

‘THE SALVATION OF THIS DISTRICT AND FAR BEYOND’:
ALUMINIUM PRODUCTION AND THE POLITICS OF
HIGHLAND DEVELOPMENT

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Giving evidence before the House of Commons sub-committee considering the Lochaber Water Power Bill of 1921—the statutory instrument for the establishment of the British Aluminium Company Ltd’s third Highland aluminium smelter and hydro-electric power scheme—the former Provost of Fort William, Colin Young, declared: ‘I am a whole hearted supporter of this scheme for in it I see the salvation of this district and far beyond.’¹ British Aluminium’s other developments in the west Highlands—their two other smelters at Foyers and Kinlochleven (opened respectively in 1896, and between 1907 and 1909), as well as the Company’s large estates, housing and hydro-electric schemes—had already amply demonstrated both the profound economic and social impact both locally and on the region as a whole.

This article is principally concerned with exploring the economic and social significance of the aluminium industry to the Highlands and Islands, and its importance to the wider political economy of regional development. These developments and activities are considered in relation to corporate ‘social action’ and political activity, appraising the motivations and strategies affecting the wider activities of the British Aluminium Company (BACo) in the region. The negotiations are examined within the context of a ‘moral economy’, alongside the political economic, balancing moral judgements, and local customs and norms, against commercial deliberations.²

Local industry, global significance, and historical oversight

Notwithstanding the importance of aluminium production to the economy and society of the Highlands and Islands (as well as Scotland and the United Kingdom), historians have largely ignored this native industry, or dismissed it in passing.³ As is often the case, the first fragments of its history were picked over by

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geographer David Turnock.⁴ The wider significance (to the UK and globally) of aluminium production in the Highlands, as well as local conditions in the smelters and Company villages, along with ecological impacts, are discussed elsewhere.⁵ The history of aluminium production in the Highlands is a global history, where the international operations and cultural characteristics of the industry produced a *histoire croisée*;⁶ the west Highland smelters formed the backbone of the UK's aluminium industry during the course of the twentieth century, which was at the centre of a global supply chain that included operations in France, Ghana, Guyana, and Norway. This was an industry that became crucial to national defence—especially with the rise of aerial warfare, and the widespread use of aluminium and aluminium alloys in military (and civil) aircraft production, as well as imperial interests. The strategic importance of BACo's operations was underlined by government support for the industry, and by the fact that during the Second World War, the west Highland smelters were the subject of a number of *Luftwaffe* bombing raids. The Highlands lay at the heart of the Company's culture and identity. This was reflected in the importance placed on the history of the region to British Aluminium's narrative through Company publications circulated to their global employees and the flow of staff. It was embodied in William (later Sir William) Murray Morrison (1873–1948), the Invernessian who joined the Company in 1894 and became both demonstrably and symbolically the *pater familias* of the Company. An illustration of the cultural symbolism of the Highlands to British Aluminium's global identity—and vice versa of the region's smelters as part of a global supply chain and one steeped in Empire—was visible in Awaso (Ghana, formerly the British colony of the Gold Coast). From here, their subsidiary, the Gold Coast Bauxite Company Ltd. (formed in 1933) supplied bauxite (the raw material necessary for making aluminium) to the smelters at Foyers, Kinlochleven and Fort William, while European staff houses were named 'Leven' and 'Lochaber'.⁷ British Aluminium's 'social landscaping' of the Company villages in the west Highlands was also replicated, with a racial dimension, in Ghana. As employees in the Highland Company villages of Inverlochry and Kinlochleven were socially segregated by the built environment—most pointedly symbolised by the arts and crafts staff houses, high on the hillside, in Garbhein Road (known colloquially as Staff Road) overlooking the housing blocks of Foyers Road for shopfloor employees on the 'dark side' of the Kinlochleven village, Kinlochbeg—so African employees in Awaso lived segregated from their European counterparts, unless they were employed as 'boys' in domestic service.⁸

The parallels with Africa do not end here. As in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and west Africa before World War Two, and subsequently the era of decolonisation, where copper companies also acted as agents for local economic development and were embroiled in complex negotiations with local political elites and government (colonial and metropolitan in these cases), so British Aluminium became embroiled in questions over colonial economic development, as well as a major provider of social amenities and investor in infrastructure

(such as transport).⁹ In essence, as in the Highlands, businesses in the colonies operated in the administrative vacuum often left by the metropolitan state and colonial administration. From the early 1950s onwards in Africa, an increasingly impecunious metropolitan Britain relied on businesses, like BACo, to promote colonial economic development, and sustain the imperial project.¹⁰ BACo's investment in the Highlands was also significant in view of the relative abrogation of responsibility by government for the Highlands prior to the 1940s, with the exception of matters pertaining to crofting.¹¹ In part, BACo's investment in local infrastructure and social amenities was a direct trade for establishing its operations in relatively geographically isolated region, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In many respects, their social strategies were similar to those of other global aluminium producers.¹² The provision of housing and other amenities was viewed as crucial to attracting families to work in the industry, which the Company felt was critical to maintaining stable industrial relations (especially in such a capital-intensive industry).

Highland aluminium production, along with downstream operations in the central belt, was also an important sector for the Scottish economy, with the smelters at the heart of the business. Between 1935 and 1950, British Aluminium's operations at Burntisland, Falkirk, Glasgow, as well as the Highland smelter group, employed no less than 24 per cent of those working in the non-ferrous metals sector in Scotland.¹³ Both directly and indirectly through salaries, rates and subcontracting, the Company contributed significantly to the Scottish economy. Moreover, their rolling mill at Falkirk produced highly specialised aluminium alloy sheets for the aircraft industry, while Burntisland (which initially produced the aluminium oxide, alumina, necessary for producing aluminium) diversified into the manufacture of highly successful chemical compounds. Conversely, Alcan's closure of Burntisland, Falkirk and Glasgow saw the loss of 655 jobs between 2001 and 2004, dealing further painful blows to Scottish manufacturing. This was felt even more acutely, and elicited bitter feelings, because the closures were enacted swiftly and contrasted markedly with the careful management of the rundown of the Kinlochleven smelter.¹⁴ The delicately managed rundown of Kinlochleven reflected Alcan's recognition of the symbolic significance of the plant and the west Highland smelter group to organisational culture, as much as regional sensitivities and geographical isolation.

Explanations for the oversight or dismissal *en passant* of the place of the aluminium industry in the history of the Highlands and Islands exhibits in a number of ways gaps in many of the historical accounts of the economy of the region as it stands. Firstly, as outlined in Perchard and MacKenzie's piece in this edition, this stems from an almost exclusive focus on crofting and land issues, essentially from legal, political and social perspectives (rather than political economic ones). Where economic activity does receive some attention, this has often been on the grounds of ability to retain population in the area. This both negates the diversity of economic activity in the Highlands and Islands,

and offers little in the way of concerted analysis of the direct and indirect social and economic impact on either indigenous or outside investment in the region. Secondly, the longer history of the industry also fell victim to the 'declinist' narrative that emerged after the closure of the short-lived Invergordon smelter (1971–81), as the erstwhile Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB) Chairman, Sir Kenneth Alexander, had adjudged: 'The long history of aluminium smelting in the Highlands at Foyers (1895), Kinlochleven (1909), and Fort William (1929) itself, suggests that it would be mistaken to allow a particular failure to condemn this form of employment for the area under all circumstances.'¹⁵ Alexander's observation reflected his experience as one of Scotland's foremost post-war Keynesian economists who understood the problems of attracting large-scale investment to the region. He would also have been acutely aware of the criticisms of other large government-sponsored industrial schemes in the wake of the closures of the Wiggins Teape pulp and paper mill at Corpach, as well as firms such as Yvette Cosmetics in Fort William. These saw unemployment rise from significantly below to well above the Scottish average.¹⁶ Notwithstanding Alexander's primary motivation, he was right to underline the very real contribution that the industry had made to the region. He would also have been aware that British Aluminium was alive to the special significance that the Highlands and Islands had for the Company, and the assurance it had given over the years about their stewardship in the region. Moreover, against the backdrop of widespread contraction of the Scottish heavy industries and manufacturing between the 1960s and 1980s, Alexander recognised the value of these skilled jobs in the Highland smelters.¹⁷

Harnessing the Highland water-power for the 'benefit of mankind'

Opening British Aluminium's Greenock carbon factory (to supply their reduction works at Foyers on the shore of Loch Ness) in 1897, the Company's scientific adviser Lord Kelvin ventured that he hoped this was the 'beginning of something that would yet transform the whole social economy of countries like the Highlands, where water abounded'.¹⁸ Lord Kelvin's comments about Highland hydro-power being harnessed for the 'benefit of mankind', in respect of British Aluminium's use of the head waters of the Falls of Foyers to supply power to their factory below, though offensive to late twentieth-century minds, 'did have a powerful logic of their own', suggested biographers Crosbie Smith and Matthew Norton Wise:

The pestilence, poverty and over-population accompanying the industrial development of his beloved Glasgow had as their counterpart the depopulation and decline of the Highland economy. Now the advancement of science, and especially science-based industry, which was transforming Glasgow into a healthier, more spacious and very prestigious Second City of Empire, would

equally bring economic and human salvation to the vast Highland regions, for so long, like Ireland, the mere reservoirs for Glasgow's labour.¹⁹

In the years that followed, British Aluminium and its supporters could point with some justification to its transformation of the area, as could some of their detractors. In 1920, British Aluminium was employing 250–300 at Foyers and Kinlochleven, paying out £170,000 in wages (£5.3m in 2011).²⁰ By the late 1930s, BACo was the largest single employer in Argyll-shire and one of the largest across the whole of the Highlands. Additionally, its provision of 'crofting leave' allowed for crofters and crofter-fishermen to return for harvests and the fishing seasons, complementing existing economic structures within the region. The Company also contributed one-fifth and one-twentieth of the rates to Inverness-shire and Argyll respectively. This contribution was made all the more significant with the changes enacted in the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1929, with landward (mainland) ratepayers supporting spending in the Islands too. These rates (as did the salaries of those crofters and fishers employed seasonally) thus had a far wider significance in supporting particularly impoverished areas like the Western Isles.²¹

The industry's social and economic contribution can also be measured in terms of its retention of Highlanders, and enticing of incomers into, the Highland smelters. This was especially significant given that it coincided with the emigration of 17 per cent of the population of the Highlands and Islands over the period 1861 and 1911, and a further 13.8 per cent between 1921 and 1930.²² In contrast, between 1891 and 1901, the parishes of Abertarf and Boleskine (including Foyers), which had seen their populations shrink by one-fifth in the decades preceding BACo's purchase of the land and the opening of the factory, saw a 30 per cent rise. In the thirty years afterwards, the population rose by a further 6 per cent. Where in 1835, the local minister had commented on the impoverishment of the local population, by 1895, there was widespread and enthusiastic support for the establishment of the factory, in the face of criticisms by conservationists.²³ If British Aluminium often solicited such panegyrics (after careful cultivation of supporters) then the real benefits of the Company's investment in the area and employment it provided were evident.²⁴ As late as the early 1950s, the local minister, Reverend MacAskill, noted that most people in the area either directly (at the factory or on British Aluminium's estates) or indirectly relied on BACo for employment. The Company also invested heavily in transport and local housing (at subsidised rates) at Foyers, albeit in a less grandiose fashion than in the Company villages of Kinlochleven and Inverloch. As at the other settlements, British Aluminium's patrician outlook was also reflected in its social stratification of village life, as well as in the factory. Whilst encouraging a culture of deference, the legacy of this was to be seen in the very real sense of betrayal by the Foyers workforce at the closure of the plant in 1967. Investment in the Kinlochleven and Lochaber smelters – and

the planned Company villages of Kinlochleven and Inverlochy – was on an even grander scale. By 1938, British Aluminium had already spent £7.5m (£384m) on its west Highland operations, with the first stage of the development of the Lochaber smelter and hydro scheme costing £2.5m alone by 1929 (£128m).²⁵ The sheer scale of the Kinlochleven and Lochaber project is illustrated by the fact that it left British Aluminium financially over-stretched and reliant on an already disquieted shareholder base to recapitalise the Company.²⁶ The construction of the Kinlochleven hydro-electric scheme, factory and town – where once had stood only two hunting lodges and four cottages at the head of Loch Leven, previously accessible only by small boat or over the treacherous ‘devil’s staircase’ leading from Glencoe – was in itself an incredible and bold feat of civil engineering, planning, and human fortitude (exactd at some cost to human life). In the space of five years, British Aluminium’s subsidiary, the Loch Leven Water Power Company, and its contractors constructed the Blackwater Dam, which held the largest volume of water of any dam in the UK until the 1950s, and a reinforced concrete conduit of nearly four miles long driven through solid rock. This linked to six-and-a-quarter-mile long iron pipes through which the 20 million gallons of the Blackwater Dam descended 935 feet to a power house producing 33,000 horse-power (hp) to satisfy the energy requirements of an industrial complex that included an aluminium reduction works, carbon electrode factory, laboratory and offices. British Aluminium’s subsidiary, the Loch Leven Pier Company, dredged the shallows of Loch Leven to develop a deep-water harbour for importing supplies of raw materials and goods, and exporting the virgin aluminium. Finally, to accommodate its employees, British Aluminium constructed a township of 166 two- and three-bedroom houses, hostels, schools, shops, churches and leisure amenities.²⁷ All of the construction was undertaken largely by the physical labour of the 2,000–3,000 navvies who worked on the scheme drawn from the Highlands and Islands as well as elsewhere in the British Isles, with limited resort and access to motive power. It came at a price too, with frequent casualties from rock blasts and other accidents. Unsurprisingly the isolation, risk and Spartan conditions meant that retaining labour became one of the problems for the contractors and led in part to the delay in the project.²⁸

The developments at Kinlochleven were dwarfed by the Company’s Lochaber scheme, constructed between 1929 and 1943. The first stage involved driving the longest tunnel in the world at the time (fifteen miles in length) through the solid granite of the Nevis range, most of this being achieved using explosives and pneumatic and hand-held picks. When completed this conduit carried 860 million gallons of water daily from a catchment area of 303 square miles. This was then channelled down two steel pipelines falling nearly 600 feet to the hydro-station, where ten giant generating units produced 10,000hp each to supply the factory. At the height of the first stage, the project employed around 3,000 navvies and tradesmen, involved in constructing the factory and hydro-electric scheme, as well as a twenty-one mile long network of railways. A second stage, completed in

1938, to enhance the productive capacity of the Lochaber plant by increasing the water catchment area resulted in the construction of two large dams, across Loch Laggan (700 feet long x 130 feet in height) and Loch Treig (400 feet spanning the loch), connected by a two-mile tunnel. BACo also constructed another Company village at Inverlochy for its employees starting in 1926. During the First World War, government demands for aluminium translated into financial support to extend the Loch Leven scheme and the deployment of a detachment of German prisoners of war to undertake the work. Similarly the importance of the metal for military aircraft production hastened the extension of the Lochaber Scheme, with the addition of a tunnel channelling the headwaters of the River Spey, via Loch Crunachan, into Loch Laggan, undertaken by the 1st Tunnelling Company of the Canadian Army.²⁹

British Aluminium's investment in housing and transport infrastructure, as well as provision of public utilities (such as water and electricity) prior to the 1940s, were clearly necessitated by the location of its operations. However, in a region where central government investment in such structural factors remained a perennial problem, this was another valuable contribution to social and economic development in the Highlands and Islands. BACo had itself been confronted by these obstacles to retaining staff. Prior to post-war public housing developments in Banavie, Torlundy, Caol and Corpach, as well as Inverlochy, overcrowding in, and an inadequate supply of, accommodation remained a problem for the Company (a problem that persists in the Highland economy to this day).³⁰ As a member of the Scottish Economic Committee's sub-committee set up to enquire into economic conditions in the Highlands and Islands (hereafter the Hilleary Committee), William Murray Morrison had used the opportunity to criticise roundly the failure to invest in transport infrastructure.³¹ Like the later report by the Committee on hydro-electric development in Scotland (1943) [the Cooper Report], the Hilleary Report also illustrated BACo's ulterior motives for participating (to promote its contribution), as well as the wider significance of its operations in advancing calls for economic diversification in the region.³² BACo's operations were used by both reports to advocate further investment in hydro-electricity and the growth of the electro-chemical and electro-metallurgical industries in the Highlands. Conversely, British Aluminium—with considerable experience of using government committees during World War One to promote its own interests—saw in these committees a means to boost its own public standing, and win valuable allies and concessions. One such example of the latter, illustrating the benefits to the Company of their influence on the deliberations of the Hilleary and Cooper Committees, was to be seen in the 1943 Parliamentary recommendations on Scottish valuation and rating systems:

We recognise that for the Highland local authorities it must be a question of balancing advantages, but after attempting to visualise the alternatives from their point of view we are satisfied that their interest lies in making

some concession to modify the rating burden borne by hydro-electric undertakings. . . The direct benefits are obvious. Even if the rate of contribution of the undertakers is reduced it will remain a substantial addition to the local authorities' funds; and a supply of electricity will be provided for more rate-payers at a cheaper price. . . most important of all, the introduction of electro-metallurgical and electro-chemical industries would add greatly to the income of the local authorities.³³

Key to BACo's political strategies in the region was cultivating relationships with those prominent landowners keen to promote economic diversification. For Highland landowners like Cameron of Lochiel, Lord Lovat and Mackintosh of Mackintosh, links with British Aluminium aided in sustaining social influence in a climate in which the real political power of the landed gentry and aristocracy was waning in Scotland, especially after the 'People's Budget' of 1909 (and the associated tax rises). By 1918 with the rise in death duties, many Scottish landowners were struggling to retain their estates, although Lovat was the notable exception of an aristocrat whose rationalisation of his estates made the 1920s 'the most prosperous [decade] in his life'.³⁴ The political complexion and shared social outlook of senior figures within British Aluminium—for example, Lord Kelvin's Liberal Unionism, and the predominantly military and land-owning backgrounds of subsequent senior directors until the 1960s—can only have helped to recommend them to these Conservative constituencies, as would BACo's much fêted position as a key industry with an essentially imperial outlook. After the collapse of the Liberal Party in the early twentieth century, the Conservatives were keen to encourage former Liberal voters into their ranks with the retention of landowning Tories felt to be more socially liberal than the businessmen gaining increasing importance in the party. Many of BACo's senior managers in the region—such as Colonel F.E. Laughton MC, John (formerly Major) Gris Bullen, W. Henkel, A.B. Jones, and William Murray Morrison's brother, Edward Shaw Morrison—up until the takeover of the Company in 1959, were socially well-connected, shared similar values and had contact with the 'county set' through social and sporting events, political, and Territorial Army or Royal Naval (Volunteer) Reserve activities. Col. Laughton, for example, was the son of Sir John Knox Laughton, 'the pioneer in the revival of naval history' (his admirers included King George V), and Lady Laughton. F.E. Laughton married the daughter of a former Lieutenant Governor of Guernsey in 1922, and his sister, Elvira (subsequently Dame Elvira) Sibyl Maria Matthews, later became Director of the Women's Royal Naval Service. Laughton and his wife attended many of the social events of the Highland calendar and regularly appeared in the society pages of *The Times*. Henkel, one of the Kinlochleven managers, was Chairman of the local Unionist Association. Edward Morrison, BACo's Highland estates manager before the Second World War, was a local county councillor for Argyll

and Justice of the Peace for both Argyll and Inverness, while Kinlochleven assistant manager and subsequently Foyers manager, A. B. Jones, was a county councillor for Kinlochleven.³⁵ Thus the relationship was mutually beneficial.

The connection between sections of the Highland landed elite and the Company was cemented by close personal links, such as those through Morrison's uncle Charles Innes and the Conservative and Unionist Party machinery in the area.³⁶ Lochiel, Lovat and Mackintosh, in their separate ways, were not simply entrenched reactionaries but showed themselves to be more prescient, pragmatic, and even progressive, reformers. All provided support for BACo, giving evidence in support of the Lochaber Water Power Bill, and lobbying both publicly and behind the scenes (regionally, as well as in Edinburgh and London) on BACo's behalf. As well as being a significant landowner in the area, Simon Joseph Fraser, the fourteenth Lord Lovat, was the first chairman (1919–27) of one of the other major employers in the region, the Forestry Commission, the first Convener of Inverness County Council after 1929, and served from 1927–8 as Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, chairman of the Overseas Settlement Committee (1928–9), and the first chairman of the Highland Reconstruction Association.³⁷ Sir Donald Walter Cameron of Lochiel (after BACo, the second largest land owner in Inverness-shire) was a towering figure in the region and locality—politically as Convener of Inverness-shire County Council and Lord Lieutenant of the County, and symbolically as twenty-fifth chieftain of the Clan Cameron—and highly influential in Scottish public life: when deliberating who would best represent Highland landowners' interests in responding to the findings of the Hilleary Committee, one senior member of the Scottish Landowners' Federation (SLF) suggested to the secretary, Erskine Jackson: 'The publicity value of Lochiel's name on this H & I subcommittee would be very great should its actions get into daylight. He ought to be on it even if he can't attend.'³⁸ Like Lovat, Lochiel had already shown support for economic diversification and infrastructure development in the region as a sponsor of the West Highland Railway. As late as 1964 the influence of, and apparent affection for, the Camerons of Lochiel—by now the clan had a new sitting chieftain, Donald Hamish Cameron of Lochiel who was passed the seat in 1951 after his father's death—were mooted as the reason for the poor performance of the Labour Party in Fort William after a local Labour candidate remarked that 'A Wilson government will sort out Lochiel.'³⁹ The importance of this can also be seen in view of the opposition of other Highland landowners. As private correspondence between Highland landowners and from within the Scottish Land and Property Federation (SLPF) and the Scottish Landowners' Federation (SLF), the lobbying bodies representing Scottish landowners reveals, this was an elite whose views diverged markedly over industrial schemes for the Highlands.⁴⁰ In contrast to Lochiel, Lovat and Mackintosh, the Perthshire landowner, the Duke of Atholl, saw in the Lochaber

scheme a recipe for social disorder: 'I can imagine the effect of this new Bolshevik [sic] population of the Radical minds of the average Fort William democrat, which will spread north and east, while poaching fish and game will become worse than it is at the present moment'.⁴¹ He privately excoriated Mackintosh of Mackintosh for supporting the development out of what he perceived to be naked self-interest, accusing him of 'keeping our ain fish guts for our ain sea maws'.⁴² In some respects, Atholl's vision resembles attitudes amongst civil servants in the Colonial Office to business interests during the interwar period; one 'derived from snobbery, distaste for the world of commerce, and a paternalistic ethos of "romantic anti-capitalism"'. However, Atholl was also astute enough to see the paradox of such schemes, as did Lochiel, Lovat and Mackintosh, for their parts: whilst attracting investment and employment to the region, they could inevitably dilute the influence of the landed elite. If their views (positive and negative, principled or pragmatic) directly affected their engagement with the industry, both parties recognised the social and political, as well as economic, significance of it.⁴³

Thus, in spite of the opposition of some of the members of these bodies to industrialisation in the Highlands, British Aluminium was able to garner support amongst those influential Highland landowners committed to economic diversification for the region. They were aided by the fact that some of their directors moved in similar social circles and shared values in common with these landowners. The senior managers at a tactical and operational level in the area also regularly fulfilled this function. British Aluminium's conduct in regional and local politics was as important as its attempts to master the 'high politics' of Whitehall and Edinburgh; something which the Company's strategic level managers sometimes forgot over time, as over the issue of pollution. Equally the unwillingness of some staff to mix with those they deemed to be of an inferior social station undermined these social strategies.⁴⁴

Harnessing the politics of Highland Development

That British Aluminium managed to maintain a high visibility in the west Highlands, despite state intervention and the growth in public services, the contraction of the workforces at the Highland smelters and openings offered by alternative employment opportunities, as well as BACo's retreat under RTIA from previous social commitments after World War Two, owed much to its deep entrenchment in local civic society and the collective memory of the region.⁴⁵ The endurance of the deep-seated loyalty to British Aluminium illustrates the effectiveness of the Company's inculcation of its role as a social benefactor, interwoven with Highland history. This strategy was also to serve the purpose of ingratiating BACo in the localities in which it operated and the region as a whole, in the face of periodic public criticism of its schemes. As part of this strategy, it also sponsored cultural events which symbolised the ideal of Gaelic Scotland,

such as the *Mòd*, financially, as well as symbolically with aluminium crowns and maces. As with the provision of ‘crofting leave’, this was designed to underline its commitment to assimilate. Equally, the planning of the Company settlements, stressing order and respectability, was aimed at rebutting criticisms and allaying the fears of allies of the sort of nightmarish, chaotic industrial tableau painted by opponents of its developments. Underlining this was also BACo’s attempts to negotiate the waters of regional politics, building alliances with key landowners and other figures within the civic elite by utilising the practically extinct, but culturally symbolic, vestiges of the clan system, conveniently conformed closely with BACo’s own values of ‘loyalty and service’. Ironically, it was these self-same values that the Duke of Atholl had espoused for the nation during the First World War.⁴⁶ The Company’s self-appointed role as a regional benefactor also lent it support from Highland development campaigners.

Across the western Highlands, against the backdrop of the recent history and the politics of development within the wider region, BACo’s activities were critical to maintaining its standing, particularly amongst those in wider public life who fêted the Company as a social benefactor and responsible steward of its estates. Moreover, Allan Macinnes’ observation that the clan system – in particular, the apparently long abandoned notion of *dùthchas*, ‘heritable trusteeship’ – left a legacy of the ‘cultural baggage of clanship’ that ‘even incomers felt obliged to exercise paternalism to offset periodic economic distress among their tenantry’, was to be evident in their transactions with local communities.⁴⁷ Even if John Burnett observes that after the crushing of the 1745 Rising, ‘traditional reciprocal relationships of *dùthchas*, of mutual obligation, were replaced by the cash nexus, and extended familial bonds of cadet lineage were shattered on the rocks of differential rent’, some fragments of these customs appear to have survived, and been resurrected, in BACo’s strategies and programmes in the Highlands.⁴⁸ This was made all the more potent given the poignant representation of the Highland emigrant and the continued potency of the clearances in the collective memory of the region. *Noblesse oblige* was as central to BACo’s image, as that of it as a patriotic ‘key’ industry, in its representations to politicians, lobbyists, and policymakers. In this respect British Aluminium’s pursuit of cordial relations with Lochiel, Lovat, and Mackintosh, alongside its courting of elements of the Highland development lobby (notably Lachlan Grant), take on an added significance. The motifs of *dùthchas* were visible in the moral economic negotiations between BACo and regional elites and communities. Equally transgressions of the breaching of those compacts could provoke a sharp response from the community, with mixed results, as labour and environmental contests showed.

William Murray Morrison, in particular, cultivated a sound working relationship with Lochiel, doing much of the necessary lobbying on local committees to ensure the support of district and county councillors for the amended Lochaber scheme. Mirroring his evidence to the Royal Commission

on Canals and Waterways in 1907. Morrison was at pains to impress upon the Chieftain of the Clan Cameron the degree of personal commitment he had to the developments, declaring in a letter to Lochiel during the passage of the Lochaber Water Power Bill in May 1921: 'I have the enormous personal reward of knowing that the foundation has been laid for a lasting and far-reaching benefit to the Highlands of Scotland.'⁴⁹ Both Lochiel and Lovat submitted evidence in support of the Lochaber Water Power Bill, and acted as public advocates on other occasions. Later still, the value of Lochiel's support was evident from his campaign as Convener of Inverness-shire County Council after the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1929 to draw attention to what he perceived to be the disproportionate burden of subsidy on mainland, 'landward', non-agricultural ratepayers. Though Lochiel was motivated primarily by his desire to support economic diversification for the region – recognising the potential obstacle that these changes in rates might present to enterprises prospecting the area – this also served British Aluminium's interests.⁵⁰ Lochiel was clearly infuriated by what he saw as the further abrogation of responsibility by central government, as epitomised by changes under the 1929 Act and the perceived shift in burden from central government to landward Highland ratepayers. In correspondence with the Provost of Inverness, and prominent Highland development campaigner, Sir Alexander MacEwen, he observed: 'By putting the Islands in with the Mainland the Government made a very astute move, as all applications for Grants have to go through the County Council, and as the County Council are expected to make a contribution of the Mainland Non-Agricultural Ratepayers, the Treasury are perfectly safe in assuming they will have very few calls made upon them.'⁵¹ This resentment compounded the distrust that Highland opinion harboured for its counterparts in Lowland Scotland; as Lochiel declared in a letter to the Provost of Inverness and Highland development campaigner Sir Alexander MacEwen: 'I heartily distrust Glasgow and the Lowlands far more than I do London.'⁵² As with its alliances in Whitehall in relation to the politics of imperial defence, BACo recognised that the frustrations of Lochiel and others with government in Edinburgh and London could be harnessed for the Company's advantage. In particular, it all served to underline the importance of British Aluminium to the region.

In a similar vein to his entreaties to Lochiel, Morrison's careful choice of message to figures like Dr Lachlan Grant, BACo's medical officer and co-founder of the Highland Development League, played to the latter's commitment to regional development and his appreciation of what he perceived to be the socially ameliorative effects of 'paternalism'. As Grant explained in an article to the *Caledonian Medical Journal* of January 1930:

Voltaire said that labour rids us of three great evils – irksomeness, vice, poverty. But to do this effectually the labour must be on a moralized basis, and in

proportion to man's needs and capacities. Man's whole sphere of manifestation has been divided into thinking and acting. . . Enlightened captains of industry like the Leverhulmes, the Fords, and the Cadburys have rediscovered the fact that man is not a machine, and that his capacity for work has a psychological side. They have found from experience that sufficient leisure not only conduces to the workers' health and happiness but to loyal service, augmented output, and a higher quality of work. The new 'paternalism' in industry pays, and also makes for stability and social progress.⁵³

As Grant made clear in his public utterances, British Aluminium fitted the model of social enterprise, and was worthy of his support and indeed participation in its mission. This included the physician also providing public lectures on social improvement in Kinlochleven.⁵⁴ Grant was a man of political and social complexity—having in his career been a Liberal imperialist (and unionist) and eventually a prominent supporter of the Scottish National Party—but was above all passionate about Highland development. Grant campaigned for the regeneration of the region from the early decades of the twentieth century, writing a number of tracts on the subject, as well as being a prolific correspondent to the newspapers. The advantages of personal contact with Grant were certainly not lost on William Murray Morrison. Writing to him in January 1935, Morrison declared: 'It is a most pleasing recollection in my career that I have also been able to do some practical and lasting good to my beloved Highlands.'⁵⁵

Grant corresponded with Morrison over a number of years, and became a robust defender of British Aluminium. He made speeches in support of BACo's first unsuccessful Lochaber Water Power Bill at meetings around the locality (Onich, Glencoe, and Ballachulish) in February 1918 and for the resubmitted successful 1921 Bill. He publicly admonished critics of housing conditions in Kinlochleven, and roundly dismissed suggestions that the manufacture of aluminium was affecting the health of workers and local communities around the smelters in spite of evidence to the contrary.⁵⁶ Grant's guiding principle in all of this was undoubtedly well intentioned: that of supporting a Company which had shown itself committed to the Highlands, at a time when the government was, for advocates of Highland regeneration, guilty of neglect. As with the sentiments expressed in his letter to Lochiel, Morrison was sincere to some degree in his correspondence with Grant, but it was equally tempered by his audience. Given Grant's prominence as a long-standing and vocal advocate of Highland development, it is highly unlikely that Morrison was not carefully composing his message (to ensure the continued support of Grant for BACo's Highland mission) when he wrote in the same 1935 letter:

My feeling is that as more and more attention is drawn to these matters and development in other directions, we shall gradually restore better conditions in our native land, and you are doing your best in this that connection.⁵⁷

The recompense for Morrison's efforts is evident from a piece published by Grant in *Caledonian Medical Journal* later that year:

The enterprise of the British Aluminium Company, and the very great benefit to the Highland communities of Kinlochleven, Foyers, and Inverlochy, resulting from their operations, might well be repeated in other parts of the Highlands. To a far seeing Gael—Mr. W. Murray Morrison of the Aluminium Company—is mainly due the credit for the development of this hitherto neglected, great national asset—water power.⁵⁸

That Grant had been busy extolling the Company's virtues at other public engagements is clear from this warm letter from Morrison from December 1936:

I am obliged to you for your letter of the 10th instant and for having sent me the paper containing a report on your recent speech in London, which as a matter of fact I had seen in another paper. I was very pleased to observe the clean bill of health which you give to our employees as a result of your long experience of the health of our community at Kinlochleven. As a layman I can speak to the same effect from my own experience going still further back—namely for the 40 odd years during which the Foyers works have been in operation. You will be interested to hear that a recent census of our 1,100 employees in the Highlands shows that 74% of these are Highlanders and 93% are natives of Scotland, and this is a fact of which I am very proud. With kindest regards and wishing Mrs. Grant and yourself and your family all the compliments of the season.⁵⁹

Conversely the support of British Aluminium, and Morrison personally, for the Caledonian Power Bill, greatly served Grant's political ends.

If British Aluminium did not actively seek to court labour and trade unions, then, especially after 1945, it was careful to seek to incorporate them both formally through the machinery of collective bargaining and informally through social contacts with trade union officials. Though BACo was, at best, grudgingly tolerant of trade unions and the power of labour, two events steadied the Company's hand, if not the views of all its managers. The first of these, the 1910 strike at Kinlochleven for trade union recognition, though ultimately unsuccessful, attracted unwanted attention. After the First World War, the trade unions gained recognition and limited mechanisms for negotiations with the Company. An attempt by the Company to impose changes to conditions and demarcations, as well as a rise in rents for Inverlochly village, led to a strike of employees at Lochaber in 1936, which proved to be a major 'social drama' in the Company's history.⁶⁰ Orchestrated in part by the local, Lewis-born, GP Isaac Maciver, a future Provost of Fort William who had already lodged condemnations of the appalling working conditions (including numerous fatalities) on the construction of the Lochaber scheme to the Scottish Trades

Union Congress (STUC) in 1926, the strike committee wags highly effective in mobilising community support, turning this into a moral contest in the wider public consciousness. In the end, the Company was forced to concede in an embarrassing climb down, with Lochiel becoming embroiled to negotiate a settlement. Ultimately it displayed the risks for BACo of transgressing the ‘moral economy’. Thereafter, especially from around 1945 to the mid-1970s, relations with labour and trade unions remained on an essentially cordial basis, reliant on informal contacts as much as the formal machinery (like large sections of British industry). From the trade unions’ perspective, BACo provided valuable employment in an economy where jobs of this type were scarce. British Aluminium did attempt at the Invergordon smelter to impose more formal negotiations and break down trade demarcations, with mixed success. With the collapse of a number of large industrial schemes in the Highlands during the 1970s, and 1980s, the imperative of holding on to jobs, especially relatively skilled and reasonably paid, in the region became the priority of trade unions. Moreover, as trade unionists observed, British Aluminium was one of only a few employers in the region who recognised trade unions. The quandary faced by the trade unions, and employees, was vividly illustrated by discussions over improvements to health and safety within the west Highland smelters in the 1970s. Initially the plant trade unions lobbied for and backed Health and Safety Executive (HSE) demands for extensive capital investment at Kinlochleven and Lochaber to improve the atmosphere in the furnace rooms. When BACo threatened to close the Highland plants, the trade unions withdrew their support for HSE action. Fortuitously, Lochaber was modernised after 1975 but this episode illustrated how industrial relations and occupational health and safety in the Highland plants were overshadowed by the politics of regional economic development.⁶¹

It was British Aluminium’s ability to garner support overtime amongst such apparently incongruous bedfellows as Lochiel, Mackintosh, Lord Lovat, and Lachlan Grant, and spanning the political spectrum from landowning Conservatives to the Labour Party and trades unions, which set it apart from those who failed to understand the subtleties of the region’s politics.⁶² British Aluminium was also careful to court the various religious denominations—whilst the clergy, for their part, appear to have been largely supportive of the Company’s aims for the same reasons as other local opinion—with care taken either to provide space and support for them to construct new places of worship or affordable rents for properties that came under BACo’s jurisdiction. This was equally critical in reassuring key constituencies and support existing social structures.⁶³

Where once the epic symbol of modernity for BACo’s directors and its supporters that was Kinlochleven had prompted one to enthusiastically propose the name of ‘Aluminiumville’ for the new settlement—and reason, and political calculation, intervened to suggest Kinlochleven—so too all of the Highland developments would become an important symbol within the Company’s narrative. In addition to nurturing personal relationships, British Aluminium

developed a sophisticated organisational narrative, placing the Highlands at the centre of the Company's story. This integrated key events in Highland history, such as the '45 and the clearances (which it clearly recognised as significant in collective narratives and memory in the region), with its own role as social benefactors to the region, and was incorporated into speeches given by senior figures within the Company. After the Second World War, this was serialised in articles, 'Our Highland Story', in the British Aluminium's magazine, *The B.A. News*, as well as the Company history (distributed to employees) and promotional films. While this was principally designed after 1945 to encourage loyalty amongst BACo staff, its uses in garnering support from government were also uppermost in the minds of the Company's senior managers, notably after the closure of Foyers in 1967 and its attempts to secure the Invergordon site in the face of competition from Alcan.⁶⁴

Conclusion

Like Lord Kelvin's remarks, which illuminated and predicted some of the tensions that surrounded British Aluminium's Highland schemes, this narrative reflected the Company's sensitivity to regional politics captured in its corporate communications and social developments: in today's business lexicon, this represented 'corporate social action'. The strategies that BACo adopted in its dealings with government and key political actors in the region, Edinburgh and London, although ultimately not always effective, formed part of a range of what contemporary political scientists and management scholars would identify as 'sophisticated' 'corporate political action'.⁶⁵ However, to understand them as such is to limit the fullest motivations of the actors in question, as well as the social process and historical context. Although British Aluminium's actions were certainly designed to assuage public opinion and garner support amongst key political constituencies, and encourage loyalty amongst employees, its actions were not entirely self-serving, determined as they were by a genuine belief on the part of key actors within the Company in the social and economic development of the Highlands. So that while its selection of more 'progressive' elements amongst the Highland landed elites and development campaigners was certainly instrumental in gaining support for its developments and producing a more favourable business environment (in terms of local taxation and infrastructure), it was also because key figures shared a commitment to securing economic and social 'progress' for the region, albeit one determined by their own philosophical and social interpretations. Moreover, support for the Company's developments, from landowners like Cameron of Lochiel, Lord Lovat, and Mackintosh of Mackintosh, to trade unionists, was conditional, negotiated and subject to a 'moral economy'. This was interlaced with elements recognisable as *dùthchas*. One such illustration of this was over the 1936 Lochaber strike, while 'moral' considerations over the local impact of effluents from the plants affecting livestock and forestry in the area

of smelters also mediated local managers' responses.⁶⁶ If trade unions and local communities exercised 'agency' in this process, it was nevertheless mediated by unequal power relations.

Notwithstanding the negative impacts of the Company's operations and some of its strategies, aluminium made a major contribution to the economic development of the Highlands. It also illustrates forcibly the importance of recognising the contribution of other sectors to the region's economy. Ultimately, the politics of regional development in the Highlands, as a peripheralised area, overshadowed the nature of negotiations between British Aluminium, on the one hand, and government, local elites, trade unions and the communities surrounding the plants. These complex relationships and exchanges were, like much corporate social and political activity, mediated by 'moral', as well as political economic, considerations.

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank the editor and anonymous referees for their comments. The British Aluminium Company Ltd. (BACo) was registered in May 1894. It was taken over in a bitter struggle, which captured the national attention, in 1959 by a UK fabricator, Tube Investments Ltd, and US metals firm, Reynolds Metals, but retained its name. In 1982, it merged with the UK subsidiary of Canadian multinational, Alcan (the Aluminium Company of Canada), only for its global operations to be taken over by Rio Tinto in 2007. Testimony of Mr Colin Young to the House of Commons Sub-committee reviewing evidence on the Lochaber Water Power Bill, 1921, Glasgow, Glasgow University Archives [GUA], UGD347 21/24/5/11.
2. C. Marquis, M. A. Glynn, and G. F. Davis, 'Community Isomorphism and Corporate Social Action', *Academy of Management Review* 32 (2007), 925–45; D. Coen, W. Grant, and G. Wilson (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government* (Oxford, 2011), 15–17; A. J. Hillman, G. D. Keim, D. Schuler, 'Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda', *Journal of Management* 30 (2004), 837–57. In his classic 1971 study of the eighteenth-century English crowd, Edward Thompson defined 'moral economy' as 'the notion of legitimation' that 'men and women in the crowd were informed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights and customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of the community'. (E. P. Thompson, 'The moral economy of the English crowd in the 18th century', *Past & Present* 50 (1971), 78; Idem, *Customs in Common* (London, 1993), 267). If interest in 'moral economy' waned in the 1980s and early 1990s, mimicking the hegemony of economic rationalism, then it has over the last two decades enjoyed something of a renaissance. Sociologist and political economist Andrew Sayer defines 'moral economy' as the blending of 'moral-political values regarding economic activities. . . with economy systems'. (A. Sayer, 'Moral Economy and Political Economy', *Studies in Political Economy* 61 (2000), 87). For further recent and related work about 'moral economy' and 'moral choice', see, for example: A. Sayer, *Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life* (Cambridge, 2011); A. Sen, *Rationality and Freedom* (Cambridge, MA, 2002); For recent historical examinations of 'moral economy', see: N. Kirk, *Custom and Conflict in the "Land of the Gael": Ballachulish, 1900–1910* (Trowbridge, 2007); J. Phillips, 'Material and moral resources: the 1984–5 miners' strike in Scotland', *Economic History Review* 65 (2012), 256–76; A. Perchard and J. Phillips,

- 'Transgressing the moral economy: Wheelerism and management of the nationalised coal industry in Scotland', *Contemporary British History* 25 (2011), 387–405.
3. For example: B. Lenman, *An Economic History of Modern Scotland 1660–1976* (Hamden, 1977); R. H. Campbell, *Scotland Since 1707: The Rise of an Industrial Society* (Oxford, 1965); E. A. Cameron, *Land for the People? The British Government and the Scottish Highlands, c.1880–1925* (East Linton, 1996); G. C. Peden, 'The Managed Economy: Scotland, 1919–2000' in T. M. Devine, C. H. Lee and G. C. Peden (eds), *The Transformation of Scotland: The Economy since 1700* (Edinburgh, 2005), 233–65. For exceptions see: J. Hunter, *Last of the Free: A Millennial History of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 2000); P. L. Payne, *The Hydro: A Study of the Development of the Major Hydro-Electric Schemes undertaken by the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board* (Aberdeen, 1988).
 4. D. Turnock, *Patterns of Highland Development* (London, 1970); Idem, *Industrial Britain: The New Scotland* (Newton Abbot, 1979), 30, 94–102, 121 and 128.
 5. A. Perchard, *Aluminiumville: Government, Global Business and the Scottish Highlands* (Lancaster, 2012); Idem, 'A Marriage of Convenience? The British Government and the UK aluminium industry in the twentieth century', in Hans Otto Frøland and Mats Ingulstad (eds), *From Warfare to Welfare: Business-Government Relations in the Aluminium Industry* (Trondheim, 2012), 127–62; Idem, 'Of the highest Imperial importance': British strategic priorities and the politics of colonial bauxite, c.1915–c.1958' in Robin Gendron, Mats Ingulstad, and Espen Storli (eds), *Bauxite, State and Society in the Twentieth Century* (Vancouver, 2013) forthcoming.
 6. *L'histoire croisée* is characterised by 'entangled or entangled history' frequently 'accounts conducted below the waterline of the nation-state and using frames and scales of reference'. (C. Jones, 'French Crossings: I. Tales of Two Cities', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 20 (2010), 2–3; B. Stuck, K. Ferris, and J. Revel, 'Introduction: Space and Scale in Transnational History', *The International History Review* 33 (2011), 573–84).
 7. Ibid; 'The Company on the Gold Coast', *The BA News*, vol.1, no.1, (1948),.10–11, GUA, UGD347 21/33/2.
 8. *The BA News*, vol.2, no.1, (1949), 10, GUA, UGD 347/ 21/33/5; A. Perchard, 'Sculpting the "Garden of Eden": Patronage, community & the British Aluminium Company in the Scottish Highlands, 1895–1982', *Scottish Labour History* 42 (2007),49–69; See also Perchard, *Aluminiumville*, 272–319.
 9. For comparisons, see: S. E. Stockwell, *The business of decolonisation: British business strategies in the Gold Coast* (Oxford, 2000), 164–5, 168; L. J. Butler, *Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, c.1930–64* (London, 2007),12, 21–6, 31–4.
 10. L. J. Butler, 'Reconstruction, development and the entrepreneurial state: The British colonial model, 1939–51', *Contemporary British History* 13 (1999), 29–55; Perchard, "'A self-contained British Empire in Metals": Metals Stockpiling, Imperial Defence and Business-Government Relations, 1914–1958', Paper to the European Business History Association/ Business History Society of Japan conference, École des haute études en sciences sociales, Paris, 2012.
 11. For government neglect of the Highlands, see: Cameron, *Land for the People*; J. Hunter, *The Claim of Crofting: The Scottish Highlands and Islands, 1930–1990* (Edinburgh, 1991).
 12. G. Vindt, *Les hommes de l'aluminium. Histoire sociale de Pechiney 1921–1973* (Paris, 2006); H. Frouard, *Du coron au HLM: Patronat et logement social (1894–1953)* (Rennes, 2008); J. E. Igartua, *Arvida ou Saguenay: Naissance d'une ville industrielle* (Montréal and Kingston, 1996).
 13. R. Saville, 'The Industrial Background to the Post-War Scottish Economy' in R. Saville (ed.), *The Economic Development of Modern Scotland 1950–1980* (Edinburgh, 1985),

- Table 1(b); A. K. Cairncross (ed), *The Scottish Economy. A statistical account of Scottish life by members of the staff of Glasgow University* (Cambridge, 1954), Table 58.
14. Scottish Parliament, *Enterprise and Culture Committee Official Report*, 24 May 2005, Col. 1871; BBC, 'Aluminium firm slashes 200 jobs', 4 December 2001; 'Alcan to axe 85 jobs as it closes Falkirk mill', *The Scotsman*, 20 August 2004; BBC, 'Chemical Plant closure "a tragedy"', 5 September 2005.
 15. For discussion of this 'declinist' narrative, see Perchard and MacKenzie's article in this edition. Alexander was mistaken about some of these works start-up dates, with initial production commencing at Foyers in 1896 and Kinlochleven in 1907 (the permanent factory at Kinlochleven entered operation in 1909): K. Alexander, 'The Highlands and Islands Development Board', in R. Saville (ed), *The Economic Development of Modern Scotland 1950–1980*, 224.
 16. British Alcan, Pension Data, 1983; *Census*, 1981: <http://census.ac.uk/casweb> [accessed 12 March 2007]; Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB), *15th Annual Report* (Inverness, 1980), Table 3, and Appendix 4; HIDB, *Sixteenth Annual Report* (Inverness, 1981), Table 2, and Appendix 4; HIDB, *17th Annual Report* (Inverness, 1982), Table 2, App.3; HIDB, *18th Annual Report* (Inverness, 1983), Table 3, and Appendix 3.
 17. W. W. Knox, *Industrial Nation: Work, Culture, and Society in Scotland, 1800–Present* (Edinburgh, 1999), 251–96.
 18. 'Lord Kelvin and the Falls of Foyers works', *The Scotsman*, 5 August 1897.
 19. C. Smith and M. Norton Wise, *Energy & Empire: A Biographical Study of Lord Kelvin* (Cambridge, 2009), 722.
 20. Current values calculated using www.measuringworth.com using the Retail Price Index (RPI). In view of the fact that the figures for 1920 salaries were supplied to the House of Commons select committee by British Aluminium, these come with a caution: 'Water Power Resources: Effect of development in Scotland. Committee's conclusions', *The Scotsman*, 15 December 1921.
 21. For early critics of the schemes, see: Perchard, *Aluminiumville*, 191–8; Edinburgh, National Records of Scotland [NRS], (AF62/1972/8, Report from Sir William Goodchild on Argyll, Fisheries Board for Scotland, 19 November 1937; Hunter, *The Claim of Crofting*, 45; J. Gibson, *The Thistle and The Crown: A History of the Scottish Office* (Edinburgh, 1985), 81.
 22. J. M. Brock, *The Mobile Scot. A Study of Emigration and Migration 1861–1911* (Edinburgh, 1999), Tables 2.6 and 2.7; M. Harper, *Emigration from Scotland between the wars: opportunity or exile?* (Manchester, 1998), 6, and 71–108.
 23. Rev. A. Macaskill, 'The Parish of Boleskine and Abertarff' in H. Barron (ed.), *The Third Statistical Account of Scotland, The County of Inverness* (Edinburgh, 1985), 19–24; Rev. W. Fraser, 'United Parishes of Boleskine and Abertarff. Presbtery of Abertarff, Synod of Glenelg', *The New Statistical Account of Scotland. Vol. XIV Inverness, Ross, Cromarty* (Edinburgh, 1835), 51–63; 'The Foyers Question', *The Northern Chronicle*, 27 March 1895.
 24. *The Northern Chronicle*, for example, was owned by William Murray Morrison's uncle, Charles Innes: see E. A. Cameron, 'Conservatism and Radicalism in the Highland Press: the Strange Cases of the *Highlander* and the *Northern Chronicle*', *Northern Scotland* 27 (2007), 117–29; L. Stott, 'Morrison, (Sir William) Murray (1873–1948), metallurgist and electrical engineer', ODNB, www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/view/article/40348, [accessed 21 September 2006].
 25. The latter uses the historic opportunity cost for a project, using a GDP deflator: GUA, UGD47/21/2/7, North British Aluminium Company, Minute Book, No.1,

- 20 January 1925, 16 March and 14 September 1926, 5 and 12 June 1928, and 25 June 1929; Parliamentary Papers [PP] 1924, 121, *Trade Facilities Acts, 1921–1924*; W. Murray Morrison, ‘Aluminium and Highland Water Power’, *17th Autumn lecture to the Institute of Metals* (1939), 471.
26. GUA, UGD347/21/6/3, BACo, Extraordinary General Meeting, 21 November 1930, and BACo, Proceedings of the 21st Ordinary General Meeting, 28 March 1931.
27. Morrison, ‘Aluminium and Highland Water Power’, 33–4, and 466–7; Payne, *The Hydro*, 6.
28. PP 1910, 5068, *Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Vol. IX: Minutes of Evidence*, Q. 37 (Mr Charles Cleveland Ellis, Local Government Board for Scotland, 14 January 1908), Qs. 90365–6 (Mr James Ferguson, Indoor Assistant Inspector of Poor for Glasgow Parish Council, 20 January 1908), and Appendix no. CXVIII (Statement of evidence by Rev. Duncan Cameron, Minister of the Parish of Bridge of Allan); M. J. F. Gregor and R. M. Crichton, *From Croft to Factory. The Evolution of an Industrial Community in the Highlands* (Edinburgh, 1946), 22–5; Kirk, *Custom and Conflict in the ‘Land of the Gael*, 95; J. E. Handley, *The Navy in Scotland* (Cork, 1970), 8–9.
29. *The Engineer*, 25 April 1930, 7–9, and 29 May 1930, 9–12; Morrison, ‘Aluminium and Highland Water Power’; Payne, *The Hydro*, 6–12.
30. GUA, UGD 347 21/2/2, BACo, minutes of managers’ annual conferences, 30 November 1936 and 23 November 1938; NRS, SEP2/454/1, letter from A. G. Chalmers to W. H. Renfrew, 26 October 1948, NRS; *Valuation Rolls for the County of Inverness, Years of 1937–1938 and 1957–1958—Parish of Kilmonivaig*; *BACo’s Highland News, Christmas Number*, No.18, (December 1947), 3; D. Turnock, ‘Population Studies and Regional Development in West Highland Scotland’, pp.55–68; G. Munro and K. Hart, ‘The Highland Problem’: State and Community in Local Development’, *Arkleton Research Papers No. 1*(Aberdeen, 2000), 37.
31. Scottish Economic Committee, *The Highlands and Islands of Scotland: A Review of the Economic Conditions with Recommendations for Improvement* [hereafter *Hilleary Report*] (Edinburgh, 1938), 118–19, 130–2, and table A; NRS, AF62/1972/8, Report from Sir William Goodchild on Argyll, Fisheries Board for Scotland, 19 November 1937.
32. Hilleary Report, 131–8; PP 1942, 6406, Scottish Office, *Report of the Committee on Hydro-Electric Development in Scotland* [hereafter *Cooper Report*], 17.
33. PP 1943–4, 6526, *First Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into certain aspects of the Scottish valuation and rating system*, points 38 and 39.
34. L. Leneman, *Fit for heroes? Land Settlement in Scotland after World War I* (Aberdeen, 1989), 71; D. Cannadine, *The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy* (London, 1990); D. McCrone and A. Morris, ‘Lords and Heritages: the Transformation of the Great Lairds of Scotland’ in T. M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Elites. Proceedings of the Scottish Historical Studies Seminar University of Strathclyde 1991–1992* (Edinburgh, 1994), 170–86. For examples of ‘influence politics’ see: P. Joyce, *Work, Society and Politics: Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian Britain* (London, 1982); D. C. Moore, *The Politics of Deference: a Study of the Mid-Nineteenth Century Political System* (Hassocks, 1976).
35. *The Times*, 29 April 1922; G. A. R. Callender, ‘Laughton, Sir John Knox (1830–1915)’, rev. Andrew Lambert, *ODNB* (Oxford, 2004); online edn, October 2007 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34420, accessed 17 Sept 2010]. For details of their social engagements, see for example: ‘The Scottish Season: Northern Meeting Ball at Inverness’, *The Times*, 23 September 1938.

36. Rev. A. Macaskill, 'The Parish of Boleskine and Abertarff'; Rev'ds. A. Robertson, A. J. Maclean, M. A. MacCorquodale, and J. M. Annand, 'The Parish of Kilmallie', in H. Barron (ed.), *Third Statistical Account of Scotland: County of Inverness* (Edinburgh, 1985), 18–19, and 369–78; Cameron, 'Conservatism and Radicalism in the Highland Press', 117–29; L. Stott, 'Morrison, (Sir William) Murray (1873–1948)', *ODNB*; Cameron, Land for the People?, *passim*.
37. J. Martin, 'Fraser, Simon Joseph, fourteenth Lord Lovat and third Baron Lovat (1871–1933)', *ODNB*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/view/article/33254?docPos=5> [accessed 5 October 2007].
38. NRS, Scottish Land and Property Federation collection (SLPF), GD325/1/315, Letter from Col. A. D. Gardayne to Erskine Jackson, 18 July 1939.
39. J. McGregor, *The West Highland Railway: Plans, Politics and People* (Edinburgh, 2005); T. Dalyell, 'Obituaries: Col Sir Donald Cameron of Lochiel, 26th Chief of the Clan Cameron', *The Independent*, 15 June 2004, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/col-sir-donald-cameron-of-lochiel-730576.html> [accessed 5 January 2008].
40. Though not a west Highland landowner, Atholl represented the interests of the seventh Baron Abinger, primarily an English landowner with inherited estates at Inverlochry: SPLF NRS, GD325/1/315, Letter from Sir Donald Walter Cameron of Lochiel to G. Erskine Jackson, 17 September 1937; Leneman, *Fit for heroes? passim*.
41. Cameron of Lochiel estate papers, LAC, CL/A/3/2/45/2, Letter from the Duke of Atholl to Mackintosh of Mackintosh, 9 December 1920.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Butler, *Copper Empire*, 8; For changes in Colonial Office attitudes during and after World War Two, see: Idem, 'Reconstruction, development and the entrepreneurial state', 29–55.
44. For discussions of these see: Perchard, *Aluminiumville*, 191–244, 272–319.
45. Macaskill, 'The Parish of Boleskine and Abertarff', and Rev'ds. A. Robertson, A. J. Maclean, M. A. MacCorquodale, and J. M. Annand, 'The Parish of Kilmallie', 25 and 381–407.
46. I. G. C. Hutchison, 'The Nobility and Politics in Scotland, c.1880–1939' in T. M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Elites*, 144–5.
47. A. I. Macinnes, 'Landownership, Land Use and Elite Enterprise in Scottish Gaeldom: from Clanship to Clearance in Argyllshire, 1688–1858' in T. M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Elites*, 3; Harper, *Emigration from Scotland between the wars*, 74.
48. J. A. Burnett, *The Making of the Modern Scottish Highlands 1939–1965* (Dublin, 2011), 32.
49. The importance of this lobbying can be judged by the fact that Lochiel had opposed the Company's 1918 Loch Leven scheme on the grounds that it intended taking the water from Inverness-shire and diverting it to Argyll-shire, with the arising delays costing the Company dearly. However he wholeheartedly endorsed the amended Bill: LAC, CL/A/3/2/45/1, Petition to the Scottish Office from Col. D. W. Cameron of Lochiel against the Lochaber Water Power Bill, Jan. 1918; LAC, CL/A/3/2/45/2, Letter from William Murray Morrison to Col. D. W. Cameron of Lochiel, 12 May 1921; See also: Morrison to Lochiel, 29 December 1920, 24 February 1921, 18 May 1921, and 15 and 22 June 1921; PP 1907, 3718, *Royal Commission on Canals and Waterways, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, Vol. III*, Q.30154, W. Murray Morrison, British Aluminium Company, 10 July 1907.
50. Lochaber Water Power Bill, Minutes of Evidence, 6 May 1921 – Colonel Donald Walter Cameron of Lochiel, CMG., ADC; The Rt. Hon. Lord Lovat, KT, KCMG, KCVO, CB, DSO; 'Highland problem: Lord Lovat on agricultural employment', *The Scotsman*,

- 2 October 1920; 'Lochaber Housing Development: Extension of Aluminium Works', *The Scotsman*, 8 September 1937.
51. Quoted in Hunter, *The Claim of Crofting*, 45; Gibson, *The Thistle and The Crown*, 81.
 52. LAC, CL/3/3/18/4/1, Letter from Col. D.W. Cameron of Lochiel to Sir Alexander MacEwen, 8 July 1935 (see also correspondence from 12 July); for mistrust of Edinburgh and lowland policymakers, see also: Hunter, *The Claim of Crofting*.
 53. L. Grant, 'Work and leisure', *Caledonian Medical Journal* [hereafter *CMJ*] XIV (January 1930), 160; for more detail on Grant, see: Kirk, *Custom and Conflict in the 'Land of the Gael'*.
 54. *The Oban Times and Argyllshire Advertiser*, 6 March 1909.
 55. Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland [NLS}, Grant Collection, Acc.12187/7, Letter from William Murray Morrison to Lachlan Grant, 1 January 1935.
 56. Though questions over perceived health risks of aluminium, in particular, the use of aluminium pans, were principally focused on consumers, BACo was subject to criticisms over the pollution emanating from its plants: *Oban Times*, 16 and 23 February 1918, and 5 February 1921; *Highland News*, 29 May 1921; 'Aluminium and Health', *The Lancet*, 14 September 1931; *Scottish Daily Express*, 20 April 1934; Perchard, *Aluminiumville*, 191–244.
 57. Letter from Morrison to Grant, 1 January 1935.
 58. NLS, Acc.12187/8, Grant, 'Highland Life, Its Past and its Future', *CMJ* XV (July–October 1935).
 59. NLS, Acc.12187/10, Letter from Morrison to Grant, 18 December 1936.
 60. These 'social dramas' or crises can have a profound effect on organisational consciousness and culture. See: A.M. Pettigrew, 'On Studying Organisational Cultures', *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24 (1979), 570–81.
 61. London, The National Archives [TNA], LAB 2/188/IC4775/1918, Ministry of Labour, Industrial Commissioners Department, Arbitration between the Workers' Union and the British Aluminium Company Ltd., 20 September and 5 November 1918; PP 1921, 185, *Report for 1921 on conciliation and arbitration*, 90; 'Inverlochy strikers', *The Scotsman*, 16 June 1936; 'Inverlochy strikers decision', *The Scotsman*, 27 July 1936; 'Inverlochy strike', *The Scotsman*, 9 July 1936; Glasgow, Glasgow Caledonian University Archives (GCAL), STUC Archive, Lochaber Trades Council (LTC) (formerly Fort William & District Trades Council), File 1: 1975–78, Letter from D.F. Hunter, Lochaber Trades Council, to J. Milne, STUC, 7 November 1977; A. Campbell, N. Fishman and J. McIlroy, 'The Post-War Compromise: Mapping Industrial Politics, 1945–64' in A. Campbell, N. Fishman and J. McIlroy (eds), *British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The Post-War Compromise, 1945–64* (Aldershot, 1999), 69–116; Perchard, *Aluminiumville*, 136–244; Perchard, 'Sculpting the "Garden of Eden"'.
62. For trade union support: Lochaber Water Power Bill, Minutes of evidence, 6 May 1921 – Mr Charles Sievewright, Chairman of the National Union of Railwaymen, Fort William Branch; Letter from Hon. J.H. Thomas MP, General Secretary National Union of Railwaymen. For a contrast, see objections to and obstacles faced by the British Oxygen Company: Payne, *The Hydro*, 3–35; J.R. Payne, 'Land-use and landscape: Hydro-electricity and landscape protection in the Highlands of Scotland, 1919–1980', unpublished PhD thesis, University of St Andrews, 2008, 38–86.
 63. *Oban Times*, 8 January 1916; A.G. MacKenzie, *Church of Scotland, Kinlochleven: Golden Jubilee, 1930–1980* (Kinlochleven, 1980), 21–4; Rev. A. Robertson et al., 'The Parish of Kilmallie', 365–407, and 407–31; Rev. I. Carmichael, 'Lorn: The Parish of Lismore

- and Appin', in C. M. MacDonald (ed.) *Third Statistical Account of Scotland: County of Argyll* (Glasgow, 1961), 160–8.
64. *The BA News*, vol.1, no.3, (1948), 3, 19; *The BA News*, vol.2, no.3, (1949), 5; BACo, *The history of the British Aluminium Company Limited 1894–1955* (London, 1955).
65. Coen et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government*, 15–17; Hillman et al., 'Corporate Political Activity', 837–57; For further reflections on these, see: Perchard, *Aluminiumville*; Idem, 'Of the highest Imperial importance'.
66. For detail on pollution case, see Perchard, *Aluminiumville*, 221–6.