'Westernization': A new paradigm for interpreting West European history in a Cold War context

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REVIEW ARTICLE

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Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), pp.160, ISBN 3-525-34017-6, €10.90 pb.

Michael Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongreß für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen.*. 'Ordnungssysteme. Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit', vol.1 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.677, ISBN 3-486-56341-6, €49.80 hb.

Thomas Sauer, *Westorientierung im deutschen Protestantismus? Vorstellungen und Tätigkeit des Kronberger Kreises.* 'Ordnungssysteme. Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit', vol.2 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), pp.vii + 326, ISBN 3-486-56342-4, €49.80 hb.

Gudrun Kruip, *Das 'Welt'-'Bild' des Axel Springer Verlags. Journalismus zwischen westlichen Werten und deutschen Denktraditionen.* 'Ordnungssysteme. Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit', vol. 3. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), pp.311, ISBN 3-486-56343-2, €49.80 hb.

Julia Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie. Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB.* 'Ordnungssysteme. Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit', vol.13 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), pp.538, ISBN 3-486-56676-8, €69.80 hb.

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The purpose of this review article is to discuss a new paradigm for interpreting transatlantic relations in the period between the late 1940s and the early 1970s. By focusing on the role of ideology in the Cold War and on the agencies through which it was transmitted, this paradigm highlights the importance of national traditions in the experience of the Cold War. Yet at the same time it does not abandon the unifying framework of the Cold War altogether. It assumes that, in a process of 'Westernization', a transatlantic community of values including compatible political, social and economic orders came into existence between the late 1940s and the early 1970s. 'Westernization' was not a one-way process of transmission or even imposition of American values on the European continent. Instead, British, French and Italian actors participated in the negotiation of such a community, so that ideas travelled back and forth across the Atlantic.[1] This transatlantic community lasted until its tenets of economic growth and its underlying political, social and economic consensus had lost credibility in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973. Under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, Britain and the United States adopted policies which broke with the politics of consensus, while European countries, most notably French and German politicians across the political spectrum, remained wedded to its basic contents.

The United States actively sought to establish such a community of values in the Western hemisphere in the late 1940s and early 1950s in order to supply an ideological foundation to the emerging Western security and economic community. The ideas which the United States tried to transmit had emerged in the United States during the New Deal era as 'consensus liberalism'.[2] This 'consensus liberalism' emphasized the tenets of classical liberalism, such as individualism and the importance of private property. But it was also merged with the more state-centred approach of the New Dealers. This brand of liberalism was emphatically pluralist and sought the rational solution of disputes both in the political system at large and at the work place. It was thus diametrically opposed to the 'ideas of 1914' which had been so widespread among the German educated elites in the 1920s. 'Consensus liberalism' became a prominent feature of the transatlantic community of values in the roughly 30 years between the end of the Second World War and the oil crisis in 1973. These values were never transferred to Europe in a pure form, but rather merged with European ideas.

The 'Westernization' project is part of the growing trend towards writing cultural histories of the Cold War and of the post-revisionist

emphasis on the importance of societies other than the two superpowers.[3] Contemporary German history in particular has profited from this trend to emphasize the interactions between national and international history. Here, 'Americanization' has been the dominant strand of interpretation. Starting with Volker Berghahn's work on the Americanization of West German industry in 1986,[4] there are now studies on the American influence on the basic law,[5] on American influences on lifestyle,[6] as well as about the US attempts to spread American culture[7] – to name but a few of these studies. Slowly but steadily, French and British post-1945 history have also been opening up towards considering international influences.[8] These debates, however, are still characterized by the assumption of a very simple one-way transfer of ideas and certain kinds of lifestyle from the United States to other countries, in Europe and elsewhere, which took place between the 1920s and the 1970s. In many of these analyses the assumption of the 1960s New Left about American hegemony still lurks in the background. The implicit assumption of an aggressively acting American imperial power can even be detected in those studies which have tried to leave this quasi-Marxist framework of analysis behind.[9] And even those works which try to modify this overall picture remain within the conceptual framework of American hegemony. Among the most recent publications, Jessica Gienow-Hecht's excellent *Transmission Impossible* is one of the few studies which takes the transfer of ideas from the United States and their reception in Germany seriously and which rejects the framework of an all-intrusive American empire.[10] Yet she does not develop a new framework for understanding transatlantic relations during the Cold War. Similarly, Giles Scott-Smith in his study on the Congress for Cultural Freedom acknowledges the importance of 'culture' as an important variable in international relations and emphasizes the formation of an 'Atlanticist outlook on the intellectual plane', he revives a Gramscian interpretation of American hegemony. Yet, according to his interpretation, 'culture' remains an instrument of power and does not receive the independent status of the foundation stone of the Atlantic community between the late 1940s and the early 1970s.[11]

'Westernization' is distinct from Americanization[12] in two ways. First, Westernization goes much deeper than Americanization. The term refers to the emergence of a transatlantic community of values between the late 1940s and early 1970s which bound Western Europe and the United States together, not merely to the adoption of

certain lifestyles or production techniques like Fordism or Taylorism[13] which originated in the United States. The Westernization paradigm accords an overriding importance to the cold war of ideologies between the Western and the Eastern bloc, which was essentially a battle over the heritage of the Enlightenment, more specifically between Liberalism and Marxism. The 'Westernization' paradigm thus allows the differentiation between criticism of certain American policies and the more fundamental disagreement with Western values. Second, while 'Americanization' often implies the hegemonic imposition of an American lifestyle on non-American societies and the one-way transfer of lifestyles and business techniques, 'Westernization' implies the cooperation of Americans and non-Americans in creating a transatlantic community of values by means of cultural transfer. The acculturation of 'consensus liberalism' took different forms in different national settings. This distinction demonstrates that the 'Westernization' paradigm does not seek to replace 'Americanization', but that it aims to offer an important addition to it.

The studies under review apply the concept of 'Westernization' in different ways. While Hochgeschwender and Angster examine the ways in which the United States tried to create a Western community of values in cooperation with German politicians, academics and intellectuals via the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) via trade union links, the scope of Sauer's and Kruip's studies is limited to the ways in which the emergence of a transatlantic community of values resonated within different sections of the West German population. Sauer analyzes as part of the Protestant *milieu* which was infamous for its nationalist sentiments and its approval of the 'ideas of 1914'. Kruip reconstructs the ideology of the most influential newspaper publishing house at the time, the Axel Springer publishing company.

Hochgeschwender's study on the CCF and German society is a masterpiece in subtle, yet strong historical argument. While Frances Stonor Saunders paints a rather monolithic picture of the CCF's control of the British intelligentsia in her study on the CCF in Britain by essentially reiterating the points made by the CCF's opponents in the mid-1960s, Hochgeschwender leaves this battlefield of the late 1960s. He emphasizes the organizational and the practical problems which the CCF encountered when trying to transmit ideas.[14]

Although parts of the introduction and the passages on the ideological origins of 'consensus liberalism' are heavy going for people without a background in philosophy, the book offers a superb

analysis of the underlying networks of politicians, intellectuals and academics. The book makes a compelling read, a bit like a mixture of a spy thriller and *Vanity Fair*. The largest part of the book examines the period up to the early 1950s, the time when the Cold War framework came into place.

The CCF was first set up in Berlin in June 1950 to counter attempts by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and by the Soviet Union, which tried to encourage neutralist sentiments among West German and West European intellectuals through an international peace campaign. It subsequently developed an extremely strong anti-communist ideological agenda which, until 1953, relegated the more positive tenets of consensus liberalism to the sidelines. The CCF emerged out of a group of intellectuals based around the journal *Der Monat*, which was the equivalent of the British *Encounter*.[15] Interestingly, support for a transatlantic community of values did not mean that the intellectuals involved in CCF necessarily supported Adenauer's policies of conventional and nuclear armament during the 1950s. The list of people who were involved or who had close links to the journal reads like an extract from *Who's Who*. Throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, the German section of the CCF sat like the spider in the web of German intellectual life, with particularly strong links to the reformist wing of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) around Willy Brandt. Politicians close to the SPD such as Ernst Reuter, Otto Suhr, Richard Löwenthal, Franz Borkenau and Max Brauer were involved from a very early point, as was the SPD politician Carlo Schmid, who became the chairman of the German executive of the CCF until its dissolution in 1953/4. Alexander Mitscherlich, Dolf Sternberger and Alfred Weber were prominent academics involved in the CCF. The writer Siegfried Lenz and the journalist Theo Sommer joined the CCF's Hamburg section in the early 1960s. Melvyn Lasky, an American journalist in Berlin with strong links to the New York intellectual world, helped to bring these people together with the aid of the occupation officers Shepard Stone[16] and Michael Josselson, a CIA agent.

During the mid-1950s' détente, the fierce anti-communism which had dominated the CCF's ideology in the early years of the decade receded, and there was now more emphasis on the core points of 'consensus liberalism' with its focus on the rational negotiation of conflicts across political and economic interests. Sociologists close to the CCF, such as Edward Shils, Daniel Bell and Raymond Aron,

developed the theory of an 'end of ideology'[17] in order to give this change of emphasis an ideological foundation. The theory became extremely influential in Anglophone and West German sociology. Its political impact can be seen in parts of the Godesberg Programme (1959) and in Willy Brandt's announcement of a *Politik der Gemeinsamkeit* ('politics of commonality') with the Christian Democrats (CDU) at the beginning of the 1960s. It enabled those close to the German CCF section to support Brandt's policies of détente. With the emergence of the New Left in during the 1960s, those close to the CCF were increasingly regarded not so much as liberals but rather as conservatives with close links to the machinery of the state, a picture which seemed to be confirmed when the *New York Times* revealed the strong links between the CIA and the CCF in 1966.

Hochgeschwender tells the story of an organizational failure, given all the rifts and debates amongst those involved in or close to the CCF. Yet the debates took place within the relatively coherent ideological framework of 'consensus liberalism'. Most of those involved in the CCF did not need to be persuaded to join. Given the havoc which the National Socialist regime had wrought, the urge for new ideas was great among certain sections of German society, and some intellectuals accepted the new ideas thankfully. They hardly needed an education in the values of this emerging transatlantic community. Most of them came from socialist, yet staunchly anti-communist backgrounds. The real importance of the German CCF lay in creating a forum for the political involvement of left-wing, reform-oriented, yet anti-communist intellectuals in the Federal Republic. It helped a social-liberal and Western-oriented intellectual *milieu* to organize itself and become dominant in the Federal Republic from about 1965 onwards.

Hochgeschwender convincingly shows that, despite support from the CIA and the Ford Foundation, the US was neither willing nor able to impose its will on the German intellectuals with links to the CCF. There were frequent organizational problems and personal rivalries both in the Paris headquarters and within the German section of the CCF, which led to the dissolution of the German executive in 1954 and its recreation in a more localized format with groups in Hamburg, Cologne, and Munich from the mid-1950s onwards. The ideas which the CCF propagated became a constitutive part of West German political culture and remained alive during the Brandt era and beyond, even after consensus liberalism had lost most of its attraction in the United States.

Julia Angster's well argued and thought-provoking study on the Westernization of the West German labour movement shows in more detail than Hochgeschwender's book how the transfer of values took place.[18] By employing a biographical approach and the insights of sociological network analysis, she seeks to show how processes of social change in the West German labour movement were influenced by intercultural transfer. More specifically, Angster examines the networks of members of the (West) German labour movement with their British and American counterparts between the 1920s and the 1950s. She is particularly interested in the 'acculturation' of the American labour movement's ideas about democracy, society, and the state – in short the ideas which defined 'consensus capitalism' – by the West German labour movement in exile and in the Federal Republic.[19] She claims that these 'Western' ideas connected to 'consensus capitalism' had a crucial impact on the programmatic reforms of the West German Social Democratic Party and the Federation of German Trade Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, DGB) in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

There were two main channels through which ideas travelled and through which certain sections of the elites of the West German labour movement became acquainted with the reformist approach of the American trade unions. These trade unions emphasized the rational negotiation of claims rather than class struggle.[20] The first of these routes was the experience of exile from National Socialism. For German socialists such as Willy Brandt the contacts with the more reformist labour movements traditions of Scandinavia, Britain, or the United States, often coupled with a staunch anti-communism, had extremely important influences on their worldviews.[21] After they had returned to Germany the former émigrés stayed in touch through networks in the DGB and the SPD.[22] And some, most notably Willy Brandt, were even part of the German CCF network.[23] Angster shows convincingly how the political values of the *emigrés* changed during exile. At the same time, she is careful to point out that the Western values were not merely imposed as the term 'Americanization' would imply. Rather, the Social Democrats and trade unionists in exile actively engaged with the 'new' ideas they were exposed to, thus acculturating them to their own background.

The connections which some SPD politicians and trade unionists formed with the European offices of the American trade unions Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) were a second important route through

which ideas could travel. Most of these networks were formed in connection with the Marshall Plan. Their aim was to strengthen the non-communist labour movement by reinforcing the Western ideas of pluralism and consensus capitalism.[24]

Although it is difficult to gauge the direct impact of these networks in relation to other factors, it seems plausible to assume that, by strengthening the reformist sections within the SPD and the West German trade unions, these networks helped to support the process of programmatic change which had been under way since at least the 1920s in response to new social and economic developments and in particular in the wake of the National Socialist dictatorship. The Godesberg Programme of the SPD (1959) and the DGB's Düsseldorf Programme (1963) represent this Westernization of the German labour movement.[25] They showed a radical change in the way in which the labour movement elites perceived themselves, and they revealed an entirely new vision of society and politics. In programmatic terms, the formerly class- and *milieu*-based SPD had now become a left-wing catch-all party, which was willing to enter into a Grand Coalition with the CDU.[26] The trade unions also acknowledged in their new programme that they were no longer a counter-force, but that they had become a pressure group among others within a capitalist society. The programmatic documents argued that parliamentary democracy had become an aim in itself, rather than a mere stepping stone towards socialism. As for economic policies, growth and the distribution of wealth, coupled with the 'politics of productivity',[27] had taken the place of the nationalization of industries as the main programmatic goals. The people who drove the 'Westernization' of the West German labour movement were those who had belonged to socialist splinter groups in the 1920s and who had spent their years in exile in the United States, Britain or the Scandinavian countries. Their own ideological traditions were not eliminated. Rather, a dynamic process of acculturation took place during the years of exile, which was supported by American trade union networks after 1945.[28] Angster thus replaces the simplistic notions of American imperialism which are implicit in many studies on 'Americanization' with a much more sophisticated framework which stresses the active part which the West German Social Democrats and trade unionists played in the American networks. Angster's intelligent study is therefore probably the best example of the insights which the 'Westernization' paradigm offers.

By contrast to Hochgeschwender's and Angster's studies, Sauer's book on the *Kronberger Kreis*, which was founded in 1951, shows

that not all groups in German society participated as eagerly in Westernization as those involved, or close to, the German section of the CCF or *Der Monat*. There was much less direct contact with American or British circles in most sections of the Protestant *milieu*. Sauer convincingly weaves together a biographical approach with a thorough analysis of the discussions within the group. Sauer's study not only shows the resilience of German (as opposed to 'Western') ideas even in circles which generally approved of German integration into the Western security community. He also produced a work which brings church and more general history together in an exemplary manner.

The circle was founded in Kronberg/Taunus in 1951 by Eberhard Müller, founder and director of the *Evangelische Akademie* (Protestant Academy) Bad Boll, Reinhard von Thadden-Trieglaff, president of the *Evangelischer Kirchentag* (Protestant Church Parliament), and Hanns Lilje, bishop of the Lutheran *Landeskirche* (state church) of Hanover. Its purpose was to counter the attempts by groups around Gustav Heinemann, formerly member of Adenauer's first cabinet and president of the synod of the EKD from 1945 to 1955, and around Martin Niemöller, Church President of Hesse-Nassau from 1947 to 1964, who both tried to foster a broad church opposition to West German rearmament. The group subsequently developed into a discussion circle with strong links to the CDU for high-ranking Protestants in the Church itself (such as Hanns Lilje), in business and management (like the director of the Phoenix rubber works, Otto A. Friedrich[29]) and in politics (the president of the German parliament Hermann Ehlers, the later Foreign Secretary Gerhard Schröder). Despite their roots in the conservative Protestant *milieu* of the Wilhelmine empire, their experiences in national and international Christian students' associations like the YMCA in the 1920s as well as their connections to the Confessing Church during the National Socialist dictatorship predisposed the group's founders and some of its members to be open towards some tenets of 'consensus liberalism'. Sauer shows that the members of the circle, despite their unquestioning support for Adenauer's policy of *Westintegration* (integration into the West), embraced Western values only unknowingly or reluctantly, and not entirely. They continued to think in terms of the cultural hegemony of Protestantism.

Gudrun Kruip's study screens another area of German society for Westernizing influences. She analyzes the ideology which was behind the publications *Die Welt* and *Bild* of the *Axel Springer Verlag* and

passes a damning judgement on the publishing house's Western credentials. She shows that, on the one hand, Springer was very eager to model his papers according to an Anglo-American style. The mass-market *Bild*, for example, which the publisher founded in 1952, followed the example of the British *Daily Mirror*. On the other hand, however, she can demonstrate that, particularly under the influence of the editor-in-chief Hans Zehrer, the publishing house's ideology, visible in both internal guidelines and its publications, remained extremely static and hesitant towards Westernization throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The publishing house's ideology remained bound to an organic view of the polity and the state. Pressure groups and extra-parliamentary movements only destroyed, according to the world view of the publishing house, the all-important harmony in domestic politics. The publishing house interpreted 'freedom' and 'democracy' only formally. Springer's views on social policies and industrial relations remained wedded to a patriarchic ethos, and did not open up towards the New Deal concept of human relations. The nation remained an important reference in the publishing house's ideology. Kruip's book offers Springer's and his editors' biographies, a history of publishing in West Germany, and a thorough analysis of the ideas which Springer's papers tried to spread.

Although all the studies under review make a powerful case for the adoption of the Westernization paradigm, there are some problems connected both with the paradigm itself as well as with its application. The precise epistemological status of the words 'West' and 'Western values' is not entirely clear in any of these works. Although the authors take great pains in elaborating what the term means, the reader remains in the dark about whether it is supposed to serve as an ideal-type, as Sauer argues[30] and as Kruip's methodology implies, or whether the term refers to particular notions of 'Westernness' which circulated at the time, as Doering-Manteuffel, Hochgeschwender and Angster seem to suggest. Particularly if one takes the dynamic and discursive character of the Western community of values seriously, the problem is how to define the boundaries of this Western community of values. If we assume that 'the West' and 'Westernness' are not ideal types, the difficulty in defining this concept is exacerbated by the fact that the authors seem to suggest that what they call 'Western' ideas were in opposition to the German 'ideas of 1914'. There are two problems with this. First, the definition directly takes on board both German and Allied propaganda during the First and Second World Wars which claimed

that Germany was not part of the West. Phrased like this, it contradicts the authors' claim that national (German) and international ideological traditions merged to create the transatlantic community of values.[31] Second, although the authors claim that their concept refers to West European processes – and there are many reasons to suspect that it does – it is not entirely clear why they use a purely national category ('the ideas of 1914') to define their paradigm. Also, in their definition of 'Western values', the authors only acknowledge, but do not pay sufficient attention to, French, British, and, indeed, German roots of Western ideas and thus neglect the dynamic interaction of these different traditions.[32]

Apart from these rather theoretical problems, the application of the paradigm is, at times, not adequate. Although the authors stress the dynamic nature of 'Westernization', their assumptions, with the exception of Angster, about the exchange of ideas are too static. They seem to assume a very simple relationship between the sender and the receiver of ideological packages. Every scholar who has worked on the transfer of ideas in international history will recognize, however, that transmission processes were fraught with many problems of misunderstandings, and that they often involved the reinterpretations of ideas. While Hochgeschwender succeeds in showing the organizational problems of transnational politics, he is too quick to state that the transfer of ideas was not affected by these problems. What we need is a more elaborate framework for the transfer of ideas which sets out in detail to what extent the biographies, the world views, the media employed for the transfer, and indeed the structure of the ideas itself influence the transfer of ideas and their acculturation in different national contexts.[33] Such an elaborate methodology would allow us to gauge to what extent the transatlantic community of values as seen from a US point of view differed from the German or French interpretation, and how a transatlantic community of values could be maintained despite these probably very different perceptions. The second problem with the application of the paradigm in these four studies is that it is too centred on the United States. Particularly for the German SPD and trade unions, influences from the British labour movement were probably as important as the ones stemming from the interaction with US labour organizations. Angster has succeeded most in developing such an approach. While her study is excellent in bringing out the ways in which cultural 'acculturation' worked, there is not enough on the practical workings of these networks.

Finally, the rather elite-centred approach in its current form is problematic. If it is correct that the Springer press was so popular in the 1950s since it represented the mood of the times, as Kruip argues, why is it not true for the 1960s and 1970s as well? And if Springer represented the mood of the population throughout the period, does this not mean that the West German population at large did not participate in 'westernization', or simply did not care?

In order to answer these questions we need more studies which analyze how widespread the values of 'consensus liberalism' were in the West German population. To what extent did they frame the practice rather than the ideology of industrial relations?[34] To what extent can they be recognized in West German society more generally, rather than among elites only? In order to tackle these questions, an approach needs to be developed which conceptualizes the relationship between elites and society.[35] In particular, we need more studies on other pressure groups (such as the employers' organizations) and parties (like the CDU and the liberal Free Democrats).

This critique does not invalidate the project as such. Rather it is evidence of the stimulating ideas which this new paradigm engenders. The achievement of these studies goes beyond their contribution to the burgeoning field of studies about the American influence on West German and West European reconstruction, and it can only be hoped that the paradigm resonates more widely within the Anglo-American world than it has done so far. Angster, Doering-Manteuffel, Hochgeschwender, Kruip and Sauer develop a paradigm which embeds national history systematically and fundamentally in an international context. At the same time, their perspective is not restricted to the Cold War. They bring experiences from the 1920s and 1930s in to explain the emergence of the Western community of values. Thus, they offer a convincing and fundamental explanation about why stabilization of Western Europe worked after World War II, while it failed after World War I. Their thoughts on the transfer and interaction of ideas, albeit still a bit rough, encourage us to think about the preconditions which enabled the United States to establish its hegemony in Western Europe relatively easily and often without exerting pressure. Hochgeschwender's study on the CCF in the Federal Republic superbly demonstrates that it was not only anti-communism but also a belief in certain liberal values which brought the West German intellectuals close to the CCF and to *Der Monat*. He can also show that CIA officers were far less interested in exerting direct power, but were quite content with leaving the German CCF

section and *Der Monat* on a long leash, so that it was, bizarrely enough, the CIA agent Josselson who tried to push Kostler's staunch anti-communism aside.[36] He thus modifies the picture of American reluctance to engage in discussion which has dominated earlier research.[37] As Angster's study brilliantly demonstrates, historians need to incorporate these intellectual and structural preconditions which existed *before* hegemony, if they want to go beyond the traditional model of American power, pressure and European response. Given the complete destruction of moral and intellectual values which the National Socialism regime had caused, certain sections of the German population were particularly open towards the ideas which the Americans offered to them. There needs to be more comparative research in order to place the German developments in context.

Given the current rift over the war in Iraq between several European states and the United States, in particular between Germany and the US, the historical analysis of transatlantic relations has only gained in importance. Although many have interpreted the rift as the outcome of the heat generated by the German general elections, others have doubted whether Germany still belonged to the Western community of values, particularly after Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had announced a 'German way' with regard to the war in Iraq and, often overlooked, with regard to socioeconomic affairs.[38] Commentators on the right of the political spectrum have, together with the US administration, detected the traditional anti-Americanism of the German left behind Schröder's stance.[39] But what precisely 'anti-Americanism' meant apart from a disagreement with US policies has not been entirely clear.

The Westernization paradigm makes it possible to come to some more precise and historically founded conclusions about the current rift. The model developed here suggests that the rift is much more fundamental than many observers have recognized.[40] While Germany and France have remained by and large wedded to the tenets of 'consensus liberalism' to the present day, the policies of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan finally destroyed that consensus in Britain and the United States respectively. The current rift appears to be the late result of the break-up of the transatlantic community in the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s. It has only come to light now, after the restraining influences of German division and the Cold War had collapsed simultaneously. These studies taken together are a testimony for future generations that an overarching transatlantic community

existed in the second half of the twentieth century. It remains to be seen, however, whether a new transatlantic community of values will emerge around free-market liberal ideas in the twenty-first.

NOTES

1. Cf. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?* (Göttingen, 1999), pp.5–19; idem, 'Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?', *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 3 (1996), pp.1–38; and, in English, idem, 'Transatlantic Exchange and Interaction – The Concept of Westernization', paper presented to the conference 'The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective', German Historical Institute Washington, D. C., March 25-27, 1999, www.ghi-dc.org/conpotweb/westernpapers/doering.pdf.

2. On the influence of New Deal ideas on US policies after the Second World War cf. Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan. America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge, 1987).

3. Cf. Dominik Geppert, 'Cultural Aspects of the Cold War', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London* 24/2 (2002), pp.50–71. Cf., among the many studies, Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain. Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (Basingstoke, 1997); Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas. US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (Cambridge and New York, 1981); Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us. How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997); Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream. American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982); with an emphasis on state–private network and written in a slightly polemic tone W. Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War. The US Crusade against the Soviet Union* (Manchester, 1999). More nuanced: Frank Schumacher, *Kalter Krieg und Propaganda. Die USA und der Kampf um die Weltmeinung und die ideelle Westbindung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945–1955* (Trier, 2000) and Bernd Stöver, *Befreiuung vom Kommunismus. Amerikanische Liberation Policy im Kalten Krieg 1947–1991* (Cologne, 2002).

4. Volker R. Berghahn, *The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945–1973* (Leamington Spa, 1986).

5. Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie. Der amerikanische Beitrag 1945–1992* (Opladen, 1993) and Edmund Spevack, *Allied Control and German Freedom. American political and ideological influences on the framing of the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz)* 'Geschichte, vol. 36' (Münster, 2001).

6. Cf., for example, Kaspar Maase, *BRAVO Amerika. Erkundungen zur Jugendkultur der Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren* (Hamburg, 1992), and Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, 2000).

7. On the American information centres in Germany cf. Maritta Hein-Kremer, *Die amerikanische Kulturoffensive. Gründung und Entwicklung der amerikanischen Information Centers in Westdeutschland und West-Berlin 1945–1955*, Cologne 1996.

8. Cf. Heide Fehrenbach and Uta G. Poiger (eds.), *Transactions, transgressions, transformations. American Culture in Western Europe and Japan* (New York and Oxford, 2000). Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French. The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, 1993). On Britain cf. Hugh Wilford, '"Unwitting Assets?": British Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom', *Twentieth Century British History* 11/1 (2000), pp.42–60, and his *The CIA, the British Left, and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?* (London, 2003). Both are directed against the polemic by Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London, 1999). Cf also Paul Lashmar and Oliver James, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War: Foreign Office and the Cold War 1948–1977* (Stroud, 1998).

9. This is especially evident in Lucas' *Freedom's War* and can also be detected in Ralph Willett, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949* (London, 1989).

10. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible. American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, 1999). See also her article 'Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer and the Cold War – A Critical Review', *Diplomatic History* 24/3 (2000), pp.465–94.

11. Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture. The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Post-war American Hegemony* (London, 2002), p.2 (quote).

12. On Americanization cf. Volker Berghahn, 'Conceptualizing the American Impact on Germany: West German Society and the Problem of Americanization', paper presented to the conference 'The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective', German Historical Institute Washington, DC, 25–27 March 1999, www.ghi-dc.org/conpotweb/westernpapers/berghahn.pdf as well as Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, 'Dimensionen von Amerikanisierung in der deutschen Gesellschaft', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 35 (1995), pp.1–34; the volume edited by Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945–1970* (Frankfurt/Main, 1997), as well as the review article by Philipp Gassert, 'Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus und Amerikanisierung. Neue Literatur zur Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des amerikanischen Einflusses in Deutschland und Europa', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 39 (1999), pp.531–61.

13. Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity. American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York and Oxford, 1994).

14. Previous studies on the activities of the CCF include: Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper?*; Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind in Postwar Europe* (New York, 1989); and Pierre Grémion, *Intelligence de l'Anticommunisme: Le Congrès pour la Liberté de Culture à Paris, 1950–1975* (Paris, 1995). Cf. now as well: Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture*.

15. For a summary on the importance of *Der Monat* in English cf. Michael Hochgeschwender, 'The intellectual as propagandist: *Der Monat*, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and the Process of Westernization in Germany', paper presented to the conference 'The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective', German Historical Institute Washington, DC, 25–27 March 1999, www.ghi dc.org/conpotweb/westernpapers/ hochgeschwender.pdf.

16. On Shepard Stone cf. Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe. Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy and Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ, 2001).

17. On this ideological package cf. now Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture* and his 'The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the End of Ideology and the 1955 Milan Conference: "Defining the Parameters of Discourse"', *Journal of Contemporary History* 37/3 (2002), pp.437–55. Scott-Smith overlooks, however, that the CCF's message was highly political and that those involved in it were very well aware of this.

18. Cf. Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*. Cf. also her '"Safe by Democracy": American Hegemony and the "Westernization" of West German Labor', *Amerikastudien/American Studies. A Quarterly* 46/4 (2001), pp.557–72, and on her 'Vom Klassenkampf zur Tarifpartnerschaft. Westernisierung in SPD und DGB 1940–1970', *Vorgänge. Zeitschrift für Bürgerrechte und Gesellschaftspolitik* 154 (2001), pp.41–50 and Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?*, pp.90–102.

19. Cf. the excellent overview on these ideas in the West German and American labour movement in Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, pp.39–98.

20. Cf. Patrick Renshaw, *American Labour and Consensus Capitalism, 1935–1990* (London, 1991).

21. Cf. on importance of exile: Martin Conway, 'Legacies of Exile: The Exile Governments in London during the Second World War and the Politics of Post-war Europe', in idem and José Gotovitch (eds.), *Europe in Exile. European Exile Communities in Britain 1940–1945* (New York and Oxford, 2001), pp.255–74, especially 269–70. On Brandt cf. in particular: Willy Brandt, *Zwei Vaterländer:*

Deutsch-Norweger im schwedischen Exil. Rückkehr nach Deutschland, 1940–1947, ed. Einhart Lorenz, vol.2, *Berliner Ausgabe* (Bonn, 2000).

22. Cf. Julia Angster, 'Wertewandel in den Gewerkschaften. Zur Rolle gewerkschaftlicher Remigranten in der Bundesrepublik der 1950er Jahre', in Claus-Dieter Krohn and Patrik von zur Mühlen (eds.), *Rückkehr und Aufbau nach 1945. Deutsche Remigranten im öffentlichen Lebens Nachkriegsdeutschlands* (Marburg, 1997), pp.111–38; and her 'Der Zehnerkreis. Remigranten in der westdeutschen Arbeiterbewegung der 1950er Jahre', *Exil* 18/1 (1998), pp.26–47. Cf. in English the broad overview: 'The Westernization of the German Labor Movement. Cultural Transfer and Transnational Network Politics in the 1940s and 1950s', paper presented to the conference 'The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective', German Historical Institute Washington, DC, 25–27 March 1999, www.ghi-dc.org/conpotweb/westernpapers/nolan.pdf.

23. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive*, p.154.

24. Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, pp.99–178 (on American foreign policy and these networks) and pp.179–269 on the working of these networks in West Germany 1945–52.

25. Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, pp.353–413.

26. For an elaboration of this theme cf. Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?*, pp.127–34; idem, 'Westernisierung. Politisch-ideeller und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik bis zum Ende der 60er Jahre', in Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers (eds.), *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (Hamburg, 2000), pp.311–41; and idem, 'Turning to the Atlantic: The Federal Republic's Ideological Reorientation, 1945–1970', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington, D.C.* (Spring 1999), pp.2–12.

27. Charles S. Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity. Foundations of American Economic Policy after World War II', *International Organization* 31/4 (1977), pp.607–33.

28. Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, pp.468–9.

29. On Friedrich see: Volker R. Berghahn and Paul J. Friedrich, *Otto A. Friedrich. Ein politischer Unternehmer. Sein Leben und seine Zeit, 1902–1975* (Frankfurt/Main, 1993).

30. Sauer, *Westernisierung*, p.17.

31. Cf. the critique by Mary Nolan, which unnecessarily juxtaposes Americanization and Westernization: 'Americanization or Westernization?', paper presented to the conference 'The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective', German Historical Institute Washington, DC, 25–27 March 1999, www.ghi-dc.org/conpotweb/westernpapers/nolan.pdf.

32. For German influences on certain sections of the British labour movement cf. Lawrence Black, 'Social Democracy as a Way of Life: Fellowship and the Socialist Union, 1951–9', *Twentieth Century British History* 10/4 (1999), pp.499–539.

33. Cf. for example, Michel Espagne and Michael Werner, 'Deutsch-französischer Kulturtransfer im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. Zu einem neuen interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramm des C.N.R.S.', *Francia* 13 (1985), pp.502–10; idem, 'Deutsch-französischer Kulturtransfer als Forschungsgegenstand. Eine Problemskizze', in idem (eds.), *Transferts. Les relations interculturelle dans l'espace franco-allemand (XVIIIe-XIXe siècle)* (Paris, 1988), pp.11–34, and Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, 'Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der *histoire croisée* und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28/4 (2002), pp.607–36. An example for a more elaborate analysis is (although it is centred too much on the realm of ideas rather than social action): Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, 'Der Transfer zwischen den Studentenbewegungen von 1968 und die Entstehung einer transnationalen Gegenöffentlichkeit', in Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig (eds.), *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 2002), pp.303–25. On a social approach to transnational history cf. Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27

(2001), pp.464–79 and the remarks in Frank Ninkovich, 'No mortems for Postmodernism, Please', *Diplomatic History* 22/3 (1998), pp.451–66.

34. For an analysis which does not rely on the Westernization paradigm cf. S. Jonathan Wiesen, 'Industrialists, Workers and Perceptions of America in West Germany in the 1950s', paper presented to the conference 'The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective', German Historical Institute Washington, DC, 25–27 March 1999, www.ghi-dc.org/conpotweb/ westernpapers/wiesen.pdf.

35. For some ideas cf. Ursula Lehmkuhl, 'Commentary', paper presented to the conference 'The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective', German Historical Institute Washington, DC, 25–27 March 1999, www.ghi-dc.org/conpotweb/westernpapers/lehmkuhl.pdf, p.4.

36. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive*, p.590.

37. Cf. Richard Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age. American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s* (Hanover, NH, 1989), p.129.

38. Cf. Daniel Friedrich Sturm, 'Schröders deutscher Weg', *Die Welt*, 6 Aug. 2002, and the critical comment 'Der deutsche Holzweg', *die tageszeitung*, 9 Aug. 2002.

39. Cf. Alfons Kaiser, 'Der amerikanische Weg', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23 April 2003. On German anti-Americanism in general cf. Dan Diner, *Feindbild Amerika. Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments* (Berlin, 2002).

40. An exception is Gustav Seibt, 'Ende einer Freundschaft', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15/16 Feb. 2003.