (6), the estimated value of  $\delta_{01}$  gives the cyclical wage response of job stayers. This is the first term on the right-hand side of (4). Using  $\hat{\phi}_{1t}$  and  $\hat{\phi}_{2t}$  in (6), we obtain estimates of  $\delta_{11}$  and  $\delta_{21}$ , that is, the incremental wage effects of within- and between-company job movers relative to job stayers. These are reflected in the second and third terms of (4).

### Estimating the Cyclicity of Internal and External Job Moves

We also estimate the cyclicity of internal (job to job within the same company) and external (company to company) moves. These comprise the fourth and fifth terms in (4). We use the same basic two-step approach, replacing  $\Delta \ln w_{it}$  in equation (5) with the binary variables in (1) and (2) that indicate, respectively, between- and within-job changes. Specifically, our estimating equations take the form

$$(7) \quad M_{Kit} = \alpha A_{Kit} + \sum_{t=1}^T \phi_{Kt} D_t + \nu_{Kit} \quad (K = W, B)$$

and

$$(8) \quad \hat{\phi}_{Kt} = \delta_{K0} + \delta_{K1} \Delta U_t + \delta_{K2} \text{Year}_t + \nu_{Kt} \quad (K = W, B)$$

In line with the wage specifications, we estimate (7) using weighted least squares, thereby using a linear job change probability model.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup>An alternative would be to use a probit or logit specification. We use the linear probability model to be consistent with the approach of Solon et al. (1997), and also because it allows us to take a two-step approach to deal with the clustering issue that is analogous to our approach with wages. The probit approach, we find, yields marginal effects similar to those obtained from our other analysis.

### Composition of Movers over the Business Cycle

Our estimates will be biased if there are systematic differences in the types of individuals who move over the business cycle that are not accounted for by the fixed individual effects and age variables in the estimating equations. For example, if movers during a boom are predominantly people whose productivity is increasing, and movers during a recession are predominantly people whose productivity is falling, we will have a procyclical bias for movers, and countercyclical bias for stayers. For both men and women, we have calculated that the average internal and external mover comes from between the 60th and 65th percentile of the respective wage distribution, during periods of both rising and falling unemployment. While this similarity across the cycle is suggestive that composition bias is not a large problem, it is not possible to be definitive.

### Results

Results based on our full NESPD male and female data are reported in Table 3. We confine our attention to the unemployment rate change coefficients, estimated in step 2 of our regressions. The table contains two sets of results. The first results refer to wages and the unemployment rate (equation 6), and the second to job moves and the unemployment rate (equation 8). For both sets of results, we show estimates based on our three methods of distinguishing between internal and external movers (A, B, and C in Table 1).

Referring to the top half of the table, there are three main findings with respect to absolute and relative real wage cyclicalities. First, both male and female stayers' wages were strongly procyclical. A one point reduction in the unemployment rate among male job stayers was associated with a 1.73% real wage increase. The equivalent wage change for women was 1.66%. Second, the real wages of between-company job movers displayed significantly higher cyclicalities than those of job stayers. For male and female external movers, a one point reduction in the unemployment rate was associated with a wage

increase of, respectively, 2.9% and 2.5%. Third, male and female within-company job movers also exhibited stronger wage procyclicalities than job stayers. The increments are decidedly modest when compared with the external mover outcomes. Among men, the wage responsiveness to a one point change in unemployment was about 10% higher for internal movers than for stayers, and among women the corresponding difference was about 15%.<sup>16</sup>

Since wage cyclicalities were greater for external movers than for internal movers, one would expect that misclassification would cause us to understate the cyclicalities of external movers and overstate the cyclicalities of internal movers. This has implications for how one might expect the estimates to differ across our (A), (B), and (C) splits. Our designated internal movers are more likely to include external movers in (A) than in (B) and especially (C). Thus, we might expect to find greater cyclicalities for internal movers using (A) than using (C). Our designated external movers are more likely to include internal movers in (C) than in (B) and especially (A). Thus, we might also expect to find greater cyclicalities for external movers using (A) than using (C). In actuality, we find very little evidence for these types of patterns, suggesting that the bias is not strongly related to the degree of misclassification, maybe because the classification is working fairly well in all cases.

The bottom half of the table reports job move/unemployment rate associations. Estimated procyclicalities were stronger for external than internal job movers. What accounts for this difference? Figure 1 plots the estimated time dummies from equation (7) against the

<sup>16</sup>The estimate for internal male movers in case (C) is not statistically significant. This may be due in part to our inability to obtain consistent 3-digit industry data across the entire time period. We use three different 3-digit classifications for 1975–81, 1982–95, and 1996–2001, and so the internal/external mover definition is not fully consistent across time. Additionally, movers in 1982 and 1996 are dropped, since the previous years contain a non-matching classification. However, we have verified that if we include all years by using 1-digit industry codes for 1981–82 and 1995–96, the point estimates change very little.

Table 3. Real Wage and Unemployment Rate Changes, 1975–2001.

Mover Identifiers	Men			Women		
	Coefficient on $(U_t - U_{t-1})$					
		Incremental Wage Effect for Internal Movers	Incremental Wage Effect for External Movers		Incremental Wage Effect for Internal Movers	Incremental Wage Effect for External Movers
Wage Change [Equation (6)]	Job Stayers			Job Stayers		
(A)	-1.73*** (0.45)	-0.24** (0.12)	-1.19*** (0.18)	-1.66*** (0.46)	-0.35** (0.15)	-0.83*** (0.16)
(B)	-1.73*** (0.45)	-0.24** (0.10)	-0.99*** (0.17)	-1.66*** (0.46)	-0.32** (0.17)	-0.76*** (0.16)
(C)	-1.73*** (0.45)	-0.03 (0.12)	-1.11*** (0.16)	-1.66*** (0.46)	-0.37** (0.14)	-0.76*** (0.16)
Job Move [Equation (8)]		Internal Job Movers	External Job Movers		Internal Job Movers	External Job Movers
(A)		-0.004** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.001)		-0.005** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.001)
(B)		-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.001)		-0.004 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.001)
(C)		-0.004 (0.004)	-0.009** (0.004)		-0.005 (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Results shown refer to step two of the two-stage estimation procedure. There are 26 observations at this stage. The three-digit industry classification used as part of identifier (C) cannot be obtained on a consistent basis over the entire period. The results are obtained using three different 3-digit classifications for 1975–81, 1982–95, and 1996–2001. Accordingly, movers in 1982 and 1996 are dropped, since the previous years contain a non-matching classification. The three separate estimates for movers are based on the identifiers: (A) 10 regions, 1-digit industries, public/private sector; (B) 97 areas, 1-digit industries, public/private sector; (C) 97 areas, 3-digit industries, public/private sector.

\*\*Statistically significant at the .05 level; \*\*\*at the .01 level, two-tail tests.


change in the national unemployment rate ( $\Delta U$ ). The graphs are based on the (B) set of results and are not greatly altered if (A) and (C) are chosen. The male and female within-company mover graphs are remarkably similar. They reveal a procyclical pattern in the middle periods, from the early 1980s until the early 1990s. Note, however, that the start and end periods do not exhibit cyclical job movements, with internal job changes displaying unbroken year to year declines from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. This occurred *despite* a period of falling unemployment in the late 1970s. This pattern may indicate that during the inflationary conditions and economic uncertainty associated with the OPEC supply shocks of the mid- and late 1970s, medium-term pessimistic outlooks among companies detracted from an atmosphere of more short-term expansion and job promotion. Additionally, the sharp un-

employment rate declines starting in 1993, followed by relatively low unemployment thereafter, do not appear to have stimulated growth in internal job changes. In contrast, male and female external job moves were procyclical over a longer time period. In particular, they appear to have been more cyclically responsive than internal moves in the early years.

One can rewrite equation (4) in a way that expresses total wage cyclicality in terms of the wage cyclicality of stayers and movers, and the cyclicality of moving behavior:

$$(9) \quad \frac{\partial E(\Delta \ln W)}{\partial (\Delta U)} = (1 - P_W - P_B) [\frac{\partial E(\Delta \ln W_S)}{\partial (\Delta U)}] + P_W [\frac{\partial E(\Delta \ln W_W)}{\partial (\Delta U)}] + P_B [\frac{\partial E(\Delta \ln W_B)}{\partial (\Delta U)}] + [E(\Delta \ln W_W - \Delta \ln W_S)] \frac{\partial P_W}{\partial (\Delta U)} + [E(\Delta \ln W_B - \Delta \ln W_S)] \frac{\partial P_B}{\partial (\Delta U)}.$$

Figure 1. Coefficients of Estimated Job Move Dummies against the Rate of National Unemployment: Between- and Within-Company Moves.



Combining the results in Table 3 with the summary data in Table 2, we are in a position to evaluate the separate contributions. Results are slightly different across the choice of mover identifiers, but reporting results for choice (B) (see Table 1) are nonetheless highly representative. Our male estimate of overall wage cyclicality (that is,  $E(\Delta \ln W) / \partial(\Delta U)$  in equation 9) is  $-1.83\%$ . Of this aggregate figure,  $84.3\%$  is accounted for by the wages of job stayers,  $6.4\%$  by the wages of internal movers,  $7.5\%$  by the wages of external movers,  $0.6\%$  by internal job moves, and  $1.1\%$  by external job moves. The overall female estimate of wage cyclicality is  $-1.78\%$ , with respective percentage breakdowns of  $81.4$ ,  $8.1$ ,  $7.5$ ,  $1$ , and  $2$ . Wages of job stayers were highly procyclical, and job stayers account for nearly  $90\%$  of all observations in our data. Unsurprisingly, therefore, their wage contribution dominates overall British wage cyclicality.

As discussed earlier, one model posits that employers may use promotions and demotions to achieve wage flexibility in spite of the sticki-

ness of wages within jobs. It is clear that this is not the dominant influence in contemporary Britain. Wages within jobs seem sufficiently flexible that internal job mobility plays a relatively minor role in moving aggregate wages in line with the business cycle. Thus, it appears that this class of sticky wage models is not particularly applicable to Britain.

**Comparison of Estimates to the Literature**

Studies of wage cyclicality in the United States have tended to find overall semi-elasticities of between  $-1$  and  $-2$  for the association between real wage changes and the contemporaneous national rate of unemployment (Solon et al. 1994; Bils 1985).<sup>17</sup> Our estimates for Britain are at the high end of this range. The coefficients we find for job stayers are higher than those that have been reported

<sup>17</sup>However, using six cohorts of the National Longitudinal Surveys, Grant (2003) obtained real wage/current unemployment rate semi-elasticities for young men and women of between  $-2$  and  $-2.6$ .



for employer stayers in the United States in recent panel data (Solon et al. 1994; Devereux 2001; Shin and Solon 2004). Hart (2006) split the sample between stayers and movers using the NESPD and found coefficients for stayers similar to ours.

The main contribution of this paper is to differentiate between the wage procyclicality of internal and external movers. Few other studies have made this distinction. Solon et al. (1997), using U.S. historical data, found evidence that a large proportion of wage cyclicality was accounted for by internal job mobility, rather than through the cyclicality of wages of job stayers. Wilson (1997) used recent data from two U.S. companies and found no evidence that the wages of position changers were more cyclical than the wages of position stayers. Devereux (2000) obtained a similar result using state-year variation in the PSID over the 1980s. While we find that wages of internal movers are more procyclical than those of job stayers, job stayers in contemporary Britain have very procyclical wages, and the process of internal mobility has little net impact on overall wage cyclicality.

There is also a related literature on nominal wage rigidity. Most recent studies from the United States have concluded that, once measurement error is accounted for, nominal wage changes of stayers are downwardly rigid (for example, Altonji and Devereux 2000; Akerlof et al. 1996). On the other hand, the British evidence suggests that nominal wage cuts are prevalent both in the BHPS (Smith 2000) and in the NESPD (Nickell and Quintini 2003). Measurement error appears unlikely to be the full explanation, as Smith found many cuts even for individuals who reported having their pay stub in hand while answering the earnings questions. Our findings that stayers in Britain have greater wage cyclicality than in the United States is consistent with these findings from the nominal wage rigidity literature.

#### **Results by Public/Private Sector and by Collective Bargaining Status**

In some organizations, promotions and other job changes may be largely based on agreed rules and laid-down formulas. In these

cases, the move from one job description to another may not be marked by significant wage increments but merely involve an individual transferring from the top rungs of one ladder across to the bottom rungs of the next higher ladder. Further, such moves may not correlate especially well with market conditions. Other organizations may take a much more *laissez faire* approach to job change. Productivity-based promotions may be especially important. Big upward movements for high fliers and demotions for under-performers are likely to be more prevalent in these cases, with productivity effects reflecting market conditions.

*A priori*, two highly interrelated divisions of the data may be expected to capture these general differences in approaches to internal job mobility. The first is the public/private sector split, and the second is the division between workers covered and not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Over all observations in our data, 87% of men and 88% of women in public sector jobs were covered by collective bargaining agreements. This contrasts with coverage of 28% for men and 21% for women in the private sector. In general, the terms and conditions of work and pay in the public sector are relatively regularized. First, the size and complexity of large governmental departments and public corporations spur greater recourse to the use of explicitly defined rules and regulations concerning pay scales. Second, occupational pay and employment conditions are standardized across geographical areas. Third, the prevalence of formal collective bargaining in the public sector reduces the likelihood of *ad hoc* decision-making over pay and jobs. The private sector is more heterogeneous and less regulated, with fewer impediments to the achievement of localized implicit and explicit agreements.

The estimates are in Table 4. Among men in the private sector, the wages of both internal and external job movers were significantly more procyclical than the wages of stayers.<sup>18</sup> This contrasts with men in the

<sup>18</sup>Note that we only include observations in which the individual was in the same sector at  $t$  and  $t-1$ . Thus, the results for external moves should be treated with some



Table 4. Real Wage Changes in Relation to Unemployment Changes by Sector, Collective Bargaining Coverage, and Age, 1975–2001.

	Men Coefficient on $(U_t - U_{t-1})$			Women Coefficient on $(U_t - U_{t-1})$		
	Job Stayers	Incremental Wage Effect for Internal Movers	Incremental Wage Effect for External Movers	Job Stayers	Incremental Wage Effect for Internal Movers	Incremental Wage Effect for External Movers
Private Sector	-1.93*** (0.37)	-0.35*** (0.12)	-1.03*** (0.19)	-1.93*** (0.33)	-0.38 (0.21)	-0.91*** (0.20)
Public Sector	-1.39** (0.73)	0.17 (0.23)	-0.12 (0.31)	-1.38 (0.73)	0.03 (0.22)	-0.21 (0.25)
Covered by Agreement	-1.50** (0.67)	0.05 (0.20)	-0.45** (0.21)	-1.41** (0.70)	0.16 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.24)
Uncovered by Agreement	-1.94*** (0.32)	-0.44*** (0.16)	-0.84*** (0.20)	-1.91*** (0.33)	-0.53*** (0.18)	-0.68*** (0.20)
Private Sector and Uncovered	-1.98*** (0.31)	-0.41*** (0.13)	-0.88*** (0.22)	-1.98*** (0.32)	-0.52*** (0.21)	-0.70*** (0.21)
Public Sector and Covered	-1.48** (0.76)	0.29 (0.27)	-0.32 (0.24)	-1.47** (0.76)	0.07 (0.27)	-0.22 (0.25)
Young (Below Median Age)	-1.84*** (0.41)	-0.40*** (0.12)	-0.91*** (0.18)	-1.86*** (0.42)	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.65*** (0.17)
Old (Above Median Age)	-1.59*** (0.50)	0.05 (0.12)	-0.89*** (0.17)	-1.44*** (0.50)	-0.35 (0.19)	-0.65*** (0.22)

Notes: See notes to Table 2. Reported results consist of movements determined by identifier (B) (97 areas, 1-digit industries, public/private sector). For job movers, “Private Sector and Uncovered” means that an individual was in the private sector and uncovered by a collective bargaining agreement in the new job at time  $t$  and the old job at time  $t - 1$ . This matching between the two periods also applies to “Public Sector and Covered.”

\*\*Statistically significant at the 05 level; \*\*\*at the .01 level, two-tail tests.

public sector, among whom neither type of mover exhibited significantly greater wage effects than did stayers. Consistent with greater flexibility in the private sector, the difference between private and public sectors is statistically significant for both internal and external movers. The relative picture is similar for women, although the internal mover coefficient for the private sector is not significant at the 5% level and, unlike the external mover coefficient, is not statistically different from the equivalent public sector estimate.

The wages of internal and external job movers of both sexes who were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement were

also significantly more procyclical than were the wages of equivalent stayers. By contrast, among workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement, only the wages of male external movers displayed more cyclicity than the wages of stayers. Consistent with uncovered workers having more flexible work arrangements, the wages of uncovered workers appear to have been more procyclical than those of covered workers, but the difference is statistically significant only for internal movers (for both men and women).<sup>19</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the intersection of private sector and uncovered reveals patterns very similar to those discussed above for the private

caution, as the external movers included are those who chose to move to a different company in the same sector. This is, of course, a selected sample of external movers.

<sup>19</sup>Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) and Grant (2003), in their studies using U.S. data, also found union workers to have lower wage procyclicality than non-union workers.

sector and the uncovered sector, with both kinds of movers having more cyclical wages than job stayers. In contrast, the intersection of public sector and covered shows no statistically significant differences between movers and stayers.<sup>20</sup> Also, the only statistically significant difference between the two groups (private/uncovered versus public/covered) is for male internal movers.

### Results by Age

In the final two rows of Table 4, we split the sample at the median age (40 for men, 35 for women) in order to examine how the estimates differ by age. We find that there are strong similarities across the two age groups for both men and women. The sole exception is that wages for male internal movers were statistically significantly more procyclical for younger than older men. This is consistent with promotions and other internal moves being more likely among young workers, as would be implied by matching models of the labor market.<sup>21</sup>

### Conclusions

In line with earlier studies, our British data demonstrate the value of distinguishing

between job stayers and job movers in the study of real wage cyclicity (Hart 2006). Additionally, our work underlines the potential importance of separating movers who change jobs within companies and those who move between companies. In our full samples, external movers exhibited considerably higher wage cyclicity than job stayers—in fact, between 30% and 40% higher—while wage cyclicity among internal movers was less markedly higher, at around 10–15%. When we disaggregate the data into private and public sectors and into workers covered and not covered by collective bargaining, the value added of making the mover distinctions becomes even more apparent. We find that wage cyclicity of both internal and external movers was considerably higher than that of stayers among private sector workers and those workers uncovered by collective agreements. Thus, it appears that employers who are less constrained by formal agreements and pay rules are more likely to adjust the wages of internal movers in line with outside economic conditions.

However, these findings should not detract from recognition of job stayers' overwhelming importance in determining total British wage cyclicity. While our results show that the relative wage cyclicity of job movers was higher than that of stayers, the absolute wage procyclicality of *both* stayers and movers was high. Combining this latter observation with the fact that job stayers comprised about 90% of all wage observations over the years studied, we find that about 80–85% of overall real wage cyclicity in Britain was accounted for by job stayers. These results suggest that sticky wage models that stress the role of job mobility in enabling wages to adjust to economic conditions are not particularly relevant to contemporary Britain.

<sup>20</sup>The other two intersections—that is, private sector  $\cap$  covered and public sector  $\cap$  uncovered—are not shown because the numbers of movers in these cases are too small to ensure reliable results.

<sup>21</sup>We also attempted to see whether the degree of wage cyclicity changed over time by splitting the sample period into two periods of equal length. We found no statistically significant differences, but this may be in part due to the lack of variation in the unemployment rate, particularly in the second of these shorter periods.

## REFERENCES

- Akerlof, George A., William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry. 1996. "The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, No. 1, pp. 1–76.
- Altonji Joseph G., and Paul J. Devereux. 2000. "The Extent and Consequences of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity." *Research in Labor Economics*, Vol. 19, pp. 313–50.
- Aoki, Masahiko. 1984. *The Co-Operative Game Theory of the Firm*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Beaudry, Paul, and John E. DiNardo. 1991. "The Effect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data." *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 99, No. 4 (August), pp. 665–88.
- Bils, Mark J. 1985. "Real Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Panel Data." *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 93, No. 4 (August), pp. 666–89.
- Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 1981. "Race and Sex Differences in Quits by Young Workers." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July), pp. 563–77.
- Booth, Alison L., Marco Francesconi, and Carlos Garcia-Serrano. 1999. "Job Tenure and Job Mobility in Britain." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (October), pp. 43–70.
- Devereux, Paul J. 2000. "Task Assignment over the Business Cycle." *Journal of Labor Economics*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January), pp. 98–124.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001. "The Cyclicalities of Real Wages within Employer-Employee Matches." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (July), pp. 835–50.
- Devereux, Paul J., and Robert A. Hart. 2005. "The Spot Market Matters: Evidence on Implicit Contracts from Britain." IZA Discussion Paper #1497.
- Grant, Darren. 2003. "The Effect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Surveys." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (April), pp. 393–408.
- Hall, Robert E. 1974. "The Process of Inflation in the Labor Market." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, No. 2, pp. 343–93.
- Hart, Robert A. 2006. "Worker-Job Matches, Job Mobility, and Real Wage Cyclicalities." *Economica*, Vol. 73, pp. 287–98.
- Hashimoto, Masanori. 1979. "Bonus Payments, On-the-Job Training, and Lifetime Employment in Japan." *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 87, No. 5 (October), pp. 1086–1104.
- Malcomson, James M. 1999. "Individual Employment Contracts." In Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., *Handbook of Labor Economics*, Vol. 3B, Chap. 35, pp. 2291–2372. Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier.
- McCue, Kristin. 1996. "Promotions and Wage Growth." *Journal of Labor Economics*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April), pp. 175–209.
- McDonald, James T., and Christopher Worswick. 1999. "Wages, Implicit Contracts, and the Business Cycle: Evidence from Canadian Micro Data." *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 107, No. 4 (August), pp. 884–92.
- Moulton, Brent R. 1986. "Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression Estimates." *Journal of Econometrics*, Vol. 32 (August), pp. 385–97.
- Nickell, Stephen, and Glenda Quintini. 2003. "Nominal Wage Rigidity and the Rate of Inflation." *Economic Journal*, Vol. 113, No. 490, pp. 762–81.
- Reder, Melvin W. 1955. "The Theory of Occupational Wage Differentials." *American Economic Review*, Vol. 45, No. 5 (December), pp. 833–52.
- Reynolds, Lloyd G. 1951. *The Structure of Labor Markets*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Shin, Donggyun. 1994. "Cyclicalities of Real Wages among Young Men." *Economics Letters*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 137–42.
- Shin, Donggyun, and Gary R. Solon. 2004. "New Evidence on Real Wage Cyclicalities within Employer-Employee Matches." Working Paper.
- Smith, Jennifer C. 2000. "Nominal Wage Rigidity in the United Kingdom." *Economic Journal*, Vol. 110, No. 462, pp. C176–C195.
- Solon, Gary, Robert B. Barsky, and Jonathan A. Parker. 1994. "Measuring the Cyclicalities of Real Wages: How Important Is Composition Bias?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 109, No. 1 (February), pp. 1–26.
- Solon, Gary, Warren Whitley, and Ann Huff Stevens. 1997. "Wage Changes and Intrafirm Job Mobility over the Business Cycle: Two Case Studies." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (April), pp. 402–15.
- Viscusi, W. Kip. 1980. "Sex Differences in Worker Quitting." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (August), pp. 388–98.
- Wilson, Beth Anne. 1997. "Movements of Wages over the Business Cycle: An Intra-Firm View." Federal Reserve Board Working Paper.