Judgments, Facts, and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey

Abstract

First paragraph: Our aim in this chapter is to outline a story that ought to be familiar and unsurprising, one that traces the fate of the correspondence theory of truth from its adoption by Russell in ‘On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood’ (1910) to its repudiation by Ramsey in ‘Facts and Propositions’ (1927). Central episodes in this story are indeed very familiar. But commonly held views of them, when placed one after the other, make for a story that is more surprising and less coherent than it should be: slightly misplaced emphasis at the beginning, regarding Russell’s reasons for adopting his new theories of judgement and truth, sets things off in a direction that leads to simple error in the middle, regarding Wittgenstein’s views in the Tractatus; this error then calls for a sudden and inexplicable plot-twist in the transition to the final chapter, regarding Ramsey’s position, which in consequence is bungled.