Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/11875
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers
Title: Unionism and Peer-Referencing
Author(s): Panos, Georgios
Theodossiou, Ioannis
Editor(s): McCausland, WD
Contact Email: georgios.panos@stir.ac.uk
Citation: Panos G & Theodossiou I (2010) Unionism and Peer-Referencing McCausland W (Editor) University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series, 2010-03. http://repo.sire.ac.uk/handle/10943/361
Keywords: Unions
Peers
Inequity Aversion
Conformism
Discretionary Effort
JEL Code(s): C25: Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
J22: Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J28: Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
J51: Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Issue Date: 28-Feb-2010
Date Deposited: 10-Apr-2013
Publisher: University of Aberdeen
Series/Report no.: University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series, 2010-03
Abstract: This study assesses the "fair-wage-effort" hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.
Type: Working Paper
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/11875
URL: http://repo.sire.ac.uk/handle/10943/361
Rights: The publisher has granted permission for use of this work in this Repository.
Affiliation: Economics
University of Aberdeen

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Panos2009_Unionism and Peer Referencing.pdfFulltext - Published Version1.53 MBAdobe PDFView/Open



This item is protected by original copyright



Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact library@stir.ac.uk providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.