1. STORRE
  2. Faculty of Arts and Humanities
  3. Law and Philosophy
  4. Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1162
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWay, Jonathanen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-02T00:15:48Z-
dc.date.available2014-11-02T00:15:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010-01en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/1162-
dc.description.abstractThe Wide-Scope approach to instrumental reason holds that the requirement to intend the necessary means to your ends should be understood as a requirement to either intend the means, or else not intend the end. In this paper I explain and defend a neglected version of this approach. I argue that three serious objections to Wide-Scope accounts turn on a certain assumption about the nature of the reasons that ground the Wide-Scope requirement. The version of the Wide-Scope approach defended here allows us to reject this assumption, and so defuse the objections.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherSpringeren_UK
dc.relationWay J (2010) Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Studies, 147 (2), pp. 213-233. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9277-2en_UK
dc.rightsPublished in Philosophical Studies by Springer. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comen_UK
dc.subjectInstrumental reasonen_UK
dc.subjectWide-scopeen_UK
dc.subjectObject-given and state-given reasonsen_UK
dc.subjectBroomeen_UK
dc.subjectSetiyaen_UK
dc.subjectKolodnyen_UK
dc.subjectReasonsen_UK
dc.subjectRationalityen_UK
dc.subjectReasonen_UK
dc.subjectObjectivityen_UK
dc.subjectPractical reasonen_UK
dc.titleDefending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reasonen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-008-9277-2en_UK
dc.citation.jtitlePhilosophical Studiesen_UK
dc.citation.issn2153-8379en_UK
dc.citation.issn0554-0739en_UK
dc.citation.volume147en_UK
dc.citation.issue2en_UK
dc.citation.spage213en_UK
dc.citation.epage233en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.author.emailj.m.way@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000272850100003en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-76149110808en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid822266en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2010-01-31en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2009-05-11en_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionAMen_UK
local.rioxx.authorWay, Jonathan|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2010-01-31en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved||2010-01-31en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved|2010-01-31|en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameDefending.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source0554-0739en_UK
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Defending.pdfFulltext - Accepted Version107.03 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


This item is protected by original copyright

View License
Show simple item record


Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact library@stir.ac.uk providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.