Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/1893/35837
Appears in Collections: | Psychology Journal Articles |
Peer Review Status: | Refereed |
Title: | Chimpanzees engage in competitive altruism in a triadic ultimatum game |
Author(s): | Sánchez-Amaro, Alejandro Maurits, Luke Haun, Daniel B M |
Contact Email: | alejandro.sanchezamaro@stir.ac.uk |
Keywords: | Chimpanzees Competitive altruism Ultimatum game Strategic decision-making Triads |
Issue Date: | 9-Feb-2024 |
Date Deposited: | 29-Feb-2024 |
Citation: | Sánchez-Amaro A, Maurits L & Haun DBM (2024) Chimpanzees engage in competitive altruism in a triadic ultimatum game. <i>Scientific Reports</i>, 14, Art. No.: 3393. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-53973-6 |
Abstract: | Partner choice promotes competition among individuals to be selected as a cooperative partner, a phenomenon referred to as competitive altruism. We explored whether chimpanzees engage in competitive altruism in a triadic Ultimatum Game where two proposers can send offers simultaneously or consecutively to a responder who can only accept one of the two competing offers. In a dyadic control condition only one proposer at a time could send an offer to the responder. Chimpanzees increased their offers across trials in the competitive triadic, but not in the dyadic control condition. Chimpanzees also increased their offers after being rejected in previous triadic trials. Furthermore, we found that chimpanzees, under specific conditions, outcompete first proposers in triadic consecutive trials before the responder could choose which offer to accept by offering more than what is expected if they acted randomly or simply offered the smallest possible amount. These results suggest that competitive altruism in chimpanzees did not emerge just as a by-product of them trying to increase over previous losses. Chimpanzees might consider how others’ interactions affect their outcomes and engage in strategies to maximize their chances of being selected as cooperative partners. |
DOI Link: | 10.1038/s41598-024-53973-6 |
Rights: | This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. |
Licence URL(s): | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
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s41598-024-53973-6.pdf | Fulltext - Published Version | 3.68 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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