Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/1893/572
Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers |
Peer Review Status: | Unrefereed |
Title: | Going NUTS: The Effect of EU Structural Funds on Regional Performance |
Author(s): | Becker, Sascha Egger, Peter H von Ehrlich, Maximilian Fenge, Robert |
Contact Email: | sascha.becker@stir.ac.uk |
Citation: | Becker S, Egger PH, von Ehrlich M & Fenge R (2008) Going NUTS: The Effect of EU Structural Funds on Regional Performance. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2008-27. |
Keywords: | Structural funds Regional growth Regression discontinuity design Quasi-randomized experiment |
JEL Code(s): | C21: Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions O40: Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General H54: National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock R11: Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes |
Issue Date: | 1-Nov-2008 |
Date Deposited: | 25-Nov-2008 |
Series/Report no.: | Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2008-27 |
Abstract: | The European Union (EU) provides grants to disadvantaged regions of member states to allow them to catch up with the EU average. Under the Objective 1 scheme, NUTS2 regions with a GDP per capita level below 75% of the EU average qualify for structural funds transfers from the central EU budget. This rule gives rise to a regression-discontinuity design that exploits the discrete jump in the probability of EU transfer receipt at the 75% threshold. Additional variability arises for smaller regional aggregates - so-called NUTS3 regions - which are nested in a NUTS2 mother region. Whereas some relatively rich NUTS3 regions may receive EU funds because their NUTS2 mother region qualifies, other relatively poor NUTS3 regions may not receive EU funds because their NUTS2 mother region does not qualify. We find positive growth effects of Objective 1 funds, but no employment effects. A simple cost-benefit calculation suggests that Objective 1 transfers are not only effective, but also cost-efficient. |
Type: | Working Paper |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1893/572 |
Affiliation: | Economics Ifo Institute, Germany Ludwig Maximilian University, Germany Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Germany |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
SEDP-2008-27-Becker-Egger-vonEhrlich-Fenge.pdf | Fulltext - Accepted Version | 495.74 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is protected by original copyright |
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact library@stir.ac.uk providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.