Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Appears in Collections:Accounting and Finance Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Do board monitoring and audit committee quality help risky firms reduce CSR controversies?
Author(s): Kuzey, Cemil
Al-Shaer, Habiba
Uyar, Ali
Karaman, Abdullah
Contact Email:
Keywords: Board monitoring
Audit committee quality
Firm risk
CSR controversies
Issue Date: 13-Apr-2024
Date Deposited: 11-Apr-2024
Citation: Kuzey C, Al-Shaer H, Uyar A & Karaman A (2024) Do board monitoring and audit committee quality help risky firms reduce CSR controversies?. <i>Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting</i>.
Abstract: This study focuses on potential inhibiting and driving factors of corporate social responsibility (CSR) controversies including board monitoring intensity and audit committee quality with a particular focus on risky firms. We draw on agency, resource dependence, and slack financial resources theories to explain this association. Using an international sample between 2002-2019 and executing fixed-effects regression and Hayes’s moderation analysis methodology, we find that risky firms tend to commit more CSR controversies. Furthermore, CSR performance, firm complexity, and indebtedness exacerbate CSR controversies, whereas larger boards mitigate them. Moreover, while board monitoring intensity and audit committee quality do not prevent committing CSR controversies in absolute terms, they alleviate risky firms' CSR controversies tendency. The findings confirm agency theory and the monitoring function of the board in mitigating CSR controversies. In line with the resource dependence theory, audit committees’ independent members and members with different skills and expertise provide critical resources that help prevent CSR controversies.
DOI Link: 10.1007/s11156-024-01280-6
Rights: This item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. The final authenticated version is available online at:
Notes: Output Status: Forthcoming/Available Online

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
REQU-D-22-00215.ACCEPTED.pdfFulltext - Accepted Version786.31 kBAdobe PDFUnder Embargo until 2025-04-14    Request a copy

Note: If any of the files in this item are currently embargoed, you can request a copy directly from the author by clicking the padlock icon above. However, this facility is dependent on the depositor still being contactable at their original email address.

This item is protected by original copyright

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved

If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.