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Sport, Imperialism and Postcolonialism: A Critical Analysis of Sport in China 1860-1993

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Abstract

Over the last three decades or more, there has been a considerable interest in the sociological analysis of sport. While a number of Western sociologists and cultural critics have attempted to locate the development of sport in various societies within an analysis of their own culture, very few have made sociological accounts of the development of sport in China. This study examines the significance of sport within the broader context of social and political change in China during the period from 1860 to 1990. Primarily this work is concerned with: (i) providing a theoretical analysis of imperialism and postcolonialism; (ii) treating the analysis of sport as a tool of cultural imperialism; (iii) highlighting the development of Western sports and physical culture in modern China and (iv) contributing to the analysis of sport in China through the notion of imperialism and postcolonialism. Nonetheless, the relative strength and weakness of this thesis may be its attempt to address the interrelated nature of all of these concerns.

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Declaration

I declare that the thesis has been composed by myself, and that it embodies the result of my own research. Where appropriate, I have acknowledge the nature and extend of work carried out in collaboration with and/by others included in the thesis.

Signed .....

Date November 2002

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father in law
Ching-Tien Tzeng (1931-1998)

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INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades or more, there has been a considerable interest in the sociological analysis of sport. The early ground clearing work of the nineteen sixties and nineteen seventies has itself developed into a body of knowledge that reflects a scholarly contribution from a number of establishments, epistemologies and individuals each with their own blend of theory and evidence. A number of classical traditions of sociological thought have had to face the challenge of the "post" world with postmodernism, postfeminism, and postcolonialism being some of the many new forms of inter-disciplinary enquiry which threaten to dominate the classical multi-paradigmatic rivalry which characterised much of the sociology of sport in the nineteen eighties and nineteen nineties (Jarvie and Maguire: 1994). This study acknowledges that sporting problems as social and developmental problems are real enough and yet in attempting to explain the development of sport within one particular social formation this thesis rejects forms of Western universalism and in its place suggests that the study of sport is better served by an analysis of particular and substantive sporting concerns that are rooted within a rare historical sociological approach. This specific study makes reference to a number of selected writers who have made significant contributions to the sociological analysis of sport. It draws its inspiration and direction from the historical sociological study of sport which is best characterised in the late nineteen seventies work of Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard (1979), the early nineteen eighties work of Richard Gruneau (1983) and the early nineteen nineties work of Grant Jarvie (1991).

While these texts are not exhaustive of the historical sociological literature on sport they nonetheless exemplify the points of departure that need to be made in relation to this thesis. A number of scholarly sports texts continue to flood the academic marketplace; these texts remain exceptional because of their complex blend of developmental, theoretical and empirical grounding. Purely theoretical accounts of sporting practice are as unsatisfactory as those accounts of sporting practice that exude empirical findings without any theoretical grounding. The two are inter-dependent features of a wide variety of sociological accounts of sport. While formalistic accounts about scientific method should not stand in the way of discovery, empirical work without theory facilitates only a limited access to many sporting problems and issues. It might be suggested that one of the perceived or real problems brought about by postmodern interventions has been the relative decline in those serious historical sociological accounts of sport which provide a sustained effort to relate theory to empirical or

historical evidence. Despite the different epistemological concerns that are evident in the above—mentioned three studies, the confluence of theory, data and historical sensitivity makes these works important points of departure for those interested in what is termed here the historical sociological analysis of sport. Such concerns are central to the analysis and approach to the study of sport and social change in China that is presented in this thesis.

Yet with specific reference to sociology, and I suspect the same holds true for a number of other bodies of knowledge, serious analyses of sport in China have been relatively few and far between (Brownell, 1995; Fan, 1997; Knuttgen, Ma and Wu, 1990). Like many other non-Western social formations, China in general, but also Taiwan, has only just begun to contribute to the body of knowledge which has been dominated by those cultural critics and writers from many Western metropolitan centres of the world. Only a few writers have contributed to the analysis of sport in China and Taiwan and fewer still have contributed to any critical historical sociological study of sport in China as encapsulated in the work of the five writers alluded to earlier (Brownell, 1995; Fan, 1997; Knuttgen, Ma and Wu, 1990). Alternatively, the problem might lie with convincing publishers to publish sociological accounts of sport in China or even non-Western sporting forms. Whatever the answer, the problem still remains that within the mass of sociological writings on sport, work within a Chinese context has been limited. There are a number of valid reasons for the present study but perhaps the strongest is that, in developing a theoretically informed analysis of sport in China, it makes a small contribution to literature which emanates from an interest in Chinese sport that is situated within the wider context of Chinese history and social development.

In this particular aspect of the work presented here, the thesis draws upon a number of writers who have been critical of Western universalism as a basis for explaining non-Western problems (Bhabha, 1990 and 1994; JanMohamed, 1985; Said, 1978, 1993; Spivak, 1990). The cultural critic Edward Said has made a significant and sustained contribution to this debate. Said has been critical of what he sees as cults such as post-modernism, discourse analysis, new historicism, deconstruction, neo-pragmatism, all of which afford an astonishing sense of weightlessness with regard to the importance of history (Said, 1993:366-367). Although this study is deliberately eclectic, if there is a single strand running through this thesis it is to recall Said's attention to the historically variable, complex and distinct set of processes at play in imperial and colonial articulations of the non-Western world. The body of work that has been produced by Edward Said is itself a theoretical engagement with eclectic

practice while at the same time it does not lose sight of the particular substantive problems of Palestinian communities and cultures. Such complex explanations of such phenomena have only been made possible because Said himself has situated himself on the borders of different bodies of knowledge. His own intellectual location and representation are lived out through his feeling for and organic intervention in the Palestinian cause. In the sense that Said has always championed the cause of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the underrepresented and relatively powerless there is a mutual understanding between this thesis, in relation to Taiwan, and his work.

More specifically, this study concerns itself with the development of sport in China. As I shall argue throughout, as a focus of analysis Chinese sport is capable of providing a great deal of information about history and social development itself since one of the central tenets throughout this study is that sport both contributes to and is constitutive of Chinese culture. Sport does not exist in some social or historical vacuum isolated from Chinese history and social development. Since the focal point of this analysis is sport, it is worth noting more concretely the broad inter-connected stages of development that are outlined in this thesis. They are:

> A stage that lasted from about 1860 until about 1911. During this stage of development sports in China underwent a number of significant changes. Traditional sports and pastimes were gradually influenced by the expansion of Western imperialism. A more formalized sport apparatus was introduced under the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Physical education programmes were introduced and students were sent to Western institutions for more specialized Western training.
>
> A stage that lasted from about 1911 until 1949. At least three important processes affected the development of sport in China during this stage; (i) the continuing influence of Western imperialism; (ii) the emergence of communism and in particular the popularity of nationalism during the 1937-1945 period; and (iii) the failure of the Chinese Republic.
>
> A stage which lasted from about 1949 until 1978, during which time sport in China experienced problems of modernity. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in mainland China in 1949, sport became an important component of the socialist state. It was a stage of Mao's socialism and the Cultural Revolution which was influenced by Marxism-Leninism. Sports development went through three stages: Mao built a new China and tried to establish a New physical culture, 1949-1957; (ii) during the Great Leap Forward and the Socialist Education Movement, China established a nationwide system to promote sports, 1957-1966; and (iii) in the Cultural Revolution, sports were discontinued twice—1966-1969 and 1974-1976.
>
> A stage which lasted from 1978 until 1993, during which sport in China has developed under the influence of postcolonialism since at least the 1980s. This provides the context for a preliminary discussion of sport and postcolonialism in Modern China. In regard to international sports, on the other hand, the Nationalists (about one and a half million people) fled to Taiwan and re-created the network of national political institutions on Taiwan since 1949. The issue of two "Chinas" has not only created different sports under separate governments, but it has also imposed a problem to many sport organisations in promoting international sport.

Implicit within this analysis of sport in China is the belief that such a historical sociological-based study can provide insights into a number of secondary problem areas. I do not at this point intend to provide an in-depth discussion of these concerns, but merely to mention the fact that, while the analysis of sport in China in itself provides a worthwhile area of investigation, it is also capable of raising questions about imperialism, cultural identity, postcolonialism and relations between the two China's. While this study recognises the influence of Western imperialism upon the development of sport in China it also questions the conventional wisdom of accepting uncritically universal post-schools of thought which threaten to marginalise or fail to recognise emerging and residual, indigenous or traditional epistemologies that stem from within rather than from outside that which is currently China. In a world that is so often polarised between the West and the rest indigenous thinkers have a responsibility as well as an authority to ensure that universal forms of Western or post-thought do not merely travel the world uncritically as if they speak for all the inhabitants of the globe (Radhakrishnan: 1994). Perhaps postmodernism could be replaced by post-Westernism in ways that are not available to Western consciousness. The same question may be asked about the influences which have affected the development of sport in China. At this point, I merely want to pose the question in order to illustrate the potential richness of a historical sociological enquiry that is connected with the development of sport in China.

In order to address these themes, I have organised my work into six chapters. Chapters one and two are essentially theoretical. Chapter one considers some of the strengths of the sociological writings on sport and some of the weaknesses of some of the conventional wisdom about Chinese sport. This initial synthesis paves the way for a somewhat eclectic theoretical discussion in chapter two that draws upon the concepts of culture, imperialism and postcolonialism as axial principles for analysing the development of sport in China. In particular it is argued that such an eclectic framework opens up new ways of thinking about the development of sport in China and in particular China's relationship with Taiwan. Together, chapters one and two provide the necessary background for conducting an analysis of the development of sport in China. Such an analysis is developed in chapters three, four, five and six. For nearly two thousand years Confucianism provided the political, social and moral foundation for Chinese culture, including forms of physical culture. Confucianism declined under the wider and deeper impact of Western cultural imperialism. Chapter three considers the influence of Confucianism and the folk origins of modern sport in traditional Chinese feudal culture

before about 1860. It also considers the process of Western cultural imperialism and in particular the formalization of Chinese sport between 1860 and 1911. The following are merely illustrative of some of the questions posed in this chapter: What was/is the influence of Confucianism upon Chinese physical culture? What was the influence of Western sport and proselytism on Chinese sport during this period? What was the role of particular organisations such as the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in promoting a form of imperialism? Why did Western forms of sport become more popular after about 1895 and what was the impact upon indigenous forms of sport of this expansion? Chapter four considers the stage of development from 1912 until 1949 during which time the emergence of communism led to a complete re-evaluation of China's cultural heritage. Chapter five considers the development of sport in China and the particular problems of modernity and Mao's socialism that were experienced between 1949 and 1978. Chapter six considers the issues of China's process of modernisation and postcolonialism between 1978 and 1990, in this chapter brief reference is made to the relationship between China and Taiwan. In the conclusions, the major strands of this analysis are drawn together.

CHAPTER ONE: SPORT, HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY AND CHINA

When Eric Hobsbawm, the author of *On History* (1997: 80) looked to the relationship between social history and the history of society he argued that we are concerned not only with social structures and their mechanism of persistence and change, general patterns of transformation, but also with what actually happened. History had often been viewed as a simple line of development along which societies made the transition through stages from feudalism to capitalism or modernity to postmodernity or from a rude, backward and barbarous state to a polished and advanced stage of civilization. Some nations have made the transition to modernity more quickly than others did, while others have experienced different rates of development. The possible development or non-development of capitalism within imperial China is relevant in that it helps to explain the actual fact that this type of structure developed in a specific way in China. It may also be used as a basis to compare and contrast other rates or phases of capitalist development within other countries. The history of any society is thus best understood as collaboration between the general models of social structure and change and the actual or specific set of substantive phenomena that actually have occurred. This remains true whatever the geographical or chronological scale of enquiry.

Eric Hobsbawm wrote nothing at all on the development of sport in China. Indeed few historians or sociologists have addressed Chinese sporting problems at all, let alone consider what many apparently believe to be a peripheral area of enquiry, namely non-Western sporting forms and traditions. From the beginning, the position assumed in this study is that it is not necessary to view China or Chinese sport as peripheral or meaningless. Yet in order to understand the significance of sport in China it is necessary to situate sport within the broader context of Chinese history and social development. When placed within this wider context forms of sport are capable of providing a great deal of information about the patterns, arrangements, tensions, conflicts and various processes of development within any particular social formation.

Historical Sociology of Sport: A Brief Review

This chapter is concerned with developing several points of departure for the analysis of sport presented in this thesis. In the first instance it will involve considering the work of several writers who have contributed significantly to the development of a rare historical sociological analysis of sport. In

the second instance it will involve a synthesis and critique of a selected number of authors who have written about sport in China. It would be misleading, and indeed incorrect, to suggest that the emphasis here on historical sociology provides a complete definition of historical or sociological enquiry into sport. Yet in the context of this study, it broadly defines the framework of analysis that has characterised a particular type of work within the sociology of sport area. In a similar vein it is not necessary or desirable to review everything that has been written about sport in China, but rather to provide an overall synthesis of thought which is consistent with the problematic that is developed throughout this study.

If the sociology of sport, more specifically the historical sociology, is to go beyond purely descriptive atheoretical expositions then accounts of sporting practice need to be located within the broader context of history and social development and to a certain extent guided by theoretical grounding. It is precisely these factors which are the strengths in the work of Gruneau, Dunning and Sheard and Jarvie to name but a few authors.

An interest in developing historical sociology, in part marked by the work of Philip Abrams' *Historical Sociology* (1982), has clearly been influenced by theoretical controversies concerning the inadequacy of those sociology accounts that have been insensitive to historical concerns. Renewed attempts to construct historical sociological models of sport have taken a number of different forms. For instance, Allen Guttmann's *From Ritual to Record* (1978) develops a Weberian examination of sports transformation from its traditional to modern forms. It is interesting that Guttmann argues that one of the possible advantages to be gained from the Weberian model is that it does not reduce explanation to the economic determinism which, it is argued, has characterised many Marxist interpretations of sport. An alternative school of thought which has influenced a great deal of historical research on sport has been that of political economy and Marxist cultural analysis of the 1980s and 1990s.

The strategy which Gruneau develops in *Class, Sports and Social Development* involves relocating the paradoxical features of sport into a broader understanding of human agency, cultural production and their expressions in patterns of social development and social transformation. Having laid out the ground rules, the strategy which, in my opinion, is quite brilliantly developed, involves locating the analysis of sport within these classical concerns. This involves, (i) articulating the classical concerns of social development; (ii) acknowledging the essential unity of critical, interpretive,

empirical analysis; and (iii) understanding the limits and possibilities governing human choices as they are lived or experienced in different social and cultural settings.

In stark contrast the work of Dunning and Sheard in *Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players* lies not so much within the confines of political economy, but within the confines of Eliasian sociology. As such the concepts of figuration, social bonding and webs of interdependence are of central importance. For instance, the development of rugby football, it is argued, has been greatly influenced by various figurations, such as the public school, the British class structure and the conflict and tensions in the amateur and professional responses to the democratisation of rugby football. The process of development is continually emphasised through the frequent use of terms, such as urbanization, civilization, modernization and democratisation.

Although the texts differ in certain problematic respects, there are a number of similarities in the work of Dunning and Sheard (1979), Gruneau (1983) and Jarvie (1991). All three texts provide serious historical-sociological accounts of sport as opposed to descriptive, atheoretical types of analysis. All three texts are sensitive to questions about social patterns and social arrangements. For Gruneau, this is explained through the idea of different social and cultural formations, for Dunning and Sheard this is expressed through the concepts of figurational development and various webs of interdependence, and for Jarvie this is accounted for in a more eclectic manner through an utilisation of the concepts of dependency, culture and development. The key similarity in all three texts is that the problems are approached from historical sociological positions. In all cases, the historical is complemented by a penetrating sociological analysis. In this particular thesis, the notions of imperialism, culture and postcolonialism provide a useful theoretical framework for an analysis of sport in China which is sensitive to both Western and non-Western bodies of knowledge.

It is to an initial consideration of the existing research on sport in China that I now turn to. In many ways it is the strengths of the works alluded to above which are the weaknesses of the literature to date that has attempted to describe the history of sport in China. It is not that existing work is irrelevant but it has to be engaged in the act of synthesis of thought. Earlier studies have provided a great deal of empirical data that need not be dismissed because of various implicit or explicit epistemological concerns which have guided the arrangement of the data. While the first part of this chapter is largely concerned with various abstract concerns, the second part is of a more descriptive

nature. The major selected works considered here are reviewed in chronological order by date of the original publication.

Sport in China: A Critical Review

Published in 1990, *Sport in China* provides a substantive amount of empirical data on the development of physical culture in China (Knuttgen, Ma and Wu: 1990). The main empirical base for this text draws upon anthropological material as well as reports, national documents and letters. There are three parts to the book. Part one of the text covers in a descriptive manner the evolution and organisation of physical culture in what is now China. Chapters one and two provide an orthodox history of sport in China. Chapters three, four and five describe the organisation and administration of sport in China. Chapters six, seven and eight describe both traditional and contemporary Chinese sporting practice. Part two consists of chapters nine to thirteen and the main focus of this research is development of modern sports science and sports medicine in China. This part reviews Chinese research in physical education, sports medicine, physiology and biochemistry, biomechanics and psychology. It is interesting to note that part three is more futuristic in that the final chapter of this book looks to future directions and goals. China's involvement in the development and advancement of sport would suggest that significant progress has been made although it should be noted that the research allows the authors to speculate, like all futuristic accounts, beyond that which the evidence allows. A more congruent body of knowledge would acknowledge the processes of development that have contributed to Chinese sporting forms without necessarily speculating on future developments.

It is not necessary to discuss the whole book in order to establish the point that most of the folk origins of modern Chinese sporting culture have developed out of a number of antecedent traditional practices that existed prior to 1860. There has been a long tradition of indigenous Chinese thought that has grown out of a specific cultural context and has included both secular and non-secular philosophies of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. As chapter one suggests, there is some evidence to show that games were common many thousands of years ago. Art objects give some anthropological weight to the notion that a thriving physical culture existed before the birth of Christ. In some cases the available evidence is used to establish the ancient origins of Chinese physical culture. China not only developed and refined forms of exercise that were in complete contrast to that provided for in the West but also developed folk games similar to Western forms of soccer and hockey. It is acknowledged that

traditional Oriental sports such as Taijichuan, Qigong and Wushu have been distinctive forms of exercise that have been practiced for centuries. Yet, as I have already indicated in some instances, the authors, I believe, have attempted to hypothesise beyond the scope of the evidence provided.

More specifically, it might be suggested that ancient China had no forms of physical culture that corresponded directly to such practices as formal Western gymnastics. Yet it would be misleading to argue that ancient Chinese culture possessed nothing resembling sport. Some ancient Chinese forms of physical culture, such as *wuyong* (martial valour), *quanyong* (boxing valour), *xi* (games), *jiji* (art of attacking) and *yangsheng* (the art of keeping fit) are described in sufficient depth by Gu Shiquan (1990: 5-11) to illustrate that the ancient Chinese experienced physical culture in numerous forms. The most distinguishing characteristic of these cultural forms is that they were all closely associated with some activity, such as military training, symbolic ritual and sacrifices, medical treatment or artistic creation, to name but a few of the most common functions. Horsemanship and archery were basic military skills that developed into modern sporting forms. Running, throwing and jumping also evolved from military exercise, while wushu, or Chinese martial arts, made an important contribution to ancient Chinese culture (Speak, 1999: 22).

Physical culture in China can be traced as far back to Beijing man who lived over 500,000 years ago in the caves of Zhoukoudan (Gu, 1990: 4). Here thousands of skeletons of wild horses and deer suggest the great hunting and running ability of the ancient Chinese. In Shanxi province, pellets, bows, and arrows unearthed from the ruins of primitive settlements can be traced to anywhere between 28,000 to 40,000 years ago. The *Shang Shu* (Book of History), which records affairs in the Xia, Shang and Western Zhou dynasties (2100-771BC) claims "of the five happiness: the first is long life; the second is riches; the third is soundness of body and serenity of mind; the fourth is love of virtue; the fifth an end crowning the life" (Speak, 1999: 23). There were several schools of exercise, all which were concerned with longevity and achieving mental and physical harmony. As Speak points out, they were more concerned with internal organic function than musculature, strength and vigour (Speak, 1999: 23). The ancestral dances of the Wa nationality, who lived more than 3,400 years ago, are depicted upon cave paintings in Cangyuan, Yuannan provinces (Figure 1). Cave paintings support the existence of dance called *xiaozhongwu* (reduce-swelling dance) used in primitive times to cure both leg and foot diseases (Gu, 1990:4). From these discoveries and the study of related documents, fables and legends it might initially be suggested that numerous and varied Chinese physical and cultural pastimes

existed within ancient Chinese culture between 3,000 to 4,000 years ago. Ancient Chinese physical culture consisted of a large number of different activities and events (Figure 2) and these activities according to Gu may be classified within the following broad categories:

> Military sport: archery, chariot races, contests of strength, wushu (martial arts), jogging, jumping, throwing, hurling, weight lifting, football (soccer), polo, hunting, tug of war and swimming.
>
> Medical sports: qigong (breathing exercises), daoying (fitness exercise of which there were many forms), massage, yangsheng (keeping fit), fushi (keeping fit on a diet), taijiquan (traditional Chinese shadow boxing), yijinjing (exercises to relax the muscles), baduanjing (a set of exercises that comprised eight movements, each beneficial to a certain part of the body), manipulation of health-preserving balls, and climbing.
>
> Recreational games and sports: lishe (shooting arrows as part of a ceremony or for amusement), touhu (throwing darts into a pot), baixi (a general term for ancient Chinese songs, dances and aerobatics), singing and dancing, vehicle racing, horse racing, chess, kite flying, swinging, dragon-boat racing, aquatic sport, ice-skating, hiking and various other activities during festivals and at temple fairs (Gu, 1990: 5).

These sports, Gu argues (1990:5), constitute the largest collective subsystem of ancient Chinese physical culture. The most familiar modern sport that has developed out of these practices is wushu, which in earlier times was called either *wuyong* (military valour) or *wuyi* (military skill). The practice of Wushu may be divided into two categories: the art of fighting barehanded and the art of fighting with weapons. Archery, fencing, boxing, wrestling and weight lifting were all practiced by foot soldiers during the period of the Warring States (475-221 BC). Exercises were performed naturally or with implements and, as infantry supplemented cavalry and chariots, a variety of forms of wushu were employed for training artisans and foot soldiers. Forms of physical culture were also developed for personal fitness training and entertainment. Other antecedent forms of physical culture were, according to the author, closely related to the development of military skills. Gu (1990:7) emphasizes that *Jiaoli* (wrestling), for example, was actually a general term used for military weight training. Later on, it became an acrobatic exercise. The Yuan and Ming Dynasties (AD 1279-1644) developed various events that were officially categorised into "18 kinds of military skills" which represented the essence of all Chinese martial arts with various ancient weapons (Yu, 1985: 155). Following the introduction of Western guns and cannons into China in 1860s, the ancient military skills gradually lost their combat value as they developed into healthy forms of popular exercises.

During the period of the Five Dynasties (AD 907-979), a sport similar to wrestling developed. Two ball games were popular in China in ancient times: *cuju* or *taju* (a kind of foot ball) (Figure 3) and jiju or *daqiu* (a kind of horse polo) (Figure 4). Both were used in military training. An antecedent form

of soccer was first played in China during the period of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States (770-221 BC). In the beginning, *cuju* was probably a folk game, but it developed into a kind of military art. During the Han Dynasty (206BC- AD220), according to Cui (1998:18) and Speak's (1999:33) argument, Li Yu's (AD 50-130) poem "*Ju Cheng Ming*" (foot ball wall epigraph) *cuju* involved two teams; had two judges; was played in a square field surrounded by walls; and had six sets of goals. During the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907), the number of goals was reduced to two, one for each side (Gu, 1990: 8). The game of polo was probably introduced into China from Central Asia and became a highly developed sport during the Tang Dynasty. The wars that the Tang Empire waged against the Turks and other minority nationalities facilitated the development of skillful riders. Polo provided not just a form of military training for cavalrymen but also entertainment for the nobility. The evolution of *chuiwan* (a variety of field hockey) (Figure 5) was in turn influenced by polo. However, the popularity of these ancient forms of football and polo had begun to decline by the Ming and Qing Dynasties (AD 1368-1911) (Gu, 1990: 7-10).

The authors argue that for at least 3,000 or 4,000 years, the Chinese people have continually devised various forms of physical culture for enhancing and maintaining physical fitness (Gu, 1990: 4). *Qigong* is but one form of physical fitness, which has a history of over 3,000 years in China. It is an activity that is aimed at strengthening the body's vital energy and it was often attractive as a form of a popular recreation (Wang, 1990: 92). *Qigong* has been considered as an important means of curing diseases, prolonging life, and improving the skills of participants in *wushu* (martial arts). Two other activities that appeared about the same time as the *qigong* are the *jingzuo* (sitting in silence or meditation) and daoying, which was a healing art. A mental approach was often linked to physical exercise. Chinese physicians often recommended gentle, non-vigorous forms of exercise since vigorous exercise made it impossible to achieve the harmony of breathing, movement and mood (Speak, 1999: 23). This initial discussion of *Sport in China* has been instrumental in establishing the fact that various forms of physical culture existed within ancient China. *Sport in China* makes a valuable contribution to our knowledge about sport in China. Since most of the contributors are amongst China's leading sport authorities, this book may be viewed as providing an orthodox and authoritative official view on China's sport and physical education. It examines the evolution and organisation of China's physical education, culture and sport. It provides a vast amount of historical data and materials relevant to Chinese sports history. It focuses upon the development of research programmes in the various

disciplines of sport science and sport medicine and provides for some valuable visual evidence by providing 80 photographs which offer a rare insight into the history of sport in China.

However, there are some disappointing aspects of the research. First, since this book's contributors are viewed as leading authorities in China, most of their views can be seen to follow government statements. Therefore, the content tends to reflect the political history of governments. Second, one of the major problems that any researcher faces when trying to pinpoint the exact origin of events, such as Chinese ancient physical culture is the fragmentary nature of the evidence. Chinese tradition itself helps to explain this occurrence since so many of the legends, customs, and traditions of Chinese communities have tended to be passed on from generation to generation by word of mouth rather than being written down. In an attempt to enhance the origin of this Chinese traditional physical culture, one of the key problems that have pervaded many of the early accounts of Chinese history is that careful attention has not been given to the exact evidence (Gu, 1990: 4). For example, Beijing man lived over 500,000 years ago in the caves of Zhoukoudan, and as Gu suggests Beijing man is ancient Chinese who had a great running ability. This is questionable anthropological speculation. While Gu traces back the physical culture of the Xia Dynasty, there is in fact no careful documentation of evidence, or archaeological record to confirm this Chinese historical myth. As such this thesis might agree with Hegel who emphasized that the mythical and perhistorical is often treated by Chinese historians as perfectly historical (Hegel, 1956: 118).

The concept of detachment occupies a central place in Elias's discussions concerning the nature of scientific enquiry (Elias, 1956; 1987). He describes it on a number of occasions as standing back from reflected objects of thought, self-distancing and stepping back from something in order to look again. Existing modes of scientific enquiry, especially in the social science, have often been perverted by the various overtly ideological or political stances that various scientific establishments or schools of thought have adopted. The sociologist as a "destroyer of myths" is well equipped, argues Elias, to replace such involved practices by less overtly ideological, more scientific knowledge about human relationships (Elias, 1978: 50-70). The task of the sociologist as a relatively detached researcher or practitioner of a relatively autonomous science is to add to human knowledge by providing alternative forms of understanding which not only contribute to a reorganization of perception and thought, but cut through increasingly abstract bodies of knowledge. Keeping in mind what was said earlier concerning the use of the original documents as the real subject matter of history, the point that

needs to be made is that there is no original document of 3,000 to 4,000 years ago to verify incidents of ancient physical and cultural pastimes. This is not to say that the cave paintings within the Cangyuan and Yuannan provinces either did or did not take place, but merely that there is not enough empirical evidence to argue categorically that this was the point of origin of ancient Chinese physical culture. After the 1860s, *wushu* and other military sports were replaced by Western military drills (Gu, 1990: 15). Yet the point that this thesis wishes to establish here is that modern Chinese sport has not developed in some historical or social vacuum, but has in fact developed out of a number of antecedent physical cultural practices which pre-date the 1860s.

In other words, the fact that this thesis takes as its starting point a period from about 1860 does not necessarily imply that this was the starting point for the development of sport in China. It is precisely this type of careful consideration that was commented upon by Elias (1983: 5) when discussing the work of the historian L.Von Ranke. In agreement with Ranke, Elias insisted upon the careful documentation of original evidence. The documents, the original sources of information are in many cases the very substance of history. Without the meticulous documentation of reliable historical sources, there is a very real danger of subjective interpretation of the subject matter. The historian runs the risk of selecting from events of the past in the light of what he or she approves or disapproves in the present. Not that meticulous documentation on its own is sufficient. It needs to be guided, informed and orientated by a body of reliable theory. In other words, it is the inter-dependence of theory and data which is an ongoing exercise required in each case and it is this which is lacking in *Sport in China.*

The strength of Gu's work lies in its empirical grounding of the subject matter from the eighteenth century onwards. I have argued, though, that, owing to the lack of concrete evidence regarding the past Chinese oral tradition and a lack of detachment from the subject matter, it is impossible to establish the validity of the claim that Chinese physical culture existed as early as or before 2,500 years ago and all that can be said is that modern Chinese sporting forms have developed out of an antecedent folk culture which existed before 1860. I shall develop this position further through considering the work of Susan Brownell.

Published in 1995, *Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People's Republic* attempts to locate an analysis of sport in Chinese culture and society within a particular framework or problematic. It draws upon a burgeoning body of literature which emanates from an interest in body culture. In the introduction the reader is led to believe that the promise of the book lies

in the examination of the body from historical, cultural and sociological perspectives. The text is essentially eclectic in that Brownell attempts to weave a number of perspectives into a discussion of the relationship between different facets of social differentiation and sport in China. To this extent Brownell's research is a major advance over the work of Knuttgen, Ma and Wu in that it attempts to explain rather than describe some of the cultural influences that have helped to shape the development of sport in China.

More specifically, Brownell highlights three main assumptions that have influenced the interpretation of sport presented throughout the book. First, it is accepted that sport itself is not some free floating set of bodily practices that merely exists outside of the culture of China. It is recognised from the start that sport should be incorporated into a thorough analysis of body culture. In this sense Brownell adopts an anthropological approach to the notion of sport on body culture. Second Brownell acknowledges that any understanding of body culture in Chinese society must utilise the notion of power. The notion of power has proved to be a fruitful, analytical concept for most social and political theorists. Much neo-Marxist, and in particular cultural materialist, discussion of sport and power have concentrated upon the process by which the main features of power in social and cultural life have been mobilised and reproduced. Finally Brownell stresses that sporting events should be viewed as body culture and in this sense her research echoes much of what is contained within Henning Eichberg's discussions of body (Bale, Eichberg and Philo, 1998). Indeed, elsewhere Brownell acknowledges that much of the thinking behind *Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People's Republic* owes much of its intellectual grounding to the work of Eichberg (Brownell, 1998). Leading from these thoughts about body culture, one of the many strengths of Brownell's intervention is that her studies tackle the inter-section of body culture with other areas of space and individual and collective identity. There are various contemporary currents of inquiry in history, anthropology, and sociology which talk about the intersection of the human body with social life. All of those recognise the complex ways in which the body is constructed, viewed, interpreted within various discourses and practices (Shilling, 1993; Turner, 1996).

While the work of Brownell at the level of theory is perhaps the most sophisticated study of sport in China to date, nonetheless a number of issues and reservations must be briefly mentioned in the context of the argument that is presented in this thesis. Most of these concerns lie at the substantive level with the examples that Brownell has used to illustrate her argument about body culture in China.

For instance, in her discussion of gender and walking styles within various convent schools in China Brownell emphasises that Western walking styles for young girls were no doubt influenced by Western forms of physical education (Brownell, 1995:9). It is asserted that Chinese walking style which is rooted in traditional forms of physical training has been overtly influenced by Western culture. Yet in the sense that no detailed comparison is made in the text between Chinese and Western walking styles it might be suggested that Brownell has overstated the case in that the substantive evidence upon which such a comparison might be made is not presented in the text.

Brownell emphasises that the earliest forms of physical education were introduced by Japanese and Germans cultures which were themselves developing new concepts of the body which were influenced by nationalist ideology. German physical education was moving away from the body as subject toward the body as object (Eichberg, 1993). In the course of its march into modernity, and under Western influence, China also moved away from the Taoist "way of life-cultivation" and towards "physical education". The female implications were lost in the move to the gender-neutral, inanimate *ti* (body). Brownell illustrates that in today's China, the instrumental, gender-neutral body is unquestionably the focus of the culture of the body. It is arguable whether the Chinese have to throw away the thought of Taoist "way of life-cultivation" when they accept physical education. Is Chinese traditional culture incompatible with physical education? It is true that Brownell's thinking on China has been influenced by Max Weber's *The Religion of China* (1951). Weber's characterisation of Taoism is a system of negative and conservative values incapable of developing a dynamic social orientation toward capitalism. Weber thus located the decisive differentiating element in the passive and traditionalist character in Confucian and Taoist values, explaining why capitalism developed in the West but not in China (Weber, 1951: 63-84). It is not necessary to debate weather Weber's view is right or wrong, but it raises other questions: Is physical education a kind of social phenomenon of Western capitalism only? Or did sport develop in China as an attribute of Chinese traditional thoughts?

Body techniques, in Brownell's thought, have occupied a very important position in the arena of cultural contest in China since the late nineteen-century. She emphasises that there are two lessons to be learned from the history of body techniques and their public dramatizations (Brownell, 1995: 62). First, body culture is never as simple as it is depicted in such performances as the National Games. She explains that Chinese people could cut the queue (pig-tail), throw off the long gown and the footbinding, but that these were only the visible manifestations of an entire orientation to the world that

was not so easy to transform (Brownell, 1995: 62). The second lesson is that modern sports have occupied a definite place in the Chinese moral order, but that this place has been constructed differently at different times in history (Brownell, 1995: 62). Reformers and revolutionaries, for instance, emphasized their newness and foreignness in their attempt to break with the traditions of the imperial past. Modern sports were perceived as being in opposition to martial arts which were hailed by traditionalists as essentially Chinese and attacked by reformers as outmoded and feudal. However, Barrington Moore (1967: 178) has argued that Western scholarship has overemphasized the significance of the condescending attitude of Chinese gentry to the Western "barbarians". He reminds us that factions of Chinese gentry did not hesitate to adopt or assimilate Western mores, traditions and social habits (Barrington Moore: 1967: 179). A more recent study has commented that, among serious Chinese thinkers of the 1890s, Western technology was considered to be a panacea for China's perceived economic backwardness (Feuerwerker, 1958: 37). If there was any cultural barrier to technical improvement, it does seem to have been insurmountable (Barrington Moore: 1967: 179). In agreement with Barrington Moore, it is important to underline the fact that no problem exists outside its cultural and political context. Furthermore, within any given country it is likely that specific forms and causal explanation might not fit easily with general ground theories (Barrington Moore: 1967: xi-xiii).

Brownell emphasizes that sport may offer insights into the inter-connectedness between discipline and belief. Drawing open personal experience, she argues that her experiences in China did not feel any different because she was rooted within an authoritarian regime. On the contrary, it is argued that her routines as an athlete were in many ways similar to that experienced in the United States of America. It is impossible to represent Chinese athlete training ignoring the political power and influence of sport. Empirical experience may provide some truth, however, that the notion of detachment as outlined by Elias is important (Elias, 1956; 1987). The task of a sociologist as a relatively detached researcher or practitioner and "destroyer of myths" is not necessarily borne out in the works of Brownell. As Durkheim (1964: 102) has argued "When the individual has been eliminated, society alone remains". We must, then, seek the explanation of social life in the nature of society itself. It is quite evident that since it infinitely surpasses the individual in time as well as in space, it is in a position to impose upon him/her ways of acting and thinking which are consistent with prestige. This pressure, which is the distinctive property of social facts, is the pressure which the totality exerts on the individual. It may be seen as one of the weak points in Brownell's book that she

explains Chinese social phenomena without acknowledging the specific interplay between structure and agency.

The text under discussion is one of the first to put the body at the centre of academic study and thus explore a new dimension of sport in Chinese culture. Brownell does not ignore the dominant moments in history which have, in part, helped to shape or transform Chinese tradition. However, it is important to recognise that such dominant moments in history were in fact comprised of groups or figurations of people. The failure to personify and to conceptualise the very complex way in which both Chinese social formation and Chinese physical culture have developed has led Brownell to an empirical type of analysis.

This is not to say that there is no place in sociological research for empirical studies. In all cases, these are indispensable, but the point of issue, according to Elias (1956), rests with the theoretical hypothesis upon which such empirical studies are undertaken. Empirical research without theory often facilitates only limited access to the problems of "deep" structures, changing figurations of people and many other sociological problems. The theoretical framework of figurational sociology goes beyond simple description in an attempt to fully comprehend the social significance of the phenomena being studied. For instance, a greater sensitivity in Brownell's work to such notions as power and social development would have provided a fuller explanation of the significance of Chinese body culture in the development of the Chinese social formation.

Brownell also focuses on sports as daily practice and as cultural performance (Brownell, 1995:15). She argues that the concept of body culture can be used to analyze any level of difference-ethnic, national, class, and gender, etc.—because it draws our attention to the practical differences that really matter. Bodies are immensely important to the people to whom they belong. Pain, hunger, fatigue, sexual desire, and so on, are central to the people who are experiencing such phenomenon. An ethnographic account that overlooks the body, may, it might be argued, omit the centre of human experience. Brownell thinks that the human body's feeling is important as daily practice and cultural performance. Nonetheless, it is also important to rethink the precise relationship between imperialism and the colonised human body's feeling. For example, Fanon constantly exposes the interplay of psychological and political factors showing that colonialism affects individuals as well as societies. Fanon's work (1956; 1967; 1986; 1990) forces us to take psychoanalysis seriously and to attend to the pervasive influence of empire in fantasy, fiction, ideology and sport.

As previously mentioned, Brownell also draws out Eichberg's perspective on the body and thus the problematic correctly emphasises the multiple roles of the body in the social process and historical change (Eichberg, 1989: 49). This approach seems to reconstitute a whole notion of body/self through the concept of body culture. It attempts to overcome the fragmenting effects of competitive sports, with their dichotomies of elite versus mass sport, professional versus amateur, performance versus health, and so on (Eichberg, 1993: 52-56). More specifically, the central ideas in Eichberg's analysis of sport are the concept of configuration, the experience of space and time, the critique of alienation, identity and Western productivity and the modernity of sport as a historical leap (Eichberg, 1993: 258). As such, Eichberg has created a synthesis that goes far beyond the original constitutional parts and in this sense there is a degree of overlap between the work of Brownell, Eichberg and the work presented in this thesis.

In conclusion, Brownell's work provides a valuable contribution in terms of empirical references, observations on Chinese sport and body culture, and the relatively theoretical text relying heavily upon Western academic analysis. However, it is the contention of this thesis that the research underplays the notion of imperialism. In her book, she is using a Western point of view to represent Chinese body culture. The book fails to analyze the relationship between native or indigenous cultural identity and "otherness". This is especially the case given the Chinese resistance and opposition to contemporary Western thought. On the other hand, China seeks to "break out of Asia and advance into the world" with a strong political purpose (Brownell, 1995: 33). Accordingly, we may see hybridised ambivalence to sport development in China. For instance, while Chinese leaders intend to appropriate Western sports as a tool to promote Chinese nationalism against Western imperialism, at the same time they resist Western culture as a means of enlightenment in terms of democracy. I shall examine further the influence of Western sport in modern China through a discussion of the work of Fan Hong.

Published in 1997, *Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom: The Liberation of Women's Bodies in Modern China* provides a deeply textural and well-documented account of the struggle and contribution made by women's physical culture in Modern China. The author's central thesis is that the emancipation of women cannot be understood adequately without recognizing their struggle for physical freedom (Fan, 1997: 78). The study contributes not only to our knowledge about sport and physical culture in Modern China, but also to a growing body of feminist literature on sport which marks as its point of departure the emancipation of women through sport and exercise. In this sense

Fan Hong's research acknowledges that exercise is an important cultural practice in the construction of male supremacy, patriarchy and social control in China. Her research acknowledges the place of theory and history in that it draws upon historical archival documentation and various theoretical models.

The strengths of Fan Hong's research are, I believe, that (i) the thesis exposes a conservative/ traditional Chinese culture which has contributed to the control of women in modern China; (ii) it highlights empirically the struggle for emancipation within the women's movement in China; (iii) it provides an evolutionary study of women's exercise and its relationship to their emancipation within modern Chinese society; and (iv) it acknowledges that modern Chinese women's participation in physical activity has not only challenged traditional patriarchy and its definition of women, but it has also helped to contribute a vision of freedom for some Chinese women.

However, the way in which the author discusses the issues of hegemony, exercise and empowerment is somewhat problematic. She suggests that exercise is a cultural sphere in which a dominant group may attempt to legitimate its power. It fails to acknowledge the way hegemony established in this way is always incomplete and open to challenge from subordinate cultures. In other words, the ruling group places ideological, moral and structural constraints on "other" thoughts and activities, but these constraints do not fully determine outcomes since individuals and groups retain the ability to act as historical agents, thinking critically and acting transformatively (Gruneau, 1988: 11-27). Exercise, like many cultural spheres, is often dominated by the values of the superior group, but it does not prevent subordinate groups from restructuring and redefining exercise in their own ways in order to meet their needs (Mangan, 1981; Holt, 1989). Consequently exercise may be conceptualised as a contested cultural terrain. Its interpretation and implementation are invariably subject to struggle and nowhere is this clearer than in modern China. Fan Hong argues that studies of women's exercise and emancipation in China should concentrate on two issues: first, how the ideological meanings of gender are produced, presented and enacted and second the relationship of exercise to women's cultural identity. Fan acknowledges that the concepts of exercise, hegemony and empowerment are fundamental to her thesis, but at times she tends to undervalue the role of other cultural spheres such as religion.

Furthermore, in discussion of the development of Modern China, Barrington Moore (1966: 205-207) considers the way in which social class helped in the consolidation of the aristocratic social relationships which governed Chinese society. The work of Fan Hong neglects an analysis of the

relations of domination which may result from the unequal distribution of power in terms of social class. With particular reference to the thesis that is presented here, I believe that the author also overlooks geographical, historical and ethnic distinctions between and within superior groups and subordinate groups in Chinese society; and more importantly between Western and Chinese culture.

Within a discussion of religion, emancipation and exercise, Fan (1997: 4-6) believes that Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity have exerted an impact upon Chinese culture and society. She asserts that Confucianism has disproportionately dominated the period up to about 1840. Different schools of Confucianism played a crucial role in the construction of the social order and the complex images of masculinity and femininity in China. The author, I believe, misunderstands the type of Confucianism that is based upon the ancient yin-yang doctrine of polarity. It has been argued elsewhere that it is difficult to outline the precise role of Confucianism as a Chinese religion (Han, 1998: 197-204). Confucianism, essentially, is a system of social ethics. The concept of Li (rites and ceremonies) lies at the heart of the system. In a traditional Confucian society, all interpersonal relationships were held together by a hierarchy of social roles. Each role functioned in the manner prescribed in the Confucian texts. Fan mistakenly says that, in Confucianism, one harsh reality was that the yin-yang doctrine was adopted to confine women to a subordinate position. Physical constraints, in particular footbinding, served as a practical means to confine women to the home. Female bodies were restrained to actualise and symbolise their subordinate role. Exercise had a place in the Confucian texts and it was essentially educational. Its purpose was to achieve a well-developed morality through non-competitive physical activity. Fan accepts that Chinese physical activities under Confucianism lost their earlier degree of competitiveness, but fails to acknowledge the reality of the yin-yang doctrine.

The liberal ideas of Christianity also contributed to the progressive imperial forces of change which penetrated 19th century China. It could be suggested that they provided comparatively more opportunities for freedom, and along with a happier vision of the future within Confucianism. Christianity brought to Chinese women the normality of unmutilated limbs - as the basic requirement of physical emancipation. The major weakness here is Fan's blurred vision of yin-yang doctrines allied with Confucianism, Christianity and Taoism. In fact, yin-yang was seen as a Chinese philosophy of natural harmony. The correct balance was seen to have creative properties, resulting in the bearing of offspring, the ripening of crops and the prevalence of social harmony. The results of any imbalance

appeared as undesirable situations as diverse as political disorder, unseasonal climatic conditions and physical illness (Dillon, 1998: 370-371).

Within the notion of "Culture, Emancipation and Exercise" Fan (1997: 6-8) appreciates the positive Western influence on Chinese women's bodies. Especially, Western women's freedom in participation in physical exercise, and public opinion gradually accepted the value of women's exercise. In contrast, some Chinese patriots insisted on the retention of traditional physical activities (Fan, 1997: 7). They argued that China should maintain traditional activities within their non-competitive nature as a way of maintaining good health, a symbol of national identity and a source of national solidarity (Fan, 1997: 7). They strongly advocated non-participation in Western competitive exercise, which they saw as a danger to Chinese ancient culture. They failed to see that the non-competitive nature of Chinese exercise had helped to make China incapable of facing up to, and successfully adapting to, new trends and new forces in the world. Moreover, they refused to endorse women's involvement in modern exercise. This is very similar to Brownell's (1997: 62) view on some Chinese traditionalists, who were under attack by reformers, who insisted upon the importance of Chinese traditional sport in the early twentieth century (1997: 62). Both Fan and Brownell overstate the extent to which, there was any Chinese radical resistance to Western culture. They perhaps also overstate the role of Western sport within China's modernisation. Fan states (1997: 8) that proselytisers of progress argued that the ancient culture and its associated physical forms of activity failed to meet the new needs of society. New social challenges required a new robustness for men and women. Western exercise, it is claimed, helped to meet these requirements and yet the author fails to acknowledge the notion of this activity as a form of colonial imperialism?

Women's widespread participation in exercise, Fan (1997: 11) points out, has changed the traditional image of Chinese women. Women's activities and general participation in exercise are precipitating, reinforcing and reflecting changes in the role of women. Even more positive prospects are clearly discernible for women both in exercise and in society as China slowly (at present) accommodates itself to new ideological pressures, and the third phase of Western ideological hegemony (contemporary capitalism). But such change also brings its problems for women. On this point, Fan's thesis is concerned with (i) the role of women in modern Chinese culture and society; and (ii) the role of women's exercise in relation to women's status in their modern physiological, psychological, educational, cultural and political progress towards emancipation.

However, from the standpoint adopted in this thesis there are at least three concerns with the research presented by Fan. First, she believes that Western exercise has emancipated women from their traditional culture in China. Yet she fails to liberate herself from Western thought and Western hegemony and consequently this affects her analysis. Second, although hegemonic relationships are mentioned on many occasions, the analysis fails to acknowledge different sexes, different classes, different regimes, different thoughts and different cultures through the history of China. Third, there are some confusions between some Chinese thought and Western thought in her book. For instance, yin-yang it is argued owes its origin to Yin-yang school of thought (403-221 B.C.) rather than Confucianism. It is important to examine Chinese culture from Chinese perspectives rather than Western perspectives. Fourth, Fan's work fails to acknowledge dominant classes and cultures. Her claim is that Western exercise, its theories and practices could bring a new vigour to feudal Chinese culture and to the Chinese people, and that central to this process was the need for women to achieve the emancipation of their bodies. It is necessary to rethink the influence of Western culture and the power relationships between China and Western countries in any account of sport in modern China.

Summary

In this chapter, I have attempted to identify a series of fundamental points of departure upon which to base an analysis of sport in China. I have argued that it is not necessary to view sporting practices in China as a peripheral or meaningless focus of historical sociological enquiry. We live in a world where exposure to Western sporting practices in various forms is almost inescapable, yet as a focus of critical enquiry sport in China is rarely viewed as posing problems which require more than simply superficial explanation. Sport in China may be romanticised, mythologised, demonised or even disliked, but as a focus of analysis it is not something that is usually systematically analysed, criticised, deconstructed from a non-Western standpoint or situated within the broader context of historical sociology.

Consider the following problems: What is/was the relationship between sport in China and the broader social structure prevailing at any given time? How has sport in China been affected by the historical epoch in which it moves? In what ways does/has sport in China reflect (ed) broader issues of imperialism and postcolonialism? In what ways has Western thinking influenced existing accounts of

sport in China? What social and historical forces have shaped the development of sport in China? What can a critical analysis of sport tell us about the relationship between China and Taiwan?

I have raised these questions as an indication of the potential richness that may be found in a thesis that has as its central focus the development of sport in China. Sport in China certainly did not develop within some social or historical vacuum. There is still some credibility in the assertion that the most classical problems in sociology are intimately connected to historical transformation over time. An interest in some of the dominant organising principles of particular historical periods and their effects on institutional arrangements in those periods was central to what C. Wright Mills (1970) called the classical tradition in sociology and, while this general principle has influenced research into the sociology of sport, it has largely if not completely been associated with historical sociological accounts of sport in Western social formations. Yet as I shall attempt to illustrate throughout this thesis, the degree to which social changes in Chinese sport have paralleled broader transformations within Chinese society is an issue which encompasses some of the most basic questions that might be asked about the relationship between sport in China and various historical or/and sociological forces, such as feudalism, imperialism, capitalism and postcolonialism. These are not meant to be an exhaustive or complete set of forces, but merely an illustrative guide to the general thrust of this thesis in which the originality lies not only in the critical analysis of sport in China, but in the fact that it is the first thesis of this type to be sensitive to the weaknesses of Western thought and the potential contribution made by indigenous Chinese thinkers to the problematic that is developed throughout this thesis. A major thrust in this chapter has been to argue that certain problems exist with the works that have contributed to our present knowledge about sport in China. In my critique of the conventional wisdom on this subject, I have indicated that the works of Susan Brownell, Fan Hong, Howard Knuttgen, Ma Qiwei and Wu Zhongyuan, while providing valuable insights into aspects of sport in China, are nonetheless inadequate. Brownell's work provides an academic study of body culture and explores a new dimension sport of Chinese society. However, she is using Western academic views to observe sport and body culture in China which might be inconsistent with facts. Fan's work on Chinese women's emancipation in sport and physical culture contributes to historical study on Chinese sport and physical culture's historical study. Yet her investigation is also influenced by the Western value of physical culture. Knuttgen, Ma and Wu supply valuable data on Chinese sports development. Nevertheless, their work is weak on the broader context within which Chinese sport has developed.

As a focus of analysis, sport in China is capable of providing a great deal of information about various processes, tensions, conflicts, and groups of people who have been part of China's social development. However, it is important to differentiate between superficial descriptive accounts of sporting practice which attempt to explain what sport is like, and more theoretical, serious critical approaches to sport. In agreement with the type of work that is represented in the work of Dunning and Sheard, Gruneau and Jarvie, I have argued that the most fruitful focus for this study is to situate the analysis of sport in China within the broader context of historical sociology in general and history and social development in particular. In this specific instance this involves an attempt to locate the study of sport in China within an analysis of Chinese history and social development.

I have been critical too of studies that have been overtly dependent upon Western forms of thinking. This is not to deny the potential of Western knowledge, but I have tried to be sensitive to indigenous forms of social and cultural thinking which have been critical of the hegemony of Western thought in China. As social meanings attached to certain bodies of knowledge change over time, new forms of reconciliation between bodies of knowledge and prospective routes to social change might be possible. New borderlands between ways of thinking might emerge which avoid the dualism inherent within Western versus non-Western bodies of knowledge. This thesis has adopted the position that the most persuasive type of analysis are those that provide examples of historical analysis combined with fruitful theorising and a tighter fit between theory and evidence. It has acknowledged that the problem with Western thought is not to deny its existence or ability to travel the globe, but to caution against its universality. Why should non-Western social formations accept Western thought uncritically? Why should any thesis or any social movement have faith in an alien body of knowledge and risk marginalisation or even solidarity with itself? The problematic that informs this thesis is a unique synthesis of Western knowledge that is sensitive to indigenous critiques from within China as well as Chinese knowledge. The next chapter explores such a problematic explicitly and in greater depth.

CHAPTER TWO: IMPERIALISM, CULTURE AND POSTCOLONIALISM

This chapter returns to the more general problem that is posed throughout this thesis. Do we need new ways of thinking about sport in China? Before outlining one particular eclectic approach it is perhaps useful to outline what is meant in this thesis by the term problematic. A problematic may be defined as definite theoretical structure, a field of concepts, which organise a particular science or text or thesis in a particular way by making it possible to ask some kinds of questions while at the same time suppressing others. One aspect of the practice of critique is to render explicit what is implicit within the text and to consider the implications of this underlying position. Problematics themselves may simplify or homogenise certain ways of seeing things but the method adopted here does not come from any particular paradigm such as Marxism or feminism or postmodernism, but does in fact grow from different existing bodies of thought and therefore builds a new way of explaining sport in China. It is implicit from the outset that all aspects of the problematic are not from the same domain and therefore by definition a new order of knowledge, however eclectic, may emerge from this thesis.

The concept of imperialism has certainly much to offer in terms of providing a contribution to a problematic for situating the development of sport in China. Many of the social commentaries on sport in China have emphasised the fact there are many aspects of imperialism that have influenced past and present social structures and which are relevant to the study of Chinese culture (Becker, 1986; Bickers, 1999). Such an analysis of the conflict between Chinese imperialism and different forms of Western imperialism is not the central feature of this chapter. I merely want to briefly illustrate the possible practical relevance of utilising imperialism as a starting point for asking questions about Chinese social development. Since many of the practical and political consequences of any analysis stem from the concepts used.

The notion of imperialism may be seen to refer to the domination or control by one country or group of people over others, in ways that are assumed to be at the expense of the latter. Beyond this sweeping simplistic definition there is much disagreement over the precise nature and causes of imperialism. The word itself is controversial and fraught with all sorts of polemics closely associated with words and concepts such as inferior, dependency, expansion, and authority. Imperialism might be simply viewed as the process of establishing and maintaining an empire and although the direct forms of colonialism are less evident today, imperialism lingers on in a number of ways, not least of which

through forms of cultural imperialism (Said, 1993). It might be more constructive to refer to the notion of imperialism as a paradigm or set of paradigms in the sense that there is no one theory of imperialism but rather a number of competing explanations. In this chapter I want to review some of the key criticisms that have emerged out of a body of knowledge on imperialism. For instance, one of the key criticisms that emerged through the earlier work of Edward Said was that theories of imperialism failed to provide an adequate theorising of culture. In a critique of his earlier work Said (1993) was quick to acknowledge that the problem with *Orientalism* was that it omitted a particular reaction or response to Western forms of dominance which gave rise to the decolonisation movement across the Third World.

While many of the issues covered in *Orientalism* might not be seen to be fundamental to understand the development of sport and social development in China, the Orientalist discourse was not merely restricted to the colonial past but continues to mediate coverage of the contemporary world as discussed by journalists, scholars, architects and others who write about the 'post' age. Therefore, the postcolonial period might be introduced as a framing device to characterise the second half of the twentieth century. It is a device that has at least two dimensions to it in that it refers to both the colonial period and what it has given us in terms of theories and evidence but also a sensitivity to the fact that decolonization does not necessary entail an immediate escape from colonial discourse. Together the concepts of imperialism, culture and postcolonialism provide a set of problematic and deliberately eclectic guidelines that inform this study. More specifically this chapter addresses the following themes: (i) a brief note in imperialism; (ii) a cultural critique of the imperialism paradigm; and (iii) a Chinese critique of imperialism and culture which utilises the notion of postcolonialism.

Imperialism: A Brief Critique

The early imperialism debate literally defined the term in relation to empire-ism or matters pertaining to empire (Marshall, 1994). Theories of imperialism attempted to provide explanations for the expansion of European control after 1870. Writers such as Hobson, Bukharin, Luxemburg and Lenin focused on economic factors, such as the rational pursuit of raw material markets. Schumpeter (1919) defined imperialism as the non-rational and objectless effort on behalf of a state seeking unlimited and forcible expansion. Imperialism was seen to be rooted in the psychology of rulers, and the effects of surviving pre-capitalist social structures and the economic interests of expanding nations or classes. All the above versions of imperialism share a Eurocentric focus and are challenged by views

which emphasis pull factors- that is the contribution made at the periphery by local crises, sometimes induced by foreign intervention, and the way in which collaboration amongst indigenous elites coped with and hoped to solve local crises. An initial fundamental point informing this thesis is a rejection of any tendency to adopt Eurocentric view as a natural form of universalism.

There remains an enormous ambiguity between the economic and political connotations of the word. If imperialism is defined as a political system in which an imperial centre governs colonised countries, then the granting of political independence logically signals the end or collapse of imperialism. If imperialism is essentially defined as an economic system of penetration and control of markets then political changes do not necessarily affect it. American imperialism, for instance, may be viewed in the late twentieth century as wielding a strong militaristic and economic power across the globe without necessarily having direct political control. It is necessary to illustrate that many of the debates about imperialism have emanated from external sources of knowledge and power many of which have been Western in orientation and location.

Before moving on to a critique of imperialism, I should like to draw together some initial observations from the literature on imperialism. It would be wrong to suggest that any theoretical explanation of imperialism have been limited to mono-causal explanations of imperialism. By way of summary it might be suggested that historically states have been motivated to pursue imperialism for a variety of reasons, some of which may be classified broadly as economic, political, and ideological. Economic explanations of imperialism have been the most common. Proponents of this view hold that states are motivated to dominate others by the need to expand their economies, to acquire raw materials and additional sources of labour, or to find outlets for surplus capital and markets for surplus goods. The most prominent economic theories, linking imperialism with capitalism, are derived from the classical Marxists. Lenin, for example, explained the European expansion of the late nineteenth century as the inevitable outcome of the need for the European capitalist economies to export their surplus capital. Similarly, contemporary Marxists explain the post-war expansion of the United States of America into the Third World in terms of economic imperatives. This involves using the Third World as a focus of investment and as a source of profit, a market for goods and a supplier of raw materials. The effect on Third World countries is primarily that of reducing the mode of internal development by concentrating their economic development own a limited range of activities, often owned by foreign monopolies, and involving the transfer of resources to the advanced capitalist countries. Even within

Marxist approaches there are disagreements and interventions by writers such as Warren (1980) who has argued that colonialism and imperialism have in fact helped promote capitalist development in the Third World rather than hold it back.

Alternatively, some stress the political determinants of imperialism, contending that states are motivated to expand primarily by the desire for power, prestige, security, and diplomatic advantages vis-à-vis other states. In this view, late nineteenth century French imperialism was intended to restore France's international prestige after its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Similarly, Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe after 1945 as well as the Soviet "bloc" up to 1990 can be understood in terms of security needs, specifically the need to protect the nation from another invasion across its Western border. More recently, the example of when Iraq invaded Kuwait in the 1991 and 1998 wars and Anglo-American support for Kuwait illustrated that forms imperialism are resilient even in the contemporary world. This turn of events was all the more remarkable because it came in the wake of the widespread acceptance the belief that the world was entering a post-imperialist era. Two main reasons may provide this brief of explanation. The first reason is "a new world order" in which disputes between states could be settled peacefully under the advocacy of the United Nations. Now we can see very clearly that the new world order is merely the same old imperialists, except with the collapse of Soviet Union. The second reason is imperialism has seen dramatic changes in the world economy over the last few decades. The internationalisation of production and the accompanying global integration of capital have, it is claimed, made war obsolete (Callinicos, 1994: 11).

A third set of explanations focuses on ideological or moral motives. According to this perspective, political, cultural, or religious belief force states into imperialism as a missionary activity. Joseph Schumpeter (1976), for instance, was drawing upon a tradition of liberal thought which viewed imperial policies as unnecessary and counter-productive. It analysed imperialism as a reflection of the existence of a pre-industrial and precapitalist social stratum within the imperial countries, a land and military aristocracy whose atavistic ideals and social position impel them towards something that is not in the interests of modern capitalist society. Britain's colonial empire was motivated at least in part by the idea that it was the white man's burden to civilize backward peoples. Germany's expansion under Hitler was based in large measure on a belief in the inherent superiority of German national culture. The desire of the USA to protect the free world and of the former Soviet Union to liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Third World are also examples of imperialism driven by moral and

ideological concerns. Some explanations of imperialism focus not on the motives of powerful states but rather on the political circumstances in weaker states. The argument holds that powerful states may not intend to expand, but may be forced to by instability on the periphery; new imperial actions result from past imperial commitments. The British conquest of India and the Russian colonization of Central Asia in the nineteenth century may be regarded as classic examples of reactive imperialism.

I have in this initial discussion of imperialism attempted to illustrate that many of the earliest contributions to our knowledge about imperialism have drawn upon Western epistemology. The literature on imperialism has to a large extent been premised upon the requirements of the Western nations throughout the early nineteenth and early twentieth century. It is wrong to suggest that most of the early approaches to theories of imperialism have been purely economic or closely related to the development of capitalism. However, many of the early discussions of imperialism fail to adequately theorise or acknowledge the relationship between culture and imperialism and it is this relationship which provides a focus for the next section.

Culture and Imperialism

The sociogenesis of the differential meanings of the terms *Kultur* and *Zivilisation* formed an integral part of Elias's discussions on the civilizing process (Elias, 1978: 3-34). Referring to the development of the term as used in German, Elias (1978: 4) notes that the concept of *Kultur* places a specific stress on intellectual, artistic and religious facts which are but a few of the human products through which people express themselves. *Kultur*, writes Elias, is the word through which more than any other, the Germans express pride in their achievement. In contrast, the concept of civilization refers to a wide variety of facts, such as levels of technology, types of manners, the development of scientific knowledge, religious ideas and customs. It is clear that the use of such terms as *Kultur* can be both similar and yet different depending on the historical origins of the context and tradition of their use.

While a comparison of the different usage of the terms *Kultur* and *Zivilisation* is not central to the present analysis, it is interesting to note that the German concept of *Kultur* placed a special stress on national differences and the particular identity of groups of people. In this usage of the term, a great deal of overlap exists between the notion of *Kultur* in the German sense and the notion of cultural identity as it is used in this study. As Elias (1978: 5) points out, the term *Kultur* reflects the self-consciousness of a nation which in both a political and a spiritual sense is continually asking itself what

is really identity? Yet such an identity and indeed such a *Kultur* are not independent of people who live out and define the self-consciousness which Elias refers to. As a result of which historical process has such an identity evolved? And, indeed, which imperialist cultures construct or become, as a result of their greater or lesser degrees of power, dependent upon such an identity? Yet it is the English term, "culture" with its associated meanings and not *Kultur* that is used in this study.

The word culture, argued Williams (1981: 76), is one of the most complicated words in the English language, mainly because it has become an important concept in several distinct, incompatible intellectual frameworks. Culture's linguistic root emanates from the Latin word "colere" which means to inhabit, to cultivate or to protect. The word in its early fifteenth century usage was confined exclusively to ploughsharing and agriculture. As a noun of process, it described the tending of crops and animals. The term, writes Williams (1977: 78), was taken a step further by the philosopher Herder who pointed out that it was necessary to speak of cultures and not culture. The important point here is the idea of a fundamental social process, which shapes, in part, distinctive ways of life. For instance, "Western culture" may refer to the meanings, values, tastes and life-style of Western thought. Williams sums up the real value of the term when he says:

> The variations in meaning and reference in the use of culture as a term must be seen, I am arguing, not simply as a disadvantage, which presents any kind of neat exclusion of definition, but as a genuine complexity corresponding to real elements of experience (Williams, 1981: 59).

While the semantic history of the term culture might be a noteworthy focus in its own right, the point being made here is that, within various intellectual frameworks, the term is muti-faceted and takes on a number of different meanings. With specific reference to just one tradition, namely cultural materialism, Alan Tomlinson (1981: iii) has argued that the term "cultural form" has come to mean just about anything in which there is contained some expression or manifestation of social consciousness rooted in lived experience. Yet as Tomlinson himself notes, it is important to distinguish between two types of cultural form: one type which may be rooted in lived experience, and the other type which may be rooted in the cultural artifact, an actual object produced by a culture and saying something, in some way or another, about that culture. For instance, some of the key cultural artifacts which express Chinese cultural identity are the dragon, Confucianism, huge population and territory, and a very old country with a perceived ancient tradition and civilization.

In developing a cultural critique of imperialism, it is not necessary to outline all the different definitions and meanings that have been attributed to the word culture. Yet in agreement with Williams

(1981) culture is one of most complicated words in the English language. That is not only because of its complex historical development in several European languages, but also because it has now come to be used for important concepts in several distinct intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of thought. Commonly, most dictionaries define "culture" as the beliefs, behaviour, language, and entire way of life of a particular time or group of people. Culture includes customs, ceremonies, and works of art, inventions, technology, and traditions. The term also may have a more specific aesthetic definition and can describe the intellectual and artistic achievements of a society. More specifically, Raymond Williams had argued that there are three general categories in the definition of culture:

> There is, first, the "ideal", in which culture is a state or process of human perfection, in terms of certain absolute or universal values...Then, second, there is the "documentary", in which culture is the body of intellectual and imaginative work, in which, in a detail way, human thought and experience are variously recorded... The analysis of culture, from such a definition, is the activity of criticism, by which the nature of the thought and experience, the details of the language, form and convention in which these are active, are described and valued... Finally, third, there is the "social" definition of culture, in which culture is a description of a particular way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour (Williams, 1981: 43).

In Williams's analysis, there are three types of culture, which are "idea", "documentary" and "the way of life". Furthermore, Williams emphasized that such analysis would include historical criticism, intellectual and imaginative works in particular traditions and societies, and the way of life. Raymond Williams's most influential books *Culture and Society* (1958) and *The Long Revolution* (1961), have nothing to say about the relation between culture and imperialism. The writer Edward W. Said extends Williams's concept of "structure of feeling" by using the phrase "structures of attitude and reference" (Said: 1993: 61). Said observed that British literary traditions had declared a serious study of imperialism and culture as marginal. Said's interventions in *Orientalism* (1978 and 1995) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) have brought the focus on issues of culture, imperialism and postcolonialism. The imperial project of educating the native influenced the identities of colonial peoples all over the world, people who remained subordinate dependants of an authority based somewhere other than in their own lives. It could be argued that a major component of European expansion is precisely that which made culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe, the idea of a form of European identity which was superior to non-European peoples and cultures. More specifically, the French and the British have had a long tradition of what Said calls "Orientalism", a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western

experience. Said emphasises that the Orient is a place of Europe's greatest, richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilisation and language, its cultural constant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the "other". Additionally, the Orient has helped to define Europe (the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience (Said, 1995: 1-2).

According to Said, there are several different meanings attached to the term Orientalism. The first and most academic is that "anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient- and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist- either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism" (Said, 1995: 2). The second and more general meaning of the term is that it is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and "the Occident". A third meaning of Orientalism is more historically and materially defined than the other two—a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. Here Said uses Michel Foucault's notion of discourse from *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) and *Discipline and Punish* (1977) in his third meaning (Said: 1995: 3). He emphases that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot understand the systematic process by which European culture was able to manage - and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period (Said, 1995: 3). He goes on to state that three qualifications of Orientalism are (i) it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality; (ii) ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied; and (iii) one ought never to assume that the structure of Orientalism is nothing more than a structure of lies or myths which, were the truth about them to be told, would simply blow away (Said, 1995: 5-6). Furthermore, Said acknowledges that *Culture and Imperialism*, was the specific response to Western forms of dominance that culminated in the great movement of decolonization all across the Third World. He goes on:

> ...European writing on Africa, India, parts of the Far East, Australia, and the Caribbean; these Africanist and Indianist discourse, as some of them have been called, I see as part of the General European effort to rule distant lands and people and, therefore, as related to Orientalist descriptions of the Islamic world, as well as to Europe's special ways of representing the Caribbean islands, Ireland, and the Far East. What are striking in these discourse are the rhetorical figures one keeps encountering in their descriptions of "the mysterious East", as well as the stereo-types about "the African [or India or Irish or Jamaican or Chinese] mind", the notions about bringing civilization to primitive or barbaric peoples, the disturbingly familiar ideas about flogging or death or extended punishment being required when "they" misbehave or became rebellious, because "they" mainly understood force or

> violence best; "they" were not like "us", and for that reason deserved to be ruled (Said, 1993: xi-xii).

Imperialism, therefore, was not a simple act of acquisition and accumulation. Western nations often believed that they had an obligation to rule inferior peoples and that these peoples should be subjugated. In other words, the imperialist enterprise depends upon the idea of having an empire. When most European thinkers celebrated humanity or culture, they were mainly celebrating ideas and values that they ascribed to their own national culture. World literatures were organised as a hierarchy with Europe and Latin Christian literatures at the top. European pre-eminence seemed natural and it should be taken for granted that Europe did command the world.

If we compare Said's earlier and later works, we may see that *Orientalism* is an outcome of the introduction between culture and imperialism. In his latest book, he is more aware that we all belong to the period of colonialism and of resistance to it (Said, 1993: 234). He begins by noting that, though we must try and understand the past there is no way in which the past can be separated from the present. Hence, it is important to know that how we formulate or represent the past shapes our understanding of the present. A critical question is how do the past and present of the imperial encounter interact with each other? The imperial past is not totally contained within it, but has entered the reality of hundreds of millions of people around the world. Imperialism is the practice, theory and attitude of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory. Said reminds us that, by 1914, Europe controlled roughly eighty five per cent of the earth. Hardly anyone alive today was not touched by the empire of the past. Here, he is drawing attention to the privileged role of culture within the modern imperial experience.

Said believed that there was a coherent, fully mobilised system of ideas about gaining overseas territory towards the end of the eighteenth century. That was before the systematic conquests under Napoleon, the rise of nationalism and the European nation-states. He also emphasised that almost all colonial schemes begin with an assumption of native backwardness and general inadequacy. Following European imperialism, Europe began to change the local habitat. Its conscious aim was to transform territories into images of what it had left behind. This process was never ending. For instance, a high number of plants, animals, crops and building methods gradually turned the colony into a new place complete with new diseases, environmental imbalances and traumatic dislocations for the overpowered natives. But how does culture participate in imperialism and what is its role? It may be argued that Western novels have authority, since novels confirm and highlight an underlying

hierarchy of family, property, and nation. Said argued that literature makes constant references to itself as somehow participating in Europe's overseas expansion. Novels create structures of feeling that support, elaborate and consolidate the practice of Empire. The argument here is that novel and imperialism fortified each other to such a degree that is impossible to read one without in some way dealing with the other. Said suggests that in reading a text one must open it out both to what went into it and to what its author excluded. In addition, we must connect the structures of a narrative to the ideas, concepts and experiences from which it draws support.

In Said's view, for example, Kipilin's *Kim* (1901) deals with a masculine world dominated by travel, trade, adventure and intrigue. In *Kim*, no-one challenges British rule, it is India's destiny to be ruled by English. The novel describes an India of the imagination which contains no elements of either social change or political resistance. On the other hand, Said also discusses Algerian nationalism and the work of Camus. He draws out some questions, such as why was Algeria the setting for so many of Camus's novels? To what extent does his work consolidate the nature of French enterprise in Algeria? Camus's novels usually read as parables of the human condition. Said disagree with this view, and argues that Camus's work is informed by a colonial sensibility which ignores Algerian history and the demands for Algerian independence. It is not necessary to discuss all novels, but we might know that novels obviously incorporate imperial attitudes (Said, 1993: 204-224).

Sport may be different from novels, as Said mentions that Conrad and Kipling have always been read as sports, not as writers whose manifestly imperialist subject matter has a long subterranean or implicit and proleptic life in the earlier work of writers (Said, 1993: 71). What to read and what to do with that reading, Said emphasises, that is the full form of the question? He also says that the determining, political horizon of modern Western culture is imperialism. In Said's explanation we may see modern Western culture as a vehicle of imperialism. In other words, Western sport could be seen as an apparent symbol of cultural imperialism. Moreover, J. A. Mangan writes that:

> It is time that it was more widely recognized that by the late nineteenth century sport lay close to the heart of Britain imperialism culture. It formed a distinct, persistent and significant cluster of cultural traits isolated in time and space, possessing a coherent structure and definite purpose. While it had many cultural functions, it had certainly become a means of propagating imperialism (Mangan, 1992: 1).

It is true, cultural imperialism did exist in sport since the late nineteenth century. Conversely, Guttmann (1994) has very different thoughts in his latest book *Games and Empire- Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism*. Guttmann explores, very subjectively, the ways in which popular modern sports

have spread from their Western roots to all corners of the globe. He discusses, for instance, how the Third World people go on to adapt these sports into their own regional variants, as following:

> British missionary educators resorted to cricket or soccer football in their tireless efforts to Christianise the native peoples of Asia and Africa, the YMCA was the principal force behind the diffusion of basketball and volleyball. Although devout believers in historical materialism may resist the notion, it is nonetheless true that the urge to bring the heathen to Christ can motivate as powerfully as the desire to sell them Coca-Cola (Guttmann, 1994: 177).

Not only what Guttmann says, here but also the language usage are exactly as Said remarks:

> Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination: the vocabulary of classic nineteenth-century imperial culture is plentiful with such words and concepts as "inferior" or "subject races", "subordinate peoples", "dependency", "expansion", and "authority" (Said, 1993: 8)

Guttmann superficially thinks there was no resistance in the process of those Western cultures invading the Third World. He argues that:

> If a purely political model of ludic diffusion is woefully inadequate to the historical complexity of the process, then a purely economic model is no more satisfactory. One economic model of ludic diffusion is drawn from André Gunder Frank's theories of the "development of dependency." What most clearly distinguishes Frank's model from older conceptions of economic imperialism and from liberal-pluralist model of development (like W.W. Rostow's) is the insistence that modernization is impossible unless the "peripheral" society breaks away from the capitalist "world-system"...The economic successes of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and the miserable plight of what was once the Union of Soviet Socialist, may or may not disprove Frank's assertions about economic dependence and the only way to overcome it; there can be no doubt that the history of modern sports has conclusively demonstrated the ability of "satellites" to surpass the "metropolis"...(Guttmann, 1994: 174-175)

Here I may agree with Said's "third meaning for Orientalism", as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Third World historically and materially (Said, 1995: 3). It seems that Guttmann disregards the enormously systematic discipline by which Western culture was able to manage - and even produce - the Third World politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. Guttmann carries on to advocate Western contributions to the Third World.

> If one keeps in mind this emancipatory potential as well as the undeniable role of modern sports as a means of social control and imperial rule, one is less inclined to condemn – as many have – efforts to assist the nations of Africa and Asia in the development of their sports programmes, This financial aid and most of which is provided by the International Olympic Committee and by various European governments... In 1985 an entire issue of the journal *Sportwissenschaft* was devoted to the debate over "sport and development aid in the Third World". The six authors agreed that modern sports are a Western phenomenon whose characteristics are on the whole incompatible with those of traditional forms of physical culture, but none of the six seemed very clear about just what to do about the fact that traditional sports are in jeopardy. Klaus Heinemann's unhappy conclusion was that modern sports are largely irrelevant to the needs of the Third World while traditional sport robbed of their original cultural functions have become anachronisms. Heinemanne's conclusion seems

> too negative. The Third World governments that request and welcome European and American coaches, trainers, equipment, and technical assistance understand very well that an enthusiasm for modern sports can be share by ethnically and religiously diverse populations that have very little else in common (Guttmann, 1994: 182-183)

Obviously, Guttmann overlooks the relationship of domination, unequal power distribution, and mode of cultural production between Western and the Third World countries. Furthermore, he always promotes an imposing appearance of Western sports culture and claims that modern sports contribute to national integration by giving people of different social classes, ethnicities, races, and religions something to share. Perhaps Guttmann insists on the contribution of Western sports to the third world countries. However, in my view, it is important to remember that Western sports development in third world countries as a kind of Western cultural hegemony.

This moves us to the question of resistance which develops into an awareness of oneself as belonging to a subject people being the founding insight of an anti-imperialist nationalist. There are some important themes in theorising cultural resistance. For instance, the insistence on the right sees the community's history coherently and integrally. The role of national language is central here, because it is through language that national culture organises and sustains communal memory. When anti-imperialist struggles begins to take place, nationalism begins to grow. Nationalist cultures depend on the concept of national identity, and nationalist politics is a politics of identity. The idea of resistance is far from not being only a reaction to imperialism, it is also an alternative way of conceiving human history. Here we may make a distinction between Said's notion of nationalism and liberation. Liberation by its very nature involves a transformation of social consciousness beyond national consciousness. Besides, Said contrasts the roughly contemporary work of Michel Foucault and Frantz Fanon. Fanon's work seeks to treat colonial and metropolitan societies together, as discrepant but related entities. Fanon summaries the position of other cultural and social critics of imperialism:

> Liberation is the total destruction of colonial system, from the pre-eminence of the language of the colonial system of the oppressor and "departmentalisation", to the customs union that in reality maintains he former colonized in the meshes of the culture, of the fashion, and of the images of the colonialist (Fanon, 1967: 105).

Said also criticises the Frankfurt School for being silent on racist theory and anti-imperialist resistance. He reacts against Western Marxism which has ignored the question of cultural imperialism. His method in *Culture and Imperialism* is to rejoin experience and culture, to read text vis-à-vis the metropolitan centre and the peripheries. He wants the experience of domination and being to be studied together. Imperialist domination and resistance to it is a dual process and thus both sides of the contest

should be interpreted not only simply hermeneutically, but also politically. Said argues that it is impossible to write of liberation and nationalism, however allusively, without also declaring oneself for or against them. As far as imperialism is concerned, there can be no neutrality; one is either on the side of empire or against it.

It is clear that Said has been deeply influenced by the work of Gramsci who had a profound understanding of culture, especially the workings of capital and the role of intellectuals. Gramsci made the useful analytic distinction between civil and political society in which the former was made up of voluntary affiliation, like schools, family, and unions, the latter of state institutions whose role in the polity was direct domination. Culture, of course, is to be found operating within civil society, where influence of ideas, of institutions, and of other person's works is not through domination but by what Gramsci called consent. In any non-totalitarian society, certain cultural forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others are; the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as hegemony, an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism and imperialism its durability and explanatory.

What Said tried to do in his work was to focus upon the disparate, intertwined, interdependent, and often overlapping streams of historical experience. Briefly, he wanted to make connections between past and present, between imperialiser and imperialised, between culture and imperialism. He does this not to reduce differences but rather to convey a more urgent sense of the interdependence between things. Said's work is an inspiration for intellectual work that explicitly deconstructs processes in relation to culture and imperialism. As he says, it is clear that hardly anyone alive today has not been untouched by the empires of the past. The identities of millions of people have been deeply affected, in many different ways, by imperialism and consequently forms of cultural, often Western imperialist culture.

Questions of national identity and exile are Said's especial interest, but he does not write much about personal identity or the psyche. He highlights a very important point: that no one today is one thing. He means that one may have a variety of different identities. Postcolonialists describe this phenomenon as "hybridity" and "ambivalence". Said concludes his book with a quotation from a twelfth-century monk: "The person who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong" (Said, 1993: 403). The strong person achieves

independence not by rejecting imperial national and provincial attachments, but by working through them. That is what Said's work has tried to do. It has perhaps, Said's work has produced a paradigm in which the notions of culture, imperialism, and postcolonialism are far from silent or inactive.

In short, the work of Edward W. Said, it is argued, provides a basis for developing a postcolonial theory. Its central thesis and theoretical concern is its transfiguration of the term "Orientalism" from an arcane field of academic study to a synonym for Western imperialism and racism. He started from a post-structuralist premise that knowledge is a discursive field or from language and he drew from Foucault the insight that its significance lies embedded within systems of power. He also argues that Western representations of those parts of world the West identifies as the Orient, seeks to show that this body of knowledge said little about the so-called Orient, which may or may not exist outside the Western imagination. Much of the West's efforts to impose itself on the peoples and cultures have come under its hegemonic sway. "Orientalism", therefore, pushes past the conventional conception of imperial power as a material phenomenon, presenting it instead as an epistemological system. Moreover, because the West's power is linked to the cultural representations it constructs and imposes on the minds of colonizer and colonized alike, it is able to survive the political decolonization that occurred after World War II. The full implication of this analysis is that the dismantlement of Western modes of domination requires the deconstruction of Western structures of knowledge. Significantly, the debate which started within Orientalism has grown into a new genre of thinking, namely postcolonialism. In contemporary China, the issues of postcolonialism had been attracting more and more scholars, including cultural and literary critics; therefore, I would like to draw out the issues of postcolonialism and China as a finial building bloc in the overall synthesis of matter that has been presented in this chapter.

Postcolonialism and China

Before turning to a discussion of postcolonialism and China it is necessary to briefly clarify a number of terms. Normally the terms colonialism and imperialism are used synonymously. Colonialism has been defined as "the policy and practice of a power in extending control over weaker peoples or areas" (Collins English Dictionary, 2000: 317). Colonialism also has been a widespread feature of human history. During the second century, for example, the Roman Empire stretched from Armenia to the Atlantic. From the fifteenth century onwards, colonialism was practiced in the

Americas by European countries, and extended to virtually all of Asia and Africa by the nineteenth century. Rudyard Kipling, for example, described the setting of White populations in Africa, South-East Asia and the Pacific at the end of nineteenth century, in *The White Man's Burden*. Frantz Fanon argued that:

> Perhaps we have not sufficiently demonstrated that colonialism is not simply content to impose its rule upon present and the future of a dominated country. Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it (Fanon, 1990: 169).

To Fanon colonialism was a system of racial oppression which was all the more insidious because its impact was seen as being mental as well as physical. Marxist theories of colonialism have approached several general issues. First, they have tried to establish that the direct political control of non-capitalist societies through capitalist expansion was dominated by Western colonial formations. Second, they have examined the political, economic and ideological effects of colonialism's industrial penetration into non-capitalist societies. Finally, they have assessed the consequences and possibilities of socialist transformation in colonizing countries (Bottomore, 1983: 83). While both colonialism and imperialism may be viewed as interchangeable in the domination of colonial, they are distinctly different terms. How do we tell the difference between colonialism and imperialism? First, imperialism is a global system, while colonialism is the practice of specific power and practice aimed at the take-over of other countries' peoples, territories and material resources. Second, if imperialism is defined as an empire and as a political system, then logically when the empire collapses imperialism also collapses. However, forms of colonialism may continue and do not necessarily need an imperial central government in order to survive. Finally, imperialism can function without colonies, but colonialism cannot.

The terms neocolonialism and neo-imperialism are in some sense quite similar. This is especially the case when neo-Marxists discuss developmental theory and the two terms are used to explain the same phenomenon of the structural relationship between Western countries and the Third World countries. Nevertheless, neoimperialism and neocolonialism have a number of differences in terms of their historical mutations. Imperialism or neoimperialism have their origins in the metropolis and this is the location of a process that leads to domination and power control. This occurs in certain colonies as a consequence of imperial domination. Therefore, the advanced imperial country is viewed as the "metropole" (core or centre) form which power flows, and the colony or neo-colony is the place

that it penetrates and controls (Loomba, 1998: 7). Furthermore, neocolonialism is the indirect maintenance of colonial power over former colonies by using political, economic or other pressure, but colonialism is the direct control over colonies. Moreover, neoimperialism might be viewed as is the process by which Western advanced industrial countries dominate the Third World countries' economy regardless of previous colonial relationships; in this sense, neocolonialism is the same. But normally imperialism, in the economic sense, represents for pre-capitalist societies attempts to subjugate, or secure low wages or practice higher investment returns. Both dependency theory and world system theory are based on the notion of neoimperialism. More importantly, concepts of neocolonialism or neoimperialism are both rooted in the theory of imperialism.

Normally there are two meanings given to be the term postcolonial. First it is the end of a period of time and in this sense the old colonial control has diminished. Second postcolonial refers to a stage of development in which postcolonialism replaces colonialism. Obviously, if colonialism maintains a supported Western power then it is debatable whether colonialism has declined and finished. We can see that many countries or societies still remain under the influence of Western imperialism nowadays. Defining the term "postcolonialism" has been an ongoing exercise over the last few years. Aidoo comments upon the term "postcolonial":

> Perhaps the concept was relevant to the United States after its war of independence, and to a certain extent to the erstwhile imperial dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Applied to Africa, India, and some other parts of the world, "post-colonial" is not only a fiction, but a most pernicious fiction, a cover-up of a dangerous period in our people's lives (Aidoo, 1991:151).

A debate over the term "postcolonial" is continued within the work of Simon During who defines "postcolonialism" as "the need, in nations or groups which have been victims of imperialism, to achieve an identity uncontaminated by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images" (During, 1987: 32-47). There is much sympathy with this approach, but Bhabha (1991), Spivak (1990) and JanMohamed (1985) are skeptical of the possibility of an "uncontaminated" or "indigenous" postcolonial theory. Bhabha's theory of post-coloniality does not acknowledge the basic non-coincidence of post-colonial interest with post-structuralist epistemology. Through his elaboration of terms such as "sly civility" and "mimicry", Bhabha has helped us to understand how the native is always in an antagonistic-deconstructive relationship with any colonialist discourse. He asserts that:

> The term postcolonial is increasingly used to describe that form of social criticism that bears witness to those unequal and uneven processes of representation by which the historical experience of the once-colonized Third World comes to be framed in the West (Bhabha, 1991:63).

Furthermore, when he discusses the notion of colonial discourse, he also emphasises the important concept of fixity. He suggests that:

> An important feature of colonial discourse is its dependence on the concept of 'fixity' in the ideological construction of otherness. Fixity, as the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference in the discourse of colonialism, is a paradoxical mode of representation (Bhabha, 1983: 18).

The relevance of the "postcolonial" seems to be that it functions to direct our attention to inequities in modes of representation. Gayatri Spivak is one of the most influential postcolonialists and she defines herself as "the post-colonial diasporic Indian who seeks to decolonize the mind" (Spivak, 1990: 67). She argues that analyses of colonial discourse demonstrates that history is not simply the disinterested production of facts, but is rather a process of "epistemic violence". In Spivak's thought the epistemic violence of the discourses of the Other includes imperialism, the colonised, Orientalism, the exotic, the primitive, the anthropological, the folkloric and marginal (Sarup, 1998: 163). Spivak argues that the concept of the Third World has itself to be retried from its role as convenient but hegemonic signifier that homogenises the Third World into questions of nationalism and ethnicity.

Most arguments, whether from the position of coloniser or colonised, tend to revolve on an opposition of this kind. Nationalist resistance to imperialism, for example, itself derives its notion of nation and of national self-determination from the very Western culture that is being resisted. Nationalism is often viewed as a product of imperialism and often only succeeds in changing the situation from territorial imperialism to neo-colonialism (Spivak, 1988: 245). Spivak advocates the catachrestic strategy of "reversing, displacing, and seizing the apparatus of value-coding" instead of constructing theories by ignoring the last few centuries of historical involvement. Other critics are Parry (1987), Dirlik (1994) and Ahmad (1995) who read the "post" in postcolonial as signifying both changes in the power structure after the official end of colonialism as well as colonialism's enduring effects, particularly as they are manifested discursively. They think that postcolonial theory is an umbrella term which covers different critical approaches that deconstruct European thought in areas as wide-ranging as philosophy, history, literary studies, anthropology, sociology and political science. Therefore, in this perspective, the term postcolonial refers not to a simple periodization but rather to a methodological revisionism which enables a wholesale critique of Western structures of knowledge and power, particularly those of the post-Enlightenment period (Coronil, 1992: 102). It is in this sense that it is an imperialist concept upon which the eclectic theoretical structure of this thesis builds upon. Furthermore, Shohat states that:

> The prefix "post", then aligns "post-colonialism" with a series of other "posts"- "post-structuralism", "post-modernism", "post-Marxism", "post-feminism", "post-deconstructionism"- all sharing the notion of a moment beyond. While these "posts" refer largely to the supercession of outmoded philosophical, aesthetic and political theories, the "post-colonial" implies both going beyond anti-colonial nationalist theory as well as a movement beyond a specific point in history, that of colonialism and Third World nationalist struggle. In this sense the prefix "post" aligns the "post-colonial" with another genre of "posts"- "post-war", "post-cold war", "post-independence", "post-revolution" - all of which underline a passage into a new period and a closure of a certain historical event or age, officially stamped with dates (Shohat 1996: 323).

This is not to suggest that the expanded use of the "post-colonial" is typical or paradigmatic, but that the phrase "post-colonial society" might equally evoke Third World nation-states after independence. The replacement of "Third World" by "postcolonial" seems to have been justified not only by the fact that there is "no such thing as Third World [culture] as an internally coherent object of theoretical knowledge" (Ahmad, 1992: 96-97), but also by a radical reconfiguration of global power relations and the need for a radically different narrativisation of history. "Third World" writers such as Fanon would identify the anti-colonialist decades when the colonized struggled with the colonizers for freedom (Fanon, 1990: 46). However, the Third World nationalists struggle no longer provides an effective framework for analyzing the confrontation between the colonized and the colonizer of the eighties and nineties. As many critics have pointed out, "formal independence for colonized countries has rarely meant the end of the First World's hegemony" (Shohat, 1996: 326); rather, Westerners, after their withdrawal from these countries, "continued to rule [there] morally and intellectually". In other words, these formerly colonized countries are confronting neocolonialist invasions. Neocolonialism emerges as a regeneration of colonialism through hegemonizing Western economy, technology, and ideology. With its economic and technological superiority, Western culture is penetrating the Third World or precapitalist spaces with its "entire system of values, attitudes, morality, institutions, and more important, mode of production" (JanMohamed, 1985: 62).

There is no longer a "Second World" because of the disintegration of the socialist bloc of Eastern Europe. Global power relations have recently undergone fundamental changes: namely, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union as a political and military superpower; the rise of Japan as an economic superpower; the emergence of the "four tigers" of East and Southeast Asia; the economic invasion of the previous Third World countries and areas in the form of multinational capital from the USA, Japan, and Western Europe. We may call this the moment of neocolonialism, which is the cultural logic of multinational capital.

JanMohamed's "hegemonic phase of colonialism" begins at the end of what he calls the "dominant phase" of colonialism. "Throughout the dominant phase", he says:

> ...which spans the period from the earliest European conquest to the moment at which a colony is granted "independence", European colonizers exercise direct and continuous bureaucratic control and military coercion of the natives (JanMohamed, 1985: 61).

In contrast, imperialism in its hegemonic phase depends largely on the active and direct consent of the dominated, though, of course, the threat of military coercion is always in the background (JanMohamed, 1985: 62). If JanMohamed's theory of the two phases of imperialism holds true historically, then subaltern resistance to hegemonic imperialism must be different from simply resistance to the dominant model of imperialism. Therefore, the former Third World nationalist political agenda no longer obtains when newly-emergent nationstates are being subjugated with their own consent, and it is in this sense that we cannot replace the concept of "postcolonial" with that of "Third World".

Furthermore, late capitalism has invented more sophisticated strategies of containment to repress oppositional culture. Neocolonialism in the form of the economic and technological revolution possesses an unprecedented capacity to conquer the precapitalist space more easily and thoroughly. Never before has Western imperialism been so successful in infiltrating and consolidating the European-American master narrative of history. Never before have the majority of Western powers been so tightly bound together by a structure of feeling. As Said (1993: xvii) says "we are number one, we are bound to lead, we stand for freedom and order, and so on". Never before have the non-Western countries been so awe-stricken by the sense of the Western world's superiority in technology and economy. In short it might be suggested that a hegemonic neocolonialism is reproducing Eurocentric ideology both through the spread of multinational capital and also the complicity of non-Western culture in its uncritical acceptance of Western culture.

Although China was never colonised by any Western imperialist power, neocolonialism can be best seen through the lens of the Chinese in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the beginning of the eighties, multinational capital and postmodernist culture have made significant impact upon the Chinese mode of production and communist ideology. In terms of both economic and cultural production, China is increasingly commercialized. The Green Revolution is taking place and new ideas and social relations are reaching into the farthest rural areas. American dollars, television, refrigerators, and video machines now enter rural as well as urban households. With fresh memories of material

poverty and political sufferings in the past, Chinese people are vying with one another for immersion in the immediate presence of hedonistic materialism. At the same time, postmodernism finds a doleful expression in popular culture: imbuing the market of mass culture are Rock-n-Roll, Karaoke, *gongfu* movies or videotapes, mysteries and best-sellers, and various forms of pastiche, which have been parasitical upon previous forms of Western culture. The recent disengagement from traditional ideology and the crisis in traditional values prompt people to accept blindly "Western" ideas and values as if everything Western was superior. All this neocolonialist penetration of China cannot be properly grasped except in a historical context. It might be the second time that the Chinese have experienced a general crisis of national identity following the May Fourth Movement of the twentieth century (Xie, 1997: 12-13).

Western ideology has influenced China since at least the late nineteenth century, if not before. China has both incorporated and questioned certain Western forms of cultural practice (Chow, 1960; Schwarcz, 1986; Yeh, 1990). The May Fourth Movement, for example, criticised not only China's traditional culture but also suggested that a particular cultural revolution was necessary if China was to develop into a modern social formation. Some radical intellectuals, such as Yan Fu, Cai Yuanpei, Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi believed that Europe provided a particular model of civilization and that China had to look to this model if it were to progress (Spence, 1990: 310-319). Such Eurocentric beliefs are reflected in the wholescale evaluation of Confucianism and its place within Chinese political philosophy. In other words Western science and democracy were the surest way to rejuvenate and reconstruct China. This occurred not only at a time when there was an enthusiasm for a cultural revolution, but also during a time of naiveté and confusion, in the sense that false causal connections were made between historical events and aspects of Western social life. Despite divergent political ideals and strategies, progressive Chinese intellectuals still shared the ultimate goal of national independence and prosperity as a defence against the threat of Western powers (Xie, 1997: 13-14). Yet, the point I wish to establish here is that the May the Fourth philosophy uncritically subscribed to a Eurocentric historicism and a notion of modernity rooted in Western culture.

More recent examples can be cited in support of the general argument that Chinese culture has been mediated by particular forms of Eurocentric thought. Since the 1980s, a particularly significant change has occurred in Chinese literary language, which used to be characterized by being classically elegant, fluently concise, full of allusions and images and sounding rhythmic. Since first and second

colonisation, it has been arguably hybridized and even "Europeanized" (Wang, 1997:40). Scholars, writers, and literary critics have in general used a "borrowed" language. This is largely due to the easy accessibility of the many translations of Western literary outputs and culture. In the Chinese context, Chineseness and Chinese experiences have inevitably been subject to both direct and indirect pressures, in all their material forms, of not only Western colonialism and imperialism, but also Western postmodern capitalism. As such, what constitutes the "Chinese experience" is not a concept or identity which reflects a pristine authenticity, but rather many hybridized identities.

On the one hand, Westernisation has acknowledged an interpretation of modern Chinese history; on the other hand, this negotiation with cultural self-identity has yet to be historically articulated. Chineseness as a signifier needs to be situated and substantiated within the discursive practices of national and individual identity in relation to both "tradition" and "the West". That is, in relation to both the modern Chinese historical imagination and also the social and cultural fantasy about the experience of otherness. If modern Chinese culture, as Chow claims, "is caught between the past as culture and the present as realpolitik" (1993: 133), then what is needed is a rediscovery of "the experience of uneasy translations between cultural translations that are mediated by the possession and lack of power" (1993: 141). In this respect, the postcolonial strategy of opposition to mainstream Western culture can easily be identified with the Chinese attempt to struggle against imperial hegemony politically, economically and culturally.

In contemporary China there have appeared in cultural and literary circles different manifestations of postcoloniality in cultural and literary practice. First, postmodern studies have aimed to prove that postmodernity is not an exclusively Western product. Second, post-Chinese studies have adopted a strategy to "decolonize" Chinese culture and literary discourse and yet the approach which these scholars adopt is still a "colonized" one. In using Western theory or ways of thinking to reconsider and reinterpret Chinese culture, this body of work has rather unwittingly produced something "other" to the West. Finally, Third World criticism has attempted to help demarginalize Chinese literature and criticism so that it could merge into the mainstream of world literature or promote interventionist dialogues with international critical circles on an equal footing. All these developments may be simply mentioned as illustrative examples of the way in which different attempts of cultural critique in contemporary China have sought to challenge not only Western culture but also

Chinese scholars living outside of China who have themselves been influenced by Western culture and thought (Zhao, 1998: 137-156).

In the many references to the "Chinese people", "Chinese intellectual", "Chinese culture", and "Chinese cultural studies", "China" is often assumed to be more or less a stable and unquestionable signifier, which has hardly been subjected to painstaking scrutiny. This, in part, is what this thesis attempts to contribute to. But how can this be done? The preoccupation with responding to the West, symptomatic of paranoia as it may be, has also served as a convenient means of postponing the much needed examination of China's own hegemony- Chinese cultural centrism. Therefore, it is important to disengage from the monolithic notion of China as one culture. This does not mean that Chinese intellectuals should adopt a "pluralistic" cultural approach, for in the 1990s even the authoritarian Chinese government developed a form of pluralism. There are many previously forbidden "cultural" subjects that can be openly discussed, but not political issues. Under this limited permissive "cultural" climate, even the espousal of the most decadent forms of postcolonialism or the most avant-garde forms of art cannot count as real interventions in Chinese centrism. In even the most "subversive" representations or experimentations (in literature, music, art, sport, painting, photography, journalism) from the People's Republic, what often remains elided to is China's own cultural dominance, chauvinism and indeed internal imperialism.

In *China Can Say No* (Chiou, Zhang and Song, 1996), for instance, the authors argue that what we face is no more than a reproduction of an exhausted form of "Third World" nationalism, itself a vengeful echo of "First-World" imperialism. What is disturbing about this claim, however, is much less its apparent extremism than the fact that it is the West, in particular the United States, which remains its implied addressee and thus its preferred Other. Contemporary Chinese centrism, in other words, relies for its own anchoring precisely on a perpetuated reactive relation to the West. In this view, any discussion of cultural studies and China could be inadequate without some attempt to address the issues of China's relation with those deemed internally to be politically and culturally subordinate. It is important not to forget China's internal relationship with Tibet, Taiwan and Hong Kong, places and social formations whose cultures and histories are simply denied identity and validity under the eyes of the People's Republic. These other "Chinese" cultures, insofar as they constitute China's repressed, are and should be a vital part of any consideration of "Chinese cultural studies" (Chow, 1997: 147-151). This is a significant point of departure for the thesis at hand.

For Chinese intellectuals to confront the realities of these other "Chinese" cultural spaces would mean that they would need to abandon the obligatory reactive position vis-à-vis the West that they have habitually occupied. While it places them in a paranoid relation to the West, this reactive position also bring with it the comfort of an illusory victimhood, making it unnecessary to interrogate their own power and their complicity with a centrist regime that, even as it opens its doors to the "cultural" influences of capitalism, continues to dictate what it means to be "Chinese" and to suppress, imprison, exile, or execute those who dare question its claim. Through this perspective of those in Tibet, Taiwan and Hong Kong, the predominant question is therefore not how and why China can say no to the West, but is can one say no to China? Therefore, there are two types of postcoloniality in the Chinese context when we discuss postcolonialism and China. First, domestically, it points to the undermining of the so called "Chinese narrative" of official ideology and second, internationally, it speaks to the deconstruction of Western imperialism dominance over world culture and discourse. These are the two crucial points of departure which have helped to shape the thinking and questioning which underlies this thesis and examination of the development of sport in China.

Summary

Finally, it is necessary to draw together the main strands of the problematic that I have outlined in this chapter on imperialism, culture and postcolonialism. The framework has been developed through a consideration of certain themes: (i) theories of imperialism; (ii) culture and imperialism; and (iii) postcolonialism and China. It is concluded that the literature on imperialism has to a large extent been premised upon the requirements of the Western nations throughout the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. Most of the early approaches to theories of imperialism have been purely economic or closely related to the development of capitalism. The discussion of the relationship between culture and imperialism has grown into a genre of thinking, namely postcolonialism. While postcolonialism fulfils the aims of opposing colonial representation and values from the West, it remains a debatable issue in the field. Ahmad's (1995: 1-20) and Dirlik's (1994: 328-356) criticisms of postcolonialism consider that postcolonial intellectuals are entirely attempting to hide their complicity in global capitalism and Western economic power, and they ignore the issue of class. Details of these criticisms are outside discussion here. However, it is important to recognise that postcolonialism has brought new possibilities to analysis of sport in Modern China. These concepts are

used in the further chapters to examine sports development—in the Chinese case of imperialism and postcolonialism.

CHAPTER THREE: SPORT, IMPERIALISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 1860-1911

Western imperialism may be view as a historical dynamic which has influenced the development of Chinese sport. This chapter aims to illustrate that the development of sports in China was influenced by Western imperialism between 1860 and 1911. Evidence from nineteenth century Chinese newspapers, pictorials, photographs and essays shows that certain sporting practices were introduced to China by Westerners. Western military drills, gymnastics and sports were adopted as the correct form of physical education in many missionary schools. This chapter is organized into three sections. Section one "Western imperialism and Chinese sport" considers how Western sports were imported and developed in China. Section two "physical culture, exercise and reform in China" comments upon the development of Chinese physical culture, the ideology of Chinese reformers on physical culture, the introduction of Western military drill, and the establishment of physical education in China's new schools. Section three critically evaluates the missionary school system as an agent of Western imperialism by examining the specific role of sport in the transmission of Western cultural imperialism through the missionary school system. The conclusion draws together the key argument that sport played a central role in the diffusion of Western cultural imperialism between 1860 and 1911.

Sports development in China was relatively protected from Western culture until about the end of the Opium Wars of the 1860s. The introduction of Western sports into China was entirely compatible with the influx of Western power into China. The Western powers (Britain, France, United States of America—USA and Russia) consolidated their political, economic and religious foothold in China after the Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-1860. When various treaties were signed between China and the imperialist countries (Nanking Treaty 1842; Tianjin Treaty 1858; Beijing Treaty 1860), most of the major ports (Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Amoy, Canton, Tianjin, Hankou and other ports) were opened up to the West. Western vessels were allowed access to certain inland waterways, while Western missionaries and merchants were granted the right to travel throughout the country and to purchase property and land. The importing of opium was legalised and many foreign goods were introduced to China since they were exempt from the transit tax (*lijin*). Western countries received a large war indemnity from China. For example, the Chinese government paid 21 million dollars to Britain as part of the Nanking Treaty of 1842, 8 million taels was subsequently paid to Britain and France as part of the Beijing Treaty of 1860, 333 millions dollars was paid to the Allied Powers as part

of the Boxer Protocol of 1901. The Chinese regarded these treaties as being preferable to military confrontations with the Western powers. During much of the period between 1853-1873, China was not only dealing with many internal rebellions (Taiping rebellions 1853-1864; Nian rebellions 1853-1868; the Moslem rebellions 1853-1878; and the Minor rebellions 1854-1873), it was also experiencing widespread disappointment with the Qing emperors. The Chinese government could not manage confrontation on various fronts at the same time. Ironically, the foreign presence within China caused further disarray because some of the rebellions, such as 1900 Boxers rebellion was anti-foreign.

The Introduction of Western Sport

It is hard to provide a comprehensive explanation as to why Western people brought sport to China in the middle of the nineteenth century. In *The Age of Empire*, Hobsbawm (1987: 56-83) argues that the era from 1875 to 1914 may be called the Age of Empire not just because the period witnessed a new kind of imperialism, but because it involved a number of rulers who officially calling themselves emperors. In his analysis, imperialism was relative to the political, economical and cultural spheres. In the cultural spheres, he emphasized that imperialism brought to the elites or potential elites of the dependent world "Westernization". In his view, Westernization initially occurred on the ground of religion, morality, ideology or political pragmatism (Hobsbawm 1987: 77). He did not discuss in detail the role of sport as an element of "Westernization", nonetheless, in his discussion of "the bourgeois", he argues that sport was part of the new invention of leisure activity which was viewed as a criterion of middle-class lifestyle and culture (Hobsbawn, 1987: 174). He explains that sport was seen as an important element in the formation of a new governing class which was modelled upon the public-school-trained British bourgeois "gentleman" who introduced it to the continent at the time (Hobsbawn 1987: 182). When Western sport was introduced to China in the 1860s, the majority of Western people were from the British middle-classes. They were seen as important agents in the development of imperialism. Sport could be viewed as a symbol of the superior and dominant classes. But at the time, Western sport was also the privilege of Western people, since the indigenous Chinese were not allowed to enter the sport clubs to play sport. Holt (1989: 207) claims that sport was not just a symbol of education within the Empire, but that it was also a major source of recreation and entertainment for the colonialist. Sport in this sense was viewed as symbolising colonial relationships. This elite was not just part of a ruling class, but also of a leisure class. Holt (1989: 212) adds that sports may have been seen

initially as training and amusement for a colonial elite, but as the Empire expanded colonialists saw the value of using sport and games to build a number of cultural bridges. When Holt (1989:212) compares the Western empires, he observes that the cultural imperialism of the British tended to be more insidious than that of the French or German empires. Guttmann (1994) argues that the diffusion of Western sport was a phenomenon of cultural imperialism. He concedes that the concept of cultural hegemony provides more than a merely cosmetic conceptual improvement over the term cultural imperialism (Guttmann, 1994: 5-6; 178-179). Gramscian theory stressed the fact that cultural interaction was something much more complex than the domination of the powerful over the powerless. Whatever one's view on this issue, it is undeniable that the introduction of Western sport in China could be seen as a process of Western imperialism. There is certainly a significant amount of evidence to support this thesis.

Western sports (horse racing, cricket, soccer, rowing, hunting, track and field athletics, golf, tennis, and rugby) became increasingly popular after China was opened up to the West following the Opium Wars of 1860. Western agents like missionaries, traders, soldiers, administrators and diplomats started to settle in the various leased territories, such as Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Amoy, Canton, Tianjin, and Hankou. During the period 1860-1911, the majority of Western agents were British, although French, German and American agents were also present in China. Horse racing (*pao-ma*) was the most popular sport among Western peoples living at the time within the Chinese treaty ports. For example, they organised horse-racing clubs and built three race courses at the Dama Road and Jingansi Road in the Shanghai leased territories between 1850 to 1861 (Shanghai Library, 1998: 15). The first race course in Shanghai was built in 1851 (Figure 6) and races were held in spring and autumn of every year. During the racing days, many Chinese citizens would gather and watch the race in excitement (Lee Chungli, 1999: 85). The second race club was built between 1850 and 1861, while the third Shanghai Race Club was built at Jingansi Road in 1861 (Shanghai Library, 1998: 16). A stand for Western members was built in the Shanghai race course in 1862 (Yu, 1997: 64). Since the Chinese were not allowed to enter the club, the Chinese could only watch the races from the outside. An owner of one building near the race club sold, as early as 1863, tickets to the Chinese who wanted to watch horse racing from the top of the building (*Shanghai*, 2 October 1863: 1). Furthermore, the British built a wooden stand for the Chinese to watch horse racing in which the admission fee was one and a half

pounds Sterling for the upper seats and one pound Sterling for the lower seats (*Shanghai*, 22 October 1863: 1).

Horse racing spread to other cities after 1863. A letter from Beijing revealed that British and Chinese customs officers were betting on horse racing as early as 7 November 1863 (*Shanghai*, 25 December 1863: 1). In that same year, the first racing club and race was organised in Tianjin. Later, Western merchants developed horse racing activity in Hong Kong (*Shanghai*, 16 March 1872: 2). Western merchants also promoted horse racing in Hanko (*Shanghai*, 2 October 1863: 2). Evidently, horse racing was very popular in the 1870s in the Chinese open cities. In the early stage, many Chinese did like horse racing, however, many were also attracted to the gambling associated with horse racing. Some criticism of horse racing appeared in the newspapers of the time. Westerners always claimed that regular horse racing was meant to contribute to training strong horses for war (*Shanghai*, 4 April 1870: 2). Shanghai international merchants held horse races regularly. Western intellectuals also criticised horse racing and questioned the ideology of choosing and training strong horses for a gambling activity. Western intellectuals were not interested in horse racing or the associates of gambling and they did not watch horse racing thus avoiding any accusation of gambling (*Shanghai*, 22 October 1870: 2). Nevertheless, gambling on horses was still the most popular Western sport within Chinese society in 1872. Some Chinese writers gave their impression of horse racing in the newspapers of the time. For example, an article "*Qi ma jue sheng*" (Horse riding competition) (*Shun Pao*, 30 April 1872: 2-3), and another article "*Guan xi ren dou chi ma ge*" (A Chant of Watching Western Horse Racing) (*Shun Pao*, 30 April 1872: 4-5) appeared in the same newspaper. A further article about Luo Yu-feng's experience of horse racing in "*Sai ma xing*" (Watching Horse Racing) (*Shanghai*, 7 May 1872: 2) appeared. These newspaper articles all described Western horse racing as exciting and attractive in Shanghai. Picture impressions from a Chinese artist on horse racing were published in a picture magazine in Shanghai in 1884 (Figure 7).

Horse racing courses did not only provide space for regular horse racing since other British sports such as cricket, soccer and athletics were also practised on the grounds of the horse-racing club. When horse-racing events occurred, Western companies suspended business for the duration of the meetings. Such meeting days were viewed as public holidays for foreigners. It has to be recognised that some Westerners did not attend horse racing meetings, but nonetheless used the three-day holidays for sports such as hunting. Western sport was viewed as a symbol of imperialist privilege, since the

indigenous Chinese were not allowed to join the horse racing clubs or courses before about 1920. However, the Chinese did enjoy spectating as they saw it as symbolic of a Western way of life associated with status, life style and class.

Horse racing was not the only popular Western sport practised in the Chinese treaty ports. According to Speak (1999: 72), by 1837 young members from thirteen factories had set up the Canton Regatta Club and organised boat races. The Western style of boat racing, with its use of oars and boat-hooks, was a surprise to the local Chinese officials. They described it as *tow sam pan*, literally the "fighting boats". Crew outlined the process and the reasons for Westerners' apparent preoccupation with boat races and sport in general:

> So far as amusements were concerned, the foreigners were left to their own resources... They had the choice of growing morbid and melancholy through boredom and loneliness, or organising games, tournaments and parties which would help them pass the time between the infrequent calls of ships bringing new faces and letters from home...There was only a handful of foreigners in Canton before they built some small boats and organised yacht races, much to the confusion of the Chinese officials, who couldn't see any fun in a boat race not accompanied by the beating of drums, like the dragon-boat races (Crew, 1940: 208-307).

Boat racing spread widely in the open ports. In Shanghai, the first race was held at Whangpu River in 1849 (Shanghai Library, 1998: 21). Percival described how the Shanghai Yacht and Boat Club's annual regattas in the spring and autumn watched how the Scottish, German and English crews pulled for their laurels (Percival, 1889: 8-12). Westerners built a Rowing Club (Shanghai Library, 1998: 20-21) at Wuchang road along the Soochow creek in 1860. In 1870, American and British merchants extended the two-day boat racing games to the new West Water Gate. Victories, as recorded in the local newspapers further testified to the popularity of Western boat racing. For example, the Americans won an eight men boat race (*Shanghai*, 27 October 1870: 2). The Scottish won on the 14th October 1870. On one occasion, a boat race on the 15th was postponed to the 17th because of rain. The race started at 3 p.m. with many foreigners and the Chinese enjoying watching the boat race from the river banks (*Shanghai*, 2 November, 1870: 2). This evidence illustrates that boat racing was practised within Chinese society in early of 1870. It too became associated with boat gambling. As early as 1872, there was *Du chuan* (Boat Gambling) on Western sailboat races on the opposite shore of Jardine Mathson & Co., from 11:00 to 12:00 (*Shanghai*, 25 April 1872: 2). Later the boat race near the bridge of Soochow creek was described as equally popular as horse racing, (*Shun Pao*, 12 May 1872: 2). These newspaper articles show that Western boat races were popular in Shanghai following the arrival of Westerners in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Like horse-racing, boat racing was also seen as the privilege of Westerners. For example, the Shanghai local government banned Chinese ships near the river area when Western boat races were being held (*Shun Pao*, 15 May 1882: 3). Later, the same newspaper described an incident including the official banning of Chinese dragon boat racing in Dang Kuo as it caused violent fighting among local dragon boat teams (*Shun Pao*, 18 June 1882: 2). These cases may be exceptional and do not suggest the banning of indigenous sports in China. However, Western Imperialism existed as the Chinese officials regarded Westerners and their sports more highly than their own sports. Chinese officials had been keen to promote the running of Western sports for Westerners by assisting in crowd control and keeping out their own people. When indigenous sports were practised, they were less bothered.

The same attitude applied to cricket, which was also seen as a symbol of British cultural imperialism. Holt (1992: 203) asserts that sport played a major role in the transmission of imperial and national ideas from the late nineteenth century. Cricket, in particular, had a special meaning for the empire. It is true that cricket was never forgotten by the British who settled around the world following the extension of imperial power during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Today, cricket in the Chinese language is called *ban qiu* (bat ball). However, in the nineteenth century, cricket in Chinese language was called *pao qiu* (throw ball), which created confusion as to what activity actually took place. There is little evidence about the development of cricket around this period of time. Nonetheless, as early as 1862, a Chinese newspaper advertisement featured the sale of a set of second-hand cricket and horse riding equipment. Later, *Shanghai* described a carriage travel accident near the *pao qiu* (cricket) ground on 5 May 1865. This evidence shows that a cricket ground existed in Shanghai around the 1860s. In fact, some Chinese sports historians are not sure what *pao qiu* was even today. Hsu I-hsiung and Hsu Yuan-ming (1999: 70), for example, merely speculated that *pao qiu* was a kind of Western ball game. Nonetheless, in my research, a Chinese artist's impression of the game of cricket, painted and published in Shanghai in the 1880s not only describes how Western players played *pao qiu* (cricket) but also proved that "*pao qiu*" means cricket (Figure 8). Evidence is also contained on an old postcard which shows the recreation ground in front of a cricket club in Shanghai on a holiday in the 1910s (Yu, 1997: 73) (Figure 9). Two other pictures show that members of the *Da Qing Pao Qiu* (Great Qing Cricket) clubs were at the Shanghai Cricket Club on the 11th September 1907 (Shanghai Library, 1998: 55) (Figure 10). This may be the very first written evidence about Chinese cricket clubs. This picture may indicate a milestone in Chinese active involvement in the playing of Western sport.

The game of association football or soccer was also played in China in the 1880s. The Chinese had their own traditional kick ball game of *cuju*, which served as a form of military training. It is interesting that when the Chinese saw Westerners playing soccer in Shanghai in the 1880s, they thought soccer was the Chinese *cuju*. They used the term *cuju*, not "football" or "kickball". They even misused the term *cuju* to describe Western soccer. One article with the headline *Cuju yu bin* (Playing football to entertain guests) featured Westerners in Shanghai hosting an invitation soccer match against officers and soldiers of the British Emperor's grandson at the race course as early as 1881. The host players were worried since they had not played football for a long time, so they had to practice in advance in order to pick the best men to play against the visitors (*Shun Pao*, 27 November 1881). The game started at 3:30 p.m. at the race course on 1 December 1881. Unfortunately, the weather turned bad and the game was moved indoors to the central house of the race course. The Chinese were prohibited to enter the house and they couldn't look into the house from afar. Westerners were not able to view the game either because of the wet and muddy ground which rendered it difficult for carriages and horses to travel. They all felt disappointed and left (*Shun Pao*, 27 November 1881).

The majority of Western sports clubs held meetings on the territory of horse racing courses. There were many different sporting events held among Western clubs. For example, Crew describes some of the activities available to the international community:

> I believe the Shanghai Baseball Club is older than any similar organisation in America, for it was in existence before Lincoln was elected President ... Sports were organised along 'hong' (company) lines, and jockeys, golfers, bowlers, cricketers and oarsmen competed for the glory of the 'hong' just as college athletes compete for the Alma Mater... Dozens of clubs connected with some sporting or athletic event flourished; clubs devoted to baseball, cricket, lawn bowls, bowling, billiards, golf, polo, hockey, rowing, swimming etc. But the most important of all the Shanghai organisations was the Race Club (Crew, 1940: 298-307).

Some games were organised by Western people across open cities. For example, an old picture shows that a rugby game between Shanghai and Tianjin foreigners was held in early 1908 (*Lao Shanghai*, 1998: 19). Western sport from Shanghai and Tianjin also spread to other cities. Hongkou Recreation Ground was built in 1905 which included a golf club, hockey field, basketball court, soccer field, baseball field and bowling green. The Ground was opened to the Chinese after July 1928. A tug-of-war game was held at Hongkou Recreation Ground before 1911(Shanghai Library, 1998: 31) (Figure 11).

Sai-li, in Chinese literally means strength competition, and could be regarded as the early Chinese term for an athletic meet. One of the earliest *Sai-li* took place in 1871. Newspapers described

Western people exercising and training by jumping, playing a ball game, weightlifting and running and all of which could improve people's physical strength. Western individuals were exercising every day, without involvement in any competition. The annual Western merchant's athletic meet can be seen as a further reflection of Western cultural influences (*Shanghai*, 11 May 1871: 2). As mentioned above, the athletic meet included activities such as jumping, ball games, weightlifting and running. That ball game could be cricket, since there was no evidence of other Western ball games in Chinese literature prior to 1871. At this time soccer was still termed *cuju*. In 1872, "*Xi Ren Sai-li*" (Westerner's athletic meet) reported an athletic meet at the Shanghai horse racing course. The records of the various events were: high jump 4 feet 5 inches, broad jump 17 feet 3 inches, ball throw (*pao qiu*): 106.5 yards, and running from 100 to 600 yards. This arguable might be one of the earliest athletic records in the literature of the Chinese language (*Shanghai*, 21 May 1872: 2).

Athletic meetings were very popular and further events were introduced later. A report of "*Qing Guan Sai-li*" announced that a Western merchant's athletic meet would be held at the horse racing course at 11 o'clock in the morning that day. The Customs' and Bankers' office hours was shortened to a half day, from 9 a.m. to 12 noon, solely because of the athletic meet. There were 15 events: (i) hammer throw (ii) 220 yards (iii) *pao-qiu* (ball throw or cricket) (iv) broad jump (v) 100 yards (vi) high jump (vii) 440 yards (viii) *Shua-li* (manipulate strength) (ix) 100 yards (x) grenade throwing (xi) 3 miles (xii) 150 yards of three legged race (xiii) 120 yards (xiv) the game of running over a prepared course with artificial obstructions and (xv) tug of war. The athletic meet was an important event within Shanghai Western culture, since Customs' and Bankers' offices were often closed early in order that officials could attend the athletic meet (*Shun Pao*, 24 November 1881: 1). "*Sai-li Re Nao*" (Bustling athletic meet) reported a further Western athletic meeting which had been held to the southeast of the horse racing course the day before (*Shun Pao*, 25 November 1881: 3). In "*Xi Ren Sai-li*" (Westerner's athletic meet), a further meeting was held at the Shanghai racing course. The major events were running and a tug-of-war. It is interesting to note that policemen gave entrance permits only to Western people and the Chinese were prohibited to enter, but observed the proceedings from the opposite bank of the river (*Shun Pao*, 25 April 1882: 2). This situation was similar to that of other Western sport events in that the local Chinese people were not allowed to enter the sporting club or field. As Holt (1992: 207) argues, "Sport helped both to relieve the tedium of a distant posting and to

integrate new arrivals into the small world of colonial society". In China, Western sport was a symbol of not only superior and dominant class, but also imperialism.

The expansion of Western sports to China corresponded with the expansion of Western economic power in the process of imperialism. Western sports in China reproduced not only forms of British imperialism, but acted as a source of cultural power. In this sense, 'cultural power' was the set of ideas, beliefs, rules and conventions concerning social behaviour carried throughout the empire by such British servants such as administrators, military officers, industrialists, traders, financiers, settlers, and advisors of various kinds. The significance of these characteristics is that they were maintained within ruling circles and fostered within the colonial population more through systems of informal authority than through formal ones, such as the bureaucracy or the military. The success of this cultural power rested upon the ability of the imperial system to have its main social tenets accepted as appropriate forms of behaviour and ordering by either the bulk of the Chinese population, or at least by those important sections of that population upon whom the British relied for the mediation of their ruling practices, objectives and ideology (Stoddart, 1987: 2). In the above cases, I have attempted to suggest that the Chinese unconsciously accepted Western sports along with their cultural fantasy, control and supervision.

When the Chinese first saw Western athletic meetings (*Sai li*) at Shanghai in 1871, they believed that Westerners were stronger than the Chinese because Western sports cultivated people's martial spirit. After the Opium wars, the Chinese were allegedly defeated by Westerners not only because of their relatively weak military power but also because of their physical weakness and the lack of martial spirit. Accordingly, some Chinese reformers thought their people must learn from Western physical culture in order to develop Chinese military spirit and power. They suggested revolutionary changes in traditional Confucianism and the education system. 'To learn from the West' became a trend among Chinese reformers, within which physical education was formally promoted in the school curriculum for the first time in Chinese history. It is this process that I want to address in the next section.

Physical Culture, Exercise and Reform in China

Apart from Western imperialism, China faced many internal social and political problems, such as corruption, overtaxation, negligence of the dikes, population, famine and rebellion. The

Chinese (Manchu) empire seemed to be on the verge of collapse during the early 1860s. Some reformers claimed that China must "strengthen itself" and adopt Western methods if it was going to save the Empire. Military strength, one of the early targets of the reformers, encouraged the development of a Western style military drill. Western military drill was first introduced through Western physical culture into China. With the military strength initiatives, the first formal programmes of physical education in China in the late nineteenth century followed. The concern was not really with sports, but with military exercise and formal types of gymnastics. The first course of physical training in 1875 was established at the Nanking Military Academy. The Tianjin Naval Academy and a military academy were established in Tianjin under the patronage of Li Hung-chang, in 1881 and 1885. Physical education courses were influenced by German military drill. Physical exercises such as gymnastics, dumbbells, horizontal bar, parallel bars, side horse, jumping, football, swimming, mountain climbing, pole climbing were all introduced as forms of physical training (Wu, 1981: 69). Knight Biggerstaff (1972: 53) adds that all students of the Tianjin Naval Academy were subjected to military drill. An English naval captain who helped to conduct the annual examination in 1890 suggested to Li Hung-chang that the cadets be taught boxing, gymnastics and fencing in order "to develop their pluck, nerve and self-confidence" (*North-China Herald*, 18 July 1890: 44). Biggerstaff thought that it may have been asking too much physical activity of a Chinese officer at that time (Biggerstaff, 1961: 53).

When the Nanking Naval Academy opened in December 1890, gymnastics was one of the major subjects taught by German officers (Biggerstaff, 1972: 59). The academy set up in 1895 in Hupei by Chang Chih-tung also involved physical exercise programmes. These programmes were generally directed by German or Japanese military training instructors, but did not include sports competition. The influence of Western ideology in forming these early programmes in physical exercise was relatively limited before 1895 (Kolatch: 1972: 4). The loss of the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 revealed China's weakness and the failure of the reformation from 1860-1895. Reformers requested further reform and the modernisation of China's military, educational and financial systems. The government established new schools with new subjects, which included Western forms of physical education. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, military exercise was the major influence on physical education in Chinese schools. Most physical education teachers were foreigners or former soldiers.

Military spirit and exercise were emphasized in physical education because of the influence of both Western and Japanese imperialism in China.

The ideology of Chinese reformers on physical culture

Before the 1870s, "strength" to all Confucian modernisers meant military strength. This narrow perception bred a narrow response with the short-term objectives being the maintenance of peace and the preservation of territorial integrity. The basic assumptions were that the Chinese people had the intelligence to acquire Western skills, that China had the natural resources for the fulfilment of her policy goals and that the bureaucracy would be supportive to these tasks. Reform along these lines was evident in the so-called "self-strengthening" movement. Its immediate objective was to build up military power. However, its ultimate aim was to preserve and strengthen the traditional way of life. There was some support for adopting Western methods among reformers. It is not necessary to introduce the thoughts and ideas of all Chinese reformers, but some illustrative examples might be insightful.

One of the reformers, Feng Kuei-fen (1809-1874), came to recognise the need for modernisation and the importance of scientific studies when he was forced to take refuge in Shanghai from the Taipings. Here he was brought into contact with Westerners defending the city. Later as an advisor to some of the leading statesmen of his time, Feng demonstrated an acute grasp of both state and foreign affairs. His essays advocated a wide variety of reforms and were highly regarded by some leaders and consequently he became increasingly influential towards the end of the century. It was at his suggestion that a school of Western languages and sciences was established in Shanghai in 1863. Feng insisted that "Western books on mathematics, mechanics, optics, light and chemistry contained the best principles of the natural sciences. Most of this information is beyond the research of the Chinese people..." (Bary, Chan and Tan, 1964: 48). Although, Feng did not mention Western physical culture, it was his idea to adopt Western forms of learning.

Other reformers such as Tseng Kuo-fan (1811-1872) and his protégé Li Hung-chang (1823-1901) were, in a practical sense, the outstanding exponents of "self-strengthening" during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Tseng was acclaimed as the conqueror of the Taipings, and as a "Confucian gentleman" who exemplified traditional virtues in the government of industry, frugality, honesty, integrity in office, and loyalty to the dynasty. He was the type of "superior person" whose learning and

personal character inspired the devotion of his subordinates and gave Confucianists a confidence that such personal qualities could meet the challenge of the times. Intellectually an eclectic, Tseng minimised doctrinal differences and sought agreement on the ethical bases of action. His support of certain types of modernisation for the purpose of national defence also reflected a readiness to make compromises in order to achieve practical ends. Tseng and Li submitted a letter to the Tsungli Yamen, which handled foreign affairs, in March, 1871. Tseng and Li emphasised not only that China needed to learn from the West but also the pre-eminent practicality of Western thought. They were convinced that Western methods could only be mastered through prolonged and intensive study abroad, and they proposed sending a select group of young men abroad for this purpose. They pointed out that military administration and shipping were considered as important as the learning that deals with the mind and body, and nature and destiny of person. "Now that the eyes of the people have been opened, if China wishes to adopt Western ideas and excel in Western methods, we should immediately select intelligent children and send them to study in foreign countries..." (Bary, Chan and Tan, 1964: 50). The aims of Tseng and Li were much more focused in that they aimed to train an elite corps with a combination of classical Chinese and Western studies, carefully directed and controlled in the interests of the state.

Yen Fu (1853-1921), one of the most influential writers in Mao Tse-tung's boyhood (Teng and Fairbank: 1971:113), studied at the Greenwich Naval Academy and translated academic Western works into Chinese. His famous translated works are Thomas Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* and *Logic*, Herbert Spencer's *Study of Sociology* and Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Yen's translations served to introduce modern Western thought. One of Yen's remarkable essays "On Strength" (Yuan Chiang), involved a discussion of Darwin's *On the Origin of the Species*. He stressed the fact that the book was even more important than Newtonian physics. He said: "According to the book, all species came from one origin but were gradually differentiated through surroundings and slight variations of physiology...This is true not only of animals and plants but also of people...The evidence is precise and strong" (Wang, 1966: 196). Passing on to Spencer, Yen stressed the philosopher's rigorous application of the evolutionary theory of social phenomena. He described in particular the *First Principles*, the *Study of Sociology* and *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical.* Yen pointed out the importance of physical training in education and argued that "The principal aim of this teaching is the development of intelligence, bodily vigour and moral virtues" (Wang, 1966: 197). He also added that in a basic programme of development, bodily vigour was to be accorded first

importance, "All of the academies in Greece and Rome had their gymnasiums, and Plato himself was known for his physical strength" (Wang, 1966: 197). More specifically, Yen named opium smoking and footbinding as China's worst evils and suggested that the government should refuse to employ or honour the offenders. Yen's essays revealed the basic trends of Yen's thought. He compared China with Western nations:

> Western scholars interested in statecraft always judge a nation by the physique, intelligence, and morals of its people. If by such criteria the quality of the people is high, neither their livelihood nor their status as a nation can be bad. If, on the other hand, the people are slow, unenlightened, and selfish, the group cannot last and will be humiliated and annihilated when faced with stronger groups. The process does not need to take the form of armed conflicts but may come about through a gradual collapse as can be from many historical episodes...Hence the West accepts the self-preservation urge of all living beings as the fact in politics and education...but extols the preservation of the species when it conflicts with the preservation of the individual...In formulating a policy, the goal is always to improve the vigour, intelligence, and virtue of people (Wang, 1966: 197).

It is interesting to note how Yen, like many of his generation, eventually reversed his admiration of the West. He had initially favoured not a process of thorough reform but a gradual or evolutionary one. He wished to have good relations with the foreign nations, to have the emperor win the hearts of the people, and to break the political monopoly of the conservatives. He advocated the encouragement of the people's power, the cultivation of their knowledge, and the revival of the right conduct on their part. In later years, after 1911 and especially after the European War, Yen Fu's ideas changed sharply. He then considered that the Chinese governmental system and Chinese learning were both better than those of Europe. He said, "The culture of Western countries since this European war has been corrupted completely. I feel that the three centuries of progress of their races have only accomplished four things, that is to be selfish, to kill others, to have no integrity and to have lost the sense of shame" (Teng and Fairbank, 1971: 151). Thus Yen Fu became a conservative who preferred to keep his queue and criticise the New Culture movement. However, in physical culture, he argued that Chinese people must do more exercise in order to strengthen their body and stop opium smoking and footbinding (Yen, 1969: 55-56).

Kang Yu-wei (1858-1929), a dominant figure within the Reform Movement, was born near Canton. The Taiping Rebellion raised by Kang's fellow provincials was still agonising the empire from within, while from without the British and French, who had moved into Canton only the year before, were launching a campaign that would lead to the occupation of Beijing itself in 1860. The significance of Kang Yu-wei as a thinker lies in his attempt to provide a Confucian justification for basic institutional reforms. The so-called self-strengtheners had urged reform on the grounds of immediate

utility, thinking that Western weapons and techniques could be adopted without proceeding further to any basic changes in Chinese government and society. They spoke of preserving the Confucian Way (*Tao*) through the use of Western "instruments" (*Chi*) or "methods" (*fa*). Yet as like Wang Tao came to appreciate, Western power and prosperity rested on something more than technology. To bring China abreast of the modern world, more radical changes would be needed and thus reform began to take on a new meaning for them. The envisaged changes would now extend to "*fa*" in the sense of institutions as well as *fa* in the sense of method.

Tang Ssu-tung (1865-1898) was one of the most striking figures of the Reform Movement. The non-conformist son of a high official, he loved both independent study and the active life. He liked practising swordsmanship, serving as a military officer in the Far West and travelling in search of historic sites. Tang's ideas were derived from Confucianism, Buddhism and the Western sciences as well as from Kang Yu-wei, whom he respected as a teacher. The main tenets of his philosophical thought are contained in his *Jen-hsueh* (*The Study of Humanity*) (1958), in which he recommends for every person the freedom that would be possible if there were no boundaries between nations. He also relied on the formulation long ago of the three bones and five human relations, so that, in controlling men's bodies, he could also control their minds (Bary, Chan and Tan, 1964: 89). In Tan's *Jen-hsueh* he insists (Teng and Fairbank: 1971: 159) that "We should have parks for public recreation and health. We should have a holiday once every seven days to enable civil and military officials to follow the policy of (alternation between) pressure and relaxation". He might be viewed as one of the pioneers to see the importance of health, recreation and physical culture for Chinese people. Furthermore, he also pointed out that martial arts, archery and swordmanship could be used to raise Chinese people's nationalism and develop brave hearts.

Liang Chi-chao (1873-1929) was a student of Kang Yu-wei and his co-worker in the Reform Movement. He escaped to Japan after the failure of Kang's brief regime and then became one of the most influential advocate of reform in the years before the Revolution of 1911. His writings deal with a wide range of political, social and cultural issues. To thousands of young Chinese studying abroad (most of them in Japan) or reading his books and pamphlets on the mainland, he became an inspiration and idol, a patriotic hero with a command of Chinese classical learning together with a remarkable sensitivity to ideas and trends from the West. At the same time, Liang also put forward a new view of world history strongly coloured by Social Darwinism, a struggle for survival among nations and races.

In the 1890s, he and Kang had urged China to go beyond the mere adoption of Western "methods" and "instruments" to basic institutional change; now he argued that institutional change itself could only be effected through a transformation of the whole Chinese way of life and particularly its morals which were always considered to be the very essence of Confucianism. Morality was now to serve "the interest of the group", national survival. In Liang's essay *A People Made New*, he states that:

> A state is formed by the assembling of people. The relation of a nation to its people resembles that of the body to its four limbs, five viscera, muscles, veins and corpuscles. It has never happened that the four limbs could be cut off, the five viscera wasted away, the muscles and veins injured, the corpuscles dried up, and yet the body still lives. Similarly, it has never happened that a people could be foolish, timid, disorganised and confused and yet the nation still stands. Therefore, if we wish the body to live for a long time we must understand the methods of hygiene. If we wish the nation to be secure, rich and honourable, we must discuss the way for the people being "made new" (Bary, Chan and Tan, 1964: 94).

In Hsu's (1996: 12) argument, the meaning of "the method of hygiene" at that there was physical education. In the meaning of *A People Made New*, Liang argued that the term "people made new" does not mean that our people must give up entirely what is old in order to follow the new. There are two meanings of "made new", one is to improve what is original in the people and so renew it; the other is to improve what is originally lacking in the people and so make a new people.

Liang's essay on Martial Spirit was one of his most significant contributions. He analysed the reasons for the defeat of China by Western countries. The Chinese had the martial form, but lacked the martial spirit. He pointed out that the human physical body has a strong relationship to the human spirit and without the former, there would be no latter. The strength of the Europeans came from their enhancement of sports; while the Chinese did not value sports but lived with poor hygiene, early marriage and weak offspring. They also cultivated bad habits, such as smoking opium, which further debilitated their body and soul. Liang not only emphasised physical education as one of most important parts of education (Gu, 1997:187), but also supported women's physical exercise in school. Liang's thoughts on physical culture were strength of closely related to producing both people and nation.

A new school system

Close year 1860 marked a turning point in Chinese modern history. In 1861-1862 a well-equipped foreign legion was formed in Shanghai to aid the imperial troops against the Taiping rebels. The demonstration of Western prowess produced an even greater effect on the minds of Chinese scholar-generals than when the foreign legion won the battle. Li Hung-chang was convinced that in

order to survive, China must obtain knowledge of Western learning. In order to acquire Western technology, it was first necessary to know Western languages. Beginning in 1862, language schools were opened in several cities. In 1866 two schools of arsenals were established and the schools undertook a programme of translating Western books. As a logical extension of these measures, students were sent abroad to secure technological knowledge at its source. The first group of students were sent to the United States in 1872. Baseball was introduced by those Chinese students who studied abroad. During the self-strength movement, Li Hung-chang had sent 120 Chinese students to America from 1872 to 1881. Those students stayed at Hartford (Yale). They learned to tuck their queues under their caps and play very smart baseball (Fairbank, 1978: 540). Unfortunately, they were not mastering the Chinese classics in preparation for their examination back in China. In 1881, the project was abandoned. The 120 students from the Hartford project made their mark on China's foreign relations, industrialisation and sports development after 1900 (Fairbank, 1978: 540-542). For instance, the famous railway engineer Zhan Tianyou, who was one of those students, introduced baseball from the USA to China (Gu, 1990: 17). Liang Chang was also one of those students; he was a member of the baseball team at Phillips Academy in Andover. Liang won the final game with Exeter in 1881. Later Liang became the Chinese ambassador in the USA in the early part of twentieth century (Wu, 1981: 71).

The modern schools established by the central government and by various provincial governments between 1861 and 1894 fall into seven categories: (i) schools to train interpreters and foreign affairs specialists; (ii) schools to train interpreters and skilled workmen for the new shipyards and arsenals; (iii) schools to train deck and engine-room officers for the modern navy—these will be called naval academies; (iv) schools to train army officers, that is , military academies; (v) schools to train personnel for the telegraph administration; (vi) a naval and military medical school; and (vii) a school of mine engineering (Biggerstaff, 1972:31). Physical Education was introduced to most of those new schools.

Historically, physical education had long been a major concern of the Chinese traditional education. For example, the education of the Chou Dynasty (1122BC-255BC) is described in the *Book of Rites*, which consisted of six virtues—wisdom, benevolence, goodness, righteousness, loyalty, harmony—the six praiseworthy actions—honouring one's parents, being friendly with one's brothers, being good neighbourly, maintaining cordial relationships with relatives by marriage, being trustful and

being sympathetic—and six arts—ritual, music, archery, charioteering, writing and mathematics. Archery, charioteering and dancing can be seen as the earliest physical education in traditional Chinese education. The *Book of Rites* gives in detail the model of a boy:

> At thirteen, he learned music, and to repeat the odes, and to dance the *ko*. When a full-grown lad, he danced the *hsiang*. He learned archery and chariot driving (Purcell, 1936: 4-5).

The notion of the *Book of Rites* had influenced the Chinese traditional education and examination system before 1860. In traditional China, examinations were divided into civil and military categories, but the former were so much more important than the later that the term "examination system" itself referred only to the civil service examinations that have been already discussed. The examination system progressed through the same stages as its civil counterpart. To become a military licentiate, or *wu sheng-yuan*, a man had to pass the district, prefectural and qualifying military examinations. Then he was entitled to take the provincial military examination, after which came the metropolitan military examination. Those who succeeded in the latter became military graduates (*wu kung-shih*) and could compete in the palace military examination to become military *chin-shih*. The only difference between the two was that the military system lacked the extra re-examinations that had been interpolated in the civilian system. According to Miyazaki's descriptions on China's military examination system, he said:

> Young men who hope to become army officers began with the district military examination, which was conducted by the magistrate and consisted of three sessions. In the first, held on the military drill grounds, candidates had to shoot three arrows from horseback at a man-shaped target about 1.6 meters high. If all three arrows hit home, the man received a perfect score; if two hit the mark, he was graded 'good'; and if only one reached the target he received a pass. Those who did not manage to do even that, or who fell from their horse, were eliminated. The rest went on to the second session.
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> This was held in the garden of the prefectural office and consisted of a marksmanship test (*pu-she*) and a test of military talent (*chi-yung*). In the first the candidates had to shoot five arrows at a target at fifty paces. Those who made four or five hits were graded 'excellent', two or three earned a 'good', and one hit a 'pass', while anyone who did not hit the target at all was failed. The second part consisted of three tests: drawing a bow (*k'ai-kung*), brandishing a sword (*wu-tao*), and weight lifting (*to-shih*). In the first of these the men had to bend a bow into the shape of a full moon, with the bows graded by strength into 120-, 100-, and 80-catty weapon (a catty, or chin, weighs approximately 600grams, or about 21 ounces). A man who bent the heaviest bow received an 'excellent', the 100-catty bow earned a 'good', and the 80-catty bow gave him a grade of 'passing'. The next test involved grasping a halberd, ch'ing-lung tao, or 'green dragon sword,' brandishing it in front of one's face, swinging it around one's back and returning it to the front, and finally spinning it like a water wheel, all without once touching it to the ground. Grades were assigned according to the weight of the halberd; men who used the 120-, 100-, or 80-catty weapons were rated 'excellent', 'good', and 'passing', respectively. In the weight –lifting test the candidates were required to raise a stone at least one Chinese foot, or 14 inches, off the ground. Those lifting the heaviest, 300-catty stone received the grade of 'excellent.' Raising the 250-catty stone earned a man a 'good', while lifting a 200-catty stone merited a 'pass'. These two outdoor tests determined whether a man would pass, but he still had to go through the third session, consisting of an indoor test.

> This was a test of scholarship, requiring the candidates to write out several hundred characters from a designated place in the military classics that they were supposed to have memorized. There were seven military classics, but only three of these were used in the examination, the Sun Tzu, Wu Tze, and Ssu-ma Fa (Miyazaki, 1976: 102-103).

From 1898, various attempts were undertaken to reform the examination system by the introduction of new material and by associating it with the schools of modern studies. In 1904, the complete integration of the school examinations with the state examinations and the gradual abolition of the old style of literary and military examination were decreed. Finally in 1905, the examination system was abolished, which represents a decisive turning point in the relationship between China and the West in the intellectual and cultural fields. However, Western military drill and physical exercise were introduced as one of the major subjects in the new schools around a decade before and after 1900. Chen (1979: 124), for example, has found that Chinese schools in 1903 conducted 3 hours of physical drill course per week and Chengtu Mission Schools conducted drills as early as 1910.

The military-favoured physical exercise known as *ti tsao* (gymnastic) and provided most of the physical training that was available in Chinese schools during the first decade of the twentieth century. It was this type of exercise which was prescribed by the Board of Education - the first organised government control over modern education—when it stipulated two to three hours per week of physical exercise for upper and lower elementary schools in 1905. Subsequently, physical education was made a required course in middle schools, higher schools, lower normal schools, and lower agricultural schools. In 1907, a physical education curriculum was devised for women's normal schools. Periodic changes were made in these directives, physical education in lower elementary schools was raised to four hours per week in 1909. At that time, urban schools were required to give physical training as a required course, and rural schools as an optional course. In 1905, 102,767 Chinese children were in public schools out of a school-age population of approximately 33 million. In 1910, the figure had reached 5%. Among the government schools of that era, only Nanyang (Shanghai), Peiyang (Tianjin), Haichün (Woosung), and some others had actual sports programmes. The average physical education programmes in Chinese schools at that time probably were similar to the description provided by Martin Yang of physical education in the rural Shantung village of Taitou about 1915 (Kolatch, 1972: 5-6). The physical training provided there consisted mainly of military drill. Since the aim of the programme was to make the boys good soldiers, marching, saluting, and military terminology were stressed so as to resemble a military camp. Teachers appealed to their students to train their bodies so that they would be able to defend their homes and their nation.

Under this mission of physical education, the dumb bell exercise was very popular around Chinese schools. For example, the dumbbell exercise was demonstrated at the Shanghai Yu-Tsair Chinese-Western School (*Shun Pao*, 7 December 1897: 1). A Western teacher gave commands to students in a Western language and by a whistle. Then students were marching and doing dumbbell exercises in high spirits. This was the first time that most guests and parents had seen the dumbbell exercise. They thought it was a very good physical training for students. An old picture of the dumbbell exercise at spring sports games by students from Shanghai Patriotic Girl School in 1907 was shown in *Old Fashions of Shanghai* (Yeh and Zheng, 1998: 99) (Figure 12). According to this feature, we can see that students had sport dress, equipment, facilities and Western physical education teachers in Shanghai.

However, the early development of physical education had totally different aspects in rural areas. In the period 1907-8, for instance, You Ziyi described his experiences in introducing modern sports in a small rural school in the vicinity of Shanghai in a teacher's magazine (Ebrey, 1993: 350). In rural areas up to that time, farmers had never dreamed of extracurricular activities or games after class. They thought that the sound of reading was expected from a school, but noise and shouting were taken as signs of naughtiness on the part of the children. How could students be so impolite to the teacher? Should anyone hear gleeful sounds, he would assume the teacher was absent. How could a teacher indulge the students that way!

To eliminate such an ingrained prejudice was not an easy job. Therefore, teachers started with some trial games. At first, they did nothing more than bounce a small rubber ball, and they did that only after the class had been dismissed. Subsequently, the students became more and more interested. The old principal was no less spirited, and one day he brought a rubber ball filled with rushes. They then organised soccer teams and set up a goal made with bamboo poles on the vacant lot west of the school building. Thereafter, they played soccer before and after class every day.

Parents of some students came to the school frequently, and the old principal always explained the importance of exercise: "By nature children want to play. If we prohibit them from playing in public, they were well play secretly anyway, which might be dangerous. In addition to the regular courses, they should be allowed to play. When playing a game, they should follow the rules. Besides, there is always a teacher supervising as referee..." (Ebrey, 1993: 350). These were the best reasons for students' extracurricular activities. They preached in this way, and the local farmers believed what they

said (Ebrey, 1993: 350). During the early stages, it was not easy to introduce physical education into rural schools not only because of the lack of equipment, facilities, the limitation of the Chinese traditional view of education as merely study work, but also because of the shortage of physical education teachers.

The first school dedicated solely to training physical educators was the Chinese Physical Training School (*Chung Kuo Ti Tsao Hsueh Hsiao*) opened in 1904, in Shanghai, by Hsu Fu-lin. Hsu and his co-workers (Hsu Yi-ping and Liu Cheng-lieh). They had been among those who had studied in Japan and brought back the Japanese exercise system. Outwardly, these people advocated a "national physical education" (*kuo min ti yu*), while under cover they preached revolution and contributed to the downfall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Hsu himself translated a book from Japanese entitled *Swedish Curative Exercise.*

By the time the school was forced to close down in 1927, after having been ravaged during the Warlord conflicts, 1,531 students had graduated from its two-year courses. The Chinese Physical Training School was extremely influential in its day and produced most of the heads of physical education departments until the government began opening physical education departments in its normal schools in 1915 and 1916. The Hsus were truly the first family of Chinese physical education. In 1905, Hsu Fu-lin's wife founded the Shanghai Chinese Girls' Physical Education School which continued in operation until the Japanese war. With the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, the Board of Education gave way to the Ministry of Education (*Chiao Yu Pu*). The Ministry had little more machinery to implement its directives than had the Board. Nevertheless, it seemed to be more vigorous in its attitudes toward physical training. It reiterated earlier directives and called for three hours per week of physical education in elementary and middle schools. In December 1912, it gave a lot more direction to future physical education programmes by stating its aim: "The essentials of physical exercise are to cause all parts of the body to develop equally, to strengthen the body, to enliven the spirit, and to cultivate the habits of discipline and harmony" (Wu, 1962: 330-337). This aim of physical education was very compatible with the missions of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) and other missionary institutions, which will be discussed in the next section.

The Missionary School System as an Agent of Western Imperialism

The missionaries set up schools in China to aid the propagation of Christianity and they were the pioneers in modern education from primary school to university. The nineteenth century witnessed a period of growth in Christian missionary schools with the political and economic expansion of Western imperialism being no coincidence. As early as 1844, in the Treaty of Whampoa, the Chinese agreed to be free propagation of Catholicism. Later in 1858, the Treaty of Tianjin provided the freedom of movement for all missionaries. None of the early treaties conceded to the foreigner the right to educate Chinese children. Yet Westerners could buy land and open schools as a privilege to the missionaries.

Why did missionaries come to China? What were their goals? In the records of the 1894 convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Fletcher Brockman, one of the early missionaries and one of the YMCA's Secretaries to China, claimed that the typical reason:

> Why shall I go to China?... One reason is because a million a month in that great land are dying without God. Can you picture what it is to die without God? Can you imagine it?... Another reason, because 300,000,000 in China are living without God. O brothers and sisters, can you picture what it is to live without God? Have you ever thought of it, to have no hope for the future and none for the present? (Lutz, 1971:11)

Brockman's words greatly influenced the attitude with which he approached his work in China. Later in his book, he talks more about the goals of the missionary:

> From the standpoint of the religious need of the missionary fields, I look upon all of the non-Christian countries as presenting the same problem. They were composed of heathens, and at the distance from which I viewed all heathens were alike. I believed sincerely that all non-Christian religions should be destroyed root, stock, and branch... The religious leaders of China were hostile to Christianity, I thought, and I must meet them with the same spirit. It was to be fight to the finish between light and darkness. It is a fight for life. We must conquer them or they will conquer us (Brockman, 1935: 16-17).

Missionaries were interested in the conversion of individuals, and they frequently considered an individual's religious beliefs separate from other aspects of culture. The missionary Griffith John spoke for many when he told a China missionary conference in 1877: "We are here, not to develop the resources of the country, not for the advancement of commerce, not for mere promotion of civilization; but to do battle with the powers of darkness, to save people from sin, and conquer China for Christ" (Lutz, 1971: 11). At the early stage, the missionary's task was very unsuccessful. The Chinese gentry, in particular, viewed missionaries as a disruptive threat to Chinese orthodoxy and incited mobs against them with ridiculous stories and false charges. From the 1880s Timothy Richards, W. A. P. Martin, Young J. Allen and other like-minded missionaries grew sympathetic to Chinese culture and customs, and decided to "secularise" their work through the promotion of Western knowledge. From "saving the

heathens from the sufferings of hell", they moved to "saving the heathens from the hell of suffering in this world". They sponsored schools, libraries, hospitals, newspapers and magazines to promote Western culture and progress (Hook, 1982: 245).

With the growth of the Chinese Christian community, missionaries desired schools to educate Christians and the children of Christians. They also hoped that by providing schools they could produce an intelligent church membership and thus raise the status of Christianity in the eyes of the Chinese. Another reason for establishing a missionary school was the need to train Chinese assistants for evangelical work. In sum, the goals of missionary schools fell into three categories: (i) conversion of the upper classes in the hope that their conversion would influence the masses; (ii) the need for training Christian converts and workers in Christian schools, hospitals and churches and (iii) the hope of Christianising the whole Chinese nation (Lutz, 1971: 19).

Missionary schools

Normally, there was no formal physical education course in the early missionary schools, but it was contained in the extra-curricular activities. For example, students of Zhen Jiang Christian Girls' School (Jiang Su province) were required to take part in gymnastics or physical exercise after their lessons at four o'clock every day in 1884 (Gu, 1989:63). These physical activities, although not included in the formal education curriculum, had an indirect influence on the liberation of women's footbinding in China. Of greater significance from a historical point of view, as far as the development of Western non-military physical education in China is concerned, are the sports activities which were first introduced through the Christian schools as early as 1888. Here, for the first time, Chinese youth became acquainted with Western sports. In 1890, St John's University in Shanghai, was one of the early China Christian colleges. St John's introduced track and field athletics a few years after its opening (Figure 13). Track and field was formally adopted as a sport and a Canadian who taught there organised a sports meet every six months. Believing in the usefulness of sports in building both character and bodies, other missionary educators followed suit and sports and athletic contests slowly won favour among students despite their initial reluctance to take part in such undignified activities. In 1904 the first intercollegiate athletic meeting in the north of China was held between Beijing University and North China Union College. While military drill and calisthenics were emphasized in some colleges, tennis, baseball and soccer were more popular and were even introduced into the

government schools. Both Ginning and Soochow added physical education courses to train leaders in physical education and public health work for schools, colleges, the YMCA, the YWCA, and other missionary organisations (Lutz, 1971: 187).

Significantly, the Christian colleges had particular influence in physical education. Christian missionaries had met considerable opposition when they introduced physical education and recreation for students. As the mission school students had come to enjoy sports such as track, tennis, and soccer, however, the Christian colleges organised intercollegiate athletic contests which included representatives from non-Christian institutions. The government eventually adopted the view that physical training could strengthen China by strengthening its citizens, and in 1909 the first programme of modern physical education for China was organised under the leadership of M.J. Exner of the International Committee of the YMCA (Hoh, 1926: 90-93).

Sports activity spread to many of the church-affiliated schools while the government schools lagged behind in this respect. Development was so one-sided in favour of the church schools that at the first National Athletic Meet in 1910 most of the athletes were from missionary schools and almost none from government schools. A gradual change occurred between 1910 and 1920 as the YMCA began to initiate sports programmes in government schools. The missionary schools initially conceived of sports as something divorced from education, intended merely for recreational purposes. The faculty members who took charge of the sports programmes were not specialists in physical education. Most frequently they had developed an interest in sports while attending school and served as volunteer supervisors at the missionary schools. It remained the job of the YMCA to take the first step (between 1895 and 1908) in turning a haphazard system of physical education into a more formalised one.

Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA)

The YMCA's physical education programme in China was not systematically carried out until the arrival of Dr. D. Willard Lyon to Tianjin in 1895. Lyon became responsible for organised sports which were one of the YMCA's regular works in China from then on. The YMCA's physical education programme proceeded slowly during its first year because no formal provision had yet been made for the physical education programme. On the other hand, the nature of the programme depended on the background of the Secretary. In 1898, three additional Foreign Secretaries - Robert R. Gailey, R. E. Lewis and Fletcher S. Brockman --were sent to China to join Lyon. They all had an interest in sports.

Later C. H. Robertson arrived in 1902 to be the YMCA Secretary in Tianjin. He spent part of his time teaching physical education in local Chinese schools. With both Gailey and Robertson taking an interest in physical education, in addition to their regular duties, Tianjin took the lead among YMCA in the development of physical education programmes in the days before Shanghai became the centre.

The YMCA sports effort in China took two broad paths. The first involved programmes initiated and run by the YMCA using its own facilities. This programme started in 1908, when M. J. Exner arrived in Shanghai and built the first Shanghai YMCA gymnasium. He set up the plan of physical education development and prepared the training course for physical education agents (Tsai, 1996: 156) (Figure 14). The aim of physical education for him was to secure for the individual the physical basis for the largest and most efficient life for which it is possible for him to live and to increase the capacity of the race. He immediately announced the opening of a two-year course for the training of Physical Directors in October 1909. This course included training in all branches of sport, textbook work and lectures in anatomy, physiology, hygiene, tests and measurements, the history of physical training, and Bible study. The trainees would receive pedagogical experience at Shanghai YMCA. His first class of trainees contained 14 students and by the spring of 1910, he was able to put on a sports demonstration in the Shanghai gymnasium before 200 spectators. A native Chinese student, Mr. C. G. Hoh from the original class, became a YMCA Physical Secretary later. This YMCA's new programme turned out some of first native Chinese experts in Western physical education (Kolatch, 1972:10).

The years 1908-1911 were busy for Exner. In addition to directing the national physical education programme, he was in charge of the local programme at the Shanghai YMCA. The Shanghai Association had better equipment than most other YMCA branches. It contained a quarter mile running track, a field for soccer and other games, four tennis courts and locker facilities for the gymnasium. The most popular class was the evening men's gymnasium class, generally consisting of about 25 men. Classes in physical education were also held for the 250 students at the Shanghai YMCA day school. A special "Leader's Class" was organised for Physical Directors who would assist Exner in the teaching.

The second path was that of "service activities" (i.e. services rendered by the YMCA to outside organisations). YMCA physical education staffs helped to develop Chinese school physical education at the early stage, since physical education teachers were very rare. In this latter category all programmes were started by the YMCA Physical Department in Chinese government schools, speeches

were made on behalf of physical education throughout China, and co-ordination of such meets as the national Athletic Meet series were arranged. For example, Exner's most far-reaching contribution was the initiation of the national Athletics Meet series which began in October 1910. Exner's idea on this meet was presented in his article "Physical Training in China":

> There are several things which these First National Athletics Games should accomplish. In the first place they will call national attention to physical training and will stimulate interest in it all over China. They will do much to establish uniform standards and events in athletics; they will open an approach to many of the government schools, for we have found that the most ready opening into the government schools is through athletics; and they will do much to remove prejudice against Christianity. They will win respect for Christianity, especially in the minds of young men, in that they will cause Christianity to be associated with virile, manly elements (Exner, 1911: 19).

Exner and other YMCA leaders felt that by running a national athletic meet, nationwide attention and interest in sport would be aroused and at the same time standardization of sports practices would be achieved. On the other hand, the YMCA was also concerned about its image. It had found that its sports programme gave it an inroad into government schools and groups which initially were prejudiced against a Christian institution. The YMCA was free to implement its gospel programme through sports. It is important not to attach too great an importance to either of these aspects and yet it is important not to under-estimate them either. The latter certainly had a more far-reaching effect in the long run. However, it was through the former that the YMCA first gained the confidence of others and thus made the Chinese receptive to its service programmes.

Geographically, the YMCA's own sports programmes were limited to those cities where there were Association branches. It was thus available to rural areas only indirectly. The YMCA's first branch was set up in Tianjin, and from there it spread to Shanghai, Beijing, Foochow and Canton. Of the 22 YMCAs in 1920, 15 were coastal, five were located in Central China, and only two were in West and Southwest China. One can get a feel for the YMCA physical training operation by looking at the programme in the Shanghai Association. With the arrival of Exner in 1908, the Shanghai YMCA became the centre of YMCA physical work in China. The local programme, which was developed there between 1912 and 1917 under Alfred H Swan, became a model for physical work in other YMCAs, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

True, the Christian missionaries had acted as agents of Western imperialism in China and had participated in the Chinese definition of their nation. Through personal life and through the schools, hospitals, printing presses and other institutions, the missionary became a propagator of ideals and customs of Western civilization. In opposition to the rights, privileges, and teachings of Westerners,

educated Chinese began to seek a conscious definition of their own state and nation. The Tung-meng hui (Alliance Society), for example, was the Chinese revolutionary party founded under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen in Tokyo in July 1905 with the aim of overthrowing Manchu rule. In the Republican Revolution of 1911, Sun Yat-sen was a Christian and Chiang Kai-shek was baptized in 1930 (Hook, 1982: 334). In the early stage of the Republican period, as a further example, over sixty five percent of government officers were Christians in Canton in 1912.

Such a secular role was not eagerly assumed by missionaries of the nineteenth century; nor has it been gladly acknowledged by Chinese scholars. It was out of dismay for the indifference of the Chinese to the Christian message that a few missionaries in the nineteenth century founded schools and other institutions. The schools were considered evangelist agencies first and academic institutions second. As Holt (1989:94) emphasizes, Christianity was the most important moral or intellectual force behind the spread of sport. Sport did play a significant role in Chinese missionary schools in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

Summary

In modern China, sport seemed to have played an important role in the process of Western cultural imperialism within various social formations. Sport also played a major role in the transmission of imperial and national ideas from the late nineteenth century onwards. In this chapter, I have attempted to show the influences of Western cultural imperialism on the development of modern sports in China from 1860 to 1911. Evidence indicates that Western sports were introduced to China through (i) the agents of imperialism such as Western merchants, diplomats, teachers, soldiers and Western missionaries and (ii) the emerging reformers at the time who were receptive to Western ideology. Reformers in China tried to uphold the Chinese Empire against its decline by promoting the adoption of Western methods, military drills being part of the programme, although this failed, it nonetheless moulded physical education in China into its contemporary structure. Finally, following the diffusion of the Western missionary school system and the YMCA, Chinese sport development was still under the domination of Western Imperialism. This lasted until the collapse of the Chinese (Manchu) Empire in 1911, and the start of the Republic period which will be discussed and develop in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR: SPORT, NATIONALISM AND FAILURE OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC, 1911-1949

While an initial phase in the development of modern sport may have existed from at least 1860 to 1911, a second phase in its development lasted from about 1911 until 1949. At least three important processes affected the development of sport in China during this period. First, the continuing influence of Western imperialist power through the channels of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and the missionary school system (as already indicated in Chapter Three) may be seen as the major agent and importer of Western sport. Nonetheless, these Western agents were requested to return the sovereign rights of education (which included physical education and sport) to China during the anti-imperialism period from 1919 to 1927. Secondly, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang—KMT) launched a critical debate on indigenous and Western sport from 1915 to 1937, when it promoted a number of Chinese traditional sports. At the same time, the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921 introduced social ideas of anti-imperialism into China and influenced the development of sport. In particular, Mao Zedong's early article *A Study of Physical Education* (*New Youth*, 1 April 1917: 66-68) could be seen as one of the most influenced pieces of writing on sport in modern China. Thirdly, there was the defeat of the Chinese nationalists in 1949; which resulted in the KMT fleeing to Taiwan. The issue of "Two Chinas" will be discussed in Chapter Five, but a few questions will be raisd in this chapter. How was Western sport rooted in China by the YMCA? What were the debates about nationalism and sport from 1911 to 1927? How had sport developed under the KMT's control from 1928 to 1949? How had sport developed under the Communist control before 1949?

The 1911 revolution marked the end of the Qing Dynasty but, more significantly, it also ended two thousand years of unbroken Chinese imperial tradition. The leader of the revolutionaries was a Western-educated Christian, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Sun and other revolutionaries thought that the imperial system was flawed and that China needed a thoroughly modern government. Sun's answer was to form a republic which could control foreign encrichment and also oust the Manchus who controlled the throne. It would then be a Chinese government run by Chinese for the sake of China. Nationalism, a strong plank in Sun's plan for China, was an idea shared by many who had far less radical plans for the country. In fact, most reformers felt that the imperial system was not the problem. Sun and the other revolutionaries were sure that it was.

Sun was also attracted by such Western ideas as democracy and socialism. He was particularly keen to bring "socialism" (what he called "the People's livelihood") to China. It is important to understand that in this instance by socialism he meant that the government should have a role in taking care of the people. Sun and other revolutionaries wanted to adapt Confucian paternalism (which taught that the emperor and officials had responsibility for the people's material welfare) to modern times, thereby broadening the idea of the government's social responsibility for people.

The influential writings of Sun reflected a thoroughly Westernised cast of mind. Besides ambitious plans to develop funds with foreign capital, Sun optimistically proposed a timetable for a three-stage transition from military through party tutelage to full constitutional rule, and drew up a five power constitution which added censorial and examination branches. Neither these schemes, nor his Three People's Principles—Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism—supplied the Kuomintang with a workable guide after his death. Sun's achievement was rather to personify defiance to bureaucrats, warlords and foreign imperialism, at a time when China resembled, he said "a plate of sand". Sun found the words and gestures to inspire those Chinese who sought at once unity, national dignity and Westernisation. In a discussion of nationalism, Sun argued that:

> For the most part the four hundred million Chinese can be spoken of as completely Han Chinese with common customs and habits. We are completely of one race. But in the world today, what position do we occupy? Compared to the other peoples of the world we have the greatest population and our civilization is four thousand years old; we should therefore be advancing in rank with the nations of Europe and America. But the Chinese people have only family and clan solidarity; they do not have a hundred million people gathering together in China, in reality they are just a heap of loose sand.
>
> Today we are the poorest and weakest nation in the world and occupy the lowest position in international affairs. Other men are carving knives and serving dishes; we are fish and meat. Our position at this time is most perilous. If we do not earnestly espouse nationalism and weld together our four hundred million people into a strong nation, there is a danger of China being lost and our people being destroyed. If we wish to avert this catastrophe, we must espouse nationalism and bring this nationalist spirit to the salvation of the country (Sun, Lecture I, 1927: 4-5).

In a sense, Sun's notion of nationalism can be seen as a reaction to imperialism. Over the next turbulent decades, the leaders of the Nationalist Party and the leaders of the Communist Party struggled for power under the slogans of Chinese nationalism. Sports development was also influenced by the Chinese sense of nationalism. Within the anti-imperialism and anti-Christian movement in the 1920s, sport was indirectly involved in the debate between Western and indigenous culture. Although the projects of the YMCA and the missionaries on sports development were forcibly coming to an end in China around 1928, their influence on sport was continued by their Chinese agents who had been educated or trained in YMCA, missionary schools and Western institutions. It is necessary to provide

more evidence to review the continuing influence of the YMCA in the development of sport in the early period of the Chinese Republic.

The Influence of the YMCA

From 1908 to 1911, Exner's work (as I mentioned in the last chapter) exerted a considerable influence upon the physical welfare of the Chinese people and educational institutions in China. His work was the real beginning of a constructive programme of physical education in China. Exner returned to the United States because of bad health in 1911. After Exner's departure a further four important secretaries arrived in China to continue the training programme between 1911 and 1913. They were J. H. Crocker, A. H. Swan, C. A. Siler and C. H. McCloy. Crocker took over the national director's position, and Swan continued the training programme in the Shanghai YMCA.

The basic work of the Association's Physical Education Department was done in the large gymnasium class, similar to that used by YMCA associations in the United States at that time. As late as 1912, due in no small part to the cultural bias against physical activity still evident in China, the Shanghai YMCA had difficulty attracting participants to its programmes. To combat this poor attendance, two steps were taken. First, to appeal to the traditional inclination of many Chinese, a course in Chinese boxing was started. Men willing to come for Chinese boxing were found later to be more receptive to such Western games as volleyball (Swan, 1913). In addition, YMCA members were not only entitled to sports privileges, but were also accommodated free of charge.

As the YMCA sports programme gradually caught on, the sports area became a busy place, open some ten hours per day, six days per week. In 1915, this involved some 3,000 participants per week. The following 'typical day' at the Shanghai YMCA shows the scope of the operation:

9:30am	gym practice for Physical Director trainees
11am	Gym class for students in YMCA day school
1pm	Gym class for students in YMCA day school
3pm	Gym class for students in YMCA day school
4pm	Boys full-member gym, bath and swim
5:15pm	Businessmen's class
5:30-7pm	Swimming pool opens for men
8-9pm	Orphan boys' gym class
9-9:30pm	Evening school students' gym, bath and swim

The programme at the Shanghai YMCA was never a luxury operation, but as the programme expanded, the budget constantly grew (from $3,445 in 1910 to $13,921 in 1916). However, there was a

constant struggle to meet operation expenses. Indeed somewhat of a fetish was made of the constant check on the cost of showers, towels and soap. Despite the fact that they were a service organisation, the YMCA did not cater to a lower class of Chinese who could not offer the costs of membership (Swan, 1916: 537-546).

Growth in other YMCA physical departments was as steady as it was in Shanghai. In 1917, in all YMCA's combined, 130,890 attended gymnasium classes. In 1918, this increased to 229,197 and in 1922 to 725,062 (Hoh, 1926: 208-220). By 1923, the membership in all YMCA Physical Departments was estimated to be 46 full-time directors (36 of them Chinese), most of whom had a middle school education plus a technical course in physical education. In order to encourage the participation of boys and young men in its programme, the National Office of the YMCA Physical Department devised several programmes run on a national scale. One of the most successful was the "Hexathlon championships" adapted from a YMCA programme developed in the United States. It involved competition among YMCA city associations, with each association divided into junior and senior (aged 18 and over) divisions. Five events made up the competition: (i) 60 yard potato race, (ii) 160 yard potato race, (iii) standing broad jump, (iv) running high jump, and (v) shot put. Each city association entered as many competitors as it wished, but only recorded the six best scores in each event. Each team competed individually, and the results were then forwarded to the National YMCA Office which announced the winners. The Hexathlon Championship began in China in 1915 and continued into the mid-1920s.

In 1917, the National Committee of the YMCA of China published a "Standard Programme for Boys" which provided five rankings for boys aged 12-20 in each of four categories: mental, physical, religious, and social. The five physical standards were (i) health, (ii) swimming or walking, (iii) jumping, (iv) running and (v) games. In 1918, a "Four-Fold programme" was established in which physical fitness and healthy living were included (Wu, 1956: 156). Both of these programmes viewed physical training as being an integral part of the development of a complete Christian.

The YMCA, being a Christian organisation, was very interested in the expansion of its various programmes as a means of gaining a foothold in areas and among groups which would ordinarily be closed to the influence of the missionaries. This, in turn, was meant to facilitate conversion to Christianity. Had the YMCA restricted itself to programmes in its own few centres throughout China, its influence would have been limited. A positive factor in the YMCA's development was the freedom

which its secretaries enjoyed to travel, free from the suspicion which often greeted locally based organisations in an area. In physical education, these activities were especially significant.

The YMCA first became known in physical education as a co-ordinator and sponsor of athletic meets. Although perhaps best known for initiating two important series of sports meetings during the Nationalist period, the National Athletic Meeting and the Far Eastern Championship Games, the YMCA spent a much greater proportion of its funds on more localised meetings. The first YMCA sponsorship of an athletic meeting took place in 1902 in Tianjin (Wu, 1956: 96-97). At the outset, the YMCA usually fielded a team in the competitions which it arranged with local schools. In subsequent years, however, the YMCA devoted itself increasingly to the management of meetings. In the same vein, the YMCA hosted "athletic days" whereby people interested in a particular sport, on an informal level of competition, would come to the YMCA athletic field for several hours of recreation (*Tianjin Young Men*, 1903). During the first quarter of the century, no group other than the YMCA carried on the continuous sponsorship of small-scale athletic meetings and informal recreation through sports. This was the main reason why more formal athletics on a large scales were subsequently able to develop in Republican China. Without these opportunities, the skills necessary for national and international competition could never have been developed.

As mentioned above, the top YMCA Physical Directors spent substantial time travelling and promoting the idea of sport. They gave many lectures throughout China, both urban and rural. Consequently, the YMCA became synonymous with sport in China, and when a government school or a municipal government began to think of initiating a sport programme, it was only natural for them to turn to the YMCA for advice. The YMCA was able to help them in several ways. If it was a school seeking advice and it was located in the geographical area of a YMCA branch, the Physical Secretary of the branch sometimes taught a course there. At other times, the YMCA supplied government schools with teachers of regular subjects from the West; by virtue of their athletic background, they were able to organise an active sports programme there. The YMCA was also able to supply in-service training for PE teachers in government schools, and during the 1913-14 school year, 11 schools in Shanghai sent staff members to the Shanghai YMCA once a week for PE training.

From 1914 to 1916, YMCA secretaries were constantly approached to organise PE programmes in various schools, especially in Beijing and Shanghai. In 1914, the Beijing YMCA directed PE programmes in the Beijing Union Medical College and other local schools. In 1915, the

Chinese government, in conjunction with the YMCA, decided to organise departments of PE in five normal universities. The first was founded in 1915 in Nanjing, with the YMCA's Charles H. McCloy heading the department. In 1916, similar departments were founded in Beijing, Sichuan, Wuchang, and Guangdong (Wu, 1956: 141-144).

The success of the YMCA effort in passing over the leadership of Chinese athletics to the Chinese gradually contributed to a reduction in its own influence. It was largely, if not completely, through the flow of events started by the YMCA, that the China Amateur Athletic Union and the China National Amateur Athletic Federation were founded. As these organisations gained in strength, they gradually took over the control of domestic physical education which previously had been the province of the YMCA. Thus, the YMCA, which had gained so much of its status as an organiser of athletic meets, lost a primary source of influence. In time its overall status on the Chinese scene declined.

While the Anti-Christian Movement and the Restore Education Rights campaign arose in the 1920s, at the core of Chinese nationalism were anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism. Chinese intellectuals were first defining China in terms of what it was not. What they generally agreed that it was not China of tradition. But just as surely, it was not to be simply a replica of the West. Though many aspects of Western civilization were considered essential to the new China, China as a nation was being defined in contradistinction to Western civilization, nation-states and ideologies. For a number of Chinese intellectuals, the rejection of Christianity was part of the process of defining China, as well as part of the search for a blueprint for China. There were two movements, one directed against Christianity and one directed against the mission schools which expressed Chinese nationalism of the 1920s. Under the effect of Chinese nationalism, YMCA's work on sport declined. In the final analysis, thereafter, it was the times themselves which drew the curtain on YMCA influence in China. Anti-foreign (anti-Christian and anti-imperialist) feeling began to grow over China strongly in the mid-1920s after the 30 May 1925 incident in Shanghai in which 12 Chinese were killed at the instruction of a British police officer. The next section will illustrate some debates about Chinese nationalism and sport.

The YMCA, with its national offices in Shanghai, probably suffered accordingly. In addition, with the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1927-28, provincial and national physical education institutes began to be established in large numbers, and private control of physical education by groups such as the YMCA was discouraged (Wu, 1956: 178). With the return of J.H. Gray (leader

of the YMCA, 1920-1927) to the United States in 1927, the YMCA ceased its active role in Chinese physical education, and an era was brought to an end. During this stage, YMCA was the most influenced institute in the development of sport in China. Nonetheless, this does not mean that all Chinese could recognize the Western missions' efforts in Chinese sport. As argued in the last chapter, the YMCA and missionary schools' role was as an agent of Western imperialism which always enhanced Western culture and civilization. Significantly, sport was the most attractive vehicle to approach this mission. At the time, Chinese nationalism was aroused against Western imperialism following the introduction of Marxism in the second decade of the twentieth century. The May Fourth Movement could be seen as the first Cultural Revolution in modern Chinese history. Through this movement, Chinese people reconsidered their own national identity and cultural reform. A number of scholars had discussed the importance of sport, but the debates on developing military training or physical education in schools and developing Western or Chinese indigenous sport were now essential. Chinese sports experienced a degree of nationalism.

The Chinese Republic from 1911 to 1927

Sport development had been influenced by military, economic, political and social chaos. The period 1911 to 1927 was a tumultuous stage for China, fragmented and ruled by an assortment of regional military dictators or warlords. The first Chinese Republic was established in 1912, but soon collapsed, in 1916, when the first president Yuan Shikai died. National government ceased to exist. Throughout China, warlords carved out autonomous districts with their own armies and tax systems. These warlords were fighting each other in a continual grab for more land for several years. Dr. Sun Yet-sen reorganised the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang—KMT) and established a power base in southern China with the support of several local warlords in Canton. Then Sun set up the Whampoa Military Academy near Canton and appointed Chiang Kai-shek as its superintendent. By 1925, the KMT began the Northern Expedition, a military campaign against warlords north of the capital of Beijing, uniting the nation under Nationalist rule. Additionally there were external problems with the extension of Japanese imperialism and the continuing influence of Western imperialism. In particular, the May Fourth Movement in 1919 and the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925, the most important historical events to raise Chinese nationalism, were simply against Japanese and Western imperialism.

These events not only strengthened Chinese nationalism, but also produced critical debates on the development of sport. It is necessary to illustrate how Chinese nationalism emerged at this time.

Modern Chinese nationalism came of age on 4 May 1919, when more than 3,000 college students from a dozen institutions in Beijing endorsed a manifesto denouncing the decision of the Paris Peace Conference to transfer Germany's rights in Shantung Province to Japan. This support of Japanese imperialism caused an affront to every Chinese patriot. The student demonstration on 4 May erupted into violent action which brought police repression, but the students' patriotic example inspired similar demonstrations in other major centres by the merchant class and other patriots as well as students. May Fourth was thus a milestone in the growth of Chinese nationalism.

Interest in the West and concepts of democracy, science and modernisation were challenged by Marxism as the impact of the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia took effect. It was during this debate that political division between the Nationalists and Communists occurred. The May Fourth Movement is often discussed in relation to the New Culture Movement that followed in Modern China. The notion implies an attempt to destroy what remained of traditional Confucian culture in the Republican era and to replace it with something new, like enlightenment from the West. The collapse of the old dynastic system in 1911 and the failure of Yuan Shih-kai's Confucian-garbed monarchical restoration in 1916 meant that, politically, Confucianism was almost dead. It had, however, been much more than a political philosophy. It had been a complete way of life, which nationalism and Republicanism only supplanted in part. There were some even among Republicans who felt that certain aspects of the old culture, Confucian ethics especially, should be preserved and strengthened, lest the whole fabric of Chinese life fall apart and the new regime itself be seriously weakened. Others, with far more influence on the younger generation, drew precisely the opposite conclusion. For them nothing in Confucianism was worth salvaging from the debris of the Manchu dynasty. On the contrary, whatever vestiges of the past remained in the daily life and thinking of the people should be rooted out; otherwise the young republic would rest on shaky foundations and its progress would be retarded by a backward citizenry. The new order required a whole new culture. The political revolution had to be followed by a Cultural Revolution.

During and just after the First World War the intellectual spearhead of this second revolution went on the offensive, launching a movement that reached out in many directions and touched many aspects of Chinese society. Roughly it may be divided into six major phases, presented below in more

or less chronological order. They are (i) the attack on Confucianism; (ii) the Literary Revolution; (iii) the proclaiming of a new philosophy of life; (iv) the debate on science and the philosophy of life; (v) the "doubting of antiquity" movement; and (vi) the debate on Chinese and Western cultural values. These phases overlapped each other considerably, and certain leading writers figured prominently in more than one phase of the movement. Sport featured in one of the debates on Chinese and Western cultural values.

From their anti-traditionalist character one may infer that the leaders of the movement looked very much to the West. Positivism was their great inspiration, science and materialism were their great slogans, and – in the early years especially – John Dewey and Bertrand Russell were their great idols. The leaders themselves were in many cases Western educated, though not necessarily schooled in the West, since Western-style education was by now established in the East, in Japan, and in the new national and missionary colleges of China. Often college professors themselves, they now had the lecture platform to make use of, as well as the new organs of public journalism and the intellectual and literary reviews which were a novel feature of the modern age. Above all, they had a new audience, young, intense, frustrated by China's failures in the past, and full of eager hopes for the future. The resolution of sport development in China was among their concerns.

Nationalism and Military training

During the early stage of the Chinese Republic, nationalism was more or less the only panacea in the Chinese imagination to save the nation from imperialism. Some debates were raised about military training and physical education in schools among Chinese intellectuals. The notion of a martial spirit was one of the essential educational principles from 1912 to 1917. Militarism was the core concept of physical education in schools. Accordingly, physical education and military training were seen as overlapping physical activities in schools. Some critiques existed on military training in schools. For example, a physical educator, Xu Yibing argued that military training must be abolished in schools, because the context of military exercise, such as attention, at ease, fall-in, trail arms, sling arms, shoulder arms...etc. were boring for the majority of students (Hsu, 1996: 13). Those training courses were the same at all levels of school. On the other hand, those military training teachers were soldiers who had a lower education than other teachers. However, when military exercise declined after

the May Fourth movement in 1919, those former soldiers automatically transferred to be PE teachers, since there was a critical shortage of formal educated PE teachers in schools.

Furthermore, in one of Dr. John Dewey's speeches given in Nanking University in 1919, (Dewey was the most influential American pragmatist philosopher and writer on psychology and social affairs in China), he claimed that:

> Mass physical education development is the most urgent problem for every country today. Can China approach this mission? It is better to improve personal and mass hygiene, teach a knowledge of physical education in society rather than focus on military education and military training which only applies to military schools... (*Physical Culture Weekly*, 23 June 1919: 6-7).

Dewey's thoughts influenced a number of intellectuals against military exercise in schools. Hu Shih, for example, one of the principal leaders of the May Fourth movement and New Culture movement, was a PhD student under Dewey at Columbia University in 1914. Hu was greatly influenced by Dewey's ideas and remained a life-long advocate of the pragmatic bit-by-bit, try-it-and-see approach, as opposed to the grand solutions offered by "isms" like Marxism. On account of Dewey's visiting lectures over 11 provinces of China from 1919 to 1921, his philosophy of pragmatism was recognized as one of the long-term influential Western imports in modern China. It is entirely appropriate briefly to present Dewey's concept on physical education here.

Dewey believed that education was necessary for democratic citizenship, social efficiency and social experience. Besides, Dewey considered mind and body to be integrated parts of the human whole, and believed that the body or physical aspect of humans served as the conductor of experience. More, the philosophical position of the body relative to epistemological considerations and the nature of our existence becomes an important issue. Dewey believed play to be purposeful activity that directed interest through physical means. Play was not a physical act that had no meaning. Rather it was an activity that integrated mind and body. The philosophy of Dewey was used to justify team sports in physical education because they promoted democratic activities and social interaction. The societal benefits derived from participation in physical education were very signification and did much to ensure strong support for physical education and athletics (Mechikoff and Estes, 1998: 240-241).

While Dewey was in China, he spread his pragmatism successfully. Yet neither Dewey nor his student Hu Shih considered the core problem of imperialism and nationalism in China. Under the trends of anti-militarism and anti-military drills, one physical education teacher, Chang Bao-chen (1919: 5) held an opinion different from that of the majority of intellectuals on the controversial issues.

Chang argued that while Dewey's suggestion for democratic education of the masses and socialism was fine for China, Chinese people were unable to pick themselves up at that moment. Therefore, the Chinese needed military education to discipline themselves. Chang doubted that the Western idea of democracy could satisfactorily make human happiness and well-being. Chang questioned that:

> Why don't the English give freedom to India? Why cannot Koreans be independent after the peace conference at Versailles? Why don't colonial countries donate some of the pervading benevolence to indigenous people in their colonies instead of carrying on a punitive campaign and slavery? What are colonists thinking and doing about their colonies today? While Europeans advocate humanism, however, their humanism is merely for strong nations, not for weak nations in the world... If we abolish military drill in schools, we are giving up our defence power and binding up our own body...Recently, a lot of scholars insist on abolishing military drill and building up formal physical education. Their reasons for abolishing military drill in schools are (i) military drill is mechanical, partial, forced with no freedom of speech; (ii) military drill is incompatible with the human body physically and psychologically. However, what kind of sport is "formal physical education"? If military drill is mechanical, forced and disciplined, then I want to emphasis that gymnastics has rules and words of command, hasn't it? If military drill is partial, then I wish to illustrate that sport is not partial to the human body...Military drill is only 1-2 hours in a school curriculum, it will not affect a student's physical development. Therefore, in my view, if China wants to progress on physical education, it should improve the methods and context of physical education... It is not necessary to debate the problem of military drill (*Physical Culture Weekly*, 24 November 1919, 5-8).

Chang was one of the very few physical educators who supported military drill in schools, not only because China needed militarism to strengthen herself, but also because the world was under the domination of imperialism. Chang argued that improving physical education and abolishing military drill were different issues. If Chinese physical educators wanted to reform physical education in schools, they should focus on teaching methods and the context of physical education. Except in his view of militarism, Chang could be one of the earliest Chinese physical educators who had seen the real face of imperialism in the 1910s. Further to the debate on militarism, one of the founders of Chinese physical education, Xu Yibing, firmly opposed military-style calisthenics in schools. Xu indicated that:

> In 1904 and 1905, revolutionary thinking among the people was spreading by the day... everyone said that without a martial education it would not be enough to save the nation from extinction. So in school *ticao* [calisthenics and gymnastics] classes, martial spirit was established as the main goal, and military-style calisthenics became the standard. But with this trend came a multitude of corrupt practices, with young average unintelligent, immoral soldier coming right out of the barracks and in one swoop becoming a teacher, ineffective and not worth a damn. These are people that do not even know what a professor is or where a school is, excessive drinkers and mad gamblers, who love to fight like wolves and whom nothing would be below. Not a year goes by that the schools' reputation is not soiled, that society's faith is not lost, that students and their fathers and brothers do not hate *ticao* classes even more, to the point now where it is seen as poison (*Physical Culture Weekly Special Edition*, 5 January 1920: 61-66).

In Xu's view, military-style calisthenics was not suitable for the school curriculum, not only because of the context of military calisthenics but also because of unintelligent and immoral soldier teachers in schools. Some historians (Hsu, 1996: 100-103; Gu, 1989: 114 and 175) have explained anti-military calisthenics like Xu's as merely the logical result of the Western "tide of thought" brought by the modernist May Fourth Movement of 1919, or a reaction to the World War I defeat suffered by Germany which was seen as a falling symbol of militarism in China. After the debates on military calisthenics, the other debates on indigenous sport were continued.

Nationalism and Indigenous sports—martial arts and Jingzuo (sitting in silence)

Ancient Chinese physical culture consisted of a large number of different activities and events. The relationship between Chinese nationalism and two of these—martial arts and Jingzuo (to sit still with a peaceful mind or to sit as a form of therapy)—will be discussed. "Martial arts" is an English translation of several classical Chinese terms which were adapted to Japanese language and culture. The terms came to Europe and America primarily from Japan, not China, because of the high level of development of the martial culture in Japan and its duration there, as well as of a greater Western familiarity with that tradition. The term is now used around the world, either in English or in local translation (Hurst, 1998: 7).

In China, the English term "martial arts" was also introduced from Japan in the early part of the twentieth century. Chinese martial arts are presently known as *wushu* or *guoshu* (national arts), in earlier times were called *wuyong* (military valour) or *wuyi* (military skill). Either Japanese pronunciation "bu" or Chinese pronunciation "Wu" are using the same character, which is commonly translated as "martial" or "military". Traditionally, Chinese martial arts were a kind of military training or military sports which were discussed comprehensively in Chapter One. Generally speaking, Chinese used the term "martial arts" relative to a fighting system in Chinese culture. Historically, therefore, the Chinese martial arts exercise was prohibited in civil society during the alien dynasties, since the martial arts exercise might encourage the subordinate class to raise Han Chinese nationalism against alien domination.

Although the eighteenth and nineteenth century the Qing banned perverse religious sects, but they did not prohibit martial arts, which was the core part of the military civil examination discussed in Chapter Three. As a result, the White Lotus Sect—a religious secret society which contained the ideas

of Buddhism and some Taoism—not only utilized martial arts as a tool to gather members but also to spread martial arts as part of their creed (National Research Institute of Martial Arts, 1996: 302-303). The influence of the Sect spread to large areas of north and central China between 1793 and 1796. This White Lotus Sect was finally suppressed by a militia organised by local landlords and officials in 1804 (Dillon, 1998: 345). A number of new branch sects (with different names) proliferated over China after the Qing's strict prohibition in the first half of the nineteenth century (National Research Institute of Martial Arts, 1996: 302-303).

One of the most famous branch sects was the *Yihequan* (Fists of Righteousness and Harmony), popularly known as the Boxers. By the end of the nineteenth century they were anti-foreigner in their philosophy. The Boxer Rebellion began in North China in 1898 as a popular peasant protest movement. In the past it was believed to be both anti-dynastic and anti-foreign. However, recent scholarship indicates that it was a strictly anti-foreigner movement, not a domestic rebellion. The Boxers believed that when they took part in certain rituals, spirits would possess them, making them impervious to foreigners' bullets. Hence they were extraordinarily brave in battle. The Boxer Rebellion was suppressed by the military units of eight foreign countries in 1900 (Tamura, 1997: 140-141). The emergence of Shao-Lin Temple Boxing was another story of martial arts under the notion of traditional Chinese nationalism. Shao-Lin Temple was seen as orthodox Buddhism which was different to Paganism.

There seems to be a certain degree of agreement among Chinese historians reasons why concerning Chinese martial arts exhibited a high degree of Chinese nationalism and religious culture before the twentieth century: (i) that martial arts was a form of Chinese cultural nationalism; (ii) that martial arts was an informal form of religious Buddhism and Taoism; (iii) that martial arts aroused the imagination of Chinese nationalism; (iv) that martial arts exercise was a traditional gathering for subordinate classes; (v) that martial arts was core part of Chinese traditional physical culture; (vi) that martial arts was a kind of physical, spiritual and mental training; and (vii) that martial arts was not in any sense scientific.

During the early Chinese Republic period, promoting martial spirit was one of the aims of education (*San Pao*, 5 April 1915: 6-7). In 1915, the Ministry of Education proposed that military education should be put into effect. All schools were to teach traditional Chinese martial arts and martial arts teachers should be educated at teacher training schools (*San Pao*, 30 May 1915: 3). Later, a

further proposal for promoting traditional Chinese martial arts as a gymnastic course in schools was introduced to inspire people's martial spirit. This recognised that:

> The world is dominated by social Darwinism, people shall have a martial spirit to struggle for their country amidst the world's high competition at the present time. Following this world trend, China has also promoted her martial spirit and has added gymnastic exercise in the tri-balance of education on wisdom, morality and the body over the last two decades. But today Chinese people are still weak after learning the Western form of education. Historically, the traditional Chinese martial arts is over thousands of years old. Therefore, it is necessary to promote traditional Chinese martial arts which is more suitable for Chinese people. All schools shall put martial arts in the gymnastic courses...(*San Pao*, 31 May 1915: 3).

At that time, most Chinese educators still thought of gymnastics course as "physical education". This was the first time that martial arts was put on the school curriculum formally in China. Also Chinese martial arts teaching methods had changed, from traditional individual teaching to group teaching which following instructional command and movement. Obviously, the new martial arts teaching method was influenced by the Western gymnastics exercises and military drill (Figure 15).

A number of martial arts societies were organised after 1910. The Jingwu Physical Culture Society, for example, was the biggest and most popular Chinese martial arts society which spread through China and South East Asia from 1917 to 1929. Up to 1929, there were 42 branches and over 400,000 members. Jingwu Physical Culture Society was the first sports society to combine Western and Chinese physical culture, which not only taught Chinese martial arts and military training, but also taught Western sport such as gymnastics exercise, athletics, football, basketball, volleyball, tennis and swimming. According to the organisation and course of Jingwu Physical Culture Society, it might be seen as the Chinese version of the YMCA. According to Chinese references, the headquarters of the Jingwu Physical Culture Society in Shanghai was destroyed twice by Japanese invasion in 1932 and 1937, because of its propaganda of patriotism and anti-Japanese imperialism (National Research Institute of Martial Arts, 1996: 335; Gu, 1989: 273).

While the martial arts development was part of school education since 1915, some critical debates on indigenous and Western sports were raised during the New Culture Movement. The open assault on Confucianism which began in 1916 was led by Chen Tu-hsiu, one of the Chinese Communist Party's founders and editor of a magazine *New Youth*. He compared the individual in society to the cell in a body. Its birth and death are transitory. New ones replace the old. This, he argued is as it should be and need not be feared at all. In one of his articles, he criticised the objectives of the classical feudal education system by over-emphasizing literary memorizing and neglecting physical exercise. Thus, he advocated the tri-balance on wisdom, morality and the body. In this sense,

his idea is similar to that of Yen Fu discussed in Chapter Three. Though Chen Tu-Hsiu argued that a student's physical strength is one of the essential elements in present educational policy (*New Youth*, 15 October 1915: 128-132), he disagreed about putting martial arts in the school curriculum because of anti-traditionalism and anti-militarism. His view was that sport should contain no martial drill, no boxing and no violent competitive games (*New Youth*, 1 January 1920: 319).

One of the other famous anti-martial arts writers was Lu Xun, who argued that the propaganda of traditional Chinese sport was based on superstition, feudalism and anti-science. Lu postulated that:

> I do not mind if some people think martial arts is a special skill and enjoy their own practice. This is not a big matter. However, I disagree with the propaganda of traditional Chinese martial arts because educators promote martial arts as a fashion, as if all Chinese people should do the exercise, and most advocators promote martial arts in a ghost-like spirit. This social phenomenon is dangerous (*New Youth*, 15 February 1919: 241-244).

In Lu's view, over-emphasising the function of Chinese martial arts might raise a similar patriotism to that of the Boxer Rebellions in 1900. Besides the debates on Chinese martial arts, the other debates were between "Quiet sport" and "Active sport". "Active sport" was seen as physical activities such as gymnastics, swimming, ball games, athletics...etc. There is no clear definition of "quiet sport", but it does mean a kind of traditional Chinese breathing exercise—Jingzuo (sitting in silence or meditation) means to sit still with a peaceful mind or to sit as a form of therapy. In ancient China, Jingzuo was often combined with Buddhism, Taoism and Zen. Some physical culture intellectuals advocated Jingzuo as a national legacy.

One of the most famous Jingzuo supporters was Huang Xing, who was the founder of *Physical Culture Weekly* (*Tiyu Chou Pao*) 1918-1920. Huang emphasised the reasons why he promoted Quiet sport.

> The first reason is that Quiet sport made people's minds clear. Especially today there are only about sixty to seventy percent of physical educators' minds that are pure in China... The first condition of quiet sport is to curb one's temper and desire. If one can take away his/her temper and desire, then certainly his/her mind will be clear (*Physical Culture Weekly*, 24 February 1919: 2-3).

Later, Huang argued:

> Over the last decade or more, sport development is not successful...there are many complicated reasons. The major reason is that most leaders are not interested in physical culture in our society... "A healthy mind is based on a healthy body". Now everyone considers that it is necessary to advocate physical culture and a number of people have searched for "the method of promoting physical culture". However, except in developed provinces, most people still do not know anything about the completed proposal of the "Physical Culture Promotion Plan" over the last six months... This obstacle is from the old custom of Chinese society which thought that those leaders must enjoy high rank and live in ease and comfort. Therefore, those leaders do not want to do physical exercise which will affect their high rank's status... They also misunderstand that physical culture merely belongs

> to military men. As a result, quiet sport is very suitable for individuals and leaders (*Physical Culture Weekly*, 3 March 1919: 2-3).

According to Huang's view, most physical educators need quiet sport to make their minds clear. Also, leaders need quiet sport to change their minds to support and promote sport. Huang's idea of quiet sport was an exercise to make soul-searching on sport development for physical educators and social leaders in China. Furthermore, Huang explained that Jingzuo is a kind of exercise to cultivate people's physical and mental capabilities. Huang pointed out four essentials of Jingzuo, which were (i) posture (ii) breathing (iii) avoiding closed eyes and sleep (iv) prevention and treatment of diseases (*Physical Culture Weekly*, 26 January 1920: 2-3; 2 February 1920: 2-3). Jingzuo was very popular in 18 provinces and rural areas during this period. One of its advocators, Jiang Wei-qiao, was a teacher at Beijing University. Jiang's studies on the method of Jingzuo was reprinted over 14 times in four years (Hsu, 1996: 235).

Contrarily, some other intellectuals raised different views on Jingzuo. Lu Xun argued that children and youth needed more physical activities than sitting in silence. Lu criticised Jingzuo as not being scientific and causing passive thinking. An article also questioned that:

> After 8 years of the 1911 Revolution, education, economics and politics have shown no progress or are even worse than before... but only two things are progress, poker and Jingzuo. Except for proper labour, everyone is skilled in the field of poker and Jingzuo in China today (*Physical Culture Weekly Special Edition*, 5 January 1920: 109).

In today's view, we may see those intellectuals were wrong to think Jingzuo was useless and unscientific. Scientists have undertaken research on ancient Chinese sports such as Xing-Qi, Qi-gong and Jingzuo, and affirmed their value for physical and spiritual health. During the New Culture Movement, however, Jingzuo was blamed not only for being passive, but also as a symbol of traditionalism.

Martial arts or Jingzuo is a kind of traditional Chinese physical exercise which has its value in culture. Among those critics of the New Culture Movement, no matter whether they were anti-traditionalist and anti-Confucianist, there were those who supported and advocated Chinese indigenous physical culture. They all acknowledged that China must strengthen her nation and race by physical culture. Particularly, Chinese people needed more physical exercise to strengthen themselves and save their nation against imperialism. Nonetheless even after the critical debates about Western and Chinese culture, Western sport continued to influence indigenous development. The arrival of Western sport forced the Chinese to reassess their martial tradition. Chinese martial arts absorbed methods of Western

sport and, through scientific study, made improvements in teaching, competition and games. For example, in the 1920s, Western physical culture led to a standardization of competition and regulations were employed by Chinese martial arts. The first national martial arts games were held in 1923 in Shanghai. Martial arts continued to play a significant role in the development of Chinese nationalism and sport after the Chinese Nationalist Party reunified most of China in 1928. It is necessary to discuss sport in more detail under nationalist government control from 1928 to 1949 in the next section.

The Era of Nationalist Government 1928-1949

Following the formation of the Nanking government in October 1928, an entirely new era in sports was started. Physical training became a concern of the government and the emphasis shifted to legislation and provision for sport within the government bureaucratic structure. Practical consideration shifted to the sports programme in school lessons. Conditions were so varied in different parts of China during the Republic period that accurate statements could only be made for the situation in limited geographical areas. The emphasis here, therefore, will be on the formal aspects: government legislation and conferences. From these angles we see (i) that the government paid for and promoted sports to various degrees, particularly in school sports competition; (ii) that the government used sports to promote feelings of nationalism and patriotism and also viewed it as a form of education; and (iii) the continuing influence of Western imperialism.

The German-Japanese military tradition which was dominant in P.E. at the beginning of the century did not go unopposed. The National Athletic Meetings of 1901 and 1914, and the Far Eastern Championships, held in Shanghai in 1915, introduced Western sports to many Chinese youths for the first time. Gradually, sport was incorporated into the curriculum of Chinese government schools. Eventually, the dual track school physical education system was developed in which military exercises were stressed in class and Western sports given time after school.

Between 1910 and 1920, there was a growth of physical education teacher training schools. In 1915-16, the Chinese government and the YMCA jointly started physical education departments in five higher normal schools. The YMCA increased its own training programme during this period. In 1915, the YWCA established a two-year physical training course for women which, in 1925, became part of Ginling College in Nanking, (*China Mission Yearbook*, 1925: 292-293).

As the 1920s approached, Japanese influence in education started to wane as American influence increased and progressive Chinese educators began to pay more attention to sports. At the Fourth Annual Conference of the National Federation of Educational Associations in 1918, it was suggested that men be sent abroad to study P.E. and that courses in it be required in normal schools. The conference also recommended the establishment of P.E. associations in all provinces and municipalities. In order to extend military training, it called for boxing, fencing, and physical drill. The Ministry of Education endorsed these recommendations (Peake, 1932: 83-84).

As Chiang Kai-shek pressed on toward the unification of China in 1927-28, sport, for the first time, began to receive real government attention. The changes effected eventually established the first total official government control over sport. The first step in this process took place in December, 1927 when the University Council – which had been created in 1927 at the urging of Ts'ai Yuan-pei, taking the place of the Ministry of Education – established a National Committee for P.E. under its auspices, headed by Liu Chia-hsiu. It was composed of well-known athletes and specialists in P.E. whose collective aim was to promote physical culture on a large scale. The Committee was largely ineffectual, partly because its members were spread throughout China and it could not easily be convened and was abandoned in 1928 (Wu, 1962: 344-349; *The Chinese Yearbook* 1935-1936, Chapter I: 543-544).

In May 1928, the University Council convened the First National Educational Conference. The outstanding resolution of this conference was that henceforth education would conform to the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen. The two week conference resolved, among other things, that "to promote nationalism, education should seek ... to raise the general level of moral integrity and physical vigour of the people ..." (*The China Yearbook*, 1929-30: 521). Specifically, the third point of the conference's 15-point resolution noted the importance of "stressing the training of national physical strength"(Wu, 1962: 325-30).

The Three People's Principles—People's Nationhood, People's Power, and People's Livelihood; or Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism (or Communism) (Chien, 1970: 112-115; Sharman 1968: 271-300), were concerned in part with stimulating a national spirit, a spirit of sacrifice, and a sense of discipline. The Kuomintang wanted to do away with individualism and help forge group consciousness. They apparently were impressed by the notion that Britain's political leaders were tempered "on the playing fields of Eton" and felt that by encouraging people to work together and to learn to endure physical hardship through physical training and athletics, they would contribute toward

a national sense of unity. It was further hoped that strengthening the body would increase the intellectual capacity of the nation.

The Three People's Principles P.E. programme later spelled out the goals of P.E.:

(1) To emphasize training of character and disposition
(2) To advocate military P.E.
(3) To expand mass P.E.
(4) To advocate P.E. for women
(5) To stress development for physical toil and intellectual thought
(6) To contribute to family life, education and aesthetic education (Wang, 1967: 104-111).

This new P.E. drive in the late 1920s brought with it the army that was part of Chinese P.E. in the first decade of this century. American physical educators, with their emphasis on games and sports, who just ten years prior were invited to teach in Chinese schools, now began to be replaced by German methods, materials and manpower. Colleges with professional P.E. Departments now began to invite German directors to head them. Chinese P.E. students began to be sent to Germany instead of to the United States. This increasingly militaristic P.E., based on the German model, was predominant until 1948. It joined with, rather than replaced, the interest in sports which the Americans had helped to create (Chan, 1931: 95-99).

The National P.E. Law of April 1929 stood out as the highlight of the first year of Nationalist government rule in the area of sport. Why did the Nationalist government enact the National P.E. Law? It can be seen that it is the first step towards the institutionalization of sport. There are three subprocesses: codification, organization, and legitimization. As Gruneau argues:

> Codification simply refers to the process whereby sports pastimes have gone from informal regulation by local and, in many cases, oral traditions, to a system based on written rules that have a more universal acceptance. The emergence of modern sport is often said to have been dependent on a movement from local variations in rules, games, and styles of play to more universal and widely accepted practices. Formal organizations, such as clubs, leagues, or national associations, have been the primary vehicles for this transformation. The codification of rules required the establishment of formal bodies that could act as the custodians of sports regulations and provide 'proper' channels for their modification. It was also necessary for those organizations to legitimise particular practices in an attempt to build public support for particular ways of playing (Gruneau, 1988: 14).

The government not only instituted the National P.E Law, but also dominated sport and physical education in a way that separated it from political or economic practice. The law was amended in September 1941, but its main provisions, as ratified by the Legislative Yuan (administrative body) and presented in their entirety below, remained in effect until 1949.

The 1929 National Physical Education Law states that:

(1) The young men and women of the Chinese Republic have a responsibility to be the recipients of P.E. and parents or guardians have the responsibility of enforcing it.
(2) The aims of P.E. are to bring about orderly development, suitable health, as well as physical power and the power to resist, together with the growth of all faculties of the body so as to enable (each Chinese) to be able to endure every type of labour and exceptionally telling tasks.
(3) In planning P.E. programmes, whether for boys or for girls, age and individual bodily strengths and weaknesses must be paid attention to; and its management and methods should follow the declarations of the Training Commissioner's Department and the Ministry of Education.
(4) All customs and habits which hinder the regular growth of the bodies of young men and young women should be strictly prohibited by the administrative organs of counties, municipalities, town, villages and hamlets' and its programme should be fixed by the Ministry of Education Committee and the Training Commissioner's Department.
(5) Each self-governing hamlet, village, town and municipality must erect public sports grounds.
(6) Schools at the upper middle school level and above must all establish P.E. as a required subject and must, at the same time, comply with the previously announced military P.E. programme.
(7) All P.E. committees established among the people must be registered under the supervision of the local government, and make application to the Ministry of the Interior, and consult with the. Training Commissioner's Department. However, those people who are serving the people's P.E. in scientific research and in investigation of teaching materials are not bound by this limitation. In matters of budge, all P.E. authorities should be closely controlled by the local government which must watch its financial situation and call in higher government control bodies to help it in making decisions.
(8) The P.E. organized in each county, municipality, village, town, and hamlet must accept the control of the local government and be under that organization which controls education.
(9) All P.E. personnel responsible for school or people's P.E. committees must have proper credentials. The regulation regarding the nature of the credentials are to be fixed by the Training Commissioner's Office.
(10) All P.E. personnel who have served for three years or more in good standing should be given suitable rewards by the Training Commissioner's Department, with the Department to work out details.
(11) The Training Commissioner's Department should set up a special high level physical education committee to deal with the research findings of special organizational and to examine foreign situations so as to serve the objective of the people's physical education.
(12) All physical education groups must inject group traits into the government programme.
(13) This law takes effect from the day on which it is issued (Wang, 1967: 100-101; Wu, 1981: 115-116).

The KMT, the government of the nationalists, saw sport as one means of developing a national spirit of unity which would enable China to emerge as a modern state and defend herself. For this reason, the 1929 law stresses national control of sport. The phrase "group traits" mentioned in article 12 refers to the national feeling of oneness which the KMT hoped to foster. National administration of P.E. would also permit more efficient use of the limited top-level physical education personnel that were available. The Training Commissioner's Department would be the organ of government responsible for overseeing the national programme.

Article 4 addresses itself to the need to work against traditional attitudes which would undermine attempts at a successful sport programme. Articles 5-12 show that the government

eventually monopolized national sports organizations and school physical education. In fact, sport is also said to function as a vehicle for political socialization (learning particular ways of thinking and behaving) which reflect and reinforce the value preferences and beliefs of the dominant class. Therefore, government sport programmes can be seen as gradually representative of nationalist interests. In compliance with the 1929 Law, many provincial and municipal educational administrative bodies (e.g. Beijing, Shanghai, Shantung, Hupei, Ankwei, Chekiang, and Kansu) began to establish physical education committees staffed by sport specialists (Wu, 1962: 325-330).

In the same month that the National Physical Education Law was ratified, the government published a specific set of guidelines on education. The seventh article of this document stated that "each school grade and social group should uniformly stress the people's sport. Middle school and University sport specialists must receive military training, develop the aims of physical education, and make it their responsibility to increase the people's physical strength, train a stronger and healthier spirit, and cultivate disciplinary habits." About this time, the Ministry of Education announced two and a half to three hours per week of compulsory P.E. for elementary school students, with from two to three hours per week required for other levels of education. The programmes were to include marching, exercise, rhythmic activities, sports skills and games, and traditional Chinese sports (Wu, 1962: 325-337). As tensions increased after the Mukden Incident in Manchuria in September 1931, military training received more and more emphasis in school P.E. programmes. The 1929 National Physical Education Law had established the basis for a physical education programme on a nation-wide level. However, it had provided no specific plan for its implementation nor any administrative machinery. These were provided as a result of the First National Physical Education Conference called by the Ministry of Education, and held in Nanking, 16-27 August, 1932 (*The China Yearbook*, 1933: 526).

At the Conference's six sessions, the 400 delegates debated the full scope of physical education: school physical education, military training, administration, physical training for children, physical training for women, sport for the masses, and traditional Chinese sports. What emerged from the over 280 resolutions put forward was a statement of the broad aims of physical education, together with recommendations for specific actions which should be taken to achieve these broad goals. In the former vein, it was decided (i) that people must receive sufficient opportunity to develop their bodies, (ii) that they be trained to exercise in order to adapt to external conditions, (iii) that the spirit of

cooperation and unity be cultivated together with courage, endurance, and nationalism, and (iv) that the habit of participating in sport as recreation be developed among the people.

Most of the progressive steps taken in the area of physical education during the next few years stem from the resolutions of this Conference: the appointment of a national Director of Physical Education and an advisory committee; the organization of physical education committees within provincial bureaux of education and municipal boards of education; the sponsorship of in-service summer school sessions by the Ministry of Education; the planning of physical education curricular for primary and middle schools; the government take-over of the National Athletic Meet; support for annual meetings in provinces, counties and municipalities (*The Chinese Yearbook*, 1935-36: 542).

In October 1932, the first official Nationalist government administrative body for physical education was formed as the Physical Education Committee of the Ministry of Education. The Committee, staffed by such notables as C T Wang and Chang Po-ling, had broad responsibilities. The scope of their activity included the creation of plans for the national development of physical education, inspection to see that government directives in physical education were carried out, the formation of a strong academic physical education programme, and the creation of a national physical education bureaucracy and budgetary apparatus.

The Committee's greatest achievements were in the planning of national curricula. Its first action in this realm came between 1932 and 1933 when the physical education directive of 1929 was revised. For the first four primary school grade, 150 minutes of physical education per week were required. Suggested activities included games, outings, traditional sports, hill climbing, calisthenics and ball games. The requirement was lengthened to 180 minutes per week for fifth and sixth graders. At this level boys and girls were separated and more strenuous activities were introduced. All students were required to participate in after-school sports and exercise programmes.

For lower middle school students, three hours per week plus ten minutes daily of morning exercise and 30 minutes daily of after-school exercise or recreation were required. The programme stipulated the inclusion of gymnastic exercises, corrective exercises, ball games, and track and field. The programme for upper middle school students was the same except that it required two hours per week instead of three, and 50 minutes daily after school (*The Chinese Year Book*, 1935-36: 544-45). In 1936, the Ministry of Education began to publish outlines for university physical education requiring two hours per week. Military training was an integral part of the course (Wu, 1962: 330-37).

The National Athletic Meets under the Nationalist Government

After the completion of the third National Athletic Meeting in 1924, plans were made to hold the next meeting in Canton in 1926. The civil war in China at the time, however, played havoc with these plans and it was not until 1930 that the fourth meeting in this series was held in Hang-chow, Chekiang. China took a step forward athletically with this meeting, due to the fact that the China National Amateur Athletic Federation took complete charge. The Chekiang provincial government also took an active role and bore $100,000 of the $260,000 budget. For the first time, Chinese took complete charge of directing and organising the meet. Chinese schools also took an increasing part in the meet as the majority of athletes came from Chinese government schools (*North China Herald*, 8 April 1930: 45).

Chinese government leaders were impressed with the potential which the meet held for national unity and, at its conclusion, took steps to put its control under the Ministry of Education. The Ministry set up an organising committee, and voted to hold the fifth meet in Nanking, in 1931. The Mukdan Incident, in which the Japanese invaded Manchuria, forced its postponement until 1933. Both the fifth and the sixth National Athletic Meets were run by the Chinese government. The previously unmatched scope of the meets, and the money spent on making them a success in times of increasing national tension, seem to indicate an effort on the part of the government to enhance morale and convey a feeling of normality. To this end, both meets were held on 10 October – the national holiday of independence.

President Wang Ching-wei expressed the government's feelings about the national meet in formal terms at the opening ceremonies of the 1933 meet:

> In the present-day world the struggle for survival depends not only on human energy but also on the utilisation of material forces. That China at the present moment needs more adequate material resources there can be no doubt whatsoever, but this utilization of material forces depends essentially on the vigour of the human spirit. We can utilize these forces only when we are in healthful spirits, otherwise we shall be simply utilized by them instead. A healthy mind always dwells in a healthy body. With a sound body, one can carry on any struggle to the finish, and not give up midway, but an unswerving spirit in an unhealthy body cannot lead us to ultimate victory. In this lies the significance of athletics. Though in past athletic meets the training and health as well as the skill of our students have been amply demonstrated, yet, according to the reports of the Ministry of Education, the number of Senior Middle School graduates who are able to fulfil the requirements of the military physical examination is still not very large. The reasons for this state of affairs are manifold, but neglect of sports is one of the chief causes. My hope for the present National Athletic Meet is that the occasion may reveal both our strong and weak points in the matter of physical health, in order that we may promote the former and rectify the latter. The aim of the athletes present today should be no merely to win personal honours, but more especially to contribute towards the strengthening of the country and the race. To impart this new spirit, this desire to fortify the country and the

> race, to the masses of the people, is therefore the primary aim of the National Athletic Meet. Over 100,000 are present at this Meet today, and I hope that everyone of them will become strong and healthy, so that they may with greater advantage share the responsibility of overcoming the national crisis (Tang, 1935: 104).

The 1933 meet attracted 2,248 athletes (including 706 women) from 33 provinces and municipalities, including athletes from the provinces of besieged Manchuria. For the occasion, the country's largest steel and concrete sports arena was constructed, near the Ming Tombs, at a cost of around one and a half million dollars. Some 300,000 spectators filled the grounds during the 10 days of competition. They were joined by over 300 newspaper correspondents and 100 photographers from 134 newspapers and news agencies, as well as several film companies. Management of the meet by China's top sports administrators - Po-ling Chang, C.T. Wang, Gunsun Hoh, and Shou-yi Tung – ensured its smooth completion (Wu, 1956: 183-85).

The Shanghai Meet of 1935 had a similar story behind it. Although the seventh meet had been planned for 1937 in Nanking, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and the subsequent Japanese occupation, postponed this meet until May 1948, when it was held in Shanghai (Wu, 1962: 186). Chiang Kai-shek apparently used this meet as a show of strength for his government. Although he was ale to secure 58 teams (over 2,000 athletes) from provinces, municipalities, overseas Chinese and the military, attendance was only 10% of the 1935 meet (Wu, 1962: 424-25). Soon after, the Nationalist government collapsed and the National Athletic Meet series came to an end.

Sport During the Sino- Japanese War (1937-45)

All contemporary observers seem to agree that China's sport suffered setbacks during the period of confrontation with Japan (1937-45). Nevertheless, the Nationalist government, because it saw sport as a means of strengthening the people, continued to give it support throughout this period. In 1936, the Physical Education Committee, which enjoyed a somewhat low status in the Ministry of Education, was elevated to the Department of Physical Education. As such, it became responsible for the coordination of all matters dealing with physical education, the Boy Scouts, hygiene education, and student military training. The early 1940s were years in which the Physical Education Committee was actively trying to plan for the future. At the same time, it had to take into account the limitations imposed upon it by the war in progress. In October 1940, the Second National Physical Education Conference was held in Chungking with the emphasis on deciding upon a national physical education

programme which stressed China's war needs. It was not until the 1940s that the Nationalist government took its first effective step toward enforcing its physical education directives. In 1940, the Ministry of Education published methods of athletic skills and bodily growth. Testing groups were organized to visit the schools and examine weight, height, bodily development, and athletic skills.

The China National Amateur Athletic Federation also made an effort to continue with its programmes during the war years. Beginning in 1941, it banded together with referee associations, and formed branches in the rural areas. In 1943, there were 12 branches of the Federation in the provinces, counties, and municipalities, and nine referee associations. The China National Amateur Athletic Federation remained active until 1949 and thereafter continued its work in Taiwan (Wu, 1962: 337-340).

The development of sport in China during the 1928-1949 period is complex. Western and Japanese imperialism continued to influence China. The KMT government ruled over China in name, but in fact, China, with the Japanese controlling some areas, Nationalists others, and Communists still others, was divided politically. This element of disunity drained the already weak potential for sporting development. Instead of developing a unified administrative command which could tap China's poor reservoir of athletic power and establish a central physical education institute to train the badly needed leadership, each faction was left to fend for itself. Teachers reflected Japanese, German and American influences. But no influence was sufficiently evident to establish the basis of a lasting tradition (Kolatch, 1972: 50).

Eichberg (1973) argues that physical exercise did not become a mass movement until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when its association with nationalism was a result of the achievement motive common to both sports and nationalism. In China, physical training was pursued for the goal of establishing a new state. The linkage of physical culture with the strength of the state is ancient and strong; modern sport and modern nationalism have simply given it a new twist. This link is a natural result of the fact that victory in sports can symbolize physical and natural dominance. The control and ordering of physical bodies in time and space was the goal in establishing a new regime, and sports provided a potent metaphor for the process (Brownell, 1991: 284-90).

Furthermore, Jarvie (1992: 22-23) has argued that there is a great danger in over-emphasising the role of sport in the making of nations. At a general level, the relationship between sport and nationalism has rested upon a number of common arguments: (i) that sport itself is inherently

conservative and that it helps to consolidate official or central nationalism, patriotism and racism; (ii) that sport itself has some inherent property that makes it a possible instrument of national unity and integration, for example, in peripheral or emerging nations; (iii) that sport itself provides a safety valve or outlet for emotional energy for frustrated peoples or nations; (iv) that sport itself helps to reinforce national consciousness and cultural nationalism; (v) that sport itself at times has contributed to unique political struggles, some of which have been closely connected to nationalist politics and popular nationalist struggle; and (vi) that sport itself, whether it be through nostalgia, mythology, invented or selected traditions, contributes to a quest for identity, albeit local, regional, cultural or global. In some cases it is easier to accept the idea that sporting forms and sporting relations help to reproduce, transform or construct the image of a community without accepting the notion of it being imagined. Many of these factors operated within the development of sport in China.

Although Chiang Kai-shek tried to unify a country in which control was shared from time to time and place to place by the Nationalists, the Japanese, and Mao's Communists, his efforts deteriorated into a brutal and bitterly anti-Communist dictatorship. Chiang tried for a unified national sports programme modelled on that of the early social democratic republic, but in a chaotic situation in which "the vast majority of Chinese had not only never participated in sports, but had never even been to school" (Kolatch, 1972: 50), his efforts rarely got far beyond formal resolutions and formal bureaucratic structures.

The Rise of the Chinese Communists 1921-1949

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in Shanghai in 1921, began its quest for revolution among China's proletariat. This was the terrain prescribed by Marx's own works, and its revolutionary potential had been stunningly confirmed by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia just a few years before. Because of a combination of its own newness, the formidability of the fluid and confusing political situation in China at the time, and advice from the Soviet Union, the party entered into a "united front" with the KMT which in the early 1920s had not yet made its rightward turn and was the leading revolutionary force in the country. This obviated the need for the CCP to expend its energies on forming its own military organization. Instead, many of its members joined the KMT army, often as political commissars. The alliance also allowed it to concentrate its early efforts on organizing unions and strikes.

The united front strategy was sensible for the new party so long as the KMT leadership remained pluralistic and reliable with Soviet aid helping to guarantee the CCP's safety. But it left the communists defenceless when the KMT moved decisively and ruthlessly rightward. In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek in a surprise move broke the alliance with the CCP by slaughtering communist activists in Shanghai and, over the next few years, everywhere else in China. The "white terror" of April 1927 taught the CCP a lesson which decisively influenced its future—that the CCP needed its own armed forces.

Communist Party leaders learned from the April events the impossibilities of making a proletarian-based revolution in the conditions prevailing in China at the time, though it took the Party Central Committee some time to reach this conclusion. In fact, the Party continued to lead urban uprisings through the rest of 1927. There are several reasons for this: the continuing importance of Marxist and Leninist theories; a still extant organizational base in other Chinese cities; the hope that the non-communist left of the KMT might yet triumph over the Chiang Kai-shek led right; and a steady stream of advice from Moscow not to abandon the cities or the KMT. Thus the centre of gravity of the decimated CCP did not shift away from the cities until 1931, when the Central Committee moved its headquarters out of hiding in Shanghai and into the Jiangxi countryside. Orthodoxies die hard, sometimes harder than the people who carry them (Blecher, 1986: 18).

Mao Zedong and a few like-minded comrades were able to liberate themselves from the failed orthodoxy sooner than others. By March 1926 Mao was urging the Party to pay attention to the peasants, sharpening his position with the publication of a report on his rural investigation in Hunan in March 1927 (Mao, Volume I, 1967: 13-59). Consequently the Party put him in charge of the Autumn Harvest Uprising there in the autumn of that year. When the revolt was crushed by the KMT, Mao and his small armed band retreated to the remote mountainous region of Jinggangshan, on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi.

In the early months in Jinggangshan, Mao and Zhu De sought their first base of support in alliances with local outlaws, bandit gangs and secret societies which operated in the area. Initially these alliances had as much or more to do with the need to survive in a hostile area than with revolutionary strategy. Especially, the Chinese agrarian structure posed serious obstacles to any communist efforts to organize peasants in their villages. The Party would eventually solve this problem, but only with

patient effort and much experience. In the interim, Mao and Zhu could find their early allies only among marginal groups like bandits, who lived outside the landlord-dominated agrarian structure.

Gradually, the communist movement in Jinggangshan began to broaden its support. It was joined by communist cadres who had survived KMT attacks in 1927 and it recruited some local miners and railwaymen, peasants and soldiers from other Northern Expeditionary armies. A radical land policy was adopted, under which all land was to be confiscated and redistributed. This frightened off many rich and well-to-do peasants, who were the mainstays of production in this very poor section of the countryside. Mao favoured a more moderate policy under which only landlords would be expropriated and others with surplus land would be permitted to sell it. Implementation of the radical policy went slowly, and was not completed before the Jinggangshan base had to be abandoned in early 1929 under the pressure of a KMT blockade which helped create serious food shortages. The Jinggangshan communists moved eastward to a new base straddling the border between Jinaxi and Fujian Provinces, establishing their headquarters at Ruijing.

During the period of Jinggangshan, the CCP's main problem was survival. The CCP's sport development programme was combined with military exercise. One reason was that the majority of Red Army soldiers were from among workers, peasants and lumpen-proletarians, who ordinarily needed six months' or a year's military training before they could fight (Mao, Volume I, 1967: 81-82). The other reason was the influence of Mao's thought on physical culture which was inherited from one of Yen Fu's remarkable essays "On Strength" (Yuan Qiang) discussed in Chapter Three. Mao's first article on physical culture was published in the April 1917 issue of *New Youth*. This article was written long before he was exposed to any Marxist influence. However, it reveals many personality traits, and many strands of thought which can be subsequently followed through. This article is especially concerned about the Chinese people suffering the catastrophe of *wang-kuo*, which means losing state, then becoming "slaves without a country". This theme was widespread in China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Mao argued that:

> The country is being drained of strength. Public interest in martial arts is flagging. The people's health is declining with each passing day. These phenomena are deserving of serious concern. Exponents of physical education have over the years failed to accomplish anything because they have never got to the root of the problems. Our country will even weaken if things are allowed to go on unchanged for long. It should be noted that athletic feats such as accurate shooting and long-distance throws are something external that results from training, whereas sinewy physical strength is something internal that causes good performance. How can a person shoot accurately or make a long-distance throw if he has a poor physique and shies away from weapons? Sinewy physical strength comes from training, which must be done conscientiously. Physical educators of today have devised not a few methods, yet they

> failed to achieve the desired results. This is because external forces can hardly appeal to the public that is not aware of the real significance of physical education. What are its effects and how should one go about it? Since people are all at sea with these questions, it is only natural that little result has been attained. To make physical culture effective, it is imperative to activate the minds of the people and make them sports-conscious (*New Youth*, 1917: 166-168; Mao, 1996: 3-4).

Mao's advocating of physical and mental fitness was to prepare a man for his social duty. The purpose of physical culture and exercise was to save the country, since traditional culture provided neither adequate method, nor an adequate philosophy. On the other hand, Mao also expressed two basic themes of his thought and action throughout the whole of his subsequent career: nationalism and admiration for the martial spirit. Furthermore, Mao claimed that a human being had to fulfil social duties, which included productive labour and fighting for survival of the state. Mao's notion of physical culture to be practiced for these purpose was shown under his leadership of the CCP in later years.

Sport development was very difficult for communists during the Jinggangshan period. The major physical exercise was military activities, such as mountain climbing, marching, and military operations. Once in training, Mao told soldiers "You all shall have intensive military training, good exercise in military field operations and train well your body. Then we can fight our enemy" (Gu, 1989: 366 and 1997: 299). There was a military field operation exercise every 3-5 days. Mao also guided soldiers to climb mountains. In the competition of mountain climbing, normally, two red flags were put on the top of mountain and three bullets were put under the flags. Soldiers would stand at the foot of the mountain and start to run up to the top of mountain at an order. Whoever reached the flags first would be the winner and get the three bullets as prizes. The Red Army, which was stationed at Jinggangshan, climbed Buyun Mountain often in the winter of 1927. The prizes for competition in climbing Buyun Mountain were two pieces of tobacco and a pair of straw sandals.

The Central Committee of the Party moved its headquarters to Ruijing and established the Jinangxi Soviet which undertook a series of agrarian reforms which on the whole were quite radical. The 1930 policy, set by Mao and his comrades, was less extreme than that of the Jinggangshan years. All land was to be confiscated from the landlords and rich peasants, but rich peasants, their dependents and even some landlords were allotted shares of redistributed land equal to those received by the "masses". This principle of protecting the interests of rich peasants in order to help assure their continuing contribution to production was to be upheld by Mao beyond liberation. At this time, though, it was controversial within the CCP. This policy was reversed by the 1931 land law, drafted by a group of Moscow-trained CCP leaders known as the "28 Bolsheviks", who were influenced by Stalin's

stringent anti-kulak policy. It provided for the redistribution of only the poorest land to rich peasants, and none at all to landlords who were also subject to being drafted for forced labour.

The radicalism of agrarian policy in the Jiangxi Soviet was coupled with difficulties in its implementation. The CCP first began to recognize the complexity and difficulty of mixing leadership and mass participation in order to carry out agrarian reform effectively. It was a problem with which the Party would continue to struggle for many years, and the experience garnered in Jiangxi would prove invaluable in refining and defining its distinctive mass style during the Yanan period. For the time being, the Chinese Soviet Republic was established in Ruijing in 1931 November. The Soviet government launched a policy of sport and sports leadership. Mao set the principle of physical education "Training iron bones and muscles of workers and peasants, then, defeating all our enemies" and "Developing red sports, cultivating a team spirit and strong physique for the masses of workers and peasants necessary for the class struggle" (Gu, 1997: 300).

According to Gu, the first and only whole Soviet area athletic meet of the Chinese Soviet Republic was held in Ruijing from 30 May to 3 June 1933 (Figure 16). The goal of the athletic meet was to spread the revolutionary war, to promote Soviet propaganda and assist anti-Japanese, anti-imperialism and anti-KMT propaganda in White areas. In the struggle of the worker and peasant masses, we shall build up our physique for the class struggle and cultivate our team spirit (Gu, 1997: 311). The organising committee of the athletic meet were Bo Gu, Deng Yingchao, Wang Sengrong, Xiang Ying, Zhang Aiping, He Changgong, and Yang Shangqun. Most were leading members of the CCP. Bo Gu, one of the "28 Bolsheviks", was the chief referee. Mao also was one of the general referees. Sports events in this meet included track and field, basketball, volleyball, football, table tennis and tennis. Over 180 athletes participated from the Red Army, the Jiangxi and Fujian Young Pioneers, mass organisations of the Soviet area and the Central Committee. This meet was the biggest and the most significant in the development of sport in the Soviet area (Gu, 1997: 311-312).

After the meet, Zhang Aiping was critical, arguing that sport had not involved enough. Young Pioneers and young labour masses; there was a bureaucratic style of work in the preparation of the meet; the records of track and field were worse than the athletic meet in the Red Army school the previous year; and there were no female athletes (Gu, 1997: 311-312). Zhang Aiping's critique was influential on the later development of female participation in sport under the CCP (Fan, 1997: 172).

Being one of the chief leaders of the Young Pioneers, she wrote a song called "The Gymnastic Song of the Young Pioneers". Surely, this song had shown the purpose of sport in the Jiangxi Soviet.

> Young Pioneers come to develop their bodies,
> They are doing gymnastics, playing games.
> They are strong, active and good at military skills.
> Young Pioneers come to develop their bodies.
> They are playing war games.
> They are fighting against the white dogs (the KMT army).
> Young Pioneers come to develop their bodies,
> They defend the Soviet.
> They are young, but strong.
> They are great heroes and heroines (Gu, 1986: 29).

The Young Pioneers' main duty was to consolidate Red Army strength. Accordingly, Young Pioneers were encouraged to extend and improve their military and athletic activities and hence athletic meets were very popular. For example, an athletic meet called "The First General View on Young Pioneers of the Chinese Soviet Republic" was held at the Red Army school near Ruijing from the 4th to 8th September 1932. Sports events included the high jump, long jump, the 1600 metre race, obstacle race and swimming. There were 21 teams and 688 athletes in this competition. According to Zhang, the track and field records of the Red Army school in 1932 were better than in the whole Soviet area athletic meet of the Chinese Soviet Republic later in 1933 (Gu, 1986: 30).

The Chinese Soviet Republic Red Sports Committee was founded in 1933. The Red Sports Committee was the leading organisation in the Jiangxi Soviet. Some athletic meets were held by the Red Sports Committee in Jiangxi and Fujian provinces later. However, the work of the Chinese Soviet Republic Red Sports Committee was terminated along with the Jiangxi Soviet in October 1934 with the successful KMT fifth encirclement. The CCP moved out of its Jiangxi-Fujian area and started its famous "Long March". It caused huge damage to the CCP's Red Army: of the 100,000 or more who left the Jiangxi base, only 8,000 arrived in Shanxi Province in late 1935. It was a miracle that the CCP could survive after its Long March. Even today, it is associated with so much heroism and so much death that it has an awesome status in Chinese historical consciousness (Blecher, 1986: 22).

After the Long March, the major focus and direction of the Chinese revolution underwent two major shifts. The first was the formation of a united front with the KMT against Japan. The second was the development of a new class constituency, agrarian policy, a set of political institutions and a form of leader-mass relations that came to be known as the "Yanan Way" after the CCP established its headquarters at the rural Shanxi. The CCP's class policy in the Jiangxi Soviet was now seen as excessively radical which had failed to promote broad mass support and a level of economic production

needed to sustain the revolutionary base. The "28 Bolsheviks" were blamed for the mistakes of their military and agrarian policies in the Jiangxi Soviet period. Now CCP policy called for the support not only of the poor and middle peasantry and the working class, but also of rich peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, national capitalists and even landlords opposed to Japanese imperialism.

The greatest innovations and most decisive break with past practice came in the area of political organisation and leader-mass relations. The "mass line" development in Yanan was a radically new approach which involved closer and more democratic leader-mass relations. It reduced the underlying distinctions between party, state and army, on the one hand, and citizens, on the other -- that is, between state and society. In Yanan the mass line took several concrete forms. First was the reduction and streamlining of government administrative apparatuses, and decentralization of political authority. Second was the campaign to send cadres to the rural villages. Third was the effort to enhance the democratic and representative character of local governments by separating them clearly from the Party and ensuring definite and significant representation of non-party people in them. Fourth, the forms of popular political expression and the range of issues on which such expression could take place were also broadened. Fifth, in a continuation of practices developed during the Jiangxi Soviet, the armed forces were to play an important role in civilian affairs, in a way which subordinated them to civil authority (Blecher, 1986: 24-27).

Under the guidelines of the mass line, the Yanan Sport Society was founded by the CCP between 1939 and 1940 (so far there is no careful evidence can provide the date). Li Fuchun was the honorary chairman. The aims of the Yanan Sports Committee were to organise mass sporting activities for organisations, schools, armies and factories to strengthen physiques and enhance the efficiency of work, production and study. At the same time, the Yanan Sport Society promoted "ten-minute exercise" every day; organised a demonstration of sport and exhibition of sport photos; organised the city's regular athletic meets and sports competitions at weekends and holidays. As a result, sport development was booming in Yanan under the advocacy of the Yanan Sport Society (Gu, 1997: 318).

In Yanan, the masses engaged in several different sporting activities such as gymnastic exercises, running, swimming and hiking in the morning. At midday, basketball and volleyball courts in schools, organisations and factories were crowded. After dinner, all sports fields were even more crowded than in daytime. In the summer, the Yan River was a natural swimming pool for water sports.

In the winter, the Yan River was a natural ski field. A ski competition was held in front of Yanan University on 7 March 1943.

The New Yanan Sports Society was established on 25 January 1942 for promoting sport, translating and editing physical education textbooks, and encouraging sport research and surveys. General Zhu De, the honorary chairman, made a speech at the inaugural meeting of the New Yanan Sports Society:

> Today Chinese sport is not yet widespread. Especially, sport advocacy was ignored in Yanan. From now on, every school, organisation and army shall advocate and organise sport in. Gymnastic exercise is the main sport, and ball games and instrumental exercise are the assistant sports in schools and organisations. It is necessary to establish a formal instrumental exercise in the Red Army. We need to start all sports competitions, advocate dancing, hunting, ice skiing, swimming and combine sport with hygiene (*Liberation Daily*, 28 January 1942: 2).

Zhu's thought of sport was quite similar to other CCP leaders who thought sport could be the best way to enhance Red Army's military strength against Japanese imperialism. Significantly, Zhu drew out the essential problem of sport development in Yanan. Later, General Zhu De held an athletic meet during anti-Japanese war, in Yanan from 1st to 6th September 1942. The aims of this meet were "support anti-fascist war and revolution", "Develop masses sport" and "Every citizen shall strengthen his physique as a duty against Japanese invasion and to save our nation" (Gu, 1997: 323). A song the athletic meet describes is:

> Soldiers of the nation and warriors of revolution,
> Come! Let's show off our agility in sport.
> The international robbers and the bloody Fascists,
> Will be trembling before us.
> Climb to the top, run to be first,
> Shoot on target, throw a hand grenade afar,
> Look! General Zhu is on the viewing stand guiding us to go forward!
>
> Soldiers of the nation and warriors of revolution,
> Come! Let's show off our agility in sport.
> The international young anti-invasion comrades
> Will cheer us with jubilation and applause.
> Like a dragon in the water, like a tiger on the land,
> Winners are not elated by victory,
> Losers are not discouraged by failure.
> Look! General Zhu is on the viewing stand guiding us to go forward! (*Liberation Daily*, 31 August 1942: 3)

This song sealed relations between sport and military thought in the CCP. As a result, military drills were the core events of the CCP's athletic meet. Additionally, there were many sport competitions in this meet, such as track and field, basketball, volleyball and swimming. The others such as tennis, football, baseball, horse riding, diving, gymnastics, dance and martial arts were

demonstration events. Over 130 athletes joined this meet which was recognised as the biggest in the Yanan period during the anti-Japanese war.

The need for physical education cadres, who could organise athletic meets, train athletes and teach physical education in schools, was an urgent problem of sport in the Yanan period. To meet this need, a physical education training class was set up in Yanan Youth Cadres School in the spring of 1941, which was directly under the Central Youth Military Sport Committee's supervision. A few months later in September, this physical education class was integrated into Yanan University as a department of physical education. The first group of PE students advanced to an earlier graduation from Yanan in the summer of 1942, owing to the shortage of PE teachers in Red Army and rural schools. The Physical Education Department of Yanan University was the first and most influential PE academic institute training PE teachers for the CCP during the Yanan period.

The CCP's popularity during the Yanan period stemmed in part from its innovation and flexible strategies on class relations, agrarian policy, political organisation and leader-mass relations. Its stature was also enhanced by the leading role it took in the anti-Japanese war. The CCP armies concentrated their military energies on fighting the Japanese. They used mobile guerrilla tactics they had developed during the Long March to wage coordinated offensives, while also engaging in sustained harassment behind Japanese lines. Though the CCP could not really damage the powerful Japanese war machine until the latter had been weakened by its declining position in the Pacific War, its efforts did help to keep Japanese armies at bay in many base areas. More important than their military effect was the positive political image of establishing the CCP as the leading anti-Japanese force in China.

There is controversy among analysts of the CCP over the reasons for its rapid growth in power and popularity from 1937 to 1945. Some have argued that the Communists owe their popularity to their nationalism, not to their programmes of agrarian and political change (Johnson, 1962). As Mao argued the tasks of the Chinese revolution were:

> Imperialism and the feudal landlord class, being the chief enemies of the Chinese revolution at this stage, what are the present tasks of the revolution? Unquestionably, the main tasks are to strike at these two enemies, to carry out a national revolution to overthrow foreign imperialist oppression and a democratic revolution to overthrow feudal landlord oppression, the primary and foremost task being national revolution to overthrow imperialism (Mao, Volume II, 1967: 318).

In Mao's thought nationalism was the core theme of Chinese revolution. Sport was one of the CCP's major campaigns to fulfil the tasks of Chinese revolution. For example, Mao wrote a few words

of encouragement: "Exercise the Body to Fight the Japanese" in a newspaper (*New China Daily*, 9 September 1942: 1). Under the Mao notion of nationalism and sport, sport was very popular in the Red Army, for example, a "Song of Sport" describes sport in the army:

> In the moment of sunset and the cold wind of evening,
> Let's go to the sports field to do exercise together.
> Playing baseball, exercising on the parallel bars, doing high jump (Figure 17) and long jump,
> Throwing a hand grenade, shooting on target and practicing gun-bayonet arts.
> Look! Whose shoulder is bigger! Look! Whose body is stronger!
> Do exercise continually, crude iron cloud shift to steel,
> Do physical exercise continually, a weak man could become a strong man.
> Training our body intensively, killing our enemies in battle bravely.
> Everyone's body is as strong as a tiger,
> No one wants to be as weak as a lamb (*The Journal of Sport History and Culture*, Number 3, 1984: 2).

In Mao's view, the principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution was armed struggle; hence physical exercise could strengthen the Red Army to win the CCP's armed struggle. Sport development in the CCP's revolution base had some significant characteristics. First, the CCP's sports organisations were affected by a group of Moscow-trained "28 Bolsheviks" in the Jiangxi Soviet period. More, under the campaigns of mass-line, the CCP introduced modern sport to masses of workers and peasants, and rural areas in China. They established the Physical Education Department in Yanan University in 1942, which helped to train the major group of PE teachers for rural schools and Red Army under CCP control. Second, CCP sport was full of colour in a military spirit. Most sports activities were combined with military drill which were advocated in the Red Army. Last, CCP sport always suffered from poor equipment and facilities, since the CCP was always faced by the KMT military "extermination" and economic blockade and the rural area that it controlled were poorer than China's industrial and financial centres, the richest farmlands in the coastal areas and in the north-east under the control of KMT.

In political, economic and military conditions the CCP was much worse than the KMT before 1949, but how the CCP could finally succeed in the Chinese revolution? In Blecher's argument (1986: 35-36), there were some structural features of the transitional Chinese social formation that were conducive to its revolutionary aspiration. First, the peasantry was increasingly exploited after 1911. Structurally, this was occasioned by the fall of the empire, which had restrained the landlords somewhat and whose absence opened up a competitive politics that fuelled their avarice. Second, this hyperexploitation took place within an essentially unchanged agrarian system. Third, there was a

structural weakness at the bottom of the landlord-peasant relationship that made China more prone than many other agrarian societies to peasant rebellions.

Fourth, the centrifugal character of the Chinese polity in these years was a great boon to the CCP, affording it the opportunity to establish base areas in remote regions in which it could test out its policies and nurture its resources. It is no accident that these base areas were often in border regions, so that the mobile political and armed forces of the CCP could more easily elude provincial leaderships who lacked coordination by central state authorities. Fifth, the protractedness of the post-imperial transition gave the CCP badly-needed time to overcome some of the structural obstacles it faced, to learn from its mistakes and to develop experience in government administration, movement organisation and political mobilization.

Sixth, the rural base and popular participatory character of the CCP movement has already been touched upon. Neither of these features of the Party's revolutionary strategy came easily to it. Indeed, it took fifteen years of failure with an urban and more Leninist approach before the CCP officially replaced it. Functionalists argue that the mass line was formulated and implemented successfully away the peasantry because it was the only way the rural revolution could be consummated. In fact, the CCP also learned lessons form its early failures of the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi days, which contributed to its later successes of the mass-line in Yanan.

There were many reasons behind the CCP's victory in 1949. Sport might not be a direct cause contributing to the successes of the CCP revolution. However, sport was the most effective training for Red Army. Though the CCP had the problem of shortage of sports staff and poor equipment and facilities around their village's bases, the CCP's military leaders were also advocating sporting activities and holding athletic meets to raise military spirits, develop a team spirit and nationalism. In addition, under the strategy of the mass-line, sport might be regarded as the most effective tool to attract mass participation.

Summary

This chapter has looked at the development of modern sport from 1911 to 1949. There are four unique features affecting sport. First is the continuing influence of the YMCA which can be regarded as an agent of Western imperialism. However, the YMCA's influence on sport was declining when Chinese anti-foreign feeling spread over China after the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925. Second is the

debate on sport and nationalism between 1912 and 1927. Martial arts became the core part of P.E. in schools to raise the Chinese national spirit. Martial arts also employed the form of standard competition and regulations from Western sports. Third is sport development under the KMT between 1928 and 1949. The National P.E. law established the basis of nationwide P.E. programme in China. KMT used sports to promote feelings of nationalism and patriotism and also viewed it as a form of education. Fourth between 1921 and 1949 the CCP combined sport with Mao's thought of physical culture, nationalism and Communist's political action as a united front of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. In summary, nationalism can be seen as the core theme of sport development during this period of time.

CHAPTER FIVE: SPORT, SOCIALISM AND THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1949-1978

To write about the Chinese social formation from 1949 to 1978 is relatively difficult. Not only does this period of development merge with what many writers have referred to as a socialist society but there is also a lack of sociological research which emanates from the unique patterns of tension and struggle experienced by the social formation within which this study is located. Scholars in particular have asked when are sociologists in China going to wake up to the possibilities of their unique situation (Chen, 1999; Fan, 2001; Gu, 1997; Wu, 1999). With specific reference to the analysis of Chinese forms of sporting culture there is relatively little evidence on such important features as social transformation and control, or any sustained concrete analysis of the complex way in which forms of sport are mediated by relatively complex and specific forms of social and cultural domination brought about, in part by the cultural researching in China.

The period between 1949 and 1978, was a phase of development during which time sport experienced problems associated with Mao's socialism as well as with China's Cultural Revolution. After the emergence of the People's Republic of China in 1949, sport became an important component of the socialist state. In order to address these issues this chapter is organised around three core themes:

(i) sporting culture during the early years of the Chinese socialist state 1949-1956;

(ii) sport and the Great Leap Forward and the pre-Cultural Revolution 1957-1965; and

(iii) sport and the Cultural Revolution 1966-1978.

Sport and Socialism in China 1949-1956

Chinese sport between 1949 and 1958 was influenced by socialist ideals and in particular the Soviet sports system. Mao proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 after more than twenty years of revolutionary struggle. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faced the task of forming a new government and a new political and economic order modelled on the Soviet example was quickly installed. A number of factors gave rise to the new Chinese sports movement with the key factors being (i) a new democratic physical culture (ii) Chinese martial arts and anti-feudalism (iii) the Soviet model and national fitness programme and (iv) sport and Physical Education in schools.

New Democratic physical culture and anti-imperialism

The CCP divided the future development of Chinese society into two successive phases, namely the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. The new democracy was the term used to describe the first of these phases. Its policies and orientation emanated from an essay by Mao Zedong published in 1940. Mao's writing *On New Democracy* (Mao, Volume II, 1967: 339-384), outlined the principles of a transitional system in which a temporary alliance of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie would co-exist under CCP leadership. The period of New Democracy effectively came to an end with socialist transformation of industry and the drive for collectivisation in 1953. When Mao commented upon the New Democracy, he explained precisely why China needed to build a new society, state and nation:

> For many years we Communists have struggled for a cultural revolution as well as for a political and economic revolution, and our aim is to build a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation. The new society and new state will have not only a new politics and a new economy but also a new culture. In other words, not only do we want to change a China that is politically oppressed and economically exploited into a China that is politically free and economically prosperous, we also want to change the China which is being kept ignorant and backward under the sway of the old culture into an enlightened and progressive China under the sway of a new culture. In short, we want to build a new China. Our aim in the cultural sphere is to build a new Chinese national culture (Mao, Volume II, 1967: 339-384).

Sport was seen as an important part of new Chinese national culture. Mao is reported to have made few significant statements on the nature of physical culture. In 1952, at the June inaugural meeting of the All-China Sports Federation, he called on the Chinese people to "Develop physical culture and sport, and strengthen the physique of the people" (New Physical Culture, 25 July 1952: 2; State Physical Culture and Sports Commission Policy Research Centre, 1982: 12) (Figure 18). In 1953, Mao made a speech on behalf of the Presidium of the Second National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League of China. He said:

> Young people between fourteen and twenty-five need to study and work, but as youth is the age of physical growth, much is imperilled if their health is neglected. The young need to study much more, for they have to learn many things older people already know. However, they must not be overloaded with either study or work. And the fourteen to eighteen-year-olds in particular should not be made to work with the same intensity as grown-ups. Young people, being what they are, need more time for play, recreation and sport. Otherwise they won't be happy... I would like to say a few words to our young people: first, I wish them good health; second, I wish them success in their study; and third, I wish them success in their work... The revolution has brought us many fine things, but also one thing which is not so good. Everybody is much too active and enthusiastic, often getting tired out. Now we must make sure that everybody, including workers, peasants, soldiers, students and cadres, can keep fit. Of course, it does not necessarily mean that if you are in good health you will be good in study, for study must be done in the proper way... Now it is necessary to arrange some recreation for which there must be time and facilities, and this end should be firmly grasped too. The Party Central Committee has decided to cut down the number of meetings and study

> hours, and you must see to it that this decision is carried out. Challenge anyone who refuses to do so. In short, young people should be enabled to keep fit, study well and work well. Some leading comrades are interested only in getting work out of young people and pay little attention to their health... In the new China of today we must change our approach and think more about the interest of our children and youth (Mao, Volume V, 1977: 96-97).

In this statement Mao illustrated his earlier views about young people, in particular, those who needed more time for play, recreation and sport. Mao saw in them the hope of building a new China. He used the slogan "Keep fit. Study well. Work well" (Mao, Volume V, 1977: 97). His later statement came in the body of a speech of 27 February 1957 "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", where he stated that "We should enable everyone who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and became a worker possessed of both socialist consciousness and a general education" (Mao, Volume V, 1977: 405). Although these statements are certainly simple, their significance lies in their constant citation, and in the fact that they, combined with Mao's 1917 essay, contain the substance of Chinese communist physical culture policy during Mao's era. Though Mao did not mention sport in *On New Democracy* he summarized the directions for the new democratic culture:

> New democratic culture is national... It links up with the socialist and new democratic cultures of all other nations and they are related in such a way that they can absorb something from each other and help each other to develop, together forming a new world culture; but as a revolutionary national culture it can never link up with any reactionary imperialist culture of whatever nation. New democratic culture is scientific. Opposed as it is to all feudal and superstitious ideas, it stands for seeking truth from facts, for objective truth and for the unity of theory and practice. On this point, the possibility exists of a united front against imperialism, feudalism and superstition between the scientific thought of the Chinese proletariat and those Chinese bourgeois materialists and natural scientists who are progressive, but in no case is there a possibility of a united front with any reactionary idealism... New democratic culture belongs to the broad masses and is therefore democratic. It should serve the toiling masses of workers and peasants who make up more than 90 per cent of the nation's population and it should gradually become their very own... A national, scientific and mass culture—such is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the people, the culture of New Democracy, the new culture of the Chinese nation (Mao, Volume II, 1967: 380-382).

In line with Mao's philosophy, Feng Wenbin, the inaugural President of the All-China Sports Federation, spelled out the task of physical culture at the 1949 meeting of the Federation. Feng (*New Physical Culture*, 1 July 1950: 8-9) where he stated that the New Democratic physical culture motto was "to develop sports for people's health, New Democratic construction, and the people's national defence". In short, Feng defined the New Democratic physical culture as national, scientific and mass. In terms of national physical culture, Mao argued that Chinese sport was national and that "It opposes imperialist oppression and upholds the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to our own nation and bears our own national characteristics" (Mao, Volume II, 1967: 380). Chinese sport

needed a national character, but it also needed to combine with other advanced sport systems, such as the then successful sports development model of the Soviet Union. Chinese sport was to be a part of the "New Sport" in the world. In terms of scientific physical culture, Chinese sport was scientific in as much as it was opposed to all feudal and superstitious ideas, and it stood for seeking truth from facts, for objective truth and for the unity of theory and practice (Mao, Volume II, 1967: 381). Sport then was viewed as being united and progressive, it had to contribute to Communist political action, which formed a systematic united front against imperialism and feudalism. Furthermore, both the body and the mind must be seen to be kept in balance in terms of overall human development. In terms of mass physical culture, sport was viewed as serving and belonging to the masses. From the schools to the factories, from the cities to the villages, and from the intellectuals to labourers, sport had to be viewed as spreading to all masses (*New Physical Culture*, 1 July 1950: 8-9).

In Feng's description, the New Democratic physical culture was one of the core themes of Mao's New Democracy (Mao, Volume II, 1967: 380-382). The vision of a national physical culture was characterised by Mao's thoughts about Chinese nationalism. The argument about scientific physical culture did not mention that sport should conform to the principles of science or that all sports programmes would adhere to the principles of physiology, hygiene, anatomy and physics, but should maintain a close relationship between physical culture and scientific research. It accommodated Mao's thoughts on anti-feudalism rather than on scientific method. Accordingly, a national, scientific and mass physical culture was based upon the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the people, the culture of New Democracy, and the new culture of the Chinese nation. In other words, New Democratic physical culture meant New physical culture, while Old physical culture meant sports development before 1949.

Following Feng's explanation of New Democratic physical culture, Xu Yingchao in 1950 provided a critique of the Old physical culture (*New Physical Culture*, 1 July 1950: 10-11). On the essential characteristic of Old physical culture, it was argued that:

> Modern Chinese sport methods, organisations and theories have been copied from the USA, which is a capitalist imperialist state, its politics, economics, military and education all serve the bourgeoisie. The American imperialists spread their sport not because they were concerned about the health of the Chinese people, but because sport was an ideal tool of cultural imperialism. The American imperialists emphasised to the Chinese people that American sports equipment is the best, their athletes are the fastest and their basketball team is the top one...in the world. American sport was perfect in every field. The Chinese Old physical educators always believed that American sport was superior to China's. American sport served the dominant classes and was not for masses (*New Physical Culture*, 1 July 1950: 10).

With Xu's statements on Old Chinese sport it must be noted that, sport was not only copied from the United States of America (USA), but that its advocates also spread the superior image of American sport, provided American sport methods, organisations, theories and equipment with cultural imperialism. Certainly, as has been indicated here, New physical culture accompanied Mao's thoughts on Chinese nationalism and its characteristics of anti-imperialism. This is one of the reasons why New China developed a New physical culture. On the other hand, apart from Western sport, how was traditional Chinese martial arts to be viewed within this new historical epoch?

Martial arts and anti-feudalism

While Chinese Old physical culture was seen to be influenced by American imperialism, Chinese martial arts were also condemned as being feudalist. Not all Chinese sports were criticised as being American imperialist imports in the early 1950s. A particular case was the Chinese martial arts of Wusu, which was seen as a tool of the counter-revolutionaries who had set up anti-revolutionary organizations which threatened the stability of society, taught young people to be thieves and rapists and provided shelter for the people's enemies (Fan, 2001: 158). Fan's argument agrees unconditionally with the government's official claim that these Wusu organizations in the countryside and cities should be banned, and that Wusu groups in schools, factories and government departments should be reorganized by the Youth League and local governments. She adds that the Sports Ministry pointed out, "In journals we do not encourage Wusu activities among the masses. Provincial and local sports commissions do not need to have offices to promote Wusu activities" (Fan, 2001: 158). Furthermore, Fan cites the case of Wang Xinwu, a martial arts expert, who was criticized as a counter-revolutionary and "rightist" and used Wusu as a front to attack the Party and New China. Wusu thus clearly symbolized an undesirable component of the class struggle (Fan, 2001: 158). Fan does not explain what the meaning of this counter-revolutionary actually was or how they intended to overthrow the New China, or the stability of existing society. In fact, the charge of counter-revolutionary was blurred and could be easily used as an all-purpose tool to wipe out those organizations or people who dared to challenge official government policy.

While Fan discusses Wusu through a Chinese book, *Sports History of the People's Republic of China 1949-1999* (Wu, 1999), edited by Wu Shaozu, the former director of the State General Sports

Administration of China and President of the international Wushu Federation, she disregards the government's attack on Wusu's development during the Anti-Rightist Campaign. In fact, Wu and other Chinese writers regarded the Chinese Leftist thoughts as having unreasonably interrupted the development of Wusu in 1955 (Wu, 1999: 92-95; National Research Institute of Martial Arts, 1996: 365-366). Moreover, Fan (2001: 158 and 165) cites Wu's book, pages 92-95, and notes that "the reinstatement of Wusu started in the 1980s and Wusu is now regarded as a legacy of Chinese culture". Contrary to Fan again, a study of this reference (Wu, 1999: 92-95) demonstrates unconditionally that there are no sentences which may reasonably be translated in the way quoted by Fan. In fact, there does not appear to be any statement consistent with her translation on this issue. Here Fan's view is different from *The History of Chinese Martial Arts* (1996), although she quotes this book as one of the important and essential Chinese sources (Fan, 2001: 150). It is edited by the National Research Institute of Martial Arts in China. According to this book, the Sports Ministry interrupted the development of Wusu in 1955, since some Wusu organisations: (i) did not register; (ii) were filled with feudalism and superstition, and destroyed the social order; (iii) cheated people to make money; and (iv) provided shelter for hiding counter-revolutionaries. Then the government started to put an order on Wusu organisations. Under the leftist policy, the Chinese martial arts activities and sports development were stopped and set back (National Research Institute of Martial Arts, 1996: 365).

Furthermore, Liu Shaoqi, a senior CCP figure and Chairman of the People's Republic from 1959 to 1969, talked to the Sport Ministry on 9 March 1956 pointing out that: "We shall strengthen our research on martial arts and improve martial arts, qigong and traditional Chinese sports. We also shall study the scientific value of Chinese martial arts and promote them" (National Research Institute of Martial Arts, 1996: 365-366; Wu, 1999: 100). In the same year, "The Draft of Temporary Rules of Sports Competition in the People's Republic of China" listed martial arts as a performance event and approved them. A martial arts display was held in Beijing on 1-7 November 1956, which was the first time the new method of scoring for martial arts was used and thus began to elevate martial arts to a competitive sport in China. From 1957 to 1959, the Sports Ministry held national martial arts education meetings for martial arts enthusiasts. At the meeting, martial arts exponents were to learn the CCP's policy on sports, to develop martial arts from different schools and to discuss the problems of martial arts teaching. A Chinese Wusu society was established on 19-22 September 1958. Later, the first "Rules of Wusu competition" were approved by the Sports Ministry and used at the national youth

sports meet and the first national sports meet in 1959. At this stage, Wusu research was thriving and a lot of different schools of Wusu thought were published. Nonetheless, martial arts development suffered another setback during the Cultural Revolution campaign from 1966 to 1976 (National Research Institute of Martial Arts, 1996: 366-367).

After reviewing the evidence and reference material presented by Fan in support of her arguments on Chinese Wusu development, outlined in her review essay (Fan 2001: 157-158), we see that the implications of the evidence and conclusions drawn from her essay are inconsistent with those cited and presented by her. In fact, Fan's view of Wusu is similar to her criticism of Western sports historians (Fan, 2001: 148). Perhaps Fan's comments on Chinese Martial Arts development from the 1950s to 1970s need a more careful approach.

Socialist sport and the Soviet model

While Fan claims that the principles and methods of sport in communist China were not directly borrowed from the Soviet Union but were developed during the communist years in Jiangxi and Yanan—the so called "Red Sports" and "New Sports" respectively from 1929 to 1948 (Fan, 2001: 156), she does not explain why Chinese sport did not directly borrow from the Soviet Union. China did copy a great deal of the Soviet sports system in the early years of the Chinese People's Republic. The editor's first comment in *New Physical Culture*, for example, declares that "To establish New Physical Culture, we must learn from the Soviet Union and other People's Democracies" (*New Physical Culture*, 1 July 1950: 6). In a speech at a preparatory meeting of the National Physical Culture Committee in 1950, Vice Chairman Chu Teh insisted "we shall learn well from the sports experience of the Soviet Union" (*New Physical Culture*, 1 July 1950: 7). After a few months, when the first Soviet sports delegation was visiting China, Chu Teh emphasised again, "Chinese sport should learn from our Russian comrades and struggle for Chinese people's sport" (*New Physical Culture*, 25 February 1951: 2).

A Soviet youth delegation visited China in August 1950 and introduced the Soviet model of sports development. At the same time, the first Chinese sports delegation visited the Soviet Union and observed sports development, in particular the Soviet sports organisations (Gu, 1997: 343). The first sports delegation from the Soviet Union to visit China on the 20 December 1950 returned on 31 January 1951. It visited eight cities in China and played 33 basketball games with local teams. Those

Soviet sports experts also gave talks and held 14 meetings with Chinese sports officials. They described the current methods of sports development in the Soviet Union, basketball organisation and functions, the principles and steps of basic training, basketball refereeing and the organisation and duties of sports personnel. It was seen as an essential first step for the Chinese to learn from Soviet sport during the early days of the People's Republic (*New Physical Culture*, 25 February 1951: 3). From 1953, few Soviet sports experts lectured in China. He Long, who was the first Sports Minister of the People's Republic, led a Chinese delegation to the Soviet Union in 1954. It is true that New China certainly learned from Soviet experience; it was one of few choices available at that early stage. Further, it was natural that China should learn, as in other areas, from a fellow socialist state that had already had thirty three years of socialist sporting experience.

Physical culture, after all, according to Marx and Lenin, was an integral part of the socialist system. Marx advised the system would consist of three elements combining training of mind with training of body:

> First, mental education. Second, bodily education, such as is given in schools of gymnastics, and by military exercise. Third, technological training, which acquaints the pupil with the basic principles of all processes of production and, simultaneously, gives him the habits of handling elementary instruments of all trades (Marx and Engels, Volume II, 1969: 81).

Marx put physical education on an equal footing with intellectual education, productive labour and polytechnical education, despite his view being somewhat narrow in that he specifically referred only to gymnastics and military exercises. In the *English Factory Acts*, Marx had seen the germs of the prototypes of such a system in which mental and physical education would be combined with manual labour to improve social production and all-round individuals:

> From the Factory system budded, as Robert Owen has shown in detail, the germ of the education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine productive labour with instruction and gymnastics (Marx, Capital, 1965: 483-484).

If Marx had made scant direct reference to sport, Lenin was scarcely more prolific on the subject—despite the sixty volumes of his writing in the last Soviet edition. Lenin was an active practitioner of physical fitness and sport in his own life. He stated that he did "gymnastics with great pleasure and value every day" (Lenin, Volume IV, 1963: 72). Like Marx, Lenin's educational philosophy favoured a combination of training of the mind and the body: "It is impossible to visualise the ideal of a future society without a combination of instruction and productive labour, nor can productive labour without parallel instruction and physical education be put on a plane required by the modern level of technology and the state of scientific knowledge" (Lenin, Volume II, 1963: 485). Lenin

took a position on character-building effects of sport which was not far removed from that of the British "Muscular Christians". Lenin argued that:

> Young people especially need to have a zest for living and be in good spirits. Healthy sport—gymnastics, swimming, hiking, all manner of physical exercise—should be combined as much as possible with a variety of intellectual interests, study, analysis and investigation... that will give young people more than extraneous theories and discussions about sex...healthy bodies and healthy minds (Zetkin, 1955: 84).

Lenin spoke to the Third All-Russia Congress of the Russian Communist Youth League in October 1920, where he stated his views on sport:

> The physical culture of the younger generation is an essential element in the overall system of communist upbringing of young people, aimed at creating harmoniously developed human beings, creative citizens of communist society. Today, physical culture also has direct practical aims: (i) preparing young people for work; and (ii) preparing them for military defence of Soviet power (Chudinov, 1959: 43-44).

This was the first clear-cut official statement on the aims of Soviet physical culture which made no unreserved qualifications about the rational use of physical education for the purposes of work and defence. A Marxist-Leninist interpretation of culture (both mental and physical), including the interdependence of the mental and physical states of human beings provided the general framework within which physical and mental recreation was viewed in many communist states, including China.

As in other spheres, the Soviet sports influence on China until the late 1950s was quite substantial. The "Labour-Defence System", was a 1931 Soviet innovation which China borrowed from the Soviet Union as a national fitness programme. Early school PE manuals were translated from Russian, and Communist China's first international sports contacts were also with the Soviet Union. The Soviet influence was also evident in the creation of physical culture institutes, government financing and control of sports, trade union sports societies, national ranking for individual sports, armed forces, clubs and sponsorship to enable talented athletes to train full time, as well as sports boarding schools and sports programmes for women. It is not surprising, therefore, that Communist China, which considered itself an orthodox socialist state, drew on the statements of the early communist theorists to justify its efforts in physical culture.

The decision to make the "Labour-Defence System" a formal programme ratified by law was apparently reached during the first plenary session of the Central People's Government Commission on Physical Culture held in Beijing 16-22 January 1954. This meeting included all members of the Commission, members of the Physical Culture Committees of the six administrative regions, and representatives of the Political Department of various military regions. During this meeting, Vice-

Chairman Chu Teh clarified the connection between national defence and physical culture clearly. It was argued that "In the field of national defence, powerful and skilful bodies are needed by the country. Because of this, young people must be strong in physique and bright and lively, courageous and sharp, tough and unyielding" (*South China Morning Post*, No. 748, 9 Feb 1954: 14). The Labour Defence System (called "Ready for Labour and Defence" in the Soviet Union) was an essential part of the Soviet sport influence on Chinese sport and physical education in schools.

Sport and physical education in schools

Sport and physical education policy also reflected important aspects of Mao's thinking on physical culture and sport. Physical education became a compulsory subject in schools during the early of 1950s. Ma Hsu-lun, the Minister of Education, reported the policy and task of educational work through China in 1951:

> The adoption of effective steps for carrying out Chairman Mao's principle of "Health above all" to improve the students' state of health, and, on the prevailing foundation, to improve the remuneration of middle school and elementary schools teachers... The Physical Culture Committee should be established to guide all schools in faithfully carrying out the policy of "Health above all", in reducing the students' amount of class work and after class activities, to promote sports activities and recreation activities, to strengthen health education, to improve environmental hygiene and medical facilities, to improve the food of students, and to promote the people's athletic and health activities, so as to improve the state of health of people (Ma, 1951: 5-12).

Mao's principle of "Health above all" developed into the early policy of physical education in schools. In a speech "On the Correct Handing of Contradictions Among the People", Mao announced that "our educational policy must enable everyone who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and culture" (Mao, Volume V, 1977: 405). Physical education became a significant part of socialist education in schools. Each of China's two constitutional documents made reference to physical culture. The Common Programme—the legal guidelines before the adopting of a Constitution in 1954—refers both directly and indirectly to physical culture. In Article 41 it states that: "Culture and education in the People's Republic of China are New Democratic, that is, national, scientific, and popular. The main reasons for raising the cultural level of the people are: training of personnel for national construction work; liquidation of feudal, comprador, fascist ideologies; and development of the ideology of serving the people" (*Current Background*, No. 9, 21 September 1950: 11). Physical culture was also mentioned in Article 48: "National sports shall be promoted. Public health and medical work shall be extended and

attention shall be paid to safeguarding the health of mothers, infants and children" (*Current Background*, No. 9, 21 September 1950: 12). In short, the aims of New China's physical education were seen as part of the entire New Democratic culture and education system which was viewed being national, scientific and popular.

In order to achieve the goals of New physical culture, New China naturally relied on the Soviet model. A study of Soviet experience in physical education began in the early of 1950s. The Soviet guidelines for physical education for grades 1-4, 5-7 and 8-10 were translated into Chinese as a PE teacher's guide. Soviet manuals on physical education were studied to aid China in setting up its own PE system. This included the aims and responsibilities of PE, the different physiological traits of various age groups, basic methods and problems of PE, school testing and planning of PE, the nature of female PE and the organisation of school PE. Through this study of Soviet experience, Chinese educators concluded that physical education should be considered a subject on a par with all others. Liu Ai-feng, Deputy Minister of Education, set out the characteristics of Chinese physical education:

> Physical culture is one of the important aspects of school education. We must implement universally the Party's educational guidelines, follow the instructions of morality, intelligence as well as physique, and cultivate them to be cultured labourers with socialist consciousness so as to become firm revolutionary successors. The middle school and primary school students are in the stage of growing physically and gaining knowledge, therefore it is more important to pay attention to their normal development and improvement of their health. Physical training has a close connection with moral and intellectual development. How they are physically developed and whether they are strong or weak at this stage, not only has an direct effect on their mental outlook and their smooth completion of study tasks, but also has effect on whether they will be able to make greater contributions and play their part in the three revolutionary movement of class struggle, production struggle and scientific experiment in future. This is a big problem in relation to the health growth of our next generation as well as the socialist revolution and socialist construction. It is precisely because of this that the Party and Government have all along shown concern to the health development of our younger generation. In 1958 Chairman Mao not only appealed to the young men to be "good in health, study and work" but has also repeatedly instructed us to pay attention to the physical health of students (*Extracts from China Mainland Magazines*, No. 434, 14 September 1964: 34).

This statement points out the close relationship in the school between health and the physical education programme. The improvement of schools physical education called for doing a good job in three aspects: (i) to handle the physical education properly; (ii) to make the students persistently and painstakingly do morning exercise and intermission exercise; and (iii) to unfold the extracurricular physical training activities among students, so as to fit in with their timetable for work, self-study and recreational activities (*Extracts from China Mainland Magazines*, No. 434, 14 September 1964: 35). Military sports, were also considered an important means of intensifying "proletarian consciousness" among Young Communist League (YCL) organizations in schools, defined as:

> An intense comprehension of enemy activity and national defence and constant awareness of the fact class and class struggle exist throughout the transitional period, that class enemies and new and old bourgeois elements at home and elsewhere are always attempting a restoration of capitalism (*Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 3435, 8 April 1965: 7).

YCL organizations were encouraged to develop mass activities of military sports such as firing practice, mountain climbing, military camping, grenade throwing and swimming with a heavy load, so that the youth of the country could made to know that they must be ever ready to fight as long as class enemies exist (*Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 3435, 8 April 1965: 7).

The Labour Defence System was largely confined to schools above middle school level in the first half of the 1950s (*New Physical Culture*, 30 July 1951: 18-20; *Sport History*, September 1989: 76-77). The content of the Labour Defence System was very similar to the Soviet "Ready for Labour and Defence" system (Riordan, 1977: 410-415). Accordingly five basic aspects of Chinese physical education during this stage were recognised: (i) the most basic was exercise—the core of the physical training programme. Participation in a varied set of exercises was viewed as preparation for all other aspects of physical education; (ii) physical education involved both games and dance which were included in the middle school programme; (iii) sports were seen as an extension of basic exercises with competition (iv) physical education involved training for labour and defence. The Labour Defence System, was the main focus of the upper school physical education programme, it always had a military flavour and (v) physical education involved complete patriotic and socialist education.

Fan Hong condemns some Western writers for their ill-informed interpretation of the Chinese system and practice of sport as explained in the young Mao's article (Fan, 2001: 156 and 165). Fan's critique is a too simplistic account of Mao's influence on the New physical culture. She overlooks Mao's early thoughts on physical culture, claiming it as not being relevant to China's Constitution in 1954. In referring to the early achievement of the CCP—for example, in the preparatory meeting for the Eighth National Congress in 1956—Mao said:

> China used to be stigmatised as a "decrepit empire", "the sick man of East Asia", a country with a backward economy and a backward culture, with no hygiene, poor at ball games and swimming, where the women had bound feet, the men wore pigtails and eunuchs could still be found, and where the moon did not shine as brightly as in foreign lands. In short, there was much that was bad in China. But after six years' work of transformation we have changed the face of China. No one can deny our achievements (Mao, Volume V, 1977: 313).

Mao's speech states how Chinese sport had been changing the face of China between 1949 and 1956. Mao believed in the importance of physical culture in China from an early age. In one of his early articles, he stated:

> The country is being drained of strength. Public interest in martial arts is flagging. The people's health is declining with each passing day. These phenomena are deserving of serious concerns. Exponents of physical culture have over the years failed to accomplish anything because they have never got to the root of the problems. Our country will become even weaker if things are allowed to go on unchanged for long... (Mao, 1996: 3).

Obviously, Mao's thoughts on physical culture were coloured by his view on nationalism from 1917 to 1956. Later Mao mistrusted the trend of learning from the Soviet Union. It was not until 1956 Mao questioned the validity of the Soviet model as a guide to Chinese development. In a speech entitled, "On the Ten Great Relationships", Mao emphasized the importance of light industry and agriculture, industrialization of the countryside, decentralization of planning, labour-intensive projects, the development of inland areas, and the use of moral incentives rather than material ones in stimulating revolutionary commitment (Mao, Volume V, 1977: 284-307). This collection of strategies, in Mao's view, was to lead to rapid economic development and allow China to overtake the capitalist West. The Great Leap Forward campaign was launched in 1958 to realize this aim but it also represented Mao's Utopian vision of creating a specifically Chinese form of socialism, which entailed a renewed emphasis on the key role of the peasantry and the ultimate achievement of a "collectivist cornucopia" (MacFarquhar, 1972: 467). This resulted in a considerable setback for sport and physical education and the Labour Defence System during the Great Leap Forward.

Sport and the Great Leap Forward 1957-1965

While Chinese sport was disturbed by the Great Leap Forward, it was also during this period that it established a nation-wide sports system. The essence of this period is dramatized by the large banners of three Chinese characters proclaiming the Great Leap Forward—"Da Yue Jin". This initiated collectivisation, nationalization of industries and by transformation of private enterprises into state-owned or joint state-private enterprises (Hu and Seifman, 1976: 88). By 1957, the basic transformations in China's class structure and political and economic institutions had been completed. The gentry, rich peasantry, and various bourgeois strata had been dispatched; industry and commerce had been nationalized or co-operatized, and agriculture collectivised. This had all been accomplished without any economic crisis, and with the security of the socialist state being preserved against foreign threats. The early phases of socialist transition and consolidation could be said to have been complete and attention could now be turned to the deeper structural questions of economics (Blecher, 1997: 66).

The Great Leap Forward was a reversal of economic policy in 1958 that called for a dramatic rise in industrial production. Chinese economic policy from 1949 had followed the Five Year Plan model of the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong was dissatisfied with the speed of development that these Plans permitted, and criticised those who held back from radical change. At a conference in Chengdu in 1958 Mao put forward the slogan "greater, faster, better, more economical" (duo kuai hao sheng) which effectively launched the Great Leap Forward. In short, the Great Leap Forward consisted of three related movements. The first was a vast campaign of labour-intensive farmland cultivation for defence against flood and drought. The second was a campaign to develop local industry in the ownership of the collectives. The third was to develop the modern sector at a provincial level to ensure that each province would have, at the disposal of local development, a backbone of basic industries, with whose assistance and guidance the areas would be able in turn to create their own industrial minicomplexes to support industries lower down (Gray, 1990: 309).

In economic terms the Great Leap Forward was not irrational. It represented in Chinese form the widespread contemporary reaction against planning principles which had been current throughout the world in the late 1940s and 1950s, a reaction which by 1958 was becoming the conventional wisdom of development specialists throughout the world. The Great Leap Forward failed not because of economics but because of politics (Gray, 1990: 309-310). In order to implement Mao's slogan "greater, faster, better, more economical", all areas practiced the "more and faster" rather than the "better and more economical". The result of the Great Leap Forward was false and destroyed the statistical system which effected the policy of "The Ten Year Guidelines for Sports Development".

The Ten Year Guidelines for Sports Development

Following the announcement of the radical Great Leap Forward, participants in the Labour Defence System and mass sports increased many-fold. The State General Sports Administration of China issued "The Ten-Year Guidelines for Sports Development" in early 1958. These contained six directions:

(i) competitive sports;

(ii) school physical education;

(iii) labour sport;

(iv) rural sport;

(v) sports playgrounds and

(vi) scientific research on sports.

The main target of competitive sports development was to approach world levels within a decade. The ten major sports were basketball, volleyball, football, table tennis, track and field, gymnastics, weightlifting, swimming, ice skating and shooting. The specific target was: 5 million people to achieve the basic sports standard (later upgraded to 50 million), some 150,000 active athletes and at least 3,000 top-notch athletes (later upgraded to 10,000). In international competition the 1968 Olympic Games were set as a target. The Outline aimed for Chinese athletes to be in the top three positions in track and field, swimming, ice-skating, gymnastics, table tennis, basketball and volleyball and in the top six in football. At the same time, the guidelines projected 700 youth sports schools with 140,000 members in the Second Five Year Plan, extended to 12,000 schools with 360,000 members in the Third Five Year Plan (*Archive of the State General Sports Administration of China*, "The Ten-Year Guidelines for Sports Development 1958-1967", 9 February 1958).

Sport and PE had different standards at various school levels. At the university standard, 10% of students would be the first class, 50% would be in the second class and 40% would be in the third class in the Second Five-Year Plan. 20% of students would be in the first class, 60% would be in the second class and 20% would be in the third class in the Third Five-Year Plan. At senior high school standard, 1% of students would be the first class, 9% would be in the second class, 50% would be in the third class, and 40% would be in the junior class in the Second Five-Year Plan. 3% of students would be in the first class, 20% would be in the second class, 60% would be in the third class and 17% would be in the junior class in the Third Five-Year Plan. At the junior high school standard, 1% of students would be in the second class, 20% would be in the third class and 79% would be in the junior class in the Second Five-Year Plan. 3% of students would be in the second class, 30% would be in the third class and 67% would be in the junior class in the Third Five-Year Plan. By contrast, in the Labour Defence System, the Guidelines projected all university students attaining the second standard, all senior high school students attaining the first standard and all junior high school students attaining to the junior standard by 1960 (*Archive of the State General Sports Administration of China*, "The Ten Year Guidelines for Sports Development in basic unions", 9 February 1958).

Labour sports developed at factories and they included track and field, gymnastics, weightlifting, swimming, ice skating, handball, shooting, chess, Go, Chinese wrestling, exercises,

basketball, volleyball, football, badminton, martial arts, cycling, mountain climbing and hiking. The Guidelines projected 93 organised sports teams with 930,000 members among 3 billion workers. The Labour Defence System would be promoted among 80% of trade unions and 2.79 million workers would achieve the standard level; 279,000 would become standard athletes; 28,000 labours would become Level 3 referees and 930,000 workers would become primary instructors and referees and 200-260,000 sports meets would be held by trade unions every year up to 1962 (*Archive of the State General Sports Administration of China*, "The Ten Year Guidelines for Sports Development in basic unions", 9 February 1958).

Rural sports in cooperative farms included exercises, hand grenade throwing, middle-to-long distance running, high jump, long jump, weightlifting, bar or rope climbing, swimming, horizontal bar or parallel bar gymnastics, wrestling and traditional sports activities. The Guidelines targets projected 1.32 million sports teams with 13.2 million members, 450 trade union sports societies with 11.81 million members; 67,500 trade union societies promoted the Labour Defence System which involved for 1.32 million primary instructors and referees, 400,000 farmers achieving the first class level and 400,000 sport meets to be held by trade union societies every year by 1962. Provincial cities sports grounds would be increased from 434 in 1957 to 1023 in 1967. The Guidelines on sports research called for ten major research centres to work on sports theories and organisations, sports skills and training, sports hygiene and physiology, sports medicine and therapy, sports psychology, Chinese sports history, sports organisations and systems, sports instructor training and school PE, research on sports equipment and fields and international sports (*Archive of the State General Sports Administration of China*, "The Ten Year Guidelines for Sports Development in basic unions", 9 February 1958).

In summary, the Guidelines called for "40 million people to achieve the standard of the Labour Defence System, 8 million people to achieve the basic sports standard, and 5000 people to become top sports people" (*Archive of the State General Sports Administration of China*, "The Report about The Ten Year Guidelines for Sports Development", 8 September 1958). Furthermore, they aimed to make the basic standard of labour defence widespread: the first target was 150 million and the second 200 million. In the number of active sports people, the first target was 50 million and the second 70 million. In the number of top-notch athletes, the first target was 10000 and the second 15000 (*Archive of the State General Sports Administration of China*, "The Report about The Ten Year Guidelines for Sports Development", 8 September 1958). However, these high targets for sports

development were almost impossible to achieve because of the tendency to report untruthfully, to exaggeration and formalism (Gu, 1997: 350). This tendency ceased in 1960 when the CCP and Mao admitted the errors of the Great Leap Forward. In order to solve the crisis of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP launched into a new policy of recovery and readjustment from the end of 1960.

Sport, socialist education and schools

The Labour Defence System, mass sport and sport in socialist education were essential parts of school education. Tung Tsun-tsai's "Two Major Reform Measures on General Education", highlights the importance of sport in schools during the Great Leap Forward:

> The physique of students will be improved through labour discipline. 41 percent of the students in the Third Middle School in Changke, Honan, were afflicted with stomach trouble in 1955, which dropped to 9 percent in 1956, and now there is not one such patient. At the sports meeting arranged in the Hsuchange administrative district, the students of the school won 21 championships in 35 events. Many instances prove that in those schools where the work-and-study programme has been launched, not only the incidence of diseases among the students is lower, but also they often lead in athletic events (Tung, 1958: 14-22).

Tung argues for the importance of labour discipline and sport in the schools. This was common under the Soviet "Ready for Labour and Defence" system to strengthen production education and introduce a programme of work combined with school education which was part of the great 1958 education reform in China. A delegation to the All-China Conference of Advanced Socialist Workers in Education, Culture, Heath, Physical Education, made the following remarks about Party leadership:

> The education and cultural task of our country is a task of socialism. It is an instrument for the consolidation of proletarian dictatorship, and it is at the same time an instrument for the Communist education of our people. The fundamental principle is that education and cultural work must serve proletarian politics and socialist economic construction. In order to accomplish this, education must be led by our Party. Within the realm of education and culture, the struggle between capitalism and socialism has manifested itself in many forms. Over a long time, the focus of contention has always been on the fundamental problem of party leadership. Prior to 1957, despite the fact that we had made great gains in educational and cultural work, we were not able to consolidate, in time, the leadership of the proletariat. As a result, the bourgeois rightists, taking advantage of this condition, began to challenge the Party on all fronts, shouting such slogans as 'the Party is incapable of leading educational work', 'education for education's sake', and 'separate labour from mental work'... The thorough crushing of the vicious attacks by the bourgeois rightists has firmly established the indisputable correctness of our Party's educational and cultural policy, has paved the way for even greater progress, and has made possible the Great Leap Forward on all fronts (*People's Daily*, 2 June 1960: 1).

Although these comments from the Conference do not mention physical education directly, the CCP's education policy was fundamentally focused on the anti-rightist campaign and the Great Leap Forward and consequently neglected the problem of famine. As a result, sports teams witnessed

reduction in training time while schools ceased to hold physical activities and physical education courses because of a shortage of food. According to sports statistics, 1962 was the worst year for sports development between 1958 and 1965 (Gu, 1997: 356-358).

The political and ideological framework of *Red and Expert* was still seen as an important educational policy of the CCP's campaign. *Red* referred to the political criterion for socialism and serving the people while *Expert* referred to the vocational level for working hard and making contributions to society (Su, 1983: 39). In 1962, the Universities Committee of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Young Communist League (YCL) of Tsinghua University arranged separate forums on the question of *Redness and Expertness* with a view to providing better guidance to students in becoming both Red and Expert and promoting a more all-round development. Most of those taking part in the forums were senior students successful in solving the problem of *Redness and Expertness*. Based upon their own experience, they expressed their views on the question of *Redness and Expertness*. The term *Red and Expert* is, in this sense, particularly pertinent and revealing, for being *Red* was viewed as being more important than being *Expert*, and the objective of education was to train a new generation of ideologically trustworthy and technically competent Chinese (MacFarquhar, 1972: 248).

Physical health was viewed as having a very important bearing on both *Redness and Expertness*. All the students taking part in the forums agreed that, in order to train oneself and become both "Red and Expert", one must have good physical health. Without good physical health, one would find it difficult to become *Red and Expert*. In particular, Lu Kuo-pao, a 6th year student of Beijing University, talked about his own personal experience:

> Physical health has a very important bearing on "Redness and Expertness". Take myself for instance. My health was very poor when I was in middle school. This affected my studies. Later, I began to pay attention to physical training. For several years, I kept on doing physical exercises and such things as long-distance running. In this way, my health has been able to give me considerable help. In the university, I have been working for a Party branch for several years. I often work and study till very late, but I never feel tired. Even after studying throughout the night, I would still feel quite energetic when I go to class the following day. My experience shows that, in order to train oneself and become the kind of useful person needed by the party, one must pay attention to physical training (Lu, 1963: 2-5).

Lu Kuo-pao's personal experience was quite different from others at that time. Although China's economy in 1962 was better than in 1961, the basic place of physical activities in society was still poor. The government did not organise physical exercise, such as long-distance running and the labour defence events. The principle of school physical education meant taking part in fewer or no

physical activities at all (Wu, 1999: 122). Yet, Lu's experience shows that physical heath was one of the important elements of being successful at "Red and Expert" in Mao's socialist education movement.

Following the "Red and Expert" campaign, physical culture became an important aspect of school education, particularly at primary and middle school levels, and was considered a means of carrying out both political and ideological education:

> Physical culture is one of the important aspects of school education. We must implement universally the Party's educational guidelines, follow the instructions of Chairman Mao, enable the students to develop vigorously and actively in respect of morality, intelligence as well as physique, and encourage them to be cultured labourers with socialist consciousness so as to become firm revolutionary successors... it [the physical culture movement] will enable the students to better complete their study task so that in the future when they participate in productive labour, enter into military service, or join other construction enterprises, they will be vigorous and firmly determined to shoulder the heavy task (Liu, 1964: 34-36).

According to Liu Ai-feng, then Deputy Minister of Education, improvement in school physical education required three elements: (i) to handle the physical education course properly... according to pedagogical plans, that is, to correctly understand the significance of physical training; (ii) to make the students persistently undertake morning and intermission exercises; and (iii) to actively promote extracurricular physical training activities among students, so as to fit in with their timetable for work, self-study, and recreational activities. Liu emphasised that diversified sports methods should be used for physical training in middle and primary schools. It was argued that in order to enable every student to have a chance of physical training, we must do more physical training without using any equipment, make do with what is available, and use all available conditions (Liu, 1964: 35). Liu concluded that the key point in improving school physical training lies was the strengthening of leadership and socialist thought. More specially he argued that:

> The Party Central Committee has instructed us that we should not only regard physical culture as an important means and way to improve health and strengthen bodily constitution but also as an important measure for carrying out communist education for students. The task of our socialist revolution and socialist construction requires our next generation to possess high political consciousness and iron revolutionary will, master the necessary cultural and scientific knowledge and technique, and have a strong body to realize revolutionary will and undertake construction (Liu, 1964: 36).

Although the Sino-Soviet split brought the Labour Defence System to an end (Fan, 2001: 157), military sports were still considered an important means of intensifying "proletarian consciousness", defined as:

> ... an intense comprehension of enemy activity and national defence and constant awareness of the fact that class and class struggle exist throughout the transitional period, that class enemies and new and old bourgeois elements at home and elsewhere are always attempting a restoration of capitalism (*China Youth Daily*, Editorial, 25 March 1965: 1).

YCL organisations were encouraged to develop mass activities of military sports (firing practice, mountain climbing, military camping, grenade throwing, swimming with a heavy load, etc.), so that the youth of the country could be made "to know that they must be ever ready to fight as long as class enemies exist" (*China Youth Daily*, Editorial, 25 March 1965: 1). Fan argued that this was to concentrate all the resources on a few elite athletes in order to produce high performances on the international sports stage. It was a turning point from mass to elite sport in China (Fan, 2001: 157). In fact, during the pre-Cultural Revolution, the stage from 1963 to 1966 was recognised as Mao's socialist education movement of *Red and Expert* which called for mass mobilization to attack *capitalist roaders* who were supporters of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping during the Cultural Revolution and were accused of following the capitalist road.

Sport, communes and famine

There is very little detailed information on how exactly sports development in the people's communes started. The emergence of the people's communes in rural China in mid-1958 was an event which occurred during the Great Leap Forward. The people's communes were the final stage in the collectivisation of Chinese agriculture and were created by merging existing agricultural cooperatives. Communes were the fundamental administrative unit of the socialist social structure of the Chinese countryside, combining industry, agriculture, trade, banking, child care, retirement homes, medical centres, road and bridge building and maintenance, education and military affairs; at the same time, the commune was the basic organisation of socialist state power. Sport was frequently associated with education and military affairs in the people's communes.

The first task of each new commune was to carry through the programme of the Great Leap Forward. Sports began to bloom in the countryside from 1956 as the movement to encourage individual farms to become part of larger cooperatives, gained momentum. Physical culture and sports committees mushroomed at the basic level of the People's Committees. Sports teams were organised according to production brigades and teams. Special attempts were made to organise sports activities according to peasant work schedules. Thus, much sporting activity took place during rest periods, before work, and especially during slack seasons. Generally, the nature of the programme in the communes coincided with that of the factory. Through the people's communes, mass sports made great headway in rural areas, since the communes effected basic changes in the social structure, personal relationships and

value system in the villages. With greater resources at the commune's command and with the labour force more effectively organised, the development of mass sport was accelerated. It is said, for example, that through the establishment of common dining halls and crèches peasants were freed from daily chores so that they had more time for recreation and sports.

The people's commune transformed the social structure, local administrative system, traditional values of the peasantry and personal relationships among villagers for over 550 million human beings (about one quarter of the world's population at that time). Changes to mass sports, the Labour Defence System and military exercise took place in the commune which profoundly affected many sport institutions in rural China. A people's commune in Suiping *Hsien* (county) Honan Province, for example, approved the "Draft Regulations of the Weihsing (Satellite or Sputnik) People's Commune" in August 1958. Article 21 of the Draft Regulations stated that:

> The Commune is to expand mass cultural, recreational and sports activities so as to develop mentally and physically developed Communist citizens. Step by step, a library, theatre and film projection team is to be set up for the Commune; clubs, amateur troupes, song groups and ball teams are to be set up for big teams; small reading rooms and radio listening facilities shall be provided for production teams (*Contemporary China, Volume III, 1958-1959*, Documents, 1960: 247).

Article 21 addresses recreation and sports activities which were important components for the communist citizen. Along with mass sport and the Labour Defence System, military training was an integral part of the commune's daily life. The emphasis on the popular militia as an essential part of the commune suggests that what Mao had in mind was the dissolution of the bourgeois state. Article 10 of the Draft Regulations states how the military training was held in the commune:

> The Commune is to arm all the people. Able-bodied young men of military age and demobilized and retired servicemen are to be enrolled in the militia to undergo regular military training and shoulder the tasks assigned by the State. During the period of military training and execution of tasks, the militiamen shall receive their wages as usual (*Contemporary China, Volume III, 1958-1959*, Documents, 1960: 240).

The policy of the Great Leap Forward and the Anti-Rightist Campaign disrupted the national economy between 1958 and 1962. The Anti-Rightist Campaign had profoundly shocked China's intellectuals, as well as the millions who had agreed with the criticisms made by the Party in the 1957 *rectification*. Many sports coaches, PE teachers and sport officials were seen as *rightist* during this stage, and this affected the development of sport. Another factor was the famine that occurred between 1959 and 1961. The famine put an end to many sports activities. In the official view, there were three years of natural disasters. Gu Shiquan notes that the official view was that the famine must be seen as a result of three years of natural disasters and difficulties (Gu, 1997: 349). Wu Shaozu not only agrees

with this official view, but also concedes that the number of abnormal deaths increased during this period (Wu, 1999: 112). By contrast, Fan Hong's essay mentions the great famine, the shortage of finance and food, and reduction of sports teams, but she does not mention the disaster of millions of people dying. In the last few years, a growing number of Chinese living abroad have written memoirs that have shed more light on the subject (Jin, 1999: 200-212). It has become clear that the greatest trauma suffered by the Chinese people was indeed the famine, not the Cultural Revolution (Becker, 1999: xi). The famine was a fact that has not yet been given sufficient attention by Chinese sports historians. Historians today, both Western and Chinese (Becker, 1999; Hutchings, 2001; Jin, 1999), concede that the 1958 policies were a complete disaster and that there were at least 20 million deaths attributable to indirectly and directly to famine. Some commentators go so far as 40 million, the figure being the result of indirect inferences drawn from the movement of China's population figure—according to official Chinese statistics, the country's population in 1959 was 672.07 millions.

Dissatisfaction with the policies of the Great Leap Forward meant that Mao's political influence declined markedly. However, even today the CCP refuses to acknowledge that a famine took place, and forbids the investigation or public discussion into what it called the "three difficult years". This makes the tragedy that swept through almost every part of China between 1958 and 1962 almost invisible. It also exposes a grim reality behind the exercise of power in communist China based on an ability to suppress the truth, and force people to say, perhaps even believe, things that were evidently untrue (Hutchings, 2001: 164). In terms of sport, the nationwide sports system was established through the political campaign from 1957. Sports recovered from the Great Leap Forward and developed rapidly during the pre-Cultural Revolution between 1963 and 1966. However, the Cultural Revolution created further conflicts between the radicals and the pragmatists on sport. It is necessary therefore to outline a broader approach to sport and the Cultural Revolution.

Sport and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1978

Sports development suffered during the early stages of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution known as the "Cultural Revolution", represented Mao Zedong's attempt to prevent the Chinese Revolution from degenerating in the same way that Mao believed the Soviet revolution had done. As a result of Khrushchev's alleged appeasement of America, his peaceful co-existence policy, Mao broke with the Soviet leadership and

set out to discover why Leninist principles had been abandoned in the homeland of the revolution. Mao's findings, published in nine polemics between 1963 and 1964, concluded that the Soviet Union had suffered a capitalist restoration encouraged by the emergence of a "privileged stratum" and a revisionist ruling clique. To prevent China from abandoning class struggle in favour of "goulash communism", Mao argued that it was crucial to train a new generation of totally dedicated revolutionary successors, whose Weltanschaung would be genuinely Marxist-Leninist (and by implication, Maoist)—hence the need for a cultural revolution.

Sports organisations

Sports development in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, as Fan argues, meant that competitive sport was damaged, the training system was dismantled, sports schools closed, sports competitions ceased, Chinese teams stopped going aboard and outstanding athletes were condemned as sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie and suffered mentally and physically (Fan, 2001: 158). However, Fan does not mention that a lot of sports leaders, officials and workers were also persecuted and falsely incriminated (Wu, 1999: 172). Today there is some evidence to substantiate these disasters in Chinese sports between 1968 and 1970. A few Da-zi-bao can still be seen as important sources of Chinese sports history during the Cultural Revolution. Da-zi-bao have been customary in the People's Republic of China, with official newspapers displayed on walls. Da-zi-bao are generally associated with the Cultural Revolution during which time they were used to attack individual CCP members. Mao Zedong's own Da-zi-bao, for example, "Bombard Headquarters" (*People's Daily*, 5 August 1966: 1), was interpreted by all delegates as an attack on Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and other prominent leaders of the powerful Party apparatus. During the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, the struggle among the top leadership intensified and the Maoist position became increasingly radical.

In a Red Guard Da-zi-bao, He Long, the CCP's commander and first Sports Minister, was attacked for supporting Liu Shaoqi's and Deng Xiaoping's revisionist sports policy and sports news publication. The majority of his colleagues were also attacked as revisionists and counter-revolutionaries (Tan and Zhao, 1996: 403-404). Most sports officials, for example, three Deputy Sports Ministers Jung Kao-tang, Li Meng-hua and Li Ta and Wang Ling in the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission, were brought down (Robinson, 1971: 307-312). Sports development was stopped, mass sport was ruined, sports training programmes were replaced by "political struggles" and *New*

Physical Culture and *Physical Culture News* ceased publication. The National Sports System was defamed as an independent realm beyond proletarian politics and the CCP control. In a Da-zi-bao *My Accusation*, Zhuang Zedong, who won the 26th World Table Tennis Championship in Beijing in 1961 (Figure 19), accused He Long and Jung Kao-tang of a revisionist policy in the table tennis team as an independent realm and stated that (i) he was very badly injured and ruined over eight years in the table tennis team; (ii) he became a seed of typical revisionism under Jung Kao-tang's education; and (iii) he wanted to revolt, he wanted to rebel and he wanted to be a people's servant (Tan and Zhao, 1996: 332-335). The slogan "Bring down Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, He Long and Jung Kao-tang! Long Live Mao Zedong's thought! Long Live Chairman Mao!" (Tan and Zhao, 1996) was often seen in the last sentence of these Da-zi-baos. He Long suffered torment from ill treatments both physically and mentally. He died on 9 June 1969 (Gu, 1997: 360-361).

Further tragedies included three of the top table tennis players (Figure 19) committing suicide during the Clean Up the Class Ranks campaign. This particular campaign was modelled on pilot studies of six factories and two universities in Beijing, which were under Mao's personal supervision (Chang, 1993: 496). Fu Qifang, for example, a famous table tennis coach and player, came from Hong Kong with Jiang Yongning to join the Chinese National Table Tennis Team in 1952. Since they were all from Hong Kong, they were seen as spies during the Clean Up the Class Ranks campaign. Fu Qifang was tortured in denunciation meetings and cruelly beaten by other sports people. Fu hanged himself on 16 April 1968. The second table tennis player, Jiang Yongning, was seen as a Japanese spy and hanged himself on 16 May 1968. The third table tennis player, Rong Guotuan, also from Hong Kong, won the first world table tennis championship in Chinese sports history in 1959. Later he hanged himself on 20 June 1968. In Rong's last letter, he wrote: "I am not a spy. Please do not suspect me. I am sorry to you all. I love my honour more than my life" (Yan and Gao, 1989: 411-412). These were the most notorious tragedies of Chinese sport during the Cultural Revolution.

The Chinese sports management, training and competition system was totally abolished in 1967. Most sports teams were dismissed. 47 province and city football teams which included 1124 players and 115 professional coaches, were disbanded. Most sports training equipment and facilities were destroyed. Sports stadiums became the gathering place for denunciation meetings (Wu, 1999: 175). As Jung Chang comments the People's Sports Stadium no longer hosted any kind of sport since competitive games were condemned by Mao. Athletes had to devote themselves to the Cultural

Revolution (Chang, 1993: 494). Following Mao's own characterization of the Cultural Revolution, ideological education appeared on some "loyal" activities to Chairman Mao. "Loyalty dances", for example, was a physical exercise which followed the melodies of Mao's Quotations to illustrate people's loyalty to Chairman Mao. Everyone had to dance the "Loyalty Dances" during the early feverish period of the Cultural Revolution (Yan and Gao, 1989: 386). As Chang testified:

> In the autumn of 1968 a new type of team took over my school; they were called "Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams". Made up of soldiers or workers who had not been involved in factional fighting, their task was to restore order... The old textbooks had all been condemned as "bourgeois poison", and nobody was brave enough to write new ones. So we just sat in classes reciting Mao's articles and reading *People's Daily* editorials. We sang songs of Mao's quotations, or gathered to dance "loyalty dance", gyrating and waving our Little Red Books. Making "loyalty dances" compulsory was one of the major orders issued by the Revolutionary Committees throughout China. This absurd decision was mandatory everywhere: in schools and factories, on the streets, in shops, on railway platforms, even in hospitals for patients who could still move (Chang, 1993: 502-503).

Although sports competition was halted for a while in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, sports performance and mass sport competition became part of celebration activities among the Revolutionary Communities after the 9th Party Congress of 1969. Athletes had to dance the "Loyalty Dances" before competitions and recited Mao's Quotations loudly when players violated a sports rule (Wu, 1999: 188). At the same time, martial arts were not allowed to have any competitions, and "Loyalty Boxing" were developed and promoted as an alternative form of martial art (Yu, 1985: 195). A lot of martial arts experts were condemned as ministers and sons of the preceding feudalism, "monsters" and reactionaries of academic authorities who were ruined during this stage. Many valuable classical boxing books were destroyed and seen as a poison of feudalism, capitalism and revisionism. Martial arts competition were attacked as a medium of feudalism and superstition. Martial arts weapons and equipment were confiscated (National Research Institute of Martial Arts, 1996: 368-369; Yu, 1985: 195). This was the second setback for martial arts after 1949.

Mass sport and PE in schools

The intensity and violence of the Red Guard movement almost brought China to the brink of internal war during 1966 and 1969. At the same time Mao had swept away most 'capitalist roaders' and 'hidden enemies', such as President Liu Shaoqi, the Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, Sports Minister He Long and their followers who disregarded Mao's policy after the Great Leap Forward (Blecher, 1997: 75-77). Mao gradually increased the political status of the PLA and reconstructed the

Party to re-establish its control over society by reorganising most of the previous state and mass organisations after the Ninth Congress of April 1969. Premier Zhou Enlai worked to restore scientific and educational standards which included sports.

Premier Zhou recognized the sports achievements between 1949 and 1966 at the first national physical culture and sports conference during the Cultural Revolution of July 1971. Zhou's positive support for sport inspired many sports officials and experts. After 1971 Zhou gradually restored sports training, competition, schools, organisations and administration which were all discontinued between 1966 and 1970. Sports officials returned to the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission which was dominated by the PLA between 1966 and 1971. National countryside sports development meetings, national labour sports development meetings and the national spare time physical education and sports schools conference were held in 1972 (Gu, 1997: 361-362).

Mass sports development became an important policy of the Chinese government in 1972. For example, a traditional mass sports activity—round-the-city race—was held in the Beijing Chungwent District during the Spring Festival of 1972. The Beijing No. 26 Middle School had the most participants when more than 100 boys and girls formed some 20 teams to take part in a middle school cross-country run race. An article "Mass Physical Training" describes sports development in this school:

> Upon our arrival at 6:30 in the morning, we saw some 500 students training on the sports grounds—some practicing throwing the javelin, discus, hand-grenade and other objects, some running or practicing the high jump and long jump, and some playing ball games. At 7:30, the students gathered on the large field or in the courtyards, doing setting-up exercise to music broadcast over the radio. Classes began at 8:00. From 8:00 through 4:00 p.m., we saw over a dozen classes taking physical training lessons on the grounds. During the interval after lunch and after 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the students played ball games and engaged in various other activities. So keen are the youngsters for ball games that they throng the sports grounds even on Sundays.
>
> The No. 26 Middle School has 3,070 boy and girl students in 54 classes, with five full-time and three part-time physical training teachers. The school has adequate sports facilities, including nine basketball courts, one volleyball court, one football field and ten table tennis tables. Apart from school teams for football, boys' and girls' basketball, volleyball, table tennis and track and field, many grades and classes have their own teams.
>
> How to organize such large contingents in regular training? What ideology should be used to guide their activities? What results have been obtained from mass physical training? And what is the relationship between moral, intellectual and physical development? Answers to these questions were given by a physical training teacher whom we interviewed.
>
> Through the Great Cultural Revolution, the teacher began by way of introduction, we have come to understand that in physical training there is also the question of "For whom?" Since the purpose is to build up the people's health, we should stress the mass character of such training. It is wrong to train just a few "stars"; our duty is to help the majority of students take an interest in physical training and actively participate in sports activities... First of all, we do our best to popularize those sports which give a comparatively large amount of exercise but require no particular skill, such as running, tug of war, skipping and throwing the hand grenade... Secondly, we pay proper attention to combining athletic meets with everyday

> sports activities. Using competition to stimulate training. It is natural that an upsurge in mass activity precedes every such meet. However, we used to stress only getting good results and did not combine competition with everyday training (*Beijing Review*, No. 14, 7 April 1972: 11-13).

Later the first National Middle School Sports meet was held in 1973 (Gu, 1997: 362). However, sports development was discontinued again when Zhou's restoration work was attacked in another political campaign. On 18 January 1974, with Mao's approval, the Party circulated a document prepared under the direction of Jiang Qing (Mao's wife) entitled "The doctrines of Lin Biao, Confucius and Mencius". This marked the formal start of the official campaign to "Criticize Lin Biao, criticize Confucius" *(pi Lin, pi Kong)*, masterminded by Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen, and foreshadowed by the 1974 New Year's Day joint editorial in the *People's Daily*, *Hongqi* (*Red Flag*) and the *Liberation Army News* (Yan and Gao, 1989: 671). This campaign was led by Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan who were referred to as the "Gang of Four". The real purpose of this campaign was to undermine Zhou Enlai (MacFarquhar, 1993: 286-287). The Sports system was set back by leftist thought on sports between 1974 and 1976.

During the restoration period, Zhou appointed Wang Meng as the leader of the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission and permitted *Physical Culture Daily* to resume publication in 1971. Nonetheless, in the campaign "Criticize Lin Biao, criticize Confucius", Zhuang Zedong, who won the World Table Tennis Championship three times, replaced Wang Meng and became a confidant of Jiang Qing, organised his own gang to support the "Gang of Four" in the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission (Yan and Gao, 1989: 678). Under the slogans of "sports revolution" and "sports competition reform", the former leaders of the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission were attacked as the "third generation of revisionists" and "bourgeois sports without capitalists" by the "Gang of Four". Gradually they took over the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission and sports organisations between 1974 and 1976, as Zhou made concessions on personnel arrangement in the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission and the Ministry of Culture. However, he kept power in the Ministry of Education during the Party's power struggle in 1974 (Yan and Gao, 1989: 718). Chinese sports were not brought out of chaos until Mao's death on 9 September 1976 and the arrest of the "Gang of Four" in October 1976, which was considered as the official end of the Cultural Revolution.

How can we fairly judge sports development in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution? In terms of official statements, as late as 1977, even after the purge of the "Gang of Four", Chinese

leaders continued to portray the Cultural Revolution in glowing terms. As Premier Hua Guofeng declared at the Eleventh Party Congress: "Beyond any doubt, the Cultural Revolution will go down in the history of the proletariat as a momentous innovation which will shine through the passage of time" (*The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China—documents*, 1977: 51-52). Indeed, Hua promised that further Cultural Revolutions would take place many times in the future as a way of continuing the struggle against bourgeois and capitalist influences within the Party (MacFarquhar, 1993: 231). However, the official Chinese line completely changed within two years. In mid-1979, Chairman Ye Jianying described the Cultural Revolution as "an appalling catastrophe suffered by all our people". The interpretation that has prevailed more recently is that China was never in danger of capitalist restoration, that Mao's diagnosis of China's political situation in 1966 "ran counter to reality", that the programmes produced in the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution were impractical and utopian, and that the Red Guards were naive and impressionable youth led by "careerists, adventurists, opportunists, political degenerates, and the hooligan dregs of society" (*Beijing Review*, 5 October 1979: 15, 18, 19). An official resolution on Party history, adopted in 1981, condemned the Cultural Revolution as causing "the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People's Republic (MacFarquhar, 1993: 231).

In terms of sport, sports historians and writers have provided a number of arguments on the Cultural Revolution. Most of them agree with the official resolution of the Cultural Revolution in 1981. The following arguments represent common ground. Gu Shiquan, for example, indicates that the Cultural Revolution was ten years of unprecedented disaster for sport (Gu, 1997: 364). In martial arts, as mentioned above experts were condemned as vestiges of feudalism, "monsters" and academic reactionaries they were ruined during the Cultural Revolution which set Chinese martial arts back over ten years or more (National Research Institute of Martial Arts, 1996: 368-369; Yu, 1985: 195). Wu Shaozu, the former director of the State General Sports Administration, agrees with the official resolution on Party history of 1981 and condemns the Cultural Revolution for destroying sports development. He writes that during the Cultural Revolution: (i) tragedies occurred amongst the top table tennis players who committed suicide; (ii) the sports level declined because most athletes were involved with the Cultural Revolution and ceased their training programmes and (iii) the entire sports system was at a standstill or near standstill condition (Wu, 1999: 171-200). Chen Rong argues that the Cultural Revolution was also an unprecedented disaster for ideology in contemporary China. Under the

influence of cultural dictatorship and with metaphysics on the rampage, sports scholarship was extremely distorted by leftist sports thought and sports were put to the service of politics. He criticises the policy of "Friendship first, competition second" because in practice it expressed Mao's revolutionary line of "friendship first" meaning "politics first". Accordingly, sports completely became a political tool during the Cultural Revolution (Chen, 1999: 7).

However, although Fan Hong often emphasises the importance of Chinese sources, her view of the Cultural Revolution is different from those Chinese sources which condemn the Cultural Revolution as a tragedy and an unprecedented disaster for sport. She concludes positively:

> The Cultural Revolution, in fact, pushed the roots of sports deep into Chinese society... Sport in the Cultural Revolution developed under very complex and unique social, cultural and political circumstances. It is curious that, unlike the arts, education, industry and agriculture, on which the revolution had a destructive effect, sport survived and even developed. This fact constitutes a valuable and interesting phenomenon in the context of Chinese contemporary history (Fan, 2001: 158-159).

In fact, Chinese sports, culture and society were deeply uprooted during the Cultural Revolution which created a serious crisis of confidence and disillusionment among Chinese people, that is the reason why sport developed so rapidly within the post-Mao reforms.

The position taken in this thesis is sympathetic to some of the above interpretations. On the other hand, it is argued that some aspects of the above arguments are fundamentally flawed. While it is not necessary to provide an in-depth analysis of all the multi-faceted developments of the Cultural Revolution, this initial base allows two points to be made. Firstly, the Cultural Revolution was a great disaster and tragedy for sport in Chinese history. The majority of Chinese sports writers agree with official statements and condemn the Cultural Revolution as mistakes of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four". However, the Chinese history of the Cultural Revolution is still blurred and ambiguous. Most Chinese writers avoid pointing out that Mao was responsible for the origins of the Cultural Revolution and he had to bear much of its blame for its outcome. The flaw in Mao's strategy, in other words, was that he waged only half a revolution between 1966 and 1969. He failed to design a viable and enduring alternative political order to replace the one he sought to overthrow, or to transform the political resources he had mobilized from destructive into constructive ones. For example, when the Sports Minister He Long and other sports leaders were brought down as revisionists, there was no other sports system that could replace the old one. It brought the sports system to a standstill.

Secondly, the chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution had been an important influence on the reforms in sports in the post-Mao era. Many senior cadres suffered greatly during the Cultural

Revolution, and yet they survived and helped to create leadership for economic and political liberalization, which included sport. The disillusionment of many thousands of educated young people and intellectuals during the Red Guard movement stimulated many radical ideas that were later translated into concrete sports reforms. Actually, the CCP found it difficult to resist the pressure for restructuring the political and economic order after the Cultural Revolution. In short, if there had been no Cultural Revolution, it is unlikely that sports reform would have gone so far and so fast in the post-Mao period.

Summary

The period between 1949 and 1978 marked a very distinctive stage in the development of Chinese sport. It was a stage of Mao's socialism and the Cultural Revolution which was influenced by Marxism-Leninism. Mao's notion of the "New Democracy" provided direction to sports development in the early stages of the People's Republic. In particular, the New Democracy of physical culture contained three spheres—national, scientific and mass. National physical culture meant that Chinese sport needed a national character—nationalism combined with socialist aspects of an advanced sports system. Scientific physical culture meant that Chinese sport was opposed to all feudal and superstitious ideas, sought the truth and united theory and practice which had to contribute to Communist political action in terms of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. Mass physical culture meant that Chinese sport served and belonged to the masses. In fact, the New Democratic physical culture was an empty theory from Mao's thoughts which could not become a sports policy or system in the New China. Therefore, China learned sport from Soviet experience which was one of options open to it at the early stage. However, Mao questioned the Soviet model and ambitiously aimed to overtake the capitalist West in a short time as part of the radical Great Leap Forward in 1957. During the Great Leap Forward, sport was set back on account of the tendency to report untruthfully, to over-ambitions, exaggeration and formalism. On the other hand, the disaster of famine caused by the Great Leap Forward also influenced sports development. During the pre-Cultural Revolution period from 1963 to 1966, both elite and mass sports developed while "revisionist", "counterrevolutionary" and "capitalist roader" views still held political sway in the Party.

Mao's restless quest for revolutionary purity in a post revolutionary age provided the motivation for the Cultural Revolution. From a number of viewpoints the Cultural Revolution was the

greatest disaster and tragedy in Chinese history. Sports development was damaged and sports officials suffered both mentally and physically. Sports were supported and restored by Zhou Enlai in 1970 when China sought to end its diplomatic isolation. But sports suffered a setback again when the "Gang of Four" took over the sports system during the period 1974-1976. Sports were brought out of chaos in 1976 which marked the end of Maoist era. To sum up, during the Maoist era 1949-1976, sports development went through three stages:

(i) Mao built a new China and tried to establish a New physical culture, 1949-1957;

(ii) during the Great Leap Forward and the Socialist Education Movement, China established a nationwide system to promote sports, 1957-1966; and

(iii) in the Cultural Revolution, sports were discontinued twice—1966-1969 and 1974-1976.

Mao's death marked the end of an era in modern Chinese history, but his legacy was an ambivalent one. In fact, from 1 October 1949, when Mao declared "the Chinese people have stood up", the Chinese people fell blindly into a mood of self-confidence and felt proud of the New China. That tended to push China into two high political fevers: the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The Great Leap Forward did not attain its economic targets, but it brought the Chinese people to follow a cult with only one aspiration—Mao's socialism. Later the Cultural Revolution transformed the country into another cult which brought a crisis in politics, the economy and culture over a period of ten years. Indeed, after the failure of Mao's Socialism and the Cultural Revolution, China sought radical change in sport. Sport became one of the most important cultural phenomena and activities as the cult gradually subsided in the post-Mao era after 1978. Following the radical process of China's modernisation, Chinese sports development entered a new era of postcolonialism.

CHAPTER SIX: SPORT, POSTCOLONIALISM AND CHINA'S REFORMS 1978-1993

Sport in China since 1978 entered another period of transformation and change. It has been subject to an increased exposure from Western researchers (Brownell, 1995 and 2000; Fan Hong, 1996; Knuttgen, Ma and Wu, 1990; Riordan and Jones, 1999). Central to some of the most recent interventions has been the suggestion that China has entered a period of neo-coloniality or postcoloniality. A number of writers have been critical of Western universalism as a basis for explaining non-Western problems (Bhabha, 1994; Said, 1993, 1995; Spivak, 1987, 1990; JanMohamed, 1985). Said has been critical of what he saw as cults such as post-modernism, discourse analysis, new historicism, deconstruction, neo-pragmatism, all of which afford an astonishing sense of weightlessness with regard to the importance of non-Western history (Said, 1993: 366-367). Although this study is deliberately eclectic, if there is a single strand running through this analysis it is to recall Said's attention to the historically variable, complex and distinct set of processes at play in imperial and colonial articulations of the non-Western world. Following on from the work of Said (1993 and 1995) which has made a significant and sustained contribution to the debate of postcolonialism, the argument at the heart of this chapter is that the analysis of the development of sport in Modern China continues to be heavily influenced by Western thought. The issues outlined in this chapter emphasize the extent to which sport in China has developed under postcolonialism since at least the 1980s. This provides the context for a discussion of sport and postcolonialism in Modern China.

The social development and change of China have been analysed by a number of writers since the post-1978 reforms. Some arguments (Wang, 1997: 33-47; Xie, 1997: 7-19; Zhao, 1998: 137-156) advocate that China has entered a period of neo-coloniality and postcoloniality after the open policy of the 1980s. Among some arguments, there has been little or no discussion of sport development in China. On the other hand, some writers have reproduced Western thought in representations of sport in China. Therefore, it is crucial to emphasis how sport has been developing under the vivid influence of postcolonialism in China since the 1980s. This chapter will consider how sport has developed in the early reform and illustrate how sport and Chinese reform during the postcolonial era are inextricably linked. I will critically evaluate China's international sporting relations. In particular, the impact of the Chinese Nationalists (about one and a half million people) who fled to Taiwan and re-created a network of national political institutions in Taiwan after 1949. The issue of the two "Chinas" has not only

created different sports under separate governments, but it has also posed a problem to many sport organizations in their efforts to promote international sport in the postcolonial world.

Sport and Early Reforms from 1978 to 1989

Sport underwent dramatic changes during the early stages of reform under Deng Xiaoping. Following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, Deng reversed the course of the Maoist model of revolution and introduced socialist reforms which had particular Chinese characteristics. At the Third Plenum, Deng claimed that emancipating the mind was a vital political task, democracy was a major pre-condition for emancipating the mind, solving old problems and would help people look to the future (Deng, 1984: 151-165). Under Deng's guidelines, multinational capital and postmodernist culture had made a significant impact upon both the Chinese mode of production and communist ideology since the beginning of the 1980s.

After the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping advocated reform policies and socialism which had specific Chinese characteristics. The criticism of Mao and Maoism, and the establishment of an alternative, moved rapidly. While the CCP attacked the mistakes of "Gang of Four", it also could not deny the historical facts that Mao Zedong made mistakes during the decade of the Cultural Revolution. However, Deng Xiaoping believed that Mao Zedong Thought was a matter of great concern for the CCP and it was important to affirm the historical role of Comrade Mao Zedong. In "Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People's Republic of China", he noted that:

> The appraisal of Comrade Mao Zedong and the exposition of Mao Zedong Thought relate not only to Comrade Mao personally but also to the entire history of our Party and our country... Mao Zedong Thought was set as the guiding thought for our whole Party at its Seventh National Congress. The party educated an entire generation in Mao Zedong Thought, and that is what enabled us to win the revolutionary war and found the People's Republic of China. The "Cultural Revolution" was really a gross error... Now, when we speak of setting things right, we mean that we should undo the damage done by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, criticize the mistakes Comrade Mao Zedong made in his later years, and put things back on the right track of Mao Zedong Thought. In short, if we fail to include in the resolution a section concerning Mao Zedong Thought, which, since it has been proved correct in practice, ought to serve as the guideline for our future work, we will diminish the practical and historical significance of the revolution and construction we have engaged in and will continue to engage in. It would be a grave historical mistake not to expound Mao Zedong Thought in the resolution or to cease to adhere to it (Deng, 1984: 285-286).

Deng's speech addressed certain historical questions relating to the founding of People's Republic of China. Deng insisted upon maintaining four cardinal principles during the reform: (i)

keeping to a socialist road; (ii) upholding the people's democratic dictatorship; (iii) upholding leadership by the Communist Party; and (iv) upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought (Deng, 1984: 339). The core of these cardinal principles was aimed at upholding the Communist Party's leadership. Officially labelled as a "revolutionary in administrative structure: but not against any person", the bureaucratic reforms had two ostensive and one hidden objective (*Daily Report*, 9 March 1982: 4). The first was to upgrade the quality of the cadre corps by making them "revolutionary, better educated, professionally competent and younger in age"—the "Four Transformations"—so that it could lead China towards the product of "Four Modernization". Another objective was to streamline unruly bureaucracy by reducing the size of the cadres, devising rational division of work, and clearly defining the authority of Deng Xiaoping's reform line by promoting the key political positions held by those cadres whose personal interests were tied to the reforms. He employed a bureaucratic approach toward bureaucratic problems. In sport reform, therefore, the CCP's leadership was viewed as a crucial part of reform. In order to uphold the CCP's leadership in sport organizations, reform of sport administration was one of the first steps forward.

Wang Meng was restored to his position as the minister of the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission in 1977. The State Physical Culture and Sports Commission of China held a national sports meeting in 1978. This meeting not only influenced Mao Zedong's thought as a guideline, but also clarified a few of the key questions facing sport namely: to persist with the CCP's leadership in sports; to persist with the combination of popularised and promoted policy; to develop sports competition; to approach the top level of sports technique; to develop international diplomatic relations through sports; to insist on reasonable regulations of sports system and to establish a "red and expert" line of sports teams (State Physical Culture and Sports Commission Policy Research Centre, 1982: 122-131). After this meeting, in an interview of the Central People's Broadcasting Station, Wang Meng outlined five important sporting measures:

> First, we must continually attack "Gang of Four" and their absurd statement on the former sport leaders as the "third generation of revisionists". In order to restore sport leaders, we firmly swept off those disciples of "Gang of Four" in the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission and sports organisations... Second, we must develop mass sports and the competition of socialism... Third, we shall establish a close training system between different levels from junior level... Fourth, we shall reform and improve our sports with techniques... Fifth, we shall restore sports organizations and built up a reasonable regulation of sports system (*New Physical Culture*, No. 2, 5 February 1978: 4-6).

Wang's statement provided the guidelines for sport reform and reaffirmed a united front on sports policy after the Cultural Revolution. In particular, sport had its own political function, the

essential work of sport was to promote socialist thought and develop Olympic sporting events (Figure 20). China began to pay serious attention to sports after the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games in which China sent both the largest communist team and a delegation headed by Wei Zhenlan to learn from the Los Angeles Organizing Committee "how to make sport pay". It was not only that China learned that sport could be a profit-making institution (Riordan, 1991: 6), but also that sport could motivate Chinese nationalism. In particular, the success of Chinese teams aroused Chinese nationalism at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. It was the first step for Chinese sport to "break out of Asia and advance into the world". The Chinese government approved two documents in 1984 and 1986 forward sporting reform.

The first document was that the central government of CCP dispatch with "A notification about moving further ahead in sports development" to all sport officers on the 5th October 1984. A number of crucial points were confirmed. First of all, Chinese sports developed well in 1980s, the great achievement of Chinese sportsmen at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games which proved that Chinese sports was approaching world levels and that this promoted Chinese national pride and self-confidence. It also aroused world wide Chinese patriotism in support of China. Second, while Chinese sport may have developed, there was still a gap at the top level of world sport. In order to reduce the difference, China promoted a popularising and improving sport policy. The measures of this policy were to: (i) positively develop both rural and urban physical activities; (ii) work hard on promoting people's health; (iii) train junior children in the school; (iv) improve training and competition systems and developing scientific training research; and (v) focus upon developing Chinese excellence of sporting events (*Tiyu Bao*, 10 November 1984: 1; *Xinhua Yuebao*, November 1984: 104-105).

The document indicated that the state should establish a sport team of "Redness and Expertness" with an excellent athlete and coach team. Furthermore, the state should encourage excellence by rewarding athletes with honour. In particular, a special achievement in sport should be awarded with a high prize fund. Retired excellent athletes should be encouraged to get jobs in higher education as sport academics. It was suggested the budget for sport should be increased. Furthermore, it was necessary to strengthen sport propaganda promoting the positive function of sport in socialist material and cultural civilization, popularising sport knowledge and attracting the masses to join physical activities. This propaganda promoted the education of patriotism, collectivism, socialism and communism through sports achievement. Finally, at all levels of the Chinese Communist Party's

committee there should be an underlying attempt to provide leadership in sport development (*Tiyu Bao*, 10 November 1984: 1; *Xinhua Yuebao*, November 1984: 104-105).

The political functions of sports were highlighted in this document. In particular, sport should help to build socialist material and cultural civilization. Athletes, coaches, referees and sports workers should be educated as socialists with ideas, high moral standards, cultural knowledge and discipline which were to be imbued with patriotism, collectivism, socialism and communism. However, there were still some problems with these reforms. The State Physical Culture and Sports Commission had researched and discussed the issue of China's sport development. A few problems were highlighted: (i) Chinese sport levels of achievement still had a big gap with advanced countries; (ii) although sports development was still influenced by leftist thought there were conservative weaknesses in terms of sport leadership, training and systems of competition; (iii) sport reform did not catch up the pace of economy reform; (iv) the core of sport system did not change under the reform policy and (v) sport system needed a great reform picture and union thought in the future reform.

In order to achieve the sport policies and attain the national target of becoming a super state of sport, therefore, the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission persisted its reform policy and certified the second document "A draft about decision for reforming the sports system" which was passed on the 15th April 1986. This draft policy contained some aspects of sport reform: (i) improving the sport leadership and confirming the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission's leadership, coordination and supervision; (ii) establishing a scientific training system; (iii) improving sport competition system continually; (iv) enhancing the Chinese traditional indigenous sports; (v) approaching sport scientific research gradually; (vi) reforming sport and physical education system; (vii) enhancing political thought on sport; (viii) improving the sport prize system and (ix) developing flexible open polices in international sports (*Tiyu Bao*, 17 March 1986: 1).

The period between 1978 and 1989 marked a very distinctive stage in the development of sport. It was a stage during which China questioned most of the basic elements of Maoism and sought a new form of political authority, economic activity, social organization and cultural expression. It had been undergoing a basic transformation of a society's state and class structures. Sports reform became a part of this reform. In particular, the CCP's leadership in the reform of the sports system reform and the Olympic sports development were the priority for sports. During the first decade of Deng's reform, impulses for structural reform of the polity and the economy tended to ebb and flow. The movement of

1989 drew the decade to a close, it became clear that economic change had advanced faster than political change.

Nonetheless, sports reform still had full support from the government. The 1990 Asia Games in Beijing, for example, were a major political and social event for China. The government dominated the television and news coverage and sought to use the Games to boost morale and confidence in the wake of the disaster of 1989. China did well in terms of medals far better than other countries. Chinese people were enthusiastic about the Games, in particular, the opening and closing ceremonies. Even people who expressed anti-government views seemed to be very proud of the Games. Thus, an implication of the Asia Games was that China wished to convince the world of its intention to continue and even expand to policies of reform, a message Chinese leaders took many opportunities to spread as Jiang Zemin claimed that China would "set up the process of reform and opening up to the outside world" (*China Daily*, 18 October 1990: 1). Consequently, sports reform has gradually progressed to a period of postcolonialism in China after about 1989.

Sport, Postcolonialism and the Process of Reform in the 1990s

The notion of postcolonialism can be used in different ways in different contexts. It reflects contingent historical, cultural and geographical conditions. It offers ways of thinking across the differences to global and transnational operations, such as multinational capitalism and American military aggression which may display itself in many disparate locations. Postcolonialism has an inseparable relationship with the expansion of Western capitalism and imperialism. According to some, postcolonialism services the requirements of Western capitalism in its contemporary global and multinational operations just as surely as colonialism served capitalism in an earlier period (McLeod, 2000: 254-255).

In China, sport has been widely promoted following the spread of capitalism after about 1978. The development of sport has come with political change. For example, the famous "Ping-Pong Diplomacy" that was coined when the United Sates of America took a team of table tennis players to China during Richard Nixon's historic visit in 1972. Since then China has been gradually opening her doors and improving Sino-Western relations through sport. On the other hand, Western capitalists have set up sports-related businesses in China since at least the 1980s. These include Trans World International (IMG/TWI) in sports televison programme, News Corporation in broadcasting, Nike and

Adidas in sporting goods, and some multinational sport sponsors especially from tobacco, beverages and communications, such as Philip Morris, British American Tobacco, Coca-Cola and Ericsson.

Soccer is now acknowledged as the number one sport in China (Glendinning, 1999: 20-21). The 14-club premier league has been sponsored by Marlboro, an event which could not have happened in the West. The Chinese FA cup competition has been sponsored by Philips, and the league has also attracted sponsorships offering perimeter board exclusivity from Budweiser, Clarion, Canon, Erricson, Ford, Pepsi, Samsung, Fuji Film, General Moters, JVC, Korean Air, Olympus, Santafe and Vinda (a Chinese paper manifacturer). Soccers dominance is only a recent development, and in team sport it is competing with basketball, in particular, in the minds of Chinese consumers. Basketball was popular throughout 1990s; NBA basketball was popular and Michael Jordan was recently voted the "Greatest Man in the World" by Chinese students. Recognition of the NBA brand logo among Chinese teenagers is over 79 per cent (Glendinning, 1999: 20-21).

In this postcolonial context, the development of global capitalism in China is similar to Ahmad's (1995: 1-20) description of the economic and social situation in some Third World countries. Ahmad points out that "we should speak not so much of colonialism or postcolonialism but of capitalist modernity, which takes the colonial form in particular places and at particular times". According to Ahmad, the contemporary global economic situation can be seen as a neo-colonial condition. Multi-national capitalist companies are increasingly able to expand their new territories easily in China. Western sports media bypass national borders and transmit Western ideologies and desires for Western cultural products direct to the Chinese people. It is recognised that Western capitalism as a form of neocolonialism has been successfully changing China's economy, culture and society.

The idea of the nation emerged with the growth of Western capitalism and industrialism and was a fundamental component of imperialist expansion. The issue of nationalism as discussed by Frantz Fanon is an important marker in the field of postcolonialism. As Fanon's work contends, sport could have played an important role in the construction of a national consciousness in Modern China (Fanon, 1990: 27-29 and 166-199). The People's Republic of China (PRC), in the decade following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, experienced a cultural and ideological transformation unprecedented in the history of communist societies. Sport, like the arts, is a political subculture that expresses prevailing ideological trends and, for this reason, the new modernization in China necessitates a new ideological interpretation of sport. Contrary to appearances, the ideological content of the Maoist sport doctrine has

actually been retained in post-Maoist sport ideology. What has changed is the relative degree of emphasis accorded to four specific ideological elements, which consist of competition, high-performance sport, sporting ethics, and scientific sport (Hoberman, 1987: 156-170). Under these four primary ideological elements, China seeks to "break out of Asia and advance into the world" and this gives a strong political purpose to Chinese nationalism in the international arena. Accordingly, we may see hybridity and ambivalence of sports development in China. For instance, Chinese leaders intend to appropriate Western sports as a tool to promote Chinese nationalism against Western imperialism. At the same time, they also resist Western culture in fear of enhancing the Western idea of democracy. More recently, for example, after NATO's mistake in bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 8 May 1999, the Chinese government temporarily banned NBA basketball games on television as a strong protest at the bombing.

Though one criticism of postcolonialism is it's lack of attention to the problem of class, Spivak's work *Can the Subaltern Speak?* may be seen as one of the few relative postcolonial discussions on the issues of class and feminism by postcolonialists. As Spivak argues on the question of the subaltern in India:

> Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just well say the silent, silenced centre) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat... On the other side of the question of the international division of labour from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak?... If, in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow (Spivak, 1995: 25-28).

Similarly, the voice of the Chinese subaltern class and women has been disregarded during China's economic boom over last two decades or more. Mass sports development has been ignored and limited because of a lack of access to sports facilities. Among the reasons for the lack of sports facilities in China are: (i) the Chinese government did not pay attention to building sports facilities in public places; (ii) the rate of increase of population was much greater than the rate of increase of building sport facilities; (iii) most sports facilities in sports committee systems have often been closed to the public; (iv) some sports halls are used only for competition; (v) school sports facilities have not been actively used by local residents; and (vi) a large number of sports facilities were swallowed up by factories and enterprises. Some activities which require a low skill level and few facilities (such as walks, running, traditional Chinese exercises, disco dancing etc.), remain the most frequent and popular forms of physical activity (Wang and Olson, 1997: 69-85). *Qigong* has become one of the most popular

mass sports in recent years. It is one of oldest Chinese ancient physical fitness and breathing exercises which can be traced back to at least the Spring and Autumn period of 770-476 BC. Throughout Chinese history *qigong* has been considered an important means of curing diseases, prolonging life, and improving the skills of participants in *wushu* (martial arts).

A very special case of *qigong*, in Beijing on 25 April 1999, was when more than 10,000 members of Falun Gong (the way of the Law Wheel or Buddhist Law Cult) staged the largest silent demonstration since the student democracy movement of 1989. The Falun Gong protesters were angry because a number of cult members had been arrested in Tianjin; they also wanted to claim their existence as a legal organisation. The leader of Falun Gong, Master Li Hongzhi said that Falun Gong was based on the belief that human beings can harness their *qi* (vital energy) by meditation and physical exercise. The Falun Gong spokesman also claimed that they have about 70 millions members in China and another 30 million or more elsewhere (the Chinese Communist Party has 60 millions). However, the state body in charge of *qigong* claimed that Falun Gong cannot be officially recognised (*The Economist*, 1 May 1999: 83-84; *The Guardian*, 26 April 1999: 13). On 28 April 1999, the government stated that "This kind of gathering affects public order...and is completely wrong". Punishment, it said, would await those who "damage social stability under the pretext of practising martial arts". The Chinese government banned citizens' practising Falun Gong in the public area of Beijing, with effect from 5:00am on 26 June 1999 (*Central Daily News*, 29 June 1999: 7).

There are several reasons to explain why Chinese citizens practise Falun Gong. First, Falun Gong followers believe *qigong* can fulfil their wish to enjoy good health. Second, the cult advocates truth, goodness and patience, which meet the need of those seeking moral and spiritual life. Last, Falun Gong followers practise *qigong* collectively, allowing them to make friends. If such needs of Chinese citizens can be satisfied by other means, Falun Gong would not have spread so quickly. Falun Gong is even practised by government officials, party members and intellectuals. Li's charisma is only one of the factors that encourage the common people to join the cult. In China, more and more workers have been laid off since the government began to restructure the economy, the health care system is in poor shape, and traditional values have collapsed. Many people feel empty and crave for support and consolation. With such material and spiritual problems, Falun Gong has spread like a prairie fire started by a single spark (*Ming Pao Daily News*, 23 July 1999: A2, A13-15 and 24 July 1999: A2-A4). Unless these problems are solved, though Falun Gong organisations have been outlawed, similar groups will

sooner or later appear. It is impossible to prevent people from having material and spiritual needs by enforcing strict laws or imposing severe punishment. Sport in Modern China contributes to this process.

Postcolonialism can recognise the continuing agency of colonial discourses and relationships of power in the contemporary world in various contexts. This study has been critical of existing texts on Chinese sport and pointed out that researches of sport scholars have been influenced by Western discourse. Said's argument is that Western views of the Orient are not based on what is observed in Oriental lands, but often on Western dreams, fantasies and assumptions that this radically different, contrasting place contains (McLeod, 2000: 41). While this thesis has discussed Chinese sport and postcolonialism, it might be insightful to provide an illustrative example of the equivalent of Orientalism in the Chinese context as it appears in the imaginary psyche of Western sport authorities and media.

A recent study by Darcy C. Plymire (1999: 155-173) concludes that, from the evidence of athletics drug tests, there is no single group that is innocent and not a single group which is to blame for the problem. Drug use is a common problem in Western athletics. It will not disappear by blaming the Chinese and the other communist nations. It is possible that Western sports communities unfairly discredit Chinese athletes and coaches. Plymire argues that when the PRC's women set a number of world records in track and field events in 1993, some Western journalists insisted that Chinese women could only have succeeded by taking steroids. Furthermore, Plymire (1999: 169) points out some unsubstantiated assumptions about Chinese women within Western track and field communities. These are as follows:

1. Women are naturally unable to run as fast as Chinese women have done
2. Steroids make Chinese women more like men and so allow them to run unnaturally fast
3. Women from communist countries are more likely to use steroids than women from Western nations
4. Women from communist nations are compelled by state supported sports "machines" to take steroids
5. The Chinese are incapable of developing a knowledge of the human body and its potential that is superior to that produced in the West
6. The Chinese must be using illicit knowledge gleaned from the East German sport "machine".

Based on this logic of Western imagination, the conclusion is clear. Chinese women have borrowed (or stolen) scientific and technical knowledge of the West (represented by steroids) and have used it in illegitimate ways to produce unnatural performances. Plymire's argument has vividly exposed stereotypes of Chinese people that are produced and reproduced by the West. Particularly,

some American images portray Chinese men as small, weak, cowardly, sensual and deceitful. Furthermore, the characters of Chinese people in American films are frequently clumsy, ugly, greasy, loud, stupid, slant-eyed, stereotypical, squawking Chinese bad guys. Chinese athletes, in particular Chinese women certainly would not fit the images of American people (Plymire, 1999: 161).

The subject matter of this initial discussion on the postcolonial issue of global capitalism, class and Orientalism concerns itself with the development of sport in China and, in particular, China's relationship with the West. As a focus of analysis, Chinese sport is capable of providing a great deal of information about history and social development itself, since one of the central tenets of thought throughout this section is that sport both contributes to and is constitutive of Chinese culture. Sport does not exist in some social or historical vacuum isolated from Chinese history and social development. Since the core theme of this analysis is sport and postcolonialism in China, it is insightful to discuss Chinese national identity and Olympic games in the postcolonial world.

National Identity and the Olympic Games in the Postcolonial World

National identity has become one of most important modes of sporting organisation in the postcolonial world. Sport is frequently viewed as a vehicle for the expression of nationalist sentiment to the extent that politicians are all too willing to harness it for such disparate, even antithetical, purposes as nation building, promoting the nation-state, or giving cultural power to separatist movements (Bairner, 2001: xi). In the postcolonial world, sports in the People's Republic of China (PRC) have been isolated by Western sporting organizations since at least 1949. In particular, after an absence of 32 years, the PRC returned to the Los Angeles Olympic Games in August 1984 which was the first time both the PRC and Taiwan took part in the same games in Olympic history. The issues of "two Chinas" in international sport has been problematic to many sport organizations since the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang—KMT) fled to Taiwan in 1949. What is the "two Chinas" issue? And how does it affect Chinese sports development in the postcolonial world? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to go through the history of PRC's relations with Taiwan and international sporting organizations and subsequently provide a proper postcolonial examination.

The "two Chinas" issue in sports was a political issue caused by the Chinese civil war whereby following the Chinese Communist defeat the Chinese nationalists fled to Taiwan in 1949. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established a new China in the name of the

People's Republic of China (PRC) and the KMT reformed on Taiwan in the name of the Republic of China (ROC) which was established in China by the first leader of the KMT Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911. Thereafter, the political conflicts between the PRC and ROC brought the "two Chinas" issue into international sporting organizations and competitions. In particular, this issue affected the Olympic movement. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) formula was devised to solve the "two Chinas" issue, since both the PRC and Taiwan claimed to be the sole legitimate representative for China. Therefore, "Two Chinas" issue can be seen as a conflict of national identities which originally was created by both CCP and KMT after 1949.

China's relations with the IOC started in the early of 20th century when China was under the government ROC. China's National Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF) was recognised by the IOC as the national Olympic committee in 1924. Before 1949, China under the ROC participated in the 1932 Los Angeles, 1936 Berlin and 1948 London Olympics. In 1949, most of the Olympic committee members fled to Taiwan with the ROC government, maintained contact with the IOC and claimed jurisdiction over Olympic affairs both in the mainland and Taiwan. However, ROC's claim was challenged by the PRC, since the CNAAF was still based in Nanjing and it was reorganized and renamed in October 1949 as All-China Athletic Federation (ACAF) which claimed its jurisdiction over all Chinese Olympic activities. These contradictory claims by the PRC and Taiwan produced conflicts between the PRC, Taiwan and IOC in the later years.

The PRC had no communication with the IOC until February 1952, when ACAF sent a message to the IOC expressing its wish to participate in the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. The IOC was put in a difficult position, since Taiwan was also prepared to take part the games. However, according to the IOC rule, only one national committee was permitted to represent a country and there were differences of opinion among IOC members as to which Chinese committee should be recognised. Neither the PRC or Taiwan was willing to negotiate or to form a single team. After much internal debate, the IOC adopted a proposal permitting both committees to participate in those events in which they had been recognised by the respective international sport federations. Taiwan was disappointed in the IOC resolution and withdrew from the 1952 Helsinki Olympics to demonstrate its opposition. 1952 was the first time athletes from mainland China participated in the Olympics under the PRC government.

In 1954, the PRC under the name of the Olympic Committee of the Chinese Republic was formally recognized as a member of IOC. Later, this name was changed to the Olympic Committee of the People's Democratic Republic of China in 1957 (*Olympic Review*, No. 66-67, May-June 1973: 172-173). At the same time, Taiwan was recognised under the name of the Chinese Olympic Committee. Therefore, a "two Chinas" situation was created in the Olympic movement. At the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, both the PRC and Taiwan were invited to take part. The PRC quit the games in protest against Taiwan's participation and continued to demand the expulsion of Taiwan after the games. Avery Brundage, then the president of IOC, in a letter of 8 January 1958 to Beijing stated that:

> Everyone knows that there is a separate government in Taiwan which is recognised internationally and specifically by the United Nations, consisting of the government of the world. Your government is not recognised by the United Nations (*Olympic Review*, No. 145, November 1979: 628).

The PRC disappointed over the representation issue withdrew its membership from the IOC and nine other international sporting organizations in protest against the "two Chinas" policy in 1958. During the 1960s, there was hardly any contact between the PRC and IOC or other sporting organizations. As a result, Taiwan was able to claim representation on behalf of all China in international sports. However, it was not long until October 1971 when the PRC was admitted to the United Nations and the ROC (Taiwan) was expelled. This event helped PRC's participation in international organizations and in its relations with the IOC. The PRC applied to rejoin the IOC in 1975 and got its admission to the IOC under the IOC formula in 1979. Since then the PRC has taken an active part in Olympic activities.

Why did the PRC return to the international sporting organizations and how did it overcome the "two Chinas" issue in the 1970s? While the whole of China fell into chaos during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, most sports training and competitive systems were dismantled, many sports officials and athletes were attacked, sport academies closed, and sports equipment and facilities neglected or destroyed. It was not only a disaster for Chinese society but also for the development of sport. This situation began to change when China rejoined international table tennis competition at the Scandinavian Open Championship in Sweden on 26 November 1970—the first time Chinese teams had gone aboard for international competition since the Cultural Revolution (*The Times*, 27,28 and 30 November 1970). Later China was invited to join the 31st World Table Tennis Championship in Japan in March-April 1971. Mao agreed with Premier Zhou Enlai's suggestion to send the Chinese table tennis team to Japan with the famous slogan "Friendship first, competition second" and Mao said: "We

shall join this competition. We must not be afraid to bear hardship. We must not be nervous and scared" (Li, 1994: 535; Wu 1999: 238). It was the beginning of China's "Ping Pong Diplomacy".

After 1970 Mao changed his sport policy. In particular the US table tennis team was invited to play in China in 1971, which was the first officially sanctioned Sino-American cultural exchange in almost twenty years. Mao increasingly regarded Soviet hegemony as the greatest threat to China following the border clashes of 1969 between Chinese and Soviet troops on China's north-eastern frontier. Mao considered that a tactical accommodation with the USA would be less of a threat than the Soviet Union. Mao's changing attitude was reflected in Premier Zhou Enlai's call for peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between states with different social systems. Accordingly Chinese sports became a useful vehicle to make contact with the USA.

The PRC was invited to send an observer delegation to the 1972 Munich Games. The secretary-general of the All-China Sports Federation, Song Zhong, turned down the invitation because of the participation of Taiwan in the games. China could not tolerate a "two Chinas" or a "one China, one Taiwan" situation (*Beijing Review*, Volume 15, No. 35, 1 September 1972: 23). However, this invitation improved the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the PRC and later they established full diplomatic relations in October 1972. In the early part of 1973, The Japanese Olympic Committee, in line with its government's policy, suggested to various international sport federations and national Olympic committees to reinstate China as a member and expel Taiwan (*The Times*, 13 February 1973: 14). In April 1973, Willi Daume, the West German vice-president of the IOC, went to Beijing to discuss the possibility of China's rejoining the Olympic movement (*The New York Times*, 22 March 1973: 61). Daume was told that China would not be prepared to rejoin the IOC as long as Taiwan was in this organization. At the same time, however, China made progress to achieve Olympic recognition.

This was an important step towards China's admission in 1973 when the Asian Games Federation voted to admit the PRC and to exclude Taiwan from the Asian Games in Teheran. Thereafter, more federations recognised the PRC. In April 1975, the PRC made a formal application to rejoin the IOC. Its condition of entry was that Taiwan must be expelled from the IOC and the All-China Sports Federation must be affirmed to be the sole sports organization representing the whole China. Beijing regarded the existing relationship between the PRC and the IOC as abnormal and unjust after

the PRC became a member of the United Nations (UN) while Taiwan was not (*Beijing Review*, Volume 18, No. 23, 6 June 1975: 17).

At the 1976 Montreal Olympics, the PRC requested Canada to bar unconditionally the entry of the Taiwanese delegation to Montreal. Instead, the Canadian government required Taiwanese athletes to compete without any reference to the word "China" or the "Republic of China". The IOC considered the Canadian action to be a breach of its promise, which was made in 1970 when Montreal was chosen as the venue, that no any recognised member country could be denied entrance (Espy, 1979: 152). To avoid further confrontation with the Canadian government, the IOC submitted a plan that Taiwan should be allowed to march as "Taiwan-ROC" behind a flag bearing the Olympic rings. This solution drew opposition from both the PRC and Taiwan. The PRC indicated that ROC was only an abbreviation for the title "Republic of China" and to adopt it would be to play the old trick of "two Chinas". On the other hand, Taiwan insisted on marching and competing under its own flag and name—Republic of China.

China continued to maintain that there was one China not "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". It refused to accept any situation in which Taiwan would be recognised. To seek a solution to the dilemma, the IOC president, Lord Killanin, tried to arrange a meeting between China, Taiwan and the IOC in 1979. Taiwan's refusal to enter into direct negotiation with China, pushed the IOC and PRC to work together for a solution without consulting Taiwan. At the Montevideo meeting of the IOC in April 1979, the plenary session passed a resolution to recognise the Chinese Olympic committee located in Beijing and to maintain recognition of the Chinese Olympic committee located in Taipei. The resolution stipulated matters of names, anthems, flags and constitutions of the two committees. In the meeting, Song Zhong claimed that:

> The resolution passed... as it now stands, is unacceptable to us. We hereby reaffirm that there is one China, that is, the People's Republic of China. And that Taiwan is part of China. The only way to solve the problem of China's representation is to recognise China's Olympic Committee as the national Olympic committee of the whole of China. As an interim arrangement, the sports organization in Taiwan may remain in the IOC bearing the name of "China Taiwan Olympic Committee", but it must not use any of the emblems of the so-called "Republic of China". We shall only accept solutions compatible with above-stated conditions (*Daily Report*, 9 April 1979: K1).

Song's statement indicated that China would not allow Taiwan to use any name associated with the "Republic of China" or to use Chinese Olympic Committee—Taipei which would apply equal state status as China (Chinese Olympic Committee—Beijing). The only solution was that Taiwan must be under the name of China and as part of China. Later Song called a press conference in Beijing and

repeated China's objection to the resolution, saying that it was tantamount to China's acceptance of the idea of "two Chinas". Song laid down two necessary condition: first, China's Olympic committee had to be recognised as the sole legitimate Chinese organization in the IOC; and second, the IOC should forbid the use of the state name, national flag and anthem of the "Republic of China".

In June 1979, the IOC executive committee meeting in Puerto Rico confirmed China's Olympic committee's title as the "Chinese Olympic Committee". It also recommended that Taiwan should stay in the IOC as the "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee" with a different national anthem and flag. At the IOC executive board meeting in Nagoya, Lord Killanin submitted a resolution to 89 IOC members for a postal vote on 26 October 1979. According the resolution, the national Olympic committee of the PRC would be named the "Chinese Olympic Committee" and it would use the flag and anthem of the PRC. The Olympic committee of Taiwan would be named the "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee" and its anthem, flag and emblem would be other than those used and would have to be approved by the executive board of the IOC. China welcomed the result of voting, claimed that the resolution took into the basic fact that there was only one China and Taiwan was a part of China (*Xinhua Yuebao*, December 1979: 111).

Taiwan was saddened by the IOC decision. Taipei's Olympic committee and Henry Hsu, an IOC member from Taiwan, filed lawsuits at the Lausanne Civil District Court against the Nagoya resolution and claimed that it violated IOC rules. Taipei's Olympic committee's claim was rejected by the court and the ruling Judge Pierre Bucher said that it seems already very obvious that Taipei's Olympic committee had no right to present a suit against the IOC (*Daily Report*, 17 January 1980: A2). The new IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch sent a letter dated 4 December 1980 to Hsu and guaranteed that Taipei's Olympic Committee would get the same treatment as any other national committee if Taiwan accepted the condition of Nagoya resolution (Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, 1981: 5-10). Afterwards, Taipei Olympic Committee agreed to change its name to the "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee" and to adopt a new flag and emblem. According to the agreement, the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee was entitled to participate in future Olympic Games and other activities sponsored by the IOC like every national Olympic committee with same status and the same rights (*Olympic Review*, No. 162, April 1981: 211).

Temporally, the question of the Chinese representation was settled. To the PRC, there was no "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". Taiwan was subsumed under China—it was suggested by

the names of the two Chinese Olympic committee. The outcome helped to facilitate communication between China and Taiwan through sport and was conducive to the process of reunification. To Taiwan, there was no option but to accept the resolution if it wished to stay in the Olympic movement. To the IOC, the resolution had settled one of the biggest problems over the past twenty years. Thereafter, the IOC formula became the solution to other international sporting organizations as well.

By way of summary, in 1979 China rejoined the International Olympic Committee (IOC) after an eleven year absence following an unsatisfactory resolution of the "Two Chinas Problem". Beijing hosted the Asia Games in 1990 but lost the right to host the 2000 Olympic Games. China has won a bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. The increasing importance of sport in China reflects the international importance of the Olympic Movement. In China, sport has been fought over by many different groups and it is relatively easy to demonstrate sport's role in promoting Chinese nationalism and its importance to the power elite. Under this inflexible ideology of Chinese centrism (Sinocentrism) Taiwan is regarded as part of China. China bans the Taiwanese from using their official national name, flag and anthem in all international competitions. Since 1984, Taiwanese athletes have competed under the name of "Chinese Taipei" in international arenas, but the Chinese domestic media consistently name Taiwanese sport teams as "Taipei China". The sports relationships between China and Taiwan can be critically viewed as a symbol of Chinese internal imperialism and hegemony. Today, the majority of Taiwanese people continue to resist attempts by China to promote unification under the Chinese official nationalist slogan of "one country, two systems".

Chinese official nationalism involved the imposition of cultural homogeneity from the top through state action. One of the Chinese official actions is to force Taiwanese sports organisations to accept that the PRC is the only central government and that Taiwan is merely a provincial state. Under the continuing threat of PRC, the Taiwanese people are struggling and searching for their own self-definitions, rather than be defined by the Chinese government. Therefore, to a certain degree the debate over the "two Chinas problem" has shifted to a debate on the "two nationalisms problem" through the notion of postcolonialism.

Summary

This chapter has attempted to situate the development of sport in the early reform from 1978 to 1989, the preliminary thoughts of sport and postcolonialism in the process of reform and the "two

Chinas" issue in the postcolonial world. The discussion has been organised around three areas. First, the priority of sports reform and in particular the CCP's leadership in sports, sports system reconstruction and Olympic sports development during the early stage of reform. Sports reform had the full support of government and has continually progressed to a postcolonial world after the movement of 1989. Sport not only has aroused Chinese nationalism and patriotism as in the 1990 Asia Games in Beijing, but it also has helped to re-establish contacts with the outside world following the international sanctions against China's Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. Second, the Chinese sports development in the postcolonial world has been analysed under three themes: (i) there are two types of postcolonialism within the Chinese context, one of which is Chinese internal imperialism and the other is Western imperialism; (ii) contemporary Chinese sports texts have been dominated by Western cultural hegemony and discourse; and (iii) Chinese sport as a unique social formation within the study of postcolonialism has presented different perspectives on economic, political, social and cultural issues. Finally, through the history of "two Chinas" issue and the IOC, it has been suggested that the "two Chinas" issue has shifted to a debate about "two nationalisms" issue under the notion of postcolonialism. To sum up, following China's Open Policy in 1978, sport has become one of the most effective mediums of Western economic and cultural imperialism. In Chinese postcolonial discourse, sport is not only a tool of the Chinese government in upholding Chinese nationalism against Western imperialism, but it is also an agent of postcolonialism in terms of Chinese cultural centrism. This has been occurring since at least 1978. Here in lies a contradiction within the problematic that is sport, postcolonialism and Modern China.

CONCLUSIONS

This work does not claim to provide a comprehensive theoretical discussion or a complete analysis of sport in modern China's social development. At a much more basic level this work has been concerned with: (i) providing a theoretically guided analysis of imperialism and postcolonialism; (ii) treating the analysis of sport as a tool of cultural imperialism; (iii) highlighting the development of Western sports and physical culture in modern China and (iv) establishing a contribution to an analysis of sport in China through the notions of imperialism and postcolonialism. Perhaps the relative strength and weakness of this work is that it has attempted to address the interrelated nature of all of these concerns.

More specifically this work has concerned itself with the development of sport and physical education in modern China. The research has attempted to illustrate throughout this study that the development of sport was involved in and did influence the modernization of China. The text has encompassed some of the most basic questions that might be asked concerning Chinese cultural identity, imperialism and postcolonialism. What is the relationship between Western sport and Western imperial system of education such as Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) in China? What is the relationship between sport and the Chinese Nationalist Government? Why did Western sport become popular after about 1895? What social forces have shaped these Western sports? Who have been the most powerful people within the complex web of interdependent configurations associated with the sport? What is the Chinese communist ideological view of physical culture? How was sports developed under the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution? What is the "two Chinas" issue in the international sports organisations? How has sport in China developed under the influence of postcolonialism since at least 1978?

Such questions have provided a basis for developing an analysis of sport which has revolved around four interrelated stages of development. The first stage of development lasted from 1860 until 1911. In this stage, The research has attempted to show the influence of Western cultural imperialism on the development of modern sports in China. The evidence indicates that Western sports were introduced to China through the agents of imperialism such as Western merchants, diplomats, teachers, soldiers and Western missionaries; and the emerging reformers at the time who were receptive to Western ideology. Reformers in China tried to halt the decline of the Chinese Empire by promoting the

adoption of Western methods, military drill being part of the programme, although this failed, it nonetheless moulded physical education in China into its contemporary structure. Finally, following the diffusion of the Western missionary school system and the YMCA, despite the collapse of the Chinese Empire in 1911, the development of sport in China continued to be influenced by Western Imperialism.

The second stage has looked at the development of modern sport from 1911 to 1949. There were four unique features affecting sport. First is the continuing influence of the YMCA as a vehicle of Western imperialism. The YMCA's influence on sport was declining when Chinese anti-foreign feeling spread over China after the May Thirtieth Incident of 1925. Second, during the debate about sport and nationalism between 1912 and 1927, martial arts became a part of P.E. in schools in an attempt to raise the Chinese national spirit. Martial arts also involved the ideology of standard competition and fair play taken from Western sports. Third, the development of sport under the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang—KMT) between 1928 and 1949, the first National P.E. law established the basis of a nationwide P.E. programme in China. The KMT used sport to promote feelings of nationalism and patriotism and also as a form of education. Fourth, between 1921 and 1949 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) combined sport with Mao's thought of physical culture, nationalism and Communist political action as a united front against imperialism and feudalism. Nationalism could be seen as the core theme of informing the development of sport during this stage.

The third stage of development emerged between 1949 and 1978. When the Communists came to power in 1949, Mao's notion of the "New Democracy" provided the basic directions with regards to national, scientific and mass sports development. Nonetheless, Mao's thoughts on the New Democratic physical culture was an empty theory which could not form the core of any sports policy or sports system, thus China looked to Soviet experience of sport during the early stage of the People's Republic between 1949 and 1957. "National defence through a strong physical culture" was a theme that could be traced to the origins of the "labour for defence system" in the early 1950's. Since modern China was born in civil war and lived under the constant threat of war and imperialism, it is hardly surprising that defence was a prime consideration and sport therefore was often associated with its physical role of military training. In China the system was described as the "militarisation of sport". The role of the military in sport was further heighten by the centralised control of sport. This is because of China's geopolitical situation and history of imperialist invasion. During the Great Leap Forward

from 1958 to 1960, sport was discredited on the account of its tendency to report untruthfully, to exaggeration, over-ambition and formalism. At the same time, the disaster of the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward also influenced the development of sport. Later the Cultural Revolution transformed the country into a cult which brought a crisis in politics, the economy, culture and sport between 1966 and 1976. The development of sport was damaged and sports officials suffered both mentally and physically during this period. After Mao's death in 1976, China sought radical change in sport. In particular, sport has become one of the most important cultural phenomena in China as Maoist socialism gradually subsided in the post-Mao era.

The last stage of development has been from 1978 to the present. China's sport has continued to reform and develop at various rates and in a number of postcolonial ways. Some of the priorities in relation to sport reform were the CCP's leadership in sports and the emphasis on Olympic sports during the early stage of reform from 1978 to 1989. Sports reform had the full support of the government and gradually progressed to a postcolonial world after about 1989. In particular, sport not only aroused Chinese nationalism and patriotism, but also became a medium for reestablishing contacts with the outside world. The development of sport in China in the postcolonial era reflected a number of themes: the two types of postcolonialism in the Chinese context which are Chinese internal imperialism and Western imperialism; the contemporary Chinese sport texts which are continually influenced by Western cultural hegemony and discourse; and the development of sport in China as a unique social formation within the study of postcolonialism has provided different perspectives on economic, political, social and cultural issues. As a result of the "two Chinas" issue in the International Olympic Committee (IOC), it is critical to understand that as a result postcolonialism in China it might be suggested that debate has shifted from being one or not just about Western imperialism to one of being about the "two nationalisms".

I should like to finish by highlighting a number of crucial points which have been central to the thinking throughout this thesis. First, there is the issue of imperialism. It has never been the intention to put forward a simplistic economic model as the basis for explaining why China is different. Most political economists and social historians have accepted the relevance of framing assumptions based upon the idea that China has probably undergone more iconoclastic and innovative change than many other social formations. Its state went from an imperial monarchy to a short-lived republic, then a weak and decentralized proto-fascist authoritarianism, then to a revolutionary form of state socialism

and finally to Deng's reform and the open policy. Yet the crucial factor is not to exaggerate certain distributional differences and link these to some form of imperialism theory, but to articulate the ways in which Chinese political, economic and cultural struggles have arisen out of a particular pattern of historical development. Imperialism can only be adequately explained if it turns to the examination of the historically structured relations and conflict between China and the West and in particular the ways in which a distinct civil society and a distinct cultural identity have developed alongside political control through imperialism. Thus this research has attempted to show, not just that China is different, but that any attempt to explain the origins and nature of this difference must avoid a narrow concentration on China's economy and instead place its explanation within the context of China's history and its effects on contemporary beliefs, voices and actions.

Secondly, there is the problem of cultural identity and nationalism. It has been suggested that during and just after the First World War the Chinese intellectual spearhead of this second revolution went on the offensive, launching a movement that reached out in many directions and touched many aspects of Chinese society. Roughly it may be divided into six major phases: the attack on Confucianism, the Literary Revolution, the proclaiming of a new philosophy of life, the debate on science and the philosophy of life, the "doubting of antiquity" movement and the debate about Chinese and Western cultural values. These phases overlapped each other considerably, and certain leading writers figured prominently in more than one phases of these movements. Sport has featured in at least one of the debates on Chinese and Western cultural values. Within the context of the issue of cultural imperialism, it is suggested that Chinese tradition, and indeed Chinese cultural identity, is not so much an invented tradition as a selection of tradition. Martial arts, Jingzuo and a certain way of life did exist prior to the present, they were not invented under the influence of Western imperialism. It is important to keep in mind that Chinese traditional sporting culture has become a symbol of cultural identity and nationalism and has struggled against alien domination since at least the thirteen century.

Thirdly, there is the issue of socialism and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. While Mao's writing *On New Democracy* (Mao, Volume II, 1967: 339-384), outlined the principles of a transitional system in which a temporary alliance of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie would co-exist under the CCP leadership. The period of New Democracy effectively came to an end with the socialist transformation of industry and the drive for collectivisation in 1953. When Mao commented upon the New Democracy, he explained precisely why China needed to build a new

society, state and nation. Nonetheless, Mao's Cultural Revolution was a great disaster and tragedy for sport in Chinese history and the chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution had been an important influence on the reforms in sport in the post-Mao era. In fact, Chinese sport, culture and society were deeply uprooted during the Cultural Revolution which created a serious crisis of confidence and disillusionment among Chinese people, that is the reason why sport developed so rapidly within the post-Mao reforms.

Finally, there is the issue of postcolonialism. Postcolonial theory tends to be dominated by the theoretical discourse associated with postmodernity, psychoanalysis and forms of discourse analysis derived in part from Foucault. Postcolonialism is not only in terms of strict historical periodisation, but it also refers to disparate forms of representation, reading practices and values which range across both the past and present. One of the postcolonial factors which has given rise for concern has been the continuing development and impact of anti-colonial nationalism in Chinese sport. According to Cronin and Mayall, "sport cannot win territory or destroy an opposing ideology or religion which the nation seeks to demonise" (Cronin and Mayall,1998: 2). Bearing in mind Hoberman's (1984) description of sports people as proxy warriors, the fact is that, throughout the twentieth century, sport has been one of the most valuable weapons at the disposal of nationalists, whatever their situation and aspirations in the postcolonial epoch. Similarly, the CCP's motives in international athletics are propagandist as well as ideological. It recognizes that through sport they are able to enhance China's image abroad and hence their heavy concentration on hosting other delegations at international receptions abroad. At the same time, they proclaim that traditionally, sport has been monopolized by imperialist countries. Within the case of China, the Olympic Games is a vehicle for the promotion of a Chinese image. Its performance has been impressive since the Los Angeles Games of 1984. China is now going to host the 2008 Olympics in Beijing an event which could greatly inspire the patriotism of Chinese people (*The Guardian*, 14 July 2001: 4). How important is sport to postcolonial China? Hu Quili, a leading member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Central Committee, has described, the victories of Chinese international athletes as:

> An historical breakthrough, signifying the growth of the Chinese nation. This shows that we Chinese are people of high aspirations and proven capability and that we can overcome all difficulties and achieve our objectives when we unite as one and move forward firmly (Lawrence and Rowe, 1986: 201).

China is beginning to embrace elements of capitalism, so sport may well increasingly become associated with capitalist economic structure and political ideology in the postcolonial era. In

particular, sport has also become one of the most effective mediums in China. However, since the radical reformers have lost the battle for power after the Tiananmen movement in 1989, the present political situation makes the discussion of the future prospects for Chinese sports reforms seem more important than the reform of politics at the moment. Now the Chinese leaders are still trying to strengthen their ideological control over the people, it seems likely that the development of sport will become a focus for Chinese official nationalism. Besides, the Chinese government, uncritically accepts and advocates the Olympic Games, hides its complicity with Western cultural imperialism and attempts to establish its own Chinese centrism in the postcolonial world.

History tells us that sport having been brought into China as a result of imperialism and postcolonialism, has and will be used as one of the vehicles by which the government fulfils its ideology of patriotism, collectivism and socialism with Chinese characteristics (Figure 21). Perhaps, both imperialism and postcolonialism may not explain the total development of sport in the Chinese social contexts. However, they have opened up new ways of thinking about sport both in and between non-Western and Western worlds. Consequently, this study has provided a critical view on the relationships between sport and China. It not only attends to cultural, historical, social, political and geographical difference, but it also thinks between and across difference too. Indeed, these comparative modes of thought remain a valuable means of critique. They need not lead to generality and universalism, since in this instance they have helped to make an original and unique contribution to the study of sport, imperialism and postcolonialism in modern China from 1860 to the present.

PHOTO APPENDIX



Figure 1
Martial dance and ball game as depicted in a cave painting in Cangyuan, Yunnan Province, China.
Source: China Sports Museum, Beijing.



Figure 2
Bronze vase with design of feasting, fishing, hunting and war (475-221 BC).
Source: Palace Museum, Beijing.

Figure 3
Handscroll painting Cu Ju Tu (Picture of foot ball) by Qian Xuan, Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368).
Source: Shanghai Municipal Museum.



Figure 4
Bronze mirror with relief design of polo game in Tang Dynasty (618-907).
Source: Palace Museum, Beijing.

Figure 5
A game of field hockey by Du Jin of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).
Source: Shanghai Municipal Museum.



Figure 6
The first race course of Shanghai was built in 1851.
Source: Shanghai Library



Figure 7
A Chinese artist impressions of horse racing in Shanghai in 1884.
Source: Dian Shi Zhai Picture Magazine, Shanghai.



Figure 8
A Chinese artist impressions of cricket in Shanghai in 1884.
Source: Dian Shi Zhai Picture Magazine, Shanghai.



Figure 9
A postcard of Shanghai Cricket Club in the 1910s.
Source: Yu, Jixing (1997) Old Postcard, Shanghai, Shanghai Pictorial Publishing House. Page: 73.



Figure 10
Members of the *Da Qing Pao Qiu Hui* (Great Qing Cricket club) were at the Shanghai Cricket Club on 11 September 1907.
Source: Shanghai Library



Figure 11
A tug-of-war game was held at Hongkou Recreation Ground in the 1900s.
Source: Shanghai Library

Figure 12
Dumbbell exercises at spring sports games by students of Shanghai Patriotic Girl School in 1907.
Source: Shanghai Library



Figure 13
St John's College track and field athletics in the 1900s.
Source: Shanghai Library

Figure 14
Students of the YMCA training course for physical education agents in Shanghai in the 1900s.
Source: Shanghai Library



Figure 15
A wushu (martial arts) lessons at a primary school in Shanghai in the 1910s.
Source: Shanghai Library

Figure 16
The football teams in the whole Soviet area athletic meet was held in Ruijing on 30 May 1933.
Source: China Sports Museum, Beijing.



Figure 17
High jump in the Red Army in Pao An in 1936.
Source: Snow, Edgar (1973) Red Star Over China, Middlesex, Penguin Books. Page: 312-313.



Figure 18
"Develop physical culture and sport, and strengthen the physique of the people"—Mao's words.
Source: *New Physical Culture*, 25 July 1952: 2.

Figure 19
At the 26th World Championships China came top in the men's team. From left 2: Xu Yinsheng, Wang Chuanyao, Fu Qifang, Zhuang Zedong, Li Furong, Jiang Yongning and Rong Guotuan.
Source: China Sports Museum, Beijing.



Figure 20
"Promoting sport for the nation's pride"— Deng Xiaoping's words.
Source: *Tiyu Bao*, 15 September 1983: 1.



Figure 21
"Developing sport for building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics"—Jiang Zemin's words.
Source: *Tiyu Bao*, 5 July 1993: 1.

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